Anderson v. Fuson
Anderson v. Fuson
2022 WL 20209918 (E.D. Ky. 2022)
September 1, 2022
Stinnett, Matthew A., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The court denied the plaintiff's motions for discovery-related relief, including a motion to review surveillance video footage, issue a subpoena, conduct additional interrogatories, object to defendants' responses to two requests for admission, and compel responses to two requests for discovery. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to supplement the record, but noted that the plaintiff had not provided any evidence that additional video footage existed.
Additional Decisions
Darnell ANDERSON, Plaintiff,
v.
A. FUSON, et al., Defendants
v.
A. FUSON, et al., Defendants
NO. 6:20-cv-00118-DCR-MAS
United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division. London
Signed September 01, 2022
Counsel
Darnell Anderson, Tucson, AZ, Pro Se.Cheryl D. Morgan, AUSA, U.S. Attorney's Office, Lexington, KY, for Defendants A. Fuson, L. Chaney, D. Gabbard.
Stinnett, Matthew A., United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER
*1 Pending before the Court are several discovery-related motions filed by pro se Plaintiff Darnell Anderson (“Anderson”). Chief Judge Reeves referred this case to the undersigned for pretrial matters. [DE 52]. The Court addresses each motion in turn. In doing so, the Court remains mindful of the liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985).
1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO REVIEW VIDEO FOOTAGE [DE 126]
Anderson seeks to review surveillance video footage Defendants attached as Attachments B and C to their February 1, 2021, motion to dismiss. [Id. at 126; see DE 30 (Motion for Leave to Seal); DE 32 (Motion to Dismiss)]. Anderson asserts that viewing the video footage is “critical so that he can ... prepare declarations asserting his version of events; and ... file a Motion to Impose Sanctions based on Defendants’ failure to preserve video footage that corroborates his version of events.” [DE 126, Page ID# 1441].
However, as Defendants note in their response to Anderson's motion, Anderson has stated in previous filings that he has already viewed the video footage in question. [See DE 64, Page ID# 1026; (stating “upon Plaintiff's inspection of the video footage included in Attachment B ...”); DE 64-1, Page ID# 1031-32 (stating that, on February 24, 2021, Anderson's case manager informed him “that arrangements were being made so that I could view the video footage included in Attachments B and C” and that Anderson was later “called out of [his] cell ... [to] review the video surveillance that had arrived”); DE 68, Page ID# 1051 (noting that Anderson has reviewed the video footage in question but asserting that 20 minutes of video capturing the incident were omitted).
Moreover, the record contains numerous statements from Anderson asserting his version of events at issue and discussing the surveillance video footage contained in Attachments B and C to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The record makes clear that Anderson has both viewed the footage contained in Attachments B and C and had ample opportunity to properly prepare for his case based on the information gleaned from that video footage. Accordingly, Anderson's Motion for Leave to Review Video Footage [DE 126] is denied.
2. MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA [DE 127]
Anderson moved this Court for an order issuing a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 45(e)(1)(D). [DE 127]. Although unclear, Anderson appears to request the production of documents related to a staff misconduct complaint against Defendants, which Anderson asserts he filed with the Solicitor General's Office. [DE 127, Page ID# 1447-48].
However, Anderson does not specifically state to whom the subpoena should be sent or the specific documents that should be produced. Anderson has also not attached a proposed subpoena to his filing. Consequently, the Court does not have sufficient information to grant the relief Anderson requests. Accordingly, his Motion for Issuance of Subpoena [DE 127] is denied.
3. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT ADDITIONAL INTERROGATORIES [DE 128]
*2 Anderson moves this Court for an order to conduct additional interrogatories pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1). [DE 128]. Specifically, Anderson seeks to serve a seventh set of interrogatories. [See DE 128-1 (Plaintiff's Seventh Set of Interrogatories/Request for Documents)]. Anderson asserts that the information he requests is critical to his theory of the case—that Defendants fabricated an alleged assault to place ambulatory restraints on him—because the interrogatories pertain to the Bureau of Prison's (“BOP”) policies concerning use of force, application of restraints, and other safety-related procedures. [DE 128, Page ID# 1462].
FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1) provides that “unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.” In determining whether additional interrogatories are warranted, the Court must determine “whether the requesting party has adequately shown that the benefits of additional interrogatories outweigh the burden to the opposing parties.” Shaw Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 12-257-JJB-RLB, 2014 WL 1816494, at *8 (M.D. La. May 7, 2014). Although Anderson represents himself, that fact “does not entitle him to ignore the procedural rules for conducting discovery.” Thatcher v. Warden, No. 1:12-cv-470, 2012 WL 5496503, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2012).
Here, Anderson has received significant discovery throughout this case, and he has not shown that his need for additional discovery outweighs the burden placed upon Defendants. Defendants note that Anderson has served at least 31 requests for production of documents and 56 requests for admission, to all of which the Defendants have responded. [See DE 137, Page ID# 1545]. Moreover, Defendants assert that Anderson has already received information related to the BOP's “use of force, application of restraints, and health-safety procedures” in response to several prior discovery requests. [See id. at 1545-46]. Accordingly, Anderson's Motion for Leave to conduct Additional Interrogatories [DE 128] is denied.
4. MOTION TO OBJECT [DE 138]
Anderson asks the Court to require Defendants to clarify their responses to two Requests for Admission that he served upon them, or in the alternative, to have those requests admitted. [DE 138]. At the outset, the Court notes that, although Anderson served both requests for admission upon Defendants before filing the instant motion, it does not appear that Anderson communicated to Defendants his dissatisfaction with their responses to resolve this issue without court involvement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1) (requiring, as a predicate to filing a motion to compel, the movant certify that he “has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action”); LR 37.1. Because it does not appear that Anderson communicated with Defendants concerning this dispute prior to filing the instant motion, it does not appear that Anderson complied with Rule 37 or LR 37.1. Denial of the instant motion is appropriate on that basis alone.[1] Nonetheless, the Court independently evaluates and denies the instant motion on its merits.
First, Anderson sought an admission that “Upon arrival at the United States Penitentiary McCreary in April 2019, Plaintiff refused to enter the General Population, for safety reasons.” [DE 138-2, Page ID# 1554]. In response, Defendants stated:
*3 After reasonable inquiry and reasonable effort to secure information that is readily obtainable within Defendants’ relative control, Defendants are without sufficient knowledge to enable them to admit or deny the statement contained within Request for Admission No. 1.
[Id.]. Anderson takes issue with the response because, in his view, Defendants have access to information—namely, Anderson's several administrative requests seeking to be relocated based the presence of members of a specific gang in general population—that would allow them to admit or deny the information contained in his request. [DE 1548, at 11547-48].
Defendants assert that they have fully responded to the Request for Admission as required by the Federal Rules, [DE 146, Page ID# 1613-14], and the Court agrees. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(4) provides that “[t]he answering party may assert lack of knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or deny only if the party states that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.” In this instance, as pointed out by Defendants in their response to Anderson's motion, [see DE 146, Page ID# 1613-14], Anderson's reason for refusing to enter general population and seeking protective custody is knowledge held by Anderson himself, so the information contained in any of Anderson's administrative requests would not enable Defendants to admit or deny. Accordingly, the Court denies Anderson's Motion to Object [DE 138] on this basis.
Second, Anderson sought an admission that “During Federal Inmate Atkins housing in SHU at the USP McCreary, in the year of 2019, said Inmate had been involved in several incidents, with his cellmates.” [DE 138-2, Page ID# 1554]. Defendants responded:
Said Request for Admission seeks inforn1ation from an individual who is not a party to this litigation. The provision of information as to this person is protected from disclosure under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a. Furthermore, this Court has previously determined that the degree of relevance of information as to Atkins to be “slight, and the relation of the information to the actual claims at issue is attenuated.” [R. 80: Order.] This Court further held that a production of records of Atkins's disciplinary history would “contravene Atkins's important interest in the privacy of his own confidential information.” Id. By logical extension, response to Request for Admission No. 5 would assuredly implicate these same privacy interests.
[Id. at 1554-55].
As alluded to in Defendants’ response, the Court previously denied Anderson's motion to compel Defendants to produce the disciplinary record for inmate Atkins (first name unknown) during his time in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) at USP McCreary. [See DE 80, Page ID# 1103-06]. The Court noted that, “[g]iven the minimal relevance of Atkins's file to the asserted constitutional claims, the serious privacy and security concerns associated with its disclosure decidedly outweigh any potential benefit it may offer to Anderson's case.” [Id. at 1106]. The same rationale applies to Anderson's Request for Admission. Accordingly, the Court also denies Anderson's Motion to Object [DE 138] on this basis.
5. MOTION TO DETERMINE SUFFICIENCY OF ANSWER [DE 140]
*4 Once again, Anderson requests the Court determine the sufficiency of Defendants’ objections to two Requests for Admission. [DE 140]. First, Anderson sought an admission that “the institutional camera positioned inside of call 145 is used to monitor inmates being held in ambulatory restraints.” [DE 140-2, Page ID# 1573]. Defendants objected to the request, stating:
Disclosure of specific location of institutional cameras and other monitoring equipment would potentially create safety and security risks to Bureau of Prisons personnel and inmates alike. The United States Penitentiary located in Pine Knot, Kentucky (“USP McCreary”) utilizes security camera video footage to protect the health and safety of USP McCreary employees and federal inmates. Video cameras are strategically placed throughout the institution to serve as a deterrent to criminal behavior and misconduct.
[Id.]
Second, Anderson sought an admission that “the institutional camera positioned inside of cell 145 should have been operable to monitor Plaintiff as he was being held in ambulatory restraints, between the hours of 12:30pm – 8:00pm.” [Id.]. Defendants again objected to the request, similarly stating:
Disclosure of specific location of institutional cameras and other monitoring equipment would potentially create safety and security risks to Bureau of Prisons personnel and inmates alike. The United States Penitentiary located in Pine Knot, Kentucky (“USP McCreary”) utilizes security camera video footage to protect the health and safety of USP McCreary employees and federal inmates. Video cameras are strategically placed throughout the institution to serve as a deterrent to criminal behavior and misconduct. Furthermore, the operational status of any particular camera is outside the scope and knowledge of the Defendants herein, and they are without knowledge to enable them to admit or deny same.
Defendants assert that their objections to both Requests for Admission are justified under Rule 36, reiterating that denial or admission of the information sought would impact security concerns within USP McCreary. [DE 149]. The Court agrees.
Pursuant to Rule 36(a)(5), a party may object to a request for admission, provided that specific reasons for the objection are stated. However, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). In evaluating proportionality, the Court must “consider[ ] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id.
Per the Complaint, Anderson generally argues that prison officials’ placement of Anderson in ambulatory restraints in cell 145 at USP McCreary was excessive force. [DE 1, Page ID# 13]. As such, whether a video camera was placed in cell 145 and whether it was operational during the incident in question is certainly important information in resolving the instant claim. Moreover, Anderson would not likely have access to that information. However, the Court agrees with Defendants that the burden of admitting or denying this information outweighs any likely benefit to Anderson. As Defendants note in their objection, disclosing the specific placement of video cameras in a federal facility would almost certainly present safety and security risks to both BOP personnel and federal inmates. Moreover, it appears that Defendants have already produced relevant video footage from inside USP McCreary for the date of the incident. [DE 31, 35]. Given that Defendants’ burden in admitting or denying the information sought outweighs Anderson's need to obtain the information, the Court determines Defendants’ objections to Anderson's Requests for Admissions were sufficient. Anderson's Motion to Determine Sufficiency of Answer [DE 140] is denied.
6. MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE [DE 144]
*5 Anderson requests the Court compel responses to two requests for discovery. [DE 144]. Specifically, Anderson claims he requested the Defendants produce copies of (1) an “Institutional Duty Officer Report” of J. Bolivar, dated August 11, 2019, and/or August 12, 2019, [DE 144, Page ID# 1599; DE 129-4, Page ID# 1493-94], and (2) an “After-Action Report” prepared after Anderson was released from ambulatory restraints on August 11, 2019. [DE 144, Page ID# 1600; DE 129-5, Page ID# 1520-21]. Anderson asserts that, although Defendants stated in their responses to these requests that the documents would be provided to Anderson, he had not received them as of July 28, 2022. [DE 144, Page ID# 1600].
The Court again notes that the record contains no indication that Anderson first conferred or attempted to confer with Defendants regarding the failure to produce the Institutional Duty Officer Report or the After-Action Report in an effort to obtain the reports without court involvement. As the Court previously warned Anderson, his failure certify that he first attempted to confer with Defendants about this dispute justifies dismissal of his motion. [See DE 80, Page ID# 1103; Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) (requiring, as a predicate to filing a motion to compel, the movant certify that he “has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action”); LR 37.1. As such, the Court will not consider Anderson's Motion to Compel [DE 144] at this juncture, so the motion is denied.
7. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS [DE 145]
Anderson moves for sanctions under FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2) for Defendants’ failure to admit the information in a request for admission. [DE 145]. Anderson seeks “re-imbursement of the funds that were expended (and incurred) in proving the facts that the Defendants denied” and “sanctions ... including the admission [ ]being deemed admitted.” [Id. at Page ID# 1606]. Specifically, Anderson states that he requested from Defendants an admission that “Defendant L. Chaney was responsible for reviewing and preserving the video and audio surveillance that was included in Defendant's disclosure of Attachment B; Video Footage [illegible] Vision Closed Circuit[,]” and Defendants denied that request. [DE 145, Page ID# 1605].[2]
Anderson asserts the matter requested was true and that he is entitled to fees and sanctions because (1) the Discipline Hearing Officer (“DHO”) who presiding over an administrative hearing in which Anderson was charged with assault in his federal detention facility relied on Defendant Chaney's review of the video footage referenced in Anderson's request for admission, and (2) Defendants have admitted that the DHO noted in his report of Anderson's administrative hearing that Defendant Chaney conducted a review of the video in question. [Id. at Page ID# 1605-06; see DE 32-2, Page ID# 828]. Anderson points to the DHO Report, filed as an attachment to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, [DE 32-3, Page ID# 827], to prove his assertion. The DHO Report states that, “[I]nvestigating Lieutenant [L. Chaney] also provided the following statement on Section 25 of the incident report, “Recorded video review: Inmate Anderson did pull his arms into the cell from the tray slot as staff attempted to remove the restraint causing injury to staff.” [Id.]
Rule 36 “governs requests for admission,” and Rule 37(c) “allows for an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees in cases in which a party does not comply with Rule 36.” Kasuri v. Saint Elizabeth Hosp. Med. Ctr., 897 F.2d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 1990). Rule 37(c)(2) provides:
*6 If a party fails to admit what is requested under Rule 36 and if the requesting party later proves a document to be genuine or the matter true, the requesting party may move that the party who failed to admit pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in making that proof. The court must so order unless:
(A) the request was held objectionable under Rule 36(a);
(B) the admission sought was of no substantial importance;
(C) the party failing to admit has a reasonable ground to believe that it might prevail on the matter; or
(D) there was other good cause for the failure to admit.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2).
So, under Rule 37(c), a court must award “attorney's fees if: (1) a responding party fails to admit a request; (2) the requesting party later proves the matter; and (3) none of the four, listed exceptions apply.” Hillside Productions, Inc. v. Cnty. of Macomb, No. 06-11566, 2009 WL 3059147, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2009). Upon review, the Court finds that Anderson has not refuted Defendants’ denial of his request for admission. The fact that Defendant Chaney reviewed the video footage in question does not refute the Defendants’ denial that Defendant Chaney was responsible for reviewing or preserving the video footage in question.[3] As such, Anderson's Motion for Sanctions [DE 145] is DENIED.
8. MOTION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS [DE 147] AND MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD [DE 151]
Anderson moves for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(1) and (2) based on his asserted belief that additional video footage from cell 145 of USP McCreary on August 11, 2019, exists. [DE 147]. Specifically, Anderson asserts he is entitled to sanctions because a 20-minute portion of video from cell 145 was either not produced in discovery or destroyed by Defendants. [Id. at Page ID# 1617-24].
First, Anderson also moves to supplement the record with an unsworn declaration explaining his belief that additional video footage exists and that Defendant Chaney had a duty to preserve the video footage. [DE 151 (motion; DE 151-1 Declaration)]. Although the Declaration is unnotarized, the Court treats the Declaration as if its contents were set forth in a sworn and notarized statement because of Anderson's pro se status. The Court thus grants Anderson's Motion to Supplement [DE 151] and deems the Declaration filed at DE 151-1 a part of the official record in this matter. The Court fully considers the Declaration in assessing the DE 147 Motion for Sanctions.
Turning to the Motion for Sanctions, the Court has already denied Anderson's previous motion to compel [DE 68] the allegedly missing 20-minute portion of video that Anderson now bases his motion for sanctions upon because “there is no concrete evidence or indication that additional footage in fact exists and/or captures such events.” [DE 8-, Page ID# 1106-07]. In denying the motion to compel, this Court noted that Anderson “advances no specific facts undermining Defendants’ assertion that they have produced all that is available to them, and the record offers no basis for concluding that the produced footage is incomplete.” [Id. at 1107]. Anderson has not produced anything since the Court's Order denying the motion to compel that would lead the Court to believe that additional footage exists or captured the incident in question. Accordingly, Anderson's Motion for Sanctions [DE 147] is also denied.
9. MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO COMPLETE FACT DISCOVERY [DE 142]
*7 Finally, Anderson moves for an additional 45 days to complete fact discovery in this matter. [DE 142]. Anderson essentially asserts two bases for his request: (1) he “anticipates further litigation over an After-Action report, which he asserts he requests in his sixth Set of Requests for Production of Documents but has not received; (2) he “anticipates further litigation” regarding Defendants’ allegedly frivolous objections to his Fourth Set of Requests for Admission; and (3) he asserts that he has not been able to review certain video footage which Defendants attached as Attachments B and C to their February 1, 2021, motion to dismiss. [DE 142, page ID# 1583-85]. Anderson filed the instant motion on July 20, 2022,[4] twelve days before the Court's discovery deadline expired on August 1, 2022. [See DE 142, Page ID# 1585; DE 113, Page ID# 1307 (Revised Scheduling Order)].
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4) provides that a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent.” In determining whether to grant additional time for discovery, the Court must consider the following factors: “(1) when the moving part learned of the issue that is the subject of discovery; (2) how the discovery would affect the ruling below; (3) the length of the discovery period; (4) where the moving party was dilatory; and (5) whether the adverse part was responsive to discovery requests.” Dowling v. Cleveland Clinic Found, 593 F.3d 472, 478 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Court will deny Anderson request, as he has not demonstrated good cause to extend the time to conduct discovery. Importantly, the discovery disputes to which Anderson cites as grounds for an extension have been resolved. Defendants unequivocally assert that they have provided Anderson with a copy of the After-Action Report via a Supplemental Response to Request for Production of Documents on July 28, 2022. [DE 152, Page ID# 1683]. And, as stated above, the Court will deny Anderson's Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of Objection [DE 140], which appears to be the basis for Anderson's asserted belief that more litigation is necessary in relation to Defendants’ responses to his Fourth Set of Requests for Admission. [See DE 142, Page ID# 1584-85 (indicating in footnote three that the discovery dispute is the subject of Anderson's Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of Objection)]. Finally, as stated above, the Court will deny Anderson's motion to again view the video footage contained in Attachments B and C because it appears that he has viewed the footage and relied on his review of the footage at several points in this litigation.
Moreover, it appears Anderson has had ample opportunity to conduct discovery and has not been diligent in doing so. As Defendants point out in their response [DE 152] to the instant motion, Anderson has served Defendants with at least 31 requests for production of documents and at least 56 requests for admissions since May of 2021. And, as Defendants note, Anderson did not request any information concerning video footage of cell 145—the subject of the Anderson's Motion to Determine Sufficiency of Answer [DE 140] (now denied)—until June 2022, more than a year after Anderson filed his Complaint referencing the camera inside cell 145. [DE 152, at 1694-85; DE 15, Page ID# 15 (Complaint)]. Finally, it appears an extension of the discovery period will prejudice Defendants, as Anderson makes this request a little over one month before the dispositive motion deadline of September 1, 2022. [DE 113, Page ID# 1307 (Revised Scheduling Order)].
*8 Accordingly, Anderson's Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Fact Discovery [DE 142] is denied.
For the reasons discussed, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Review Video Footage [DE 126] is DENIED;
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Issuance of Subpoena [DE 127] is DENIED;
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Conduct Additional Interrogatories [DE 128] is DENIED;
4. Plaintiff's Motion to Object [DE 138] is DENIED;
5. Plaintiff's Motion to Determine Sufficiency of Answer [DE 140] is DENIED;
6. Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Fact Discovery [DE 142] is DENIED;
7. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Disclosure [DE 144] is DENIED;
8. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions [DE 145] is DENIED;
9. Plaintiff's Motion to Impose Sanctions [DE 147] is DENIED; and
10. Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement the Record [DE 151] is GRANTED, and the Declaration filed at DE 151-1 is deemed a part of the official record in this matter.
The undersigned enters this Order on non-dispositive pretrial matters pursuant to Rule 72(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). A party may serve and file objections to this Order, to be considered by the District Judge, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.
Footnotes
The Court has previously noted its ability to deny Anderson's motions on this basis. [See DE 80, Page ID# 1103].
Anderson appears not to have attached to his motion this request for admission or the Defendant's response.
Although Anderson attached to his motion a receipt reflecting that an account in his name was charged $5.85 for a “copy card” and $11.60 for a book of stamps, [DE 145-1, Page ID# 1612], he does not state that he incurred these costs in allegedly proving his request for admission. The Court notes that the DHO Report from which Anderson gleaned the information he now relies upon to refute Defendants’ denial was produced by Defendants as an attachment to their Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, [DE 32-3, Page ID# 827]. As such, even if Anderson successfully refuted Defendant's denial, he would not be entitled to fees. See Hillside Productions, 2009 WL 3059147, at *3 (denying motion for Rule 37(c)(2) sanctions where party incurred no expenses in proving the matter in question true).
Anderson's motion is deemed filed on the date it was signed. See Brand v. Moley, 526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that, under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner's pleading is deemed filed when it is handed over to prison officials for mailing to the court, which the court assumes occurs on the date the prisoner signed the pleading, absent contrary evidence).