*1 Currently pending is Plaintiff Dunyasha Yetts’ “Motion to Quash Subpoenas, Motion for Protective Order, Request for Telephonic Conference, and Request for Expedited Consideration.” (Doc. No. 78.) For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED.

On November 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Quash Subpoenas, Motion for Protective Order, Request for Telephonic Conference, and Request for Expedited Consideration” (Doc. No. 78), in which he asked the Court to quash several subpoenas issued by Defendant U.S. Wells Service on November 5, 2019. (Doc. No. 78.) These subpoenas were issued to Plaintiff's former employers Dynamic Structures and Lightning Energy, as well as to his current employer Ironclad Energy, and sought the production of the following:

(Doc. Nos. 78-1, 78-2, and 78-3). Plaintiff argued the subpoenas should be quashed on the grounds that they were overbroad, sought irrelevant information, and amounted to harassment. Plaintiff also argued Defendant failed to provide prior notification of the subpoena as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4).

Defendant filed a Brief in Opposition on November 11, 2019, in which it argued that the subpoenaed information was relevant to Plaintiff's economic claims and the issue of mitigation of damages. (Doc. No. 83.)

The Court conducted a telephonic conference with counsel on November 13, 2019. In an Order issued that date, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion to Quash with respect to the Subpoenas issued to Dynamic Structures and Ironclad Energy. (Doc. No. 85.) With regard to the subpoena issued to Lightning Energy, the Court took the matter under advisement pending additional information and briefing. (Id.) While the matter remained pending, the Court ordered that Lightning Energy was not required to comply or otherwise respond to Defendant's subpoena. (Id.) The Court also ordered the parties to meet and confer to determine whether they were able to agree to a narrower subpoena that is limited to the production of documents that may be relevant to the issue of economic loss. (Id.) Lastly, the Court extended the expert deposition deadline to February 1, 2020.

On November 14, 2019, Defendant submitted supplemental briefing, in which it acknowledged that it did not notify Plaintiff's counsel of the Lightning Energy subpoena until several hours after it had already been served. (Doc. No. 86.) Defendant argued, however, that Plaintiff suffered no harm from the delayed notification, whereas Defendant would be severely prejudiced if the subpoena was quashed. (Id.) Defendant requested that, if the Court were to quash the November 5, 2019 subpoena, it should be permitted to re-serve the same subpoena on Lightning Energy. (Id.) It also seeks to subpoena another of Plaintiff's former employers, Pro-Oil.

*2 Plaintiff filed a response on November 21, 2019, in which he again argued that the subpoenas should be quashed as overbroad. (Doc. No. 87.)

I. Analysis

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, where a subpoena commands the production of documents, a notice and copy of the subpoena must be served on each party “before it is served on the person to whom it is directed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4). The purpose of this requirement is to “enable[e] the other parties to object or to serve a subpoena for additional materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, Advisory Committee Notes to the 2013 amendments. See also Rotonda v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2015 WL 4652696 at * 1 (S.D. Ohio June 24, 2015). Here, Defendant concedes that it did not notify Plaintiff's counsel of the November 5, 2019 subpoenas until several hours after they had already been served on Plaintiff's current and former employers. (Doc. No. 86.) Defendant argues, however, that the Court should overlook this “technical violation” because Plaintiff suffered no harm.

Even assuming arguendo that Defendant's failure to timely notify Plaintiff regarding the subpoenas at issue constituted harmless error, the Court finds the subpoenas should be quashed as overbroad. The scope of a subpoena issued under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 is “subject to the general relevancy standard applicable to discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).” Laetham Equip. Co. v. Deere and Co., 2007 WL 2873981 at * 4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2007). See also Hendricks v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc., 275 F.R.D. 251, 253 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (noting that “[although] Rule 45 does not list irrelevance or overbreadth as reasons for quashing a subpoena, [c]ourts ....have held that the scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery under Rule 26.”); Kacmarik v. Mitchell, 2017 WL 131582 at * 4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2017); Baker v. Royce, 2015 WL 13584586 at * 2 (E.D. Mich. June 26, 2015); Black v. Kyle-Reno, 2014 WL 667788 at * 2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2014).

Here, Defendant maintains that the subpoenaed information is relevant to Plaintiff's economic claims and to the issue of mitigation of damages. (Doc. No. 86 at p. 8.) The subpoena issued to Lightning Energy on November 5, 2019, however, is not limited to documents relating to Plaintiff's compensation or benefits. Rather, the subpoena seeks the production of Plaintiff's entire personnel file, including his performance evaluations, disciplinary records, and attendance records. As stated during the November 13, 2019 telephonic conference, the Court finds that such documents are simply not relevant to Plaintiff's economic claims and/or the issue of mitigation of damages. Thus, the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion to Quash the November 5, 2019 subpoena issued to Lightning Energy.

Defendant requests that it be permitted to re-issue a subpoena on Lightning Energy and issue a new subpoena on Plaintiff's prior employer Pro-Oil. However, the subpoenas that Defendant now wishes to serve are identical to the overly broad subpoena that was served on Lightning Energy on November 5, 2019. Specifically, Defendant's proposed new subpoenas also seek the production of Plaintiff's entire personnel file, including his performance evaluations, disciplinary records, and attendance records. Thus, the Court will not grant Defendant's request to serve the subpoenas attached to its supplemental briefing (Doc. Nos. 86-1, 86-4), either on Lightning Energy or on Pro-Oil.

*3 The Court does, however, agree that information regarding Plaintiff's compensation and benefits are relevant to the instant lawsuit. Therefore, the Court will allow Defendant to issue subpoenas to Lightning Energy and Pro-Oil that are narrower in scope, i.e., limited to information contained in Plaintiff's employment records that relate to his compensation and benefits, including but not limited to non-taxable income, benefits such as car and/or phone allowances, employer 401k contributions, and any bonuses that may have been received. Defendant is also reminded of its obligation to notify counsel for Plaintiff before the subpoenas at issue are served.

Accordingly, and for all the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion to Quash (Doc. No. 78) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.