*1 On May 9, 2023, defendant Deputy Saidleman (“Defendant”) filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order with respect to plaintiff Angel Felipe Aleman (“Plaintiff”)'s subpoena directed to the Riverside County Sheriff's Department (“Motion”). ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 93. On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff constructively filed[1] an opposition to the Motion, dkt. 101, and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, dkts. 102, 103. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED without prejudice.

On May 1, 2022, Plaintiff, who is currently an inmate at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, constructively filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Dkt. 17. In his sole remaining claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by unleashing a K-9 dog on Plaintiff after Plaintiff was apprehended following his escape from custody on July 18, 2020. Id.

On April 2, 2023, Plaintiff constructively filed a motion requesting issuance of a subpoena directed to the Riverside County Sheriff's Department commanding the production of documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things. Dkt. 86. Specifically, Plaintiff sought documents relating to: the July 18, 2020 incident underlying the SAC; Plaintiff's alleged resulting injuries; the Riverside County Sheriff's Department K-9 unit's rules, regulations, and policies pertaining to the “treatment of handcuff[e]d inmates”; Defendant's training on use of force and “how to handle his K-9 dog”; and allegations of excessive use of force against Defendant during his employment as “a K-9 officer.” See id. at 3-6.

On April 17, 2023, Defendant filed an opposition to issuance of the requested subpoena. Dkt. 88.

On April 18, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion requesting issuance of the subpoena and ordered the Clerk of Court to issue a signed subpoena directed to the Riverside County Sheriff's Department. Dkt. 89.

On May 9, 2023, Defendant filed the instant Motion, requesting an order quashing Plaintiff's subpoena in its entirety and a protective order (1) barring Plaintiff from “service of further subpoenas seeking [Defendant's] employment or personnel file records,” (2) barring the County of Riverside “from producing any of [Defendant's] or any other non-party deputy's personnel file records,” and (3) requiring Plaintiff “to establish his reasonable ability to comply with a protective order and maintain the privacy and confidentiality of, and prevent (un)intended disclosure to third parties of any privileged or confidential documents that may subsequently be produced to him[.]” Dkt. 93 at 2, 7.

*2 On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff constructively filed an Opposition to the Motion. Dkt. 101. On the same date, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, requesting an order appointing counsel so he can “maintain [the] confidentiality of privileged and protected information.” Dkts. 102, 103.

On June 6, 2023, Defendant filed a Reply. Dkt. 104.

The matter thus stands submitted.

Rule 26(b) provides that parties may obtain discovery regarding:

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Relevant information “need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. A court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed” if “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

A party seeking discovery from a nonparty may obtain a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 (“Rule 45”). Amini Innovation Corp. v. McFerran Home Furnishings, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 406, 409 (C.D. Cal. 2014). The scope of discovery allowed under a Rule 45 subpoena is the same as that allowed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., No. C 12-4936 LB, 2013 WL 6774072, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013).

A court “must quash or modify a subpoena that: (i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to undue burden.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A). “ ‘[A]n evaluation of undue burden requires the court to weigh the burden to the subpoenaed party against the value of the information to the serving party,” considering “such factors as relevance, the need of the party for the documents, the breadth of the document request, the time period covered by it, the particularity with which the documents are described and the burden imposed.” Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 637 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.R.D. 111, 113 (D. Conn. 2005)).

A. PLAINTIFF'S SUBPOENA DOES NOT SUBJECT THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE TO UNDUE BURDEN

Defendant argues Plaintiff's subpoena subjects the County of Riverside to undue burden because it requires production of personnel records that are not relevant to Plaintiff's claim.[2] However, to the extent Defendant seeks to quash the subpoena on this basis, Defendant does not have standing to move to quash a subpoena directed to a third party based on the interests of the third party. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 973-74 (C.D. Cal. 2017).

*3 Moreover, Defendant's argument that the requested documents are not relevant to Plaintiff's claim is without merit. As an initial matter, Defendant appears to have misconstrued the scope of the subpoena. Defendant contends the subpoena requires production of personnel records pertaining to “non-comparable” investigations against Defendant, “such as traffic collisions,” and “personnel file and training records and information concerning not only [Defendant] but also numerous non-party deputies[.]” Dkt. 93 at 8, 20. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, Plaintiff seeks only limited documents from Defendant's personnel records – specifically, documents relating to Defendant's training on “use of force,” his training on “how to handle his K-9 dog,” and “allegations of excessive use of force” against Defendant. See dkt. 90 at 5-6.

In addition, Defendant asserts “[t]here are no complaints or investigations against [Defendant] that involve allegations of excessive force of any type.” Dkt. 93 at 13. However, the nonexistence of documents responsive to one portion of the subpoena is not a basis for quashing the subpoena. Furthermore, while Defendant argues excessive force complaints against Defendant that do not involve deployment of a K-9 are not relevant to Plaintiff's claim, prior complaints or investigations against Defendant involving allegations of excessive force may be relevant to impeaching Defendant's credibility, even if Defendant did not use precisely the same type of force. See Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296-97 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (permitting discovery of “all complaints made against [defendant officers] alleging excessive force” over defendants' objection that discovery request did not “indicate which types of excessive force complaints are sought” (emphasis added)); see also Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating information such as “conduct, performance, and evaluation of officer-defendants in excessive force cases” may be relevant to issues such as officers' credibility and motive).[3]

Finally, documents relating to Defendant's training on use of force and how to handle his K-9 are clearly relevant to Plaintiff's claim that Defendant used excessive force against Plaintiff. Such records may be relevant to assessing the need for force under the circumstances or whether alternative measures were available to temper the severity of force used. See Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028-30 (9th Cir. 2013) (identifying “the need for application of force,” “the relationship between that need and the amount of force used,” and “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response” as relevant factors in determining whether use of force is excessive under the Eighth Amendment); Jacques v. Simpson, No. 2:21-CV-02143-KJM-EFB (PC), 2022 WL 16701970, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2022) (finding records of defendants' training on excessive force “clearly relevant” to whether defendants used unreasonable force in violation of the Eighth Amendment). Nonetheless, the Court agrees with Defendant's argument that training records from more than five years prior to the July 18, 2020 incident are likely to have little probative value and unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See dkt. 93 at 19; see also Darraj v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 11-CV-1657-AJB (BGS), 2012 WL 5966854, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2012) (limiting discovery of personnel evaluations to three years prior to the incident at issue). Thus, at this time and without prejudice, the Court will limit Plaintiff's discovery of documents relating to Defendant's use of force and dog handling training to five years prior to the July 18, 2020 incident.

*4 Accordingly, because the documents requested in Plaintiff's subpoena are relevant to Plaintiff's claim against Defendant, Defendant's claim that production poses an undue burden to the County of Riverside is meritless. See Moon, 232 F.R.D. at 637.

B. DEFENDANT'S PRIVACY RIGHTS DO NOT WARRANT QUASHING THE SUBPOENA

Defendant additionally argues Plaintiff's subpoena must be quashed because Defendant's personnel file is “privacy-privileged.”[4] Dkt. 93 at 13-18.

Parties may raise constitutionally based privacy rights in response to discovery requests. See Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 616. In the law enforcement context, “courts have recognized that [officers'] privacy rights [in their personnel files] are not inconsequential.” Id. However, privacy concerns are not absolute and “must be weighed against other competing interests.” Ramirez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 231 F.R.D. 407, 411 (2005). Furthermore, protective orders can minimize the impact of disclosure. Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 616; see also Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 671 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (permitting disclosure, pursuant to a protective order, of police department training manuals pertaining to use of force in making arrests).

Here, while the Court acknowledges the significance of Defendant's privacy interests, Plaintiff is entitled to the discovery of documents relevant to preparation of his case. The Court, therefore, finds issuance of a protective order strikes the appropriate balance between Plaintiff's need for information and Defendant's privacy concerns. See Simon v. City of Los Angeles, CV 22-1775-SSS (GJSx), 2023 WL 3402628, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2023) (finding stipulated protective order “strikes the appropriate balance between Plaintiff's need for information and the privacy interests of Defendant(s) or third parties”).

Accordingly, Defendant's request for an order quashing Plaintiff's subpoena is DENIED and his request for a protective order is GRANTED. Defendant shall file a proposed protective order within five (5) days of the date of this Order. In addition, the County of Riverside may redact personal identifying information, such as addresses, social security numbers, dates of birth, or medical information, as reasonably required to protect the privacy and security of law enforcement officers and third parties.

To ensure Plaintiff's ability to comply with a protective order while incarcerated, defense counsel shall contact the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Litigation Coordinator for the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, where Plaintiff is an inmate, to determine whether the CDCR Litigation Coordinator can facilitate disclosure of documents that are subject to a protective order to Plaintiff while maintaining their confidentiality. Within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, defense counsel shall file a declaration indicating whether production of documents to Plaintiff via the CDCR Litigation Coordinator at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility is feasible. If such production is not feasible, Defendant shall propose alternatives.

C. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

*5 Plaintiff requests an order appointing counsel so he can “maintain [the] confidentiality of privileged and protected information” produced in response to his subpoena. Dkts. 102, 103. Because the Court has herein ordered defense counsel to contact the CDCR Litigation Coordinator at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility to facilitate production of documents responsive to Plaintiff's subpoena, Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED without prejudice.

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena and for Protective Order is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED without prejudice.

Within five (5) days of the date of this Order, Defendant shall file a proposed protective order.

In addition, within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, defense counsel shall file a declaration indicating whether production of documents that are subject to a protective order to Plaintiff via the CDCR Litigation Coordinator for the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility is feasible. If such production is feasible, defense counsel shall confirm in the declaration that the County of Riverside will produce documents responsive to Plaintiff's subpoena that are subject to the protective order to the CDCR Litigation Coordinator. If such production is not feasible, defense counsel shall propose alternatives for providing Plaintiff the necessary access to responsive documents in order to prepare his case while maintaining their confidentiality.

IT IS SO ORDERED.