Diamond Peo, LLC v. Bridge HRO, LLC
Diamond Peo, LLC v. Bridge HRO, LLC
2023 WL 4845980 (W.D. Pa. 2023)
June 2, 2023

Hardy, W. Scott,  United States District Judge

Privacy
Protective Order
Third Party Subpoena
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Summary
The court granted the motion in part, ordering CPA to produce documents requested pursuant to the Subpoena which fall into the categories of relevant documents identified, modifying the Subpoena to limit its scope and designating relevant documents produced thereunder as “Confidential”. The court denied the motion in all other respects.
DIAMOND PEO, LLC and DIAMOND ZB STAFFING SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiffs,
v.
BRIDGE HRO, LLC. and SCOTT HANSON, Defendants
Civil Action No. 21-1718
United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed June 02, 2023
Hardy, W. Scott, United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM ORDER

*1 Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoena to Capital Program Administrators or, in the Alterative, Motion for Protective Order, (Docket No. 55), which is opposed by Plaintiffs. (Docket No. 57). Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45, Defendants’ Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
The Subpoena (Docket No. 55-1) seeks to command Capital Program Administrators, Inc. (“CPA”) to produce specified categories of documents, including but not limited to bank statements, financial statements, and tax returns; organizational and operational documents (e.g., articles of incorporation, bylaws, business plans, etc.); documents identifying or otherwise referencing shareholders/members, directors, officers, managers, employees, and contractors; board meeting notices and minutes; correspondence and other specified documents. While CPA is not a party, it appears to be affiliated or otherwise related to Defendants insofar as Defendant Hanson and his co-owner of Defendant Bridge HRO, LLC formed CPA and Defendant Hanson represents that he has a financial interest in CPA. (Docket Nos. 55; 55-2). However, notwithstanding this interest and affiliation, Defendants’ counsel informed the Court that he has not been authorized by Mr. Hanson or his co-owner to accept service of the Subpoena on behalf of CPA, yet Defendants wish to invoke standing to seek relief from the commands of the Subpoena, predominantly seeking to protect CPA's privacy interests. Defendants have failed to convince the Court that they have standing to seek the full relief that they request. Mallet & Co. Inc. v. Lacayo, Civ. No. 19-1409, 2020 WL 13672947 (W.D. Pa. June 29, 2020) (citing cases).
The Subpoena nonetheless is overly broad and seeks to command production of documents that, at least in part, are not relevant. In this Court's estimation, relevant documents fall into three categories. First, documents reflecting funds purportedly paid by Plaintiffs to Defendants (or to other entities such as CPA at the direction of Defendants) for the purpose of procuring workers’ compensation insurance, appear relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims as defined by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Second, documents reflecting funds conveyed by Defendants or by their affiliates to others for the benefit of Plaintiffs likewise appear relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. Finally, organizational documents and documents reflecting transactions pertaining to deposits, withdrawals, and transfers between accounts owned by Defendants and/or purported intermediary affiliates such as CPA, or other such documents reflecting the interrelatedness of Bridge HRO, LLC and Mr. Hanson, also appear relevant, at least as to Plaintiffs’ alter ego/piercing the corporate veil claims.
Moreover, even if they have standing to ask the Court to quash the Subpoena, Defendants have not met their burden of establishing that compliance with it would be unreasonable or oppressive. See First Sealord Sur. v. Durkin & Devries Ins. Agency, 918 F. Supp. 2d 362, 383 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“[A] court may also grant such a motion if it finds that the movant has met the ‘heavy burden of establishing that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable and oppressive.’ ”). Even so, the Court has balanced several competing factors such as the relevance of the records sought, need, confidentiality, and harm. Id. As noted, records pertaining to Plaintiffs’ payments to Defendants or CPA for workers’ compensation coverage and related transactions are relevant. Also relevant are documents related to the interrelatedness of Bridge HRO, LLC and Mr. Hanson, which may include their use of affiliate entities such as CPA, which are relevant to Plaintiffs’ alter ego/piercing the corporate veil claims. However, records of transactions pertaining to Defendants’ other clients or pertaining to other unaffiliated business relationships are not relevant here, at least at this juncture. The Court further notes that Defendants contend that they no longer possess certain of their own records, thus causing Plaintiffs to seek production of these documents from other sources. Consequently, use of a non-party subpoena is necessary to obtain relevant documents and there is no credible suggestion that the production of these records would be unduly burdensome or otherwise be disproportional to the needs of the case.[1] Finally, the privacy interests of Defendants, and, importantly, the privacy interests of Defendants’ other clients, may be implicated but can be protected by modifying the scope of the Subpoena to exclude from production irrelevant documents and transactions pertaining to Defendants’ other clients and by designating relevant documents produced thereunder as “Confidential” pursuant to the parties’ Stipulated Protective Order. (Docket No. 23).
*2 Based on the foregoing, the Court enters the following Order:
AND NOW, this 2nd day of June, 2023, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoena to Capital Program Administrators or, in the Alterative, Motion for Protective Order, (Docket No. 55), is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
1. CPA shall produce documents requested pursuant to the Subpoena which fall into the categories of relevant documents identified herein.
2. The Subpoena shall be modified to limit its scope to exclude documents pertaining specifically to matters between CPA and other persons or entities unrelated to Plaintiffs and their claims, such as Defendants’ other clients.[2]
3. The parties shall deem all documents produced pursuant to the Subpoena to be “Confidential” in accordance with the parties’ Stipulated Protective Order. (Docket No. 23).
4. Plaintiffs shall ensure that a copy of this Memorandum Order is served upon CPA along with the Subpoena. CPA shall have thirty (30) days from the date of service in which to produce responsive documents.
5. Defendants’ Motion is denied in all other respects.

Footnotes

Defendants alternatively seek a protective order, arguing that the Subpoena is a harassing “fishing expedition” that is unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Rule 26(b)(1) was amended in 2015. At that time, the provision authorizing courts to order discovery of any matter “relevant to the subject matter involved in the action” was removed, while retaining the narrower formulation “relevant to any party's claim or defense” to govern the parties’ scope of discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). Also removed from the text of Rule 26(b)(1) at that time was the “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” standard. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2015); see also Cole's Wexford Hotel, Inc. v. Highmark Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d 810, 820-21 (W.D. Pa. 2016). In its current form, Rule 26(b)(1) provides that relevant matter is discoverable so long as it is “proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
If CPA is concerned about an infringement upon its own privacy or confidentiality interests, Rule 45 provides a mechanism for it to seek relief in its own name as such arguments are beyond Defendants’ putative standing to raise same.