*1 Carl Lee Ledford, proceeding pro se, sues Meloday Waldo, the City of Fort Wayne, the Fort Wayne Police Department, and the LaPorte County Police Department for constitutional violations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and harassment. He says their actions caused his unlawful arrest and seizure of his property, and that he faced discrimination based on his race and economic status. The court previously dismissed Mr. Ledford's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and malicious prosecution claims against Ms. Waldo without prejudice.

After over a year of litigation (largely driven by the defendants) and months of not cooperating with discovery, Mr. Ledford filed a motion to dismiss his case without prejudice. The defendants objected to dismissal without prejudice, arguing that a dismissal with prejudice was warranted or that they were entitled to attorney fees. His motion became ripe on February 7, 2023, the day of the court's status conference. Mr. Ledford failed to appear.

The court ordered Mr. Ledford to respond to the defendant's objection and to show cause for his failure to appear and failure to prosecute the case, including past discovery. The defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute claiming that Mr. Ledford had failed to answer interrogatories, respond to document requests, and participate in a deposition. Mr. Ledford responded claiming he wasn't aware of the court's hearing, which is why he didn't appear, that the court was showing bias against him, and that he couldn't attend a deposition because of lack of resources. He didn't provide an explanation for his failure to respond to the defendants’ interrogatories and document requests.

Under Rule 41(b), a court may dismiss a claim “for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply ... with any order of court[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Dismissal for failure to prosecute is “an extraordinarily harsh sanction” that should be used “only in extreme situations, when there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, or when other less drastic sanctions have proven unavailable.” Kruger v. Apfel, 214 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2000). In considering such a dismissal, a district court should consider numerous factors, including the frequency and magnitude of the plaintiff's conduct, the prejudice to the defendant, the disruption to the orderly administration of the court's calendar, and the merits of the underlying litigation. See Bolt v. Loy, 227 F.3d 854, 856 (7th Cir. 2000); Williams v. Chi. Bd. Of Educ., 155 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 1998).

Dismissal may also be appropriate for failing to comply with discovery. A district court has the discretion to impose sanctions, including dismissal, for failure to comply with discovery orders and disclose any information required. Dotson v. Bravo, 321 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2003). Dismissal under Rule 37(b) is appropriate when a plaintiff fails to comply with a discovery order and that failure results from willfulness, bad faith, or fault. In re Golant, 239 F.3d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 2001). Incomplete or evasive responses to interrogatories may be grounds for dismissal of an action under Rule 37(b). See Aura Lamp & Lighting Inc. v. Int'l Trading Corp., 325 F.3d 903, 909-10 (7th Cir. 2003). The same is true of a party's failure to respond to requests for production. Hindmon v. Nat'l Ben Franklin Life Ins. Corp., 677 F.2d 617, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1982). Dismissal may also be a proper sanction for misconduct during a deposition, not least non-participation. Donelson v. Hardy, 931 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2019). “Absent [these] circumstances, the careful exercise of judicial discretion requires that a district court consider less severe sanctions and explain, where not obvious, their inadequacy for promoting the interests of justice.” Schilling v. Walworth Cnty. Park & Planning Comm'n, 805 F.2d 272, 275 (7th Cir. 1986).

*2 The court first addresses Mr. Ledford's failure to appear. He explains that he didn't receive proper notice of the court's February 7, 2023 status conference because the court's order setting the hearing didn't arrive at his correct address due to a typographical error on his previous motion (the order setting the hearing was mailed to 2810 Normandy Drive and not 2310 Normandy Drive, his correct address) [ECF 48, 49]. He contends his address shouldn't have been changed on the docket without his filing of an official change of address notice. However, it is clerk's office policy in all pro se cases to consider a new address listed as the return address to be a change of address notice, as a courtesy to pro se litigants. In fact, Mr. Ledford has twice benefitted from that courtesy in this case. The clerk's office followed policy, which meant changing Mr. Ledford's mailing address to the address most recently used on his filing. It was Mr. Ledford's responsibility to provide his correct address. See Tylicki v. Ryan, 244 F.R.D. 146, 147 (N.D.N. Y 2006) (“The demand that plaintiffs provide contact information is no esoteric rule of civil procedure, but rather the obvious minimal requirement for pursuing a lawsuit.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Mr. Ledford also said he called the clerk's office and was never told about the hearing and was only notified about the hearing after it had concluded. The notice was mailed to the most recent address he provided the court. The hearing was scheduled to begin at 10:00 a.m. ET on February 7, 2023. The court called Mr. Ledford at 10:13 a.m. ET to see if he would be in attendance and received no answer. The hearing began at 10:14 a.m. ET. It was Mr. Ledford's duty to maintain an updated address and to check the docket to ensure he was aware of court hearings and deadlines.

His failure to appear is compounded by his history of non-compliance with discovery. The court entered its scheduling order on October 4, 2022; and, by February 16, 2023, the filing of the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, Mr. Ledford had not responded to any interrogatory requests, produced any requested discovery, or participated in a deposition. After numerous attempts to engage in discovery, Mr. Ledford has yet to fulfill his obligation to engage in discovery. See Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 191 (7th Cir. 2011) (failing to respond to interrogatories is “a violation even more grave than [ ] incomplete interrogatories”). The defendants repeatedly asked for his answers and responses. See, e.g., Mojapelo v. AMTRAK, 748 Fed. Appx. 68, 71 (7th Cir. 2019). He didn't respond to Ms. Waldo's first motion to dismiss. And after numerous attempts to take his deposition, Mr. Ledford didn't attend because this case has “prevented [him] from gaining gainful employment and also securing housing, [causing him to] become displaced.” See id. (“refusing to attend a deposition can also be evidence of fault if the party does not give a legitimate reason, especially after failing to timely respond to interrogatories or supply requested documents”). Opposing counsel was more than accommodating offering several different locations and even offering transportation. He didn't respond to their offer to provide transportation, and they cancelled his deposition the day before it was planned to occur. They rescheduled his deposition, and he didn't appear.

“Once a party invokes the judicial system by filing a lawsuit, it must abide by the rules of the court; a party [cannot] decide for itself when it feels like pressing its action and when it feels like taking a break because ‘trial judges have a responsibility to litigants to keep their court calendars as current as humanly possible.’ ” GCIU Employer Ret. Fund v. Chi. Tribune Co., 8 F.3d 1195, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Kagan v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 795 F.2d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 1986)). Throughout the pendency of this litigation, Mr. Ledford has engaged in a continuing “pattern of delay and contumacious conduct,” Kruger, 214 F.3d at 787, at the time and expense of opposing counsel and parties who have done their part to move this litigation along, as evinced by the numerous emails and accommodations offered to Mr. Ledford, and now a second motion to dismiss (the first was only brought by Ms. Waldo, and the second by all defendants). Mr. Ledford's failure to respond to interrogatories, produce discovery, and appear for a deposition displayed willfulness, bad faith, and fault. See Collins v. Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. He provides no explanation otherwise.

*3 “Though a motion to compel usually precedes the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37, one is not always necessary. Instead, if a party receives notice that certain discovery proceedings are to occur by a specific date, and then refuses to comply, a court may impose sanctions.” Mojapelo, 748 Fed. Appx. at 70. (citing Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 729 F.2d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 1984)). Assuming his failure to produce discovery includes initial disclosures, the court told Mr. Ledford that he was required to make mandatory initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1). The defendants informed Mr. Ledford that he needed to respond to interrogatories and a request for documents, as well as attend his deposition. And the discovery rules set forth the 30-day window for responding to discovery requests. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2), 34(b)(2). Mr. Ledford was on notice of his obligations and that his failure to comply with these rules and requests would have consequences.

Additionally, the court explicitly warned Mr. Ledford that dismissal with prejudice would be a result of his actions. See Ball v. City of Chi, 2 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 1993). After he failed to appear, the court issued a show cause order to explain why he failed to appear at the court's status conference and why this case should not be dismissed with prejudice for his failure to prosecute, including his failure to comply with past discovery. The court cautioned Mr. Ledford that failure to respond could result in the dismissal of his case with prejudice. After the defendants filed their motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, the court again cautioned him that failure to respond could result in dismissal of his case. Though Mr. Ledford responded, he didn't provide any reasonable explanation for his failure to appear and failure to comply with the discovery in his case.

All parties seek the dismissal of this action, including Mr. Ledford. He asks for dismissal (without prejudice) further demonstrating his current lack of interest in pursuing this case today. Mr. Ledford has not diligently prosecuted his case and the court will not allow valuable time and resources to be spent by the court and defendants when Mr. Ledford's historical conduct demonstrates no interest in prosecuting it. Because he wishes to dismiss his case, no other sanction is appropriate and less severe sanctions are not warranted in light of Mr. Ledford's conduct.

Mr. Ledford chose to file this lawsuit. Mr. Ledford had an obligation to prosecute this action and participate in discovery. All parties want this case dismissed. Even if the court were to consider Mr. Ledford's motion to dismiss alone, the dismissal could occur only “on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). And a dismissal without prejudice, given this record, isn't proper. In sum, the court finds Mr. Ledford's conduct in this case exhibits willfulness, bad faith, and fault, see Collins, 554 F.3d at 696; Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, and establishes “a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct,” Kruger, 214 F.3d at 787; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. The court won't operate on Mr. Ledford's schedule. See GCIU Employer Ret. Fund, 8 F.3d at 1198-99.

Accordingly, the court DENIES Mr. Ledford's motion to dismiss without prejudice [ECF 48] and GRANTS the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice [ECF 54].

SO ORDERED.