Del Campo-Aguila v. Am. Inst. for Foreign Study, Inc.
Del Campo-Aguila v. Am. Inst. for Foreign Study, Inc.
2023 WL 5317831 (S.D. Fla. 2023)
July 24, 2023

Torres, Edwin G.,  United States Magistrate Judge

Exclusion of Evidence
Exclusion of Witness
Medical Records
Cost Recovery
Sanctions
Failure to Produce
Download PDF
To Cite List
Summary
The court found that the expert opinions of Defendants' neurology, neuroradiology, and neuropsychology experts were based on reliable ESI, such as medical records, imaging tests, and neuropsychological examinations. The court denied Plaintiffs' motion to exclude the experts' testimony and opinions, noting that any factual disputes or challenges to the weight of the experts' opinions should be addressed at trial.
Related Rules
Federal Rules of Evidence
Fed. R. Evid. 702
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26
Related Cases
Farrell v. U.S. Olympic & Paralymic Comm.
2023 WL 6390476 (N.D.N.Y. 2023)
July 28, 2023
Scullin Jr., Frederick J.,  United States District Judge
Failure to Produce
Competency of Counsel
...
Foster v. Cintas Corp. No. 2
2021 WL 601877 (S.D. Ga. 2021)
February 16, 2021
Ray, Christopher L.,  United States Magistrate Judge
Cost Recovery
Exclusion of Witness
...
Murray v. Manorcare of Topeka KS, LLC
2021 WL 2413380 (D. Kan. 2021)
June 14, 2021
Gale, Kenneth G.,  United States Magistrate Judge
Medical Records
Sanctions
...
Sherwood v. BNSF Ry. Co.
2018 WL 3340571 (D. Idaho 2018)
July 6, 2018
Bush, Ronald E.,  United States Magistrate Judge
Medical Records
Exclusion of Evidence
...
JOYCE DEL CAMPO-AGUILA, and ORLANDO JAVIER AGUILA, Plaintiffs,
v.
AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN STUDY, INC., d/b/a/ AU PAIR IN AMERICA, STEPHANIE STEPHENSON MARTINS, and RAYANE APARECIDA SANTOS DE OLIVERA, Defendants
Case No. 22-21146-Civ-WILLIAMS/TORRES
United States District Court, S.D. Florida
Entered on FLSD Docket July 24, 2023

Counsel

Willie Benjamin Ramhofer, Ramhofer, Garcia and Moore, PLLC, Miami, FL, Raymond Renato Dieppa, Florida Legal, North Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Robert Richard Coulombe, Jr., Clark Robb Mason Coulombe Buschman & Charbonnet, Miami, FL, Che Christian Padron, Zediker & Associates, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant Stephanie Stephenson Martins.
Che Christian Padron, Zediker & Associates, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant Rayane Aparecida Santos De Olivera.
Torres, Edwin G., United States Magistrate Judge

OMNIBUS ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

*1 This matter is before the Court on Stephanie Martins’ and Rayane Santos De Olivera's (collectively “Defendants”) Motions to Compel Payment of Expert Deposition Fees [D.E. 176], Compel the Production of an Expert's Raw Data [D.E 177], and Exclude the Testimony of Plaintiffs’ Expert [D.E. 187]. Also before the Court is Joyce Del Campo Aguila's and Orlando Javier Aguila's (collectively “Plaintiffs”) Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony [D.E. 186]. The Motions have been fully briefed and are now ripe for disposition.[1] After careful consideration of the motions and the record presented, Defendants’ Motion to Compel Deposition Fees [D.E. 176] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, Defendants’ Motion to Compel Expert Raw Data [D.E. 177] is GRANTED, and the Parties’ Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony [D.E. 186] [D.E 187] are DENIED.
This case arises from personal injuries sustained by Plaintiff Joyce Aguila on May 3, 2019, when Defendant Rayane Olivera struck her while operating an automobile owned by Defendant Stephanie Martins. According to the Complaint, Ms. Olivera, who at the time was employed as a live-in nanny/housekeeper for Ms. Martins, negligently stuck Ms. Aguila when she was transporting Ms. Martins’ son from school in Miami, Florida. [D.E. 65 ¶ 15]. Ms. Olivera, a Brazilian citizen, had been placed as an “au pair” at Ms. Martins’ household by Au Pair in America, a company that links young foreigners seeking to work in the U.S. with families in need of child-care assistance. Id. ¶¶ 50–53.
Au Pair in America was a named defendant in Plaintiffs’ initial complaint. However, on April 14, 2023, the Court entered an order terminating Au Pair in America from this law suit pursuant to a joint stipulation of dismissal indicating that Plaintiffs and the institute had settled all of their disputes. [D.E. 192, 193]. Plaintiffs’ negligence and related claims remained live as to Defendants Ms. Martins and Ms. Olivera. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Aguila suffered serious injuries as a result of Ms. Olivera striking her with Ms. Martins’ minivan which have resulted in substantial damages, including severe pain and suffering, physical and neuropsychological disability, disfigurement, costly medical expenses, loss of past and future earnings, and loss of consortium. [D.E. 65 ¶ 36]. Defendants dispute these claims.
In support of their competing damages theories, the parties have retained medical and accounting experts to testify at trial. The instant motions relate to the alleged impropriety of some of these expert opinions, as well as to the amount of fees that Plaintiffs should bear in connection with the deposition of Defendants’ experts.
The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is within the trial court's discretion and the court enjoys “considerable leeway” when determining the admissibility of this testimony. See Cook v. Sheriff of Monroe County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1103 (11th Cir. 2005). As explained in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Fed. R. Evid. 702. The party offering the expert testimony carries the burden of laying the proper foundation for its admission, and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The burden of establishing qualification, reliability, and helpfulness rests on the proponent of the expert opinion, whether the proponent is the plaintiff or the defendant in a civil suit, or the government or the accused in a criminal case.”).
*2 “Under Rule 702 and Daubert, district courts must act as ‘gate keepers’ which admit expert testimony only if it is both reliable and relevant.” Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589).[2] The purpose of this role is “to ensure that speculative, unreliable expert testimony does not reach the jury.” McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002). Also, in its role as “gatekeeper,” its duty is not “to make ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness of the proffered evidence.” Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003)
To facilitate this process, district courts engage in a three-part inquiry to determine the admissibility of expert testimony:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
City of Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit refers to the aforementioned requirements as the “qualification,” “reliability,” and “helpfulness” prongs and while they “remain distinct concepts”; “the courts must take care not to conflate them.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260 (citing Quiet Tech, 326 F.3d at 1341).
In determining the reliability of a scientific expert opinion, the Eleventh Circuit also considers the following factors to the extent possible:
(1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community. Notably, however, these factors do not exhaust the universe of considerations that may bear on the reliability of a given expert opinion, and a federal court should consider any additional factors that may advance its Rule 702 analysis.
Quiet Tech, 326 F.3d at 1341 (citations omitted). The aforementioned factors are not “a definitive checklist or test,” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, but are “applied in case-specific evidentiary circumstances,” United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005). While this inquiry is flexible, the Court must focus “solely on principles and methodology, not on conclusions that they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95. It is also important to note that a “district court's gatekeeper role under Daubert ‘is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.’ ” Quiet Tech, 326 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 666 (11th Cir. 2001)). Rather, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580; see also Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distrib., LLC, 766 F.3d 1296, 1306 (11th Cir. 2014) (“As gatekeeper for the expert evidence presented to the jury, the judge ‘must do a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.’ ”) (quoting Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2010)).
*3 “[T]he objective of [the gatekeeping role] is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). The district court's role is especially significant since the expert's opinion “can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).
Defendants have moved this Court for an order compelling Plaintiffs’ neuropsychology expert, Jessica Rivera, to turn over the raw data from her three-day mental evaluation of Ms. Aguila to Defendants’ neuropsychology expert, Melissa Friedman. [D.E. 177].
In a discovery hearing held on February 23, 2023, the parties offered oral argument on the motion, and following that presentation the undersigned granted the order on the record. We hereby memorialize that ruling and order that Defendants’ motion to compel raw data is GRANTED for the reasons stated on the record. As noted during the hearing, in order to comply with privacy and ethical obligations, Plaintiffs’ expert must send her raw data directly to Defendants’ expert. Unless Ms. Rivera has already done so, she must send her raw data to Ms. Friedman within seven (7) days of this Order.
Next, we turn to Defendants’ motion which seeks to compel Plaintiffs to pay for their experts’ deposition fees. [D.E. 176]. The parties are in disagreement as to what the proper amount of deposition fees should be and have been unable to reach a resolution on this issue.[3] Specifically, Defendants seek payment of the deposition fees (as well as interests and attorney's fees) attributable to the depositions of four witnesses: accountant Oscar Padron (fee amount not specified); neuroradiologist Thomas Naidich ($3,150); neurologists Julie Schwartzbard ($4,400); and neuropsychologist Melissa Friedman ($2,000). Id. at 1–2.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, concede that they should bear the reasonable fees of Defendants’ experts’ depositions, but submit that the amount of fees requested by the experts in this case are excessive and go beyond the reasonable amount charged for these types of services in our district. [D.E. 180]. Because we agree that the requested fees are excessive, Defendants’ motion to compel payment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The payment of fees for an expert's deposition is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E). The rule provides that “[u]nless manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking discovery ... pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (D).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i) (emphasis added). In evaluating the reasonableness of an expert's fee, courts consider the following factors:
*4 (1) the witness's area of expertise; (2) the education and training that is required to provide the expert insight sought; (3) the prevailing rates for other comparably respected available experts; (4) the nature, quality and complexity of the discovery sought; (5) the cost of living in the particular geographic area; (6) the fee being charged by the expert to the retaining party; (7) the fee traditionally charged by the expert on related matters; and (8) any other factor likely to be of assistance to the court in balancing the parties’ respective interests.
Fraser v. AOL LLC, 2008 WL 312670, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2008) (citing Adams v. Mem'l Sloan Kettering Cancer Ctr., 2002 WL 1401979, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002)). “As a general rule, the party seeking reimbursement of deposition fees bears the burden of proving reasonableness.” Mannarino v. United States, 218 F.R.D. 372, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Courts have authority to reduce experts’ fees when those fees are found to be excessive. See Mannarino, 218 F.R.D. at 375–76 (reducing fee of medical expert from a flat fee of $3,000.00 per day to $250 per hour for deposition testimony); Hose v. Chicago and North Western Transp. Co., 154 F.R.D. 222, 227 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (reducing fee of expert neurologist from $800 per hour to $400 per hour for deposition testimony); Dominguez v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 166, 170 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (reducing fee of expert neurologist to $341.50 per hour, but noting that it was “a great deal higher” than fees awarded by other courts under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)); Anthony v. Abbott Lab., 106 F.R.D. 461, 465 (D.R.I. 1985) (finding that $250 per hour for a medical expert was “the outmost periphery of the range of sustainable awards”); but see Grady v. Jefferson County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 249 F.R.D. 657, 662 (D. Colo. 2008) (finding expert fee of $600 per hour for deposition testimony of medical expert to be reasonable).
We agree with Plaintiffs that a partial reduction of the hourly fees requested by Defendants’ witnesses is warranted in this case. Defendants’ motion seeks the following hourly rates: $1,100 for Dr. Schwartzbard's (neurologist) three-hour long deposition on February 14, 2023; $900 for Dr. Naidich's (neuroradiologist) three and a half-hour long deposition on February 12, 2023; $500 for Ms. Friedman's (psychologist) four-hour long deposition on February 20, 2023; and $500 for Mr. Padron's (accountant) one hour and forty five minutes long deposition on February 8, 2023. [D.E. 184 at 2–3]. However, other than conclusorily asserting that the requested fees are reasonable and attaching the corresponding CVs, Defendants’ skeletal filings do little to legally substantiate the requested amounts. Indeed, Defendants fail to cite a single case or source of authority in support of their reasonableness claim, fail to propound evidence showing that these are figures traditionally charged by the experts on similar matters, and, more importantly, fail to show that these inflated fees are consistent with the prevailing hourly rates applicable to similar experts in our district.
Furthermore, the parties have not discussed in their briefs the nature, quality, or complexity involved in the experts’ work and discovery in this case, but we note that nothing about the deposition transcripts or the allegations in this car accident dispute suggest novelty or unusual complexity. It is also noteworthy that Plaintiffs have propounded evidence reflecting that radiologists and psychologists of comparable experience operate under significantly lower rates, [D.E. 180-4, 180-6], and that Plaintiffs’ own witnesses only charged a fraction of the fees sought by Defendants’ experts despite holding similar expertise and practices, and conducting similar work in this case. [D.E. 180-2, 180-8].[4] Applying the above numerated factors to these circumstances, we find that the requested fees are partly unreasonable and warrant reduction. See Dobson v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., No. 05-80984CIVRYSKAMP, 2007 WL 842130, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2007) (reducing physicians hourly deposition fee from $1,450 to $500); Barnes v. Hickox, No. 3:08-CV-938-J-25JRK, 2009 WL 10670584, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2009) (“[neurologist]’s fee of $1,100.00 per hour for deposition testimony is unreasonable under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)”); Jalowsky v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 336 F.R.D. 452, 454 (D. Ariz. 2020) (reducing neurologist's hourly rate for a deposition to $750); FCOA, LLC v. Foremost Title & Escrow Servs., LLC, No. 17-23971-CIV, 2019 WL 1318361, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2019) (reducing medical expert's hourly deposition fee to $200); Whalen v. CSX Transportation, Inc., No. 13-3784, 2017 WL 374737 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2017) (setting hourly rate for deposition and deposition preparation time of expert neurosurgeon at $500 per hour).
*5 On the other hand, Plaintiffs’ proposed reductions are too draconian and bear no relationship to the education, training, and witness experience of Defendants’ experts, nor to the time and effort that they allocated to preparing for the video depositions. Likewise, Defendants’ unsubstantiated request for the payment of interest, and attorney's fees and costs are unwarranted under the circumstances. Accordingly, Defendants’ deposition fees are set as follows: (i) Dr. Julie Schwartzbard must be compensated at an hourly rate of $750 for three hours of deposition time; (ii) Dr. Thomas Naidich must be compensated at an hourly rate of $550 for three and a half hours of deposition time; (iii) Melissa Friedman, Ph. D, must be compensated at an hourly rate of $400 for four hours of deposition time; and (iv) Oscar Padron must be compensated at an hourly rate of $250 for one hour and forty five minutes of deposition time. Plaintiffs shall pay for these expert deposition fees—which amount to a total sum of $6,212.5—within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order.
Next, we turn to the parties’ cross-motions to exclude experts. According to Plaintiffs, this case warrants the wholesale exclusion of all of Defendants’ expert witnesses. [D.E. 186]. Specifically, as to Defendants’ neurology and neuroradiology experts, Dr. Julie Schwartzbard and Dr. Ronald Naidich, the motion argues that both experts should be excluded because their medical conclusions are based on ipse dixit rather than reliable methodology or sufficient data. Id. at 4–6, 8–9. Plaintiffs also argue that her Dr. Schwartzbard's supplemental report improperly relies on the opinions of Dr. Naidich. Id. at 7. As to Defendants’ psychology and accounting experts, Melissa Freidman, Ph. D., and Oscar Padron, Plaintiffs allege that both witnesses are unqualified to offer expert testimony, and that their opinions, too, are the product of ipse dixit rather than acceptable methodologies. Id. 10–16.
Defendants, on the other hand, move to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ economic expert, Carl Meme. [D.E. 187]. According to Defendants, Mr. Meme's opinion on Plaintiff's lost future wages, which is premised on economic statistical projections, should be excluded because it relies on flawed factual assumptions and data. We address each of these arguments in turn.
Starting with Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the expert opinions of Defendants’ neurology expert, Dr. Schwartzbard, the motion is DENIED. Notably, Plaintiffs do not challenge Dr. Schwartzbard's qualification to provide expert testimony regarding the extent of the neurological injuries that Ms. Aguila purportedly sustained as a result of the accident.[5] Rather, Plaintiffs object to the admissibility of two narrow conclusions expressed in Dr. Schwartzbard's Compulsory Medical Examination (CME”) Report; namely (i) that the medical timeline assessed by Dr. Schwartzbard “is not consistent with cognitive impairment secondary to traumatic brain injury”, and (ii) that “[b]ased on all of the available data, there is no objective evidence for any neurologic sequelae as a result of the accident that occurred on May 3, 2019.” [D.E. 186-1 at 9–10].
As noted above, “[t]he reliability standard is established by Rule 702’s requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to ‘scientific ... knowledge,’ since the adjective ‘scientific’ implies a grounding in science's methods and procedures, while the word ‘knowledge’ connotes a body of known facts or of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as true on good grounds.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580. This entails an assessment of whether the “methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.” Id. at 592. The four non-exhaustive factors used to evaluate the reliability of a scientific expert opinion include the following:
*6 (1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262 (citations omitted).
After an independent review of the underlying expert report and the testimony in the record, we find that Plaintiffs’ motion lacks merit because Dr. Schwartzberg's narrow opinions were arguably drawn from reasonable data and methods that characterize the practice of experts in her field. In the first place, it is undisputed that Dr. Schwartzberg's CME report (December 16, 2022) was based on a comprehensive amount of objective medical data sources. Indeed, Dr. Schwartzberg personally examined Ms. Aguila on December 15, 2022, where she conducted a medical assessment of her treatment history, including a review of Ms. Aguila's pre and post-accident medical records. This examination lasted for nearly one hour, and included Dr. Schwartzberg's own in-person neurological examination of Plaintiff. [D.E. 186-2 at 13–15].
Furthermore, as the expert disclosure reflects, Dr. Schwartzberg's report was informed by Ms. Aguila's own observations regarding her medical state following the accident, as well as Dr. Schwartzberg's assessment of medical records dating back to June 2014. [D.E. 186-1 at 3–8]. Those medical records included, among other things, Ms. Aguila's visit notes to her primary care physician, post-accident neurological consultations, psychological testing examinations, and several laboratory testing results (including a brain scans and an MRI). Id. We find that this review of the relevant record by an expert constitutes sufficient indicia of reliability. See Milbrath v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 17-CV-22071, 2018 WL 2291307, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 2018) (“[neurologist] expert opinion that plaintiff does not suffer from any neurological or cognitive deficient based on his review of the plaintiff's medical records, brain MRI, neuropsychological test results and deposition testimony is reliable”); Geyer v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1216 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (opinion of medical expert sufficiently reliable where based on medical records, despite never interviewing the patient or reviewing pre-accident reports); In Re: 3M Combat Arms Earplug Products Liability Litigation, No. 19-CV-2885, 2021 WL 2028682, at *6 (N.D. Fla. May 11, 2021) (expert's extensive experience in neurology, “together with his explanation of how that experience informed his [ ] opinion, provides a reliable basis for his opinion.”).
Although Plaintiffs claim otherwise, nothing in their motion or the record it cites undermine the admissibility of, as opposed to the weight or strength of, Dr. Schwartzberg's expert opinion. It is noteworthy, for instance, that Plaintiffs chose not to file a rebuttal opinion challenging the methodology employed by Dr. Schwartzberg. Likewise, a review of Dr. Schwartzberg's deposition transcript does not reveal any testimony calling into question the admissibility of her medical impressions, which as she testified were based on her reading of Ms. Aguila's medical records, Ms. Aguila's statements regarding her perceived medical state following the accident, and Dr. Schwartzberg's own in-person neurological examination of Ms. Aguila. [D.E. 186-2 at 29–30].
*7 Rather, a plain review of the motion and the deposition transcript reveals that the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ arguments stem from factual objections as to what the available medical records say or omit. In other words, Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Schwartzberg's opinion is unreliable because a different expert may have reached a different conclusion based on the available medical data. [D.E. 186 at 4–6] (stressing that Plaintiff actually complaint of numerous cognitive issues); [D.E. 186-2 at 29–36] (debating whether the records include notes of pre-accident anxiety, or whether Ms. Aguila was able to drive within ten days following the accident). Of course, this kind of fact-sounding attacks are misguided in the context of a Daubert motion, which is meant to root out hypotheses that embody unsupported analytical gaps, rather than “supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.” Quiet Tech, 326 F.3d at 1341 (quotation marks omitted); see also Salvani v. Corizon Health, Inc., 2019 WL 4101794, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2019) (“If Plaintiff believes that his set of facts are more accurate, he has ample opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Fournier at trial to undermine Dr. Fournier's opinion. However, to do so on a Daubert motion would be inappropriate when there are several factual disputes and an expert relies on one side of a story in determining a patient's illness.”); Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“ ‘[a]n expert is ... permitted to base his opinion on a particular version of the disputed facts and the weight to be accorded to that opinion is for the jury.’ ”) (quoting Walker v. Gordon, 46 Fed. Appx. 691, 695–96 (3d Cir.2002)).
Likewise, Plaintiffs’ allegations that Dr. Schwartzberg's report improperly relies on the findings of another expert ring hollow. According to Plaintiffs, “Dr. Schwartzberg improperly bolster[s] her testimony by relying on the opinions of the defense expert radiologists Dr. Thomas Naidich.” [D.E. 186 at 7]. Yet, Plaintiffs do nothing to substantiate this conclusory assertion. Besides pointing to two unhelpful portions of Dr. Schwartzberg's deposition transcript, Plaintiffs’ motion does nothing to explain where, when, or how, Dr. Schwartzberg's report or addendum blindly relies on Dr. Naidich's assessments.
To the contrary, a review of her report and deposition testimony makes clear that Dr. Schwartzberg's conclusions go well beyond the assessment of any one expert. As explained earlier, her conclusions flow from the coupling of her over two decades of neurology expertise with her review of Ms. Aguila's pre and post-accident medical records, Ms. Aguila's statements regarding her perceived medical state, and Dr. Schwartzberg's own neurological examination of Ms. Aguila. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs’ arguments simply lack merit. See Palma v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, No. 820CV251TKKMJSS, 2021 WL 1405507, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2021) (“It is normal for one expert to partially rely on another expert's report to form his or her own opinion.”); Arch Specialty Ins. Co. v. Balzebre, No. 10-23775-CIV, 2013 WL 12061814, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2013) (“There is a distinction, which is applicable here, between an expert basing his independent opinions upon hearsay and otherwise inadmissible evidence, and an expert merely parroting the expert opinion of another.”); Hendrix v. Evenflo Co., 255 F.R.D. 568, 607 (N.D. Fla. 2009), aff'd sub nom. Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2010) (“An expert may properly rely on the opinion of another expert.”).
We recognize that Dr. Schwartzberg's methodology may be vulnerable to criticism, but “[a]n expert's method need not be perfect, nor need he apply it perfectly.” Banta Properties, Inc. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 2011 WL 13096149, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2011) (citing Pandora Jewelers 1995, Inc. v. Pandora Jewelry, LLC, 2011 WL 182295269, at *5–6 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2011) (noting that a rebuttal expert could testify to the flaws in a report based on imperfect data or imperfect methodology). The defects Plaintiffs identified merely affect the weight of Dr. Schwartzberg's opinions, as opposed to their admissibility. See, e.g., Pods Enterprises, Inc. v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 2014 WL 2625297, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2014) (“PEI also argues that Dr. Wood improperly weighted the data, included improper questions, and failed to employ proper quality controls. These criticisms likewise go to the weight of her opinions, not their admissibility.”). This means that, even if Dr. Schwartzberg did not use a perfect methodology, she used her extensive experience and observations to determine the neurological effects, if any, that the accident had upon Ms. Aguila. While Plaintiffs may take issue with those observations, and challenge them at trial, Dr. Schwartzberg has presented a reliable methodology that passes muster under Daubert and therefore Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Dr. Schwartzberg's testimony and opinions is DENIED.
*8 Plaintiffs’ motions also seek to exclude the testimony of Defendants’ neuroradiologists expert, Dr. Naidich, on the basis that his opinions are unreliable. [D.E. 186 at 8–10]. Yet, Plaintiffs’ objections to Dr. Naidich's expert opinions suffer from the same legal deficiencies than those launched against Dr. Schwartzberg above and, thus, are due to be DENIED.[6]
For starters, Plaintiffs inexplicably conflate Dr. Naidich's reliance on his medical expertise and his application of that experience to the medical records at hand with inadmissible “ipse dixit”. However, both his expert report and deposition testimony make abundantly clear that Dr. Naidich's opinions are based on the different imaging tests of Ms. Aguila's head, his review and interpretation of those images, his experience as a neuroradiologists for many years, and the basic relevant medical literature. [D.E. 186-3 at 3–4] (enumerating a non-contrast CT of the head dated May 3, 2019, and two non-contrast MRIs of the head dated June 6, 2019, and July 10, 2020, respectively); [D.E. 186-4 at 10–11]. As noted above, these analytical steps constitute the archetypical kind of reliable methodology that this court regularly deems Daubert complaint. See Ostroski v. United States, No. 06-80327-CIV, 2007 WL 9701868, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2007) (“it is clear that Dr. Elster applied the same methodology used by radiologists in everyday practice - he looked at the pertinent film and relied on a basic understanding of the nature of the Plaintiff's injury and the context in which it occurred to draw a well-reasoned conclusion.”).
Plaintiffs’ other attacks on Dr. Naidich are equally unavailing. Plaintiffs submit that the fact that Dr. Naidich's expert testimony has been limited by a Wyoming district court in the past is indicative of the unreliability of his opinions in this case. This argument is unpersuasive because it relies on a case that has no bearing to the facts at hand. [D.E. 186 at 8] (citing to Moreno v. Zimmerman, No. 20-CV-086, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101838 (D. Wyo. May 6, 2021)). In Zimmerman, a case involving a driver who claimed to have suffered a stroke while driving, the court excluded Dr. Naidich's testimony as to the exact date and time during which the stoke allegedly took place. However, the court's holding was not premised on any purported unreliability of Dr. Naidich's radiological work. To the contrary, that portion of Dr. Naidich testimony was excluded precisely because the “testimony or opinion [was] not derived from the radiologic evidence,” but from a factual timeline that counsel had provided to Dr. Naidich. Zimmerman, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101838, *5.
Here by contrast, no similar allegation of reliance on extraneous evidence has been made against Dr. Naidich and, as the deposition transcript and report in this case show, his medical opinions flow directly from his assessment of the radiological films. [D.E. 186-4 at 10–11]. Instead, what Plaintiffs’ motion really does is fault Dr. Naidich's opinion that the radiological record does not evidence traumatic brain injury, by criticizing the weight that he gave to certain imaging data. [D.E. 186 at 9 (arguing that Dr. Naidich improperly discounted abnormal radiological findings)]. However, and as noted earlier, the fact that Dr. Naidich may have applied a different approach and interpretation to the relevant imaging from what one of Plaintiffs’ experts may have done, does not make Dr. Naidich's opinions unreliable. See Price v. Carnival Cruise Lines, No. 20-CV-20621, 2022 WL 951318, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2022) (“Defendant's argument that ... Dr. Shim did not review any pre-incident medical records goes to the weight of Dr. Shim's opinion, not its admissibility. Defendant may, of course, cross-examine Dr. Shim on his methodology.”).[7] Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion as to Dr. Naidich is DENIED.
*9 Next, Plaintiffs move to exclude the expert opinion of Defendants’ neuropsychology expert, Ms. Friedman. According to Plaintiffs, Ms. Friedman lacks the qualifications to testify about Ms. Aguila's mental state and her methodology is flawed because it relies on insufficient data. Here, too, Plaintiffs’ challenges prove unpersuasive.
First, Plaintiffs attack Ms. Friedman's qualifications in a single-paragraph section of their brief entitled “[l]ack of qualifications.” [D.E. 10–11]. Yet, this skeletal section of the motion fails to specifically address her qualifications in any detail, or explain how they fall short of the expert threshold in this case.
To the contrary, Ms. Friedman educational and training background—including a Ph. D. and Masters in clinical psychology, an ABCN Certification in neuropsychology, plus private practice experience (she has been a licensed psychiatrist with a practice specializing in neuropsychology since 2007)—qualifies her to provide expert testimony about Plaintiff's mental state in this case. See United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1412-13 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a psychologist was qualified to testify regarding defendant's mental state because the psychologist had a doctoral degree, her intended testimony related to psychological tests and evaluation, and any deficits in her qualifications beyond her professional training went to the weight of her testimony rather than to its admissibility); Sims v. Medical Ctr., 1997 WL 527330, at *2, No. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13163, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 1997) (“Psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health professionals routinely testify as experts in criminal and civil cases in which the mental condition of an individual is an issue.”).
Further, Plaintiffs’ motion seems to mischaracterize the nature of Ms. Friedman's intended testimony by suggesting that she will offer opinions as to the cause of Plaintiff's alleged brain injury. [D.E. 186 at 10]. This is inaccurate. As her report clearly provides, she was engaged to conduct a “neuropsychological evaluation” on Ms. Aguila “to characterize her neuropsychological functioning, following [the accident].” [D.E. 186-5 at 1 (emphasis added)]. Indeed, Ms. Friedman's evaluation of Plaintiff lasted two days, and “consisted of [a] clinical interview, behavioral observations, and administration of [neuropsychological] standardized test instruments” aimed at testing her emotional and personality functioning, as well as her different cognitive capabilities. Id. at 13–20.
Based on the scores from this evaluation and her review of Ms. Aguila's post-accident medical records, Ms. Friedman concluded “that Ms. Del Campo-Aguila is not currently experiencing any neuropsychological effects of any traumatic brain injury.” Id. at 22. Ms. Friedman is clearly qualified to testify as to this conclusion regarding Ms. Aguila's mental state, including whether her cognitive and emotional scores are consistent with traumatic brain injury. See United States v. Morris, No. 2:08-CR-90, 2009 WL 290601, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 5, 2009) (“[psychologist]’s testimony is admissible .... [Psychologist] may testify concerning her clinical interview and testing of [patient], her diagnosis of PTSD, the characteristics and behavior of sexual abuse victims generally, and may offer her opinion that [patient]’s PTSD is consistent with that to be expected following a trauma such as sexual assault.”).
*10 Finally, as it was the case with Dr. Schwartzbard and Dr. Naidich, Plaintiffs remaining challenges against Ms. Friedman's opinion bear on her opinion's weight or strength, rather than its admissibility. [D.E. 186 at 11–15 (alleging, for instance, that “Ms. Friedman utilizes a misleading interpretation of test data to conclude that Plaintiff's mental functioning remains in the ‘average range’ ”)]. These alleged failures will be subject to cross-examination at trial. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Ms. Friedman's testimony is DENIED.
Lastly, Plaintiffs seek to limit the testimony of Defendants’ economic damages rebuttal expert, Oscar Padron. [D.E. 186 at 15]. According to the motion, “[i]t is anticipated that at trial Mr. Padron will seek to offer opinions beyond the scope of his qualifications,” including offering projections of what Ms. Aguila's economic damages would be had she never been injured by Ms. Olivera. Defendants, on the other hand, respond that Mr. Padron's testimony is only offered as a rebuttal to Plaintiffs’ own economic expert's testimony, which also engages in economic projections based on employment assumptions in determining Plaintiff's wage losses. [D.E. 187-1]. Indeed, Defendants have filed their own Daubert motion seeking to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ economic expert, Carl Meme on the basis that he economic projections rely on flawed assumptions and data. [D.E. 187]. For the reasons that follow, both motions are DENIED.
As a threshold matter, we note the obvious fact that an accountant is not qualified to provide opinions on medical causation; thus, neither economic expert is allowed to introduce such testimony at trial. However, economic experts are allowed to engage in economic projections when those projections are based on factual assumptions that find support in the facts. See Coleman v. Dydula, 139 F. Supp. 2d 388, 394–95 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (calculation of lost future wages admissible where “[economist] identifies the number of years he used and offers a reasoned explanation as to why he used that number of years[,]” even when “the NAFE Survey indicate[s] that there may be several acceptable analytical approaches when it comes to projecting future economic trends.”); Bostick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94333, *5 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2017) (“[economic experts] have calculated the expected value of [plaintiff]’s future lost income by looking at W-2 tax forms, merit increase forms, and pay stubs .... Their methodology is a standard one, generally used by forensic economists in litigation matters”). That is exactly what Plaintiffs’ expert, Mr. Meme, has done in his report, which engages in statistical projections that rely on data of Plaintiff's historical work performance and income. [D.E. 187-1].[8] As noted in the report and his deposition transcript, Mr. Meme applied generally accepted statistical and economic forensics principles, reviewed several years of financial data from Plaintiff's tax returns and wage statement, and surveyed national and local public school wages. [D.E. 187-2 at 93–104, 124–26].
Furthermore, the available factual record here also seems to suggests a correlation between the May 3, 2019, accident and Ms. Aguila's professional setbacks. Indeed, one could reasonably conclude that, prior to the accident, Ms. Aguila's professional career was steadily progressing (e.g., she was prompted twice in the span of five years), but that afterwards, her professional trajectory was set on a downward spiral that culminated with her termination as Principal of Downtown Doral Charter and her demotion to fourth grade teacher. [D.E. 186-6 at 76]. Against this factual backdrop, then, the assumption that, but for the injuries she allegedly sustained during the accident, she would have remained a principal in steady ascent of the professional ladder does not reach the level of unmoored speculation that warrants exclusion. See Southard v. Belanger, 966 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (factual assumptions underpinning future earning capacity opinion not fatal because “any weakness in the underlying factual basis of an expert's testimony bears on the weight, as opposed to the admissibility, of the evidence. [ ]. Here, the Defendants’ criticisms relate to the underlying factual basis. While the Defendants are free to bring out these criticisms on cross-examination, the Court finds that they are not grounds to exclude her testimony.”); Michaels v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 3:10-CV-1051-AC, 2013 WL 12318545, at *2 (D. Or. Apr. 19, 2013) (attacks on the factual assumptions underpinning economist's projections “went to weight and not admissibility, and the jury would decide whether the assumptions were supported by sufficient evidence.”).
*11 The same is true for Defendants’ economic rebuttal expert, Mr. Padron, who may offer testimony that disputes Mr. Meme's projections based on the statistical approaches and calculations expressed in his rebuttal report.
Accordingly, the parties’ motions to exclude the testimony of their respective economic experts are both DENIED.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Motion to Compel Payment of Expert Deposition Fees [D.E. 176] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; Defendants’ Motion to Compel Production of Expert Raw Data [D.E. 177] is GRANTED; and the Parties’ Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony [D.E. 186] [D.E. 187] are DENIED.
DONE AND SUBMITTED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 24th day of July, 2023.

Footnotes

On January 30, 2023, the Honorable Kathleen M. Williams referred all pretrial non-dispositive matters to the Undersigned Magistrate Judge for disposition. [D.E. 158].
Rule 702 states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
During the discovery hearing held on February 23, 2023, counsel for the parties indicated that they were engaged in conferral efforts aimed at reaching a resolution of the issue and that, in the event that a resolution was obtained, Defendants would be moving to withdraw the motion. Instead, on March 1, 2023, Defendants filed a reply rebutting Plaintiffs’ response and the motion was never withdrawn. To the extent that the parties have not already mooted this issue by agreement, Plaintiffs shall pay the deposition fees set forth herein.
Plaintiffs’ expert neurologist Larisa Elberg, M.D., charged an hourly rate of $250 for her deposition in this case, while Plaintiff's forensic accountant, Carl Meme, charged an hourly rate of $75 for his deposition.
Dr. Schwartzbard is a Board Certified Neurologist who graduated from medical school in 1993, and has been engaged in medical practice for over two decades. [D.E. 184-1]. She is a member of the National board of Medical Examiners and the American Academy of Neurology, an active neurology clinical researcher, and a neurology assistant professor at the University of Miami and FIU Schools of Medicine. Id.
As it was the case with Dr. Schwartzberg, Plaintiffs’ motion does not call into question the qualifications of Dr. Naidich. A cursory review of his resume reveals that his outstanding credentials and his decades-long radiology experience clearly qualify him to provide expert testimony in this case. [D.E. 184-3; 186-3 at 6].
Likewise, Plaintiffs’ argument that Dr. Naidich's opinion is unreliable because it is not supported by a differential diagnosis is unpersuasive because “an expert's failure to perform a differential diagnosis in rendering a specific causation opinion alone does not compel exclusion of the expert's testimony if the opinion is otherwise reliable.” In re 3M, 2021 WL 830309, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2021); see also Dawsey v. Carnival Corp., No. 16-23939-CIV, 2018 WL 4854651, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2018) (because “[plaintiff] bears the burden of proving causation[,] ... Defendants’ expert is allowed to provide testimony that casts doubt on [plaintiff]’s causation theory without also definitively opining on what caused the injury.”).
Mr. Meme is a licensed Certified Public Account, who holds a bachelor's degree in accounting, a Master's degree in finance, and a certification in financial forensics. [D.E. 187-1 at 18].