*1 This matter is before the court on: (i) defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC's (“JLRNA”) motion for a protective order with respect to certain interrogatory requests, ECF Doc. 19; and (ii) plaintiff John Biondi's motion to compel JLRNA to produce certain requested documents, ECF Doc. 24. For the reasons discussed below, JLRNA's motion for a protective order (ECF Doc. 19) is DENIED. However, ON THE COURT'S OWN MOTION, JLRNA's obligation to respond shall be LIMITED. Biondi's motion to compel (ECF Doc. 24) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Factual Background[1]

In early 2021, Biondi entered an agreement with March/Hodge/LaMarch Cleveland, LLC d/b/a Westside Automotive Group and Land Rover Westside (“Westside”), an authorized dealer for JLRNA, to lease a 2020 Land Rover Range Rover (the “Vehicle”) from Westside's Brooklyn, Ohio store. ECF Doc. 11 at 3. During the lease, Biondi contacted Westside periodically to report issues with battery warnings from the Vehicle. Id. at 4. Frustrated with Westside's responses, Biondi had the Vehicle serviced by Land Rover Solon, who replaced the battery and updated the Vehicle's software. Id.

Biondi alleges that on December 3, 2022, the Vehicle completely shut down on I-77 in rural Virginia while his spouse was driving herself and Biondi to Florida. Id. The Vehicle was towed to Land Rover Greensboro in Greensboro, North Carolina where it remained for repairs for approximately four months. Not long after the return of the allegedly repaired Vehicle, Biondi alleges the problematic low battery warning reappeared. Biondi's wife refuses to drive or ride in the Vehicle, and the Vehicle remains in the possession of Land Rover. Id. JLRNA denied Biondi's request for a buyback of the Vehicle. Id. On July 23, 2022, a different Land Rover owner reported a similar-sounding issue to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (“NHTSA”). Id.

Biondi now asserts three claims against JLRNA: (i) violation of Ohio's New Motor Vehicle Non-Conformities Act (the “Lemon Law”), Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.72; (ii) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq.; and (iii) breach of warranty. Id. at 5-7.

II. Procedural Background

On April 6, 2023, Biondi served JLRNA with his discovery requests. ECF Doc. 23 at 1; ECF Doc. 24 at 1.[2] JLRNA informally requested a 14-day extension of time to respond on May 9, 2023 – one day after the deadline to respond had expired. ECF Doc. 23 at 1; ECF Doc. 24 at 1-2. On June 2, 2023, JLRNA provided its initial discovery responses. ECF Doc. 23 at 2; ECF Doc. 24 at 2. Afterwards, Biondi sent a discovery deficiency notice to JLRNA, JLRNA provided amended responses, and Biondi served a second deficiency notice. ECF Doc. 23 at 2; ECF Doc. 24 at 2.

*2 On July 20, 2023, JLRNA filed the instant motion for a protective order, requesting that the court issue a protective order that: (i) forbade Biondi's counsel from recording JLRNA's inspection of the Vehicle and Biondi's expert witness from attending the inspection; and (ii) relieved JLRNA from having to provide further information or responses to Interrogatories No. 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18. ECF Doc. 19. Generally, JLRNA argues that a protective order should issue because: (i) as to the Vehicle's inspection, the court issued a previous order permitting only one attorney from Biondi's counsel's office could attend, the order provided no permission to video tape the inspection, and video tapping the inspection raised work product concerns, id. at 2-3 (citing ECF Doc. 17 at 1); and (ii) as to the interrogatories, they requested information that was irrelevant, unduly burdensome, or protected by attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine,[3] id. at 3-6. The next day, the court partially granted JLRNA's motion by granting a protective order on the Vehicle inspection issue and otherwise referring the remainder of the motion to the undersigned. ECF dkt. entry dated July 21, 2023.

On August 1, 2023, a status conference was held where the court and the parties discussed ongoing discovery disputes and Biondi indicated that he intended to file a motion to compel discovery. ECF dkt. entry dated Aug. 1, 2023. On August 4, 2023, Biondi filed his motion to compel discovery, requesting that the court order JLRNA to respond completely to Requests for Production No. 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, and 15. ECF Doc. 24. Generally, Biondi argues that JLRNA waived all objections by failing to timely respond to Biondi's discovery requests and that he is otherwise entitled to the information requested.[4] Id. at 5-11.

III. Waiver

In both his motion to compel and his opposition to JLRNA's motion for a protective order, Biondi argues that JLRNA's failure to object to the relevant discovery requests within the 30 days provided under Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 and 34 constituted a waiver of all objections. ECF Doc. 23 at 3; ECF Doc. 24 at 5-6. Biondi concedes that the 26-day delay is not egregious by itself but argues that the delay has prejudiced Biondi's trial preparation when it is coupled with JLRNA's boilerplate objections, which have caused delays in the resolution of various discovery disputes. ECF Doc. 24 at 6.

JLRNA responds by simply asserting that it has not waived its objections and stating: (i) that it provided responses within 2 days of Biondi's reminder email; and (ii) that sanctioning JLRNA with a waiver of objections is not justified in this case. ECF Doc. 27 at 1-2; ECF Doc. 29 at 2.

“[D]istrict courts have inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47, 136 S.Ct. 1885, 195 L.Ed.2d 161 (2016). Within this power, district courts have broad discretion under the rules of civil procedure to manage the discovery process. Marie v. Am. Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 366 (6th Cir. 2014). Deadlines provide courts with an important tool to exercise control over their dockets and ensure the efficient progress of a lawsuit. Thus, when parties play fast and loose with discovery deadlines, they do so at their own peril.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 governs interrogatories and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 governs document production. Both Rules establish a 30-day deadline for responses; and Rule 33 explicitly provides that untimely objections “[are] waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A); see also Carfagno v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 5:99-CV-118, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1768, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2001) (“As a general rule, failure to object to discovery requests within the thirty days provided by Rules 33 and 34 constitutes a waiver of any objection.”); Caldwell v. 9173-7999 Québec, Inc., No. 18-cv-12752, 2019 WL 6907349, at *1, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217953, at *3-7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2019) (“District courts in the Sixth Circuit have held that the waiver applies to both Rule 33 interrogatories and Rule 34 document production requests.”) (collecting cases). “If the time limits set forth in the discovery rules are to have any meaning, waiver is a necessary consequence of dilatory action ... [a]ny other result would completely frustrate the time limits contained in the Federal Rules and give a license to litigants to ignore the time limits for discovery without any adverse consequences.” Carfagno, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1768, 2001 WL 34059032, at *1 (internal quotations omitted).

*3 Courts not only have the power to enforce discovery deadlines but also have the discretion to relieve a party of its waiver if it finds that circumstances warrant such relief. See Carfagno, 2001 WL 34059032, at *1, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1768, at *4-5; see also Palombaro v. Emery Fed. Credit Union, No. 1:15-cv-792, 2017 WL 213071, at *3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6365, at *10-12 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 17, 2017). In exercising this discretion, courts will often determine whether enforcement of a waiver is equitable by examining “the circumstances of each case, including the reason for tardy compliance, prejudice to the opposing party, and the facial propriety of the discovery requests.” See Carfagno, 2001 WL 34059032, at *1, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1768, at *4-5; Caldwell v. 9173-7999 Québec, Inc., No. 18-cv-12752, 2019 WL 6907349, at *1, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217953, at *3-7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2019). A court may also limit the scope of requested discovery even after finding a defendant has waived its objections. See Firneno v. Nationwide Mktg. Servs., No. 14-cv-10104, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195322, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197900 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2016) (finding that the defendant waived all discovery objections but ordering production of only certain relevant documents).

Here, JLRNA has provided no arguments or reasons why its responses to Biondi's discovery requests were delayed. ECF Doc. 27 at 1-2; ECF Doc. 29 at 2. Even though Biondi asserted that JLRNA had waived its objections and had provided no justification for its delayed response, ECF Doc. 24 at 5-6, JLRNA's response brief still failed to provide any excuse or good cause for its late response and, instead, simply stated that it had provided responses two days after a reminder email, ECF Doc. 29 at 2. JLRNA's only argument against enforcement of a waiver appears to be the simple assertion that enforcement would be “unfair.” ECF Doc. 23 at 3; ECF Doc. 29 at 2. As to prejudice, while a 26-day delay might not usually result in significant prejudice, this case is set for trial in little over a month from now. As such, JLRNA's delayed response and its refusal to compromise in regard to the ongoing discovery dispute could result in appreciable prejudice to Biondi and his ability to prepare his case. Under these circumstances, I find that JLRNA has waived its objections to the interrogatories and requests for production through its failure to timely respond to Biondi's discovery requests and such a waiver is equitable.

That said, courts prefer to resolve issues and disputes on the merits rather than on procedural technicalities. See Michaels v. City of Vermilion, No. 1:05cv2991, 2007 WL 893185, at *––––, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95831, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007); see also White v. Coventry Health & Life Ins. Co., No. 3:14-CV-00645-CRS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147910, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 30, 2015) (citing Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 252 (6th Cir. 2003)). As such, the court has determined that it will exercise its discretion and excuse JLRNA's waiver of objections IN PART so that the court can assess the breadth of Biondi's discovery requests and the potential applicability of JLRNA's claims of attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. See Ghandi v. Police Dep't of City of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338, 354 (6th Cir. 1984).

IV. JLRNA's Motion for a Protective Order[5]

JLRNA's motion for a protective order originally sought protection related to Interrogatories No. 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18. ECF Doc. 19 at 4-6. Through the parties’ briefing, they indicate that they have narrowed the dispute and the scope of the requested protective order to only Interrogatories No. 12, 16, and 18. See ECF Doc. 23 at 2; ECF Doc. 27 at 1, 4.

A party from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). A court may issue a protective order “for good cause ... to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Id. The starting point in the protective order evaluation is the determination of whether discovery for which a protective order is sought is relevant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also, e.g., T.C. ex rel. S.C. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:17-CV-01098/3:17-CV-01159/3:17-CV-1209/3:17-CV-02177/3:17-CV-1427, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113517, at *17 (M.D. Tenn. July 9, 2018); Queen v. City of Bowling Green, No. 1:16CV-00131, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160425, at *12 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2017). If the information sought appears relevant, the party seeking the protective order must “articulate specific facts showing clearly defined and serious injury resulting from the discovery sought and cannot rely on mere conclusory statements.” Nix v. Sword, 11 F. App'x 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. Interrogatory No. 12

*4 Interrogatory No. 12 asked JLRNA to “state the number of 2020 Land Rover Range Rover vehicles bought or received back by you from January 1, 2020, through to the present, due to complaints related to electrical systems including the battery.” ECF Doc. 19-3 at 5. JLRNA's response to Interrogatory No. 12 was: “Objection, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and seeks information that is not relevant to Plaintiff's claims.” Id.

In its motion for a protective order, JLRNA argues that Interrogatory No. 12 seeks irrelevant information because “issues with other vehicles have nothing to do with the repairs to Plaintiff's vehicle, whether Plaintiff's vehicle is a ‘lemon,’ or whether JLRNA breached its warranty to Plaintiff.” ECF Doc. 19 at 4. It generally argues that Interrogatory No. 12 is overbroad and unduly burdensome. Id. at 4-5.

Biondi responds that he is entitled to inquire about repurchases of similar vehicles with similar defects and complaints because that information constitutes relevant evidence under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. ECF Doc. 23 at 3. He argues that if Interrogatory No. 12 is overly broad, it can be narrowed to request only “repurchases of vehicles that have ‘catastrophic electrical failures of 2020 Land Rover Range Rover vehicles while being driven.’ ” Id. Biondi argues that JLRNA did not attempt and failed to meet its burden to substantiate why Interrogatory No. 12 was overly burdensome with any specific showing of reasons or evidence. Id. at 4. JLRNA replies that a protective order is appropriate because Biondi has not sufficiently explained how the number of buybacks for undefined “electrical systems” issues has any relevance to his claims or how he would be permitted to offer such evidence at trial. ECF Doc. 27 at 2-3.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), a party may “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Rule 26 embodies a liberal approach to discovery, and ‘relevance’ is construed broadly for discovery purposes.” Howard v. Onion, No. 1:20-CV-02802-JG, 2023 WL 4706760, at *1, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127381, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 24, 2023) (citing Noakes v. Case Western Rsrv. Univ., No. 1:21-CV-01776-PAB, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227993, 2022 WL 17811630, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2022); see also Rui He v. Rom, No. 1:15-CV-1869, 2016 WL 909405, at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30923, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2016) (noting that the 2015 amendment s to Rule 26 “do not alter the basic tenet that Rule 26 is to be liberally construed to permit broad discovery”). Moreover, information “need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Given this liberal approach, I find that Interrogatory No. 12 seeks information that is relevant to Biondi's claim. I also find that JLRNA has not satisfied its burden of showing that Interrogatory No. 12 is unduly burdensome, particularly given that it provided no specific evidence to demonstrate how this request was actually burdensome. See Delta T, LLC v. Williams, 337 F.R.D. 395, 398 (S.D. Ohio 2021); see also Cratty v. City of Wyandotte, 296 F. Supp. 3d 854, 859 (E.D. Mich. 2017) (“A party objecting to a request for production of documents as burdensome must submit affidavits or other evidence to substantiate its objections.”).

*5 I also find that Interrogatory No. 12 is overly broad as written but it can be narrowly tailored to fix this deficiency. Thus, the court, ON ITS OWN MOTION, ORDERS that the scope of Interrogatory No. 12 shall be limited to requiring JLRNA to state:

B. Interrogatory No. 16

Interrogatory No. 16 asked JLRNA to “describe what policies, procedures and/or guidelines JLRNA had in place and referred to in determining whether The Vehicle should be replaced, or a refund offered in accord with the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Ohio's New Motor Vehicle Non-Conformities Act R.C. § 1345.73.” ECF Doc. 19-3 at 5. JLRNA's responded to Interrogatory No. 16 with an objection that it sought information that was protected by the work product doctrine and attorney client privilege. Id. It further stated that: “Decisions about whether to repurchase a vehicle depend on a number of factors including the particular issues with the vehicle, the number of repair attempts, the law of the jurisdiction where the vehicle is located, and any number of other factors. Further answering, any repurchase decisions are made on a case by case basis.” Id.

In its motion for a protective order, JLRNA argues that Interrogatory No. 16 clearly requests privileged information because it concerns decisions to repurchase vehicles pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act or Ohio's Lemon Law. ECF Doc. 19 at 5. It further argues that it answered the interrogatory by indicating that such a decision is made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 5-6.

Biondi responds that Interrogatory No. 16 does not implicate the work product doctrine or attorney-client privilege because it simply requested company policies and procedures relating to the Ohio and federal laws that underly two counts of this action. ECF Doc. 23 at 4-5. He further argues that JLRNA waived any assertion of privilege under Rule 26(b)(5) because it failed to provide a privilege log addressing its privilege objections. Id. at 5. JLRNA replies that it is entitled to a protective order because it is unclear how the information requested in this interrogatory is admissible or has any relevance to Biondi's claims in this action. ECF Doc. 27 at 3.

JLRNA's motion for a protective order is DENIED as to Interrogatory No. 16. The information requested in Interrogatory No. 16 is relevant and properly within the scope of discovery. See Howard, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127381, at *2; Rui He, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30923, at *4. Moreover, JLRNA responded by invoking attorney-client privilege but failed to provide a privilege log as required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) (providing that a party withholding information on the basis of privilege must “expressly make the claim [of privilege] and [ ] describe the nature of the [information withheld], without revealing the information itself [in order to] enable other parties to assess the claim.”). Accordingly, JLRNA must either provide Biondi with: (i) the information requested in Interrogatory No. 16., if it exists;[6] or (ii) a privilege log that complies with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, if it wishes to assert an attorney-client privilege.

C. Interrogatory No. 18

*6 Interrogatory No. 18 asked JLRNA to “identify the person(s), by name, title, and phone number at [JLRNA], most knowledgeable about the service and repairs performed on the Vehicle and/or most responsible for communicating to Flow Jaguar Land Rover Greensboro regarding those repairs and service.” ECF Doc. 19-3 at 6. JLRNA's response to Interrogatory No. 18 was: “The individuals most knowledgeable about the repairs would be the service technicians identified in the repair orders. Any relevant communications will be produced. Without waiving the foregoing objection, Hector Cruz was the JLRNA employee assigned to the technical assistance case opened by the dealership.” Id. (emphasis added).

JLRNA sought a protective order with respect to this interrogatory because it has adequately responded with the name of Hector Cruz, the employee in its technical assistance department who advised the dealership about the repairs, and because it is unclear why Biondi is objecting to this answer. ECF Doc. 19 at 6. Biondi responds that: (i) JLRNA knows who Cruz communicated with at the Flow Land Rover Greensboro, NC (“Flow”) dealership – the dealership who had the Vehicle for over four months making repairs; (ii) JLRNA supplied documents identifying specific persons at Flow who worked on the Vehicle; and (iii) “[i]t would be a simple thing to ask Mr. Cruz to identify all people at Flow that he spoke with.” ECF Doc. 23 at 5. JLRNA replies that it has responded sufficiently and argues that Biondi is asking for information not requested in the interrogatory because Biondi asked for identity of the most knowledgeable JLRNA employee and did not request the identity of any dealership personnel. ECF Doc. 27 at 3-4.

JLRNA's motion for a protective order is DENIED with respect to Interrogatory No. 18. JLRNA should provide Biondi with the identity of the persons to whom Cruz spoke at Flow in relation to the Vehicle.

V. Biondi's Motion to Compel[7]

A. Governing Principles

If a party fails to adequately answer an interrogatory or respond to a request for production, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling an answer or production. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that the information sought is discoverable: i.e., non-privileged, relevant, and proportional to the needs of the case or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. White v. City of Cleveland, 417 F. Supp. 3d 896, 902 (N.D. Ohio 2019); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). If met, the burden shifts to the disclosing party to show that the information sought is irrelevant, disproportional to the needs to the case, or overly burdensome to produce. O'Malley v. NaphCare Inc., 311 F.R.D. 461, 463 (S.D. Ohio 2015); see also Doe v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., No. 1:21 CV 1641, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81242, at *6 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 2022) (quoting Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 271 F.R.D. 556, 559 (N.D. Tex. 2010)).

B. Requests for Production

Request for Production No. 5 asked JLRNA to produce “a copy of all communications relating to The Vehicle and/or Dr. Biondi that occurred between [JLRNA] and dealerships other than Motorcars, including but not limited to [Flow].” ECF Doc. 19-3 at 9. JLRNA responded that the information was protected by the work product doctrine, but it would also provide any non-privileged, responsive documents if discovered. Id. (emphasis added).

*7 Biondi argues that he is entitled to communications between JLRNA and Flow because the information is relevant and JLRNA waived any privilege claim related to this request by failing to provide a corresponding privilege log. ECF Doc. 24 at 7. JLRNA responds that the request seeks privileged communications because they occurred in anticipation of litigation after Biondi threatened to bring a lawsuit. ECF Doc. 29 at 2. JLRNA concedes that it should have provided a privilege log for these communications and states it will provide such a log. Id.

Biondi's motion to compel is GRANTED with the respect to Request for Production No. 5, to the extent that JLRNA must either provide the documents requested or submit a privilege log that complies with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.

Biondi's Requests for Production No. 6 and 8, as well as JLRNA's responses are as follows:

ECF Doc. 19-3 at 9.

Biondi argues that Requests for Production No. 6 and 8 are not “fishing expeditions,” as characterized by JLRNA, but relate to information relevant to his case. ECF Doc. 24 at 7-8. He also argues that JLRNA did not attempt to demonstrate or substantiate its objection and, therefore, has not meet the standard for claiming that these requests for production are unduly burdensome. Id. at 8-9. JLRNA responds that it has found no internal memos, logs, or notes related to the Vehicle other than the repair orders already produced. ECF Doc. 29 at 3. It also argues that any documents relating to all other 2020 Range Rovers in existence have no relevance to Biondi's claims and it would be unduly burdensome to comb through all repair orders to locate repairs involving an “electrical issue.” Id. at 3-4.

Biondi's motion to compel is GRANTED as to Request for Production No. 6, to the extent that JLRNA must provide any internal memos, logs, or notes related to the Vehicle that exist and have not already been produced, unless it plans to assert attorney-client privilege over specific documents. In that case, then JLRNA must provide a corresponding privilege log in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.

Biondi's motion to compel is GRANTED IN PART as to Request for Production No. 8. The request as it is currently phrased is overly broad. However, it would not be too broad or overly burdensome if it were appropriately tailored to the circumstances of this case. Thus, JLRNA must produce documents related to an owner or lessee of 2020 Land Rover Range Rover complaining about:

*8 Request for Production No. 9 asked JLRNA to produce “provide all copies of repair orders for every 2020 Land Rover Range Rover where the owner or lessee complained about electrical issues, including battery warning light, battery failure, and electrical failure causing vehicle to shut down.” ECF Doc. 19-3 at 9. JLRNA responded that the information was overbroad and unduly burdensome. Id.

In his motion to compel, Biondi argues that JLRNA has labeled this as a “fishing expedition” without providing a demonstration of what responding to this request would entail. ECF Doc. 24 at 9. Biondi suggests that the request could be limited to “2020 Land Rovers that encounter a catastrophic electrical failure as experienced by Dr. and Mrs. Biondi.” JLRNA responds that producing every document related to an unspecified electrical issue in a 2020 Range Rover is an unreasonable and burdensome request that seeks information irrelevant to Biondi's claims. ECF Doc. 29 at 4-5.

I find that Request for Production No. 9 is overly broad as currently phrased. As before, a more limited request that is more tailored to the facts of this case would not be too broad or unduly burdensome. Accordingly, Biondi's motion to compel is GRANTED as to Request for Production No. 9, to the extent that JLRNA must produce all copies of repair orders for every 2020 Land Rover Range Rover where the owner or lessee complained about:

Requests for Production No. 13, 14, and 15 requested that JLRNA produce copies of: (i) “every technical service bulletin regarding NHTSA Complaint 11501496”; (ii) “all correspondence received by [JLRNA] or sent by [JLRNA] regarding NHTSA Complaint 11501496”; and (iii) “all documents generated in response to NHTSA Complaint 11501496.” ECF Doc. 19-3 at 10-11. JLRNA's response to each request was: “Objection, any technical service bulletins are publicly available to Plaintiff. Further answering, JLRNA is determining whether any responsive documents exist and investigating what NHTSA Complaint 11501496 refers to as it is not referenced any repair orders for the vehicle.” Id. (Emphasis added).

Biondi argues that he is entitled to learn what JLRNA knows about NHTSA Complaint 11501496 because that complaint involved an event with a 2020 Range Rover electrical failure that is almost identical to the Vehicle, and any actions taken by JLRNA to address that complaint are clearly relevant to the claims at issue in this case. ECF Doc. 24 at 9-11. JLRNA responds that the NHTSA complaint is an anonymous complaint concerning an unrelated vehicle that is both inadmissible hearsay and irrelevant to Biondi's claims. ECF Doc. 29 at 5.

Biondi's motion to compel is GRANTED as to Requests for Production No. 13, 14, and 15. As discussed previously, admissibility is not a bar to discovery under Rule 26 and I find that JLRNA's response to NHSTA Complaint 11501496 is relevant to Biondi's claims in this action.

VI. Summary

JLRNA's motion for a protective order (ECF Doc. 19) is DENIED because JLRNA waived its objections to plaintiff's discovery requests. However, ON THE COURT'S OWN MOTION, JLRNA's obligation to respond in regard to Interrogatory No. 12 shall be LIMITED, as described in the body of this Order.

*9 Biondi's motion to compel (ECF Doc. 24) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion to compel is GRANTED as to Requests for Production No. 5, 6, 13, 14, and 15. The motion to compel is GRANTED as to Requests for Production No. 8 and 9, to the extent that these requests shall be limited as described above. Because the court found certain requests to be overly broad, Biondi's motion is DENIED to the extent he sought an order compelling discovery as originally phrased.

So that the court can preserve its existing deadlines, JLRNA is ORDERED to provide its responses in a form consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within 10 days from the entry of this Order.

To the extent that JLRNA intends to assert a claim of attorney-client privilege concerning any production discussed above, it is ORDERED to provide a privilege log pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). Such a privilege log must include: (i) the legal basis for each claim of privilege; and (ii) a description of the content of the document with sufficient particularity to permit Biondi and/or the court to evaluate the propriety of the privilege claim. If JLRNA has already provided such a privilege log, it must, within 10 days, certify to the court that it has done so. Likewise, JLRNA must, within 10 days, certify that it has produced responsive information in regard to any discovery response that contained a future promise to produce or respond.

IT IS SO ORDERED.