*1 Dear Counsel:

This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion of Defendants Universal Property Services, Inc. (“Universal”) and Shamikh Kazmi (collectively “Defendants”) to quash two non-party subpoenas duces tecum served on TD Bank, N.A. (“TD Bank”) and Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”), or, in the alternative, for the entry of a protective order that limits the scope of the two subpoenas duces tecum. (Dkt. No. 62). Plaintiff Petroleum Marketing Group, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) opposes the Motion. (Dkt. No. 65). The Court considers the Motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rules 37.1(b)(4) and 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Quash is DENIED and alternative Motion for the Entry of a Protective order is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As the facts and background are well-known to the parties and the Court, they are not set forth at length. Only those facts and procedural history related to the instant Motion are discussed herein.

By way of background, this action arises out of Plaintiff's claim that Defendants took, without permission or payment, thousands of gallons of Plaintiff's gasoline product arising from a business relationship between the parties that began in February 2021. (See Dkt. No. 1). Defendants deny Plaintiff's allegations and Universal asserts a counterclaim seeking, inter alia, restitution for alleged lost revenue caused when Plaintiff turned off the fuel supply to Universal without providing a contractually required notice period. (See Dkt. No. 34).

The parties are currently engaged in discovery. At issue in the instant Motion, are two (2) subpoenas that Plaintiff served on TD Bank and BOA on or about September 8, 2022 and September 9, 2022 (collectively, the “Subpoenas”). (See Dkt. Nos. 62-3, 62-4). Through the Subpoenas, Plaintiff seeks documents relating to Defendant Universal's accounts, including transaction data and payment, transfer, and withdrawal information. (See Dkt. Nos. 62-3, 62-4). The Subpoenas also seek “[a]ll documents identifying and/or listing other accounts for which Shamikh Kazmi and/or Syed Kazmi are authorized signatories.”[1] (Dkt. No. 62-3 at II.2.; Dkt. No. 62-4 at II.2). The first request in each Subpoena limits the time period “from January 1, 2019 to present,” whereas the other requests are not limited to any time period. (See Dkt. No. 62-3 at II.1; Dkt. No. 62-4 at II.1).

On September 22, 2022, Defendants informed Plaintiff that they objected to the Subpoenas, (See Dkt. No. 65 at p. 6), and filed the instant Motion on September 28, 2022, (Dkt. No. 62). On September 30, 2022, TD Bank produced documents in response to the Subpoena, which Plaintiff in turn produced to Defendants. (Dkt No. 65 at pp. 6-7). On October 17, 2022, BOA responded to Plaintiff, stating that it could not locate any documents responsive to the Subpoena. (Dkt No. 65-2).

*2 Through the instant Motion, Defendants ask the Court to quash the Subpoenas as being overbroad, harassing, and unduly burdensome. (See Dkt. No. 62-1 at pp. 6-7). Defendants contend that the Subpoenas seek information unrelated to Universal's claim of lost profits in its counterclaim, by seeking documents as to all accounts used by Universal and all of its principals. Alternatively, Defendants argue that the Court should enter a protective order limiting the scope of the Subpoenas. Defendants propose the following limitations: (1) Universal's bank account statements for the time period of January 1, 2021 through August 10, 2021, and providing Defendants an opportunity to first review the statements and redact any trade secret, confidential, or proprietary information unrelated to the claim for lost profits; (2) Universal's profit and loss statements and balance sheets during that same time period; and (3) documents related to transactions between Universal and Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 62-1 at pp. 7-8).

Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ Motion. (See Dkt. No. 65). Plaintiff argues that Defendants do not have standing to quash the Subpoenas to the extent that they seek information related to non-party Syed Kazmi. (Dkt. No. 65 at pp. 8-9). Plaintiff further argues that there is no contention by TD Bank or BOA that the Subpoenas impose on them an undue burden for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 and that Defendants fail to specify the burden imposed on them through the Subpoenas. (Dkt. No. 65 at pp. 9-10). Plaintiff also contends that the Subpoenas seek relevant information proportional to Universal's claimed lost profits in excess of $20 million, in that the sought-after documents may show both the quantum of any alleged loss by Universal and also the cause thereof. (Dkt. No. 65 at pp. 10-11). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the determination of whether the principals of Universal are signatories to other accounts would allow Plaintiff to determine if there are other Universal customers tending to support Universal's claim of lost profits. (Dkt. No. 65 at p. 12). Finally, Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ request for the entry of a protective order because Defendants have not met their burden for such an order and the proposed restrictions, including the proposed time limitation, would too narrowly restrict Plaintiff's discovery of Defendants’ claim for lost profits. (Dkt. No. 65 at pp. 12-15).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Generally, parties may seek discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to a party's claim or defense and that is “proportional to the needs of the case, considering ... the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The information need not be admissible at the trial. Id. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the court must limit the ... extent of discovery otherwise allowed ... if it determines that ... the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). “While the scope of discovery is broad, it is not unlimited ... and should not serve as a fishing expedition.” Burgess v. Galloway, Civ. No. 20-6744, 2021 WL 2661290, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, discovery is not limitless and may be circumscribed by the Court within the Court's discretion. See Bayer AG v. Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1999).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3) governs motions to quash or modify a subpoena and provides as follows:

*3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(i)-(iv) (emphasis added). The movant bears the burden of persuasion to quash a subpoena. See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. 21st Cent. Fox Am., Inc., Civ. No. 18-11273, 2022 WL 2533011, at *4 (D.N.J. July 7, 2022) (slip op.); see also Memory Bowl v. N. Pointe Ins. Co., 280 F.R.D. 181, 185 (D.N.J. 2012). “[I]f the movant demonstrates that the subpoena falls outside the scope of permissible discovery, requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, or subject[s] a person to undue burden[,]” the court may quash or modify the subpoena. Occidental Chem. Corp., 2022 WL 2533011, at *4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In addition, “[a]n undue burden exists when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive.” In re Lazaridis, 865 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (D.N.J. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To determine if a subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive, a court may consider the following factors: (1) the party's need for the production; (2) the nature and importance of the litigation; (3) the relevance of the material; (4) the breadth of the request for production; (5) the time period covered by the request; (6) the particularity with which the documents are described; and (7) the burden imposed on the subpoenaed party. Id. Ultimately, a district court “has broad discretion regarding the enforcement of subpoenas.” Tattle Tale Portable Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, Civ. No. 11-7013, 2012 WL 1191214, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2012) (citation omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) permits a party to seek a protective order to shield that party “from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The party seeking such an order bears the “burden of persuasion” and must show good cause through a demonstrable need for protection. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986); see Glenmede Tr. Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121 (citations omitted). Indeed, the “harm must be significant, not a mere trifle.” Id. (citations omitted).

Ultimately, the resolution of the instant dispute lies within the Court's sound discretion. See Forrest v. Corzine, 757 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (D.N.J. 2010) (“Magistrate Judges are given wide discretion to manage cases and to limit discovery in appropriate circumstances.”).

III. DISCUSSION

First, the Court addresses whether Defendants have standing to challenge the entirety of the Subpoenas at issue. A party who claims a personal privilege, including with respect to bank account records, has standing to move to quash a third-party subpoena directed to financial institutions. See Schmulovich v. 1161 Rt. 9 LLC, Civ. No. 07-597, 2007 WL 2362598, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2007). Defendants, therefore, have standing to bring the instant Motion to the extent the Subpoenas seek their financial information. The Court, however, agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants lack standing to challenge the subpoenas through a motion to quash to the extent the Subpoenas seek financial information relating to non-party Syed Kazmi. See Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, Civ. No. 15-8252, 2016 WL 3876425, at *3 (D.N.J. July 14, 2016) (“Generally, a motion to quash or modify a subpoena must be brought by the individual to whom it was directed.”).

*4 Nevertheless, Rule 26(c) affords Defendants standing to move for a protective order as to the entirety of the Subpoenas, including to the extent Plaintiff seeks documents relating to non-party Syed Kazmi.[2] See Contour Data Sols. LLC v. Gridforce Energy Mgmt., LLC, Civ. No. 20-3241, 2022 WL 3907530, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2022) (finding that a party lacked standing to quash a subpoena under Rule 45, but had standing to seek a protective order under Rule 26(c)); in re Actiq Sales & Mktg. Pracs. Litig., Civ. No. 11-274, 2011 WL 5509434, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2011) (same). Accordingly, the Court considers Defendants’ arguments under Rule 45 relating to Defendants’ own financial documents sought through the Subpoenas and considers Defendants’ arguments under Rule 26(c) as to the entirety of the Subpoenas.

Second, considering Defendants’ arguments as to the alleged undue burden of the subpoenas, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their burden. “A party does not generally have standing to challenge a third party subpoena based on undue burden because the subpoena is directed at [a third-party].” Malibu Media, 2016 WL 3876425, at *4 (citations omitted). Here, Defendants do not have standing to claim undue burden on behalf of TD Bank or BOA and, even if they did, Defendants fail to raise any basis for claiming such an undue burden on the financial institutions’ behalf. Moreover, Defendants have not established that the Subpoenas pose an undue burden on Defendants themselves other than to assert that the requests are overly broad. In short, Defendants have not articulated a basis upon which the Court can find that the Subpoenas are unreasonable or oppressive based on the relevant factors set forth in in re Lazaridis. See in re Lazaridis, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 524. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to the extent it seeks to quash the Subpoenas pursuant to Rule 45.

Third, the Court considers Defendants’ objections as to relevancy and scope under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Here, Universal has asserted a counterclaim against Plaintiff, placing into issue Universal's alleged lost profits as a result of the alleged breach of the parties’ agreement. As to temporal limitations, Defendants argue that the relevant time period should be January 1, 2021 (one month before the parties’ relationship) through August 10, 2021 (when the alleged breach occurred). (Dkt. No. 62-1 at p. 7). Plaintiff counters that limiting the requests in time, beyond the first topic, is inappropriate because it needs to evaluate Universal's profits before the parties’ relationship began and after the relationship ended. (See Dkt. No. 65 at pp. 13-15).

Discovery of nonprivileged relevant matter must also be “proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). A fulsome picture of Defendants’ claim for lost profits is relevant to Universal's Counterclaim. However, discovery of such financial information more than two (2) years prior to the formation of the parties’ relationship is not proportional to the needs of the case and would result in the production of information irrelevant to Universal's claim of lost profits. Further, financial information dated just one (1) month prior to the relationship, as Defendants suggest, is too narrow to provide Plaintiff with sufficient discovery as to Universal's alleged lost profits. Rather, the Court finds that a six (6) month time period prior to the formation of the parties’ relationship represents a fair balance of the respective interests of the parties and is proportional to the needs of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); LaVerde v. Sirius Am. Ins. Co., Civ. No. 08-1946, 2012 WL 13033983, at *10 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2012) (finding that lost profits must be established with a “reasonable degree of certainty” and can be established through showing “past experience of an ongoing, successful business”). In addition, discovery as to Universal's financial information dated through the present is appropriate and proportional here, given Universal's allegations regarding its lost profits. Accordingly, the Court grants in part Defendants’ request for a Protective Order because the topics in the Subpoenas are not limited to a relevant time period. The Court finds that the relevant time period for purposes of the Subpoenas at issue in this Motion is August 1, 2020 through the present.

*5 However, regarding Defendants’ additional proposed limitations, the Court finds these limitations too narrow. The requests in the Subpoena, subject to an appropriate time limitation, seek relevant information that are proportional to the needs of the case. Indeed, Defendants’ concerns as to confidential and/or proprietary information that may be contained in the responses to the Subpoenas can be addressed pursuant to the Discovery Confidentiality Order entered on November 9, 2022. (See Dkt. No. 70). For these reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ request for a Protective Order that further limits the sought-after discovery subject to this Motion.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, and for good cause shown;

IT IS, THEREFORE, on this 5th Day of December 2022,

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Quash (Dkt. No. 62) is hereby DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Entry of a Protective Order is hereby GRANTED IN PART; to the extent Defendants seek to temporally limit the topics in the Subpoenas at issue, the Court hereby limits the relevant time period for each topic in the Subpoenas at issue to August 1, 2020 through the present; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to TERMINATE the Motion pending at Docket Entry No. 62.

SO ORDERED.