*1 This matter comes before the Court on defendant's “Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production of Documents” (Dkt. # 23). The Court, having reviewed the submissions of the parties and the remainder of the record, finds as follows:

I. Background

Pro se plaintiff Michael Long filed this employment discrimination lawsuit against Amazon.com, asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. See Dkt. # 1. Defendant Amazon.com has filed a motion to compel plaintiff's responses to its requests for production. See Dkt. # 23.

A. Right to Sue Notice

Under Title VII, a complainant must file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, or 300 days if the complainant initially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e); see Green v. L.A. Cnty. Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1473 (9th Cir. 1989). If the EEOC does not bring suit based on the charge, the EEOC must “notify the person aggrieved” that he can file suit. Id. § 2000e–5(f)(1). “The notice is accomplished through a right-to-sue letter.” Surrell v. California Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). Once a person receives an EEOC right-to-sue letter, he has 90 days to file suit. Id. § 2000e– 5(f)(1); see also Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the 90-day period is a statute of limitations). If the lawsuit is not filed within 90-days of receipt of the dismissal notice, the Title VII action generally is time barred. Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1997).

Here, plaintiff's initial Complaint alleged that he received a dismissal notice from the EEOC, dated October 25, 2022, on October 28, 2022. See Dkt. # 1 at 6; Dkt. # 1-2. As plaintiff's complaint was filed on February 14, 2023 – more than 90 days after the receipt of his dismissal notice – Amazon filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Complaint was untimely. See Dkt. # 5. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, alleging that he received his dismissal notice on November 28, 2022. See Dkt. # 9; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B) (explaining that a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b)).

Recognizing that in reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, “[a]ll well-pleaded allegations of material fact in the complaint are accepted as true and are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013), Amazon withdrew its motion to dismiss, “reserving all rights to raise the statute of limitations defense through a summary judgment motion,” Dkt. # 11 at 1.

B. Amazon's Requests for Production

On June 9, 2023, Amazon served plaintiff with defendant's First Request for Production of Documents, which contains six requests focused on obtaining documents relevant to Amazon's statute of limitations defense. Specifically, Amazon sought:

Dkt. # 24-1 at 4-6.

Plaintiff did not respond to the request within the 30-day timeline established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. # 23 at 2; Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A) (“The party to whom the request is directed must respond in writing within 30 days after being served.”). On July 20, 2023, defense counsel followed up with plaintiff in writing and via a telephone call. Dkt. # 24-1 at 9; Dkt. # 23 at 2-3. On July 24, 2023, defense counsel requested in writing that plaintiff produce all documents responsive to Amazon's document request. Dkt. # 24-1 at 12-13. Receiving no response, defense counsel followed up again on August 8, 2023. Id. at 15.

On August 11, 2023, plaintiff served Amazon with a blanket objection to the document request, stating as follows:

Id. at 17. On August 21, 2023, plaintiff and defense counsel met and conferred over the telephone in an attempt to resolve the discovery dispute, but no resolution was reached. Dkt. # 24 at 2.

On August 31, 2023, Amazon filed the instant motion to compel. See Dkt. # 23. Plaintiff has failed to respond to Amazon's motion.

II. Legal Standard

District courts have significant discretion to control discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). However, both litigants and third parties are subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30-35 (1984). Rule 26(b)(1) provides that parties:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Because discovery must be both relevant and proportional, the right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. Discovery may be denied where: “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

On a motion to compel discovery, the moving party carries the “initial burden of demonstrating relevance.” Rockemore v. Aguirre, No. C21-550VAP-ADS, 2022 WL 18397379, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2022) (citation omitted). “As part of this burden, the moving party must identify each disputed discovery request, the response to each request, and an argument why the response is deficient.” Id. Once relevance has been established, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that discovery should be disallowed and to support its objections with evidence. Id.; see also Bryant v. Ochoa, No. C07-200JM-PCL, 2009 WL 1390794, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009).

III. Analysis

Here, the Court finds that Amazon has met its initial burden of demonstrating relevance. Amazon's requests for production are relevant to its contemplated statute of limitations defense, as all six requests seek information about correspondence between plaintiff and the EEOC, as well as information regarding how plaintiff may have received materials from the EEOC (including through the mail or via e-mail). See Dkt. # 23 at 5.

Plaintiff failed to respond to defendant's request for production within the 30-day timeline set forth by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Ninth Circuit has held that failure to object to requests for production of documents within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection. See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff also failed to file a response to defendant's motion to compel, which, under this Court's local rules, “may be considered by the court as an admission that the motion has merit.” LCR 7(b)(2). However, pro se litigants are afforded more leniency than those represented by counsel and are to be given opportunities to correct their procedural mistakes. See Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986) (pro se litigants should be treated with “great leniency” when evaluating compliance with rules of civil procedure); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[F]ederal courts liberally to construe the ‘inartful pleadings’ of pro se litigants.”). Accordingly, the Court will consider the objections raised in plaintiff's response to defendant's requests for production.

As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with plaintiff's argument that the requests are “vague, ambiguous” and “overly broad” as to “time and scope.” Dkt. # 24-1 at 17. Plaintiff has failed to specify what part of the requests he considers vague or ambiguous, and the Court's independent review of defendant's requests has not identified any vague or ambiguous language. Furthermore, absent any specific argument from plaintiff as to his overbreadth objection, the Court agrees with defendant that each of its requests are “narrowly tailored to the statute of limitations defense and discovering any admissions by Plaintiff to the EEOC.” Dkt. # 23 at 2.

*4 Plaintiff objects that the information sought is not relevant, as defendant “withdrew a Motion to dismiss on matters pertaining to documents being requested.” Dkt. # 24-1 at 17. However, when Amazon withdrew its motion to dismiss, it clearly indicated that it intended to raise the statute of limitations defense at the summary judgment stage. See Dkt. # 11. As discussed above, the information sought is relevant to the statute of limitations defense.

Plaintiff further objects that the request “seeks disclosure of privileged or confidential information.” Dkt. # 24-1 at 17. If plaintiff believes that certain information sought by the requests is protected by a recognized privilege, then plaintiff must follow the procedure for making a claim of privilege outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5). He may not assert a conclusory blanket claim of “privilege” as a justification for refusing to produce any documents in response to defendant's discovery request.

Finally, plaintiff raises an objection that the request seeks “inaccessible data (i.e. phone calls between Plaintiff and EEOC etc.).” Dkt. # 24-1 at 17. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a responding party produce “writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations” that are within the “responding party's possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1).

The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that discovery should be disallowed and accordingly grants defendant's motion to compel.

IV. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to compel (Dkt. # 23) is GRANTED. Plaintiff must respond in writing to each of the production requests and provide Amazon with all responsive documents within 14 days of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 19th day of September, 2023.

Robert S. Lasnik

United States District Judge