*1 Defendant Donte Ramone Howard faces a four-count indictment charging him with drug and firearms offences. See Indictment, D.E. 21. In investigating Howard's alleged crimes, law enforcement officers executed two search warrants—one targeted an apartment, and the other authorized officers to search Howard's mother's home. Howard now seeks to suppress the fruits of those searches, contending that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See First Mot. Suppress, D.E. 61; Second Mot. Suppress, D.E. 64. He also asks the court to schedule a Franks hearing because, he claims, the apartment search warrant application recklessly omitted information that, if included, would vitiate probable cause.

For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that the court deny Howard's motions to suppress (D.E. 61, 64).

I. Background

In September 2021, management from the Park Central apartment complex contacted the Raleigh Police Department to report drug activity on the property. See Apartment Warrant at 4, D.E. 61–1. Park Central explained that it had been conducting “routine fire sprinkler system checks inside each apartment.” Id. As part of these inspections (of which tenants received notice), management sought to inspect Apartment 324. When they arrived, however, no one was home. Id. Park Central management and employees of Fire & Life Safety America (a private company) then entered the apartment and encountered “an overwhelming odor of marijuana.” Id. They noticed “numerous small containers with marijuana in plain sight[,]” emptied cigars, and “a large plastic trash bag that appeared to be full of marijuana.” Id. In another room, they found “bulk amounts of paper U.S. currency along with a money counter machine.” Id. Management took pictures of these items and sent them to RPD. Id.; see also Police Report, D.E. 61–4.

RPD officers sought and received a search warrant for Apartment 324 the same day. See Apartment Warrant at 1. The warrant affidavit described what Park Central management told RPD, but it did not include the photos.

When officers executed the search warrant that night, they found 24 pounds of marijuana, over $500,000 in cash, and a money counter. See Police Report at 2. They also uncovered a firearm hidden in a sofa. Id. And although Howard's name was not on the lease for Apartment 324, various law enforcement agencies (including the Department of Homeland Security) knew from an ongoing investigation that he lived there. See First Mot. Suppress at 3; see also Black Stallion Warrant Affidavit at 8, D.E. 64–1 (“Investigators served an administrative subpoena at the apartment complex requesting video footage and documentation that was used to lease the apartment. Video footage revealed HOWARD was the primary resident of apartment, even though documentation provided showed a female had leased the apartment.”).

The following Valentine's Day, DHS applied for a federal warrant to search a home that belongs to Howard's mother on Black Stallion Court in Zebulon, North Carolina. See Black Stallion Warrant Affidavit at 1. Through surveillance, DHS determined that Howard had been living at the Black Stallion home and suspected that he stored bulk marijuana there before it was disbursed to distribution locations by other members of the alleged drug trafficking ring. Id. at 6. Howard purportedly laundered the drug proceeds through a business called Never Change Auto, LLC. Id. at 12.

*2 In its application, DHS explained the steps it had taken in investigating Howard before requesting the warrant: Law enforcement officers watched other members of the alleged drug trafficking organization arrive at the Black Stallion home with bags of money and leave with large duffel bags or other containers. Id. They intercepted text messages in which Howard advertised different strains of marijuana—often priced by the pound. Id. at 7. They also spoke to two confidential informants. One claimed that he travelled to the Black Stallion home “to pick up bulk marijuana and transported it to various locations for it to be sold.” Id. The other claimed that he had purchased marijuana from Howard at Never Change Auto and that Howard sold marijuana from the home. Id. at 8. DHS also noted the large amount of drugs and cash that RPD officers seized from Apartment 324 four months earlier. Id. And finally, investigators assessed bank records associated with Never Change Auto stretching back to 2020. Id. at 9–10.

A United States Magistrate Judge granted DHS's search warrant application, and the agency executed the warrant in late February. See Black Stallion Warrant at 1, D.E. 64–2. The warrant authorized officers to seize “evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities” of drug trafficking, conspiracy to traffic drugs, money laundering, wire fraud, and bank fraud. Id. at 3. It then listed several categories of property subject to seizure. Id. After executing the warrant, officers supplied an inventory of items they seized. Id. at 4. Among these were two handguns, a money counter, ten pieces of jewelry,[1] several electronic devices, three cars, and nearly $200,000 in cash. Id.

After the Black Stallion search warrant was signed—but before it was executed—the government filed a criminal complaint against Howard. See Compl., D.E. 1. The complaint charged him with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of marijuana. Id. at 1. Howard was arrested and, eventually, indicted. The four-count indictment—which was filed after officers searched the Black Stallion home—charges him with: conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana; possession with intent to distribute a quantity of marijuana; possession of a firearm by a felon; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. See Indictment at 1–2.

Nearly a year after he was indicted, Howard moved to suppress the fruits of both searches. He first contends that the apartment search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the officer who applied for the search warrant “recklessly omitted photos and information about management's reliability that would have negated probable cause.” First Mot. Suppress at 3. This, Howard maintains, entitles him to a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to determine whether the evidence gathered in the search should be excluded. Id. He also alleges that the initial sprinkler safety inspection was an unconstitutional administrative search. Id. at 3–4.

Second, Howard challenges the search of his mother's home. He claims that the Black Stallion warrant application also “failed to establish probable cause” because “each sentence of the application referencing the residence must be stricken” under binding caselaw. Second Mot. Suppress at 10. He also maintains that the warrant was insufficiently particular. See id. at 14–15. And because the warrant was facially unconstitutional, Howard argues, “the executing officers could not reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id. at 16 (cleaned up). Taken together, Howard's motions seek suppression of all evidence gathered from executing the warrants and a Franks hearing to discuss the alleged deficiencies in the apartment warrant application.

II. Discussion

The Fourth Amendment protects two distinct—but related—rights. To begin with, it mandates that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. It then provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 allows defendants to move to suppress evidence gathered in violation of these rights. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h).

*3 Howard contends that the court should suppress the fruits of the searches at Apartment 324 and his mother's home. He also maintains that he is entitled to a Franks hearing to determine whether law enforcement's alleged omissions in the apartment warrant application affected the state court's probable cause determination. His arguments are unavailing.

A. The Apartment Search Was Constitutional

Howard makes two arguments for suppressing the evidence found within Apartment 324. First, he claims he is entitled to a Franks hearing because the affidavit in support of the search warrant omitted the photos that Park Central management sent to RPD and because law enforcement failed to include information about the reliability of Park Central management. See First Mot. Suppress at 4–9. And second, he alleges that Park Central management and the private inspectors that entered his apartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an administrative search without consent. Id. at 9.

Howard first contends that the court should suppress evidence obtained from the apartment search because the search warrant application failed to include the photographs that Park Central supplied RPD and omitted information about the reliability of Park Central management. Id. at 4–9. He seeks a Franks hearing to explore these issues and allow the court to make a new assessment of probable cause.

To be entitled to a Franks hearing (which is a precursor to finding an affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause), a defendant must satisfy both an intentionality and a materiality prong. United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit has noted that “[t]he defendant's burden is a heavy one[.]” United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 558 (4th Cir. 1994). And there is a “strong ‘presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant[.]’ ” Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171).

At the start, a defendant must “make ‘a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit.’ ” Id. at 300 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56). Allegations of “negligence or innocent mistake” will not do. Franks, 428 U.S. at 171.

When a defendant alleges that law enforcement has omitted material information from a warrant application, his “burden increases yet more.” United States v. Tate, 524 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). This is because “an affidavit offered to procure a search warrant ‘cannot be expected to include ... every piece of information gathered in the course of an investigation.’ ” Id. (quoting Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300). So the mere fact that an affiant omitted information from an affidavit cannot show recklessness or intentionality. United States v. Shorter, 328 F.3d 167, 171 (4th Cir. 2003). Instead, a defendant must establish that the affiant “omit[ted] material facts ‘with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading.’ ” Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300 (quoting United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1986)).

A defendant's allegations related to the intentionality prong “ ‘must be more than conclusory’ and must be accompanied by a detailed offer of proof.” Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). If the defendant cannot submit supporting documentation or statements, the “absence [of these documents should be] satisfactorily explained.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.

*4 If the defendant satisfies the intentionality prong, the court's analysis then moves to the materiality prong. Under this prong, a defendant is only entitled to a Franks hearing if he can show that the offending information was “essential to the probable cause determination[.]” Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300. “To determine materiality, a court must ‘excise the offending inaccuracies and insert the facts recklessly omitted, and then determine whether or not the ‘corrected’ warrant affidavit would establish probable cause.’ ” Miller v. Prince George's County, 475 F.3d 621, 628 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000)).

If the defendant can satisfy both the intentionality and materiality prongs, he is entitled to a hearing where he can try to establish “an affiant's material perjury or recklessness ... by a preponderance of the evidence[.]” Colkley, 889 F.2d at 300. If the defendant succeeds, the court will suppress the warrant and the evidence obtained through its execution. Id.

Howard contends that Officer Pekich, the RPD officer who filled out the apartment warrant application, “omitted two key pieces of information.” First Mot. Suppress at 5. “First,” Howard maintains, “he failed to include the photos management sent to RPD.” Id. The first photo shows a yellow rolling tray with two small packages and an emptied cigar casing on top of it. See Photos at 1, D.E. 61–2. One of the packages is labeled “Blue Nerdz[,]” and the other is black. Id. Next to the tray are two containers. Although the containers are dim, one of their lids appears to depict marijuana leaf,[2] and the other says “STAY LIIIT[.]” Id. A dark substance can be seen within the containers, but it's not immediately clear what the substance is.

The second photo is a black trash bag that is partially tied shut. See Photos at 2. Like the substance in the containers in the first photo, the bag's contents are dim. Id. It's impossible to state with certainty what's in the bag from the picture alone, but it appears to contain a dark green substance in clear plastic wrapping. Id.

According to Howard, these photos “prove nothing”—the dark blobs in the containers and trash bag are too obscure to make out, and the other items in the photos are not illegal to possess. First Mot. Suppress at 5. Thus, the officer's omission of the pictures “created a false narrative that management took unmistakable photos of marijuana[,]” and their inclusion “would have negated probable cause[.]” Id. at 5–6.

Howard is incorrect. Nothing in the photos would negate probable cause for the warrant. The first photo shows a rolling tray, a cigar wrapper, one container that bears a marijuana leaf, and another that is emblazoned with “Get Liiit,” slang for getting high. And as for the second photo, the dark green substance inside the trash bag, while not clearly marijuana, appears consistent with marijuana. See Photos at 2. These items all support—not negate—the contention that there was marijuana use going on in the house.

Thus, RPD's omission of the photographs in its warrant application does not entitle Howard to a Franks hearing.

Howard also alleges that Officer Pekich omitted details about the reliability of Park Central's management. This argument depends on Howard's contention that “[t]he photos demonstrated ... management falsely claimed the photos showed marijuana inside the apartment.”[3] Mem. in Supp. at 6. But since the photos do not show that management made a false statement, this argument fails.

*5 Howard has not shown that the inclusion of the photographs would have altered the state judge's probable cause determination. Thus, the court should find that Howard is not entitled to a Franks hearing.

Howard next contends that the court should suppress the fruits of the apartment search because Park Central management and the private inspectors entered the apartment without a warrant to conduct the sprinkler safety inspection. First Mot. Suppress at 9.

But this is a difficult argument because the Fourth Amendment doesn't apply to private actors. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“This Court has ... consistently construed [the Fourth Amendment] as proscribing only governmental action[.]”). Thus, the Amendment “is wholly inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Neither Park Central nor Fire & Life Safety America are government actors—their employees' conduct does not implicate Howard's Fourth Amendment rights.

Howard still suggests that the sprinkler inspection contravened the Constitution because Park Central management and the safety inspectors entered the apartment as part “of a public-private investigation.” First Mot. Suppress at 9. In essence, Howard claims that his “Fourth Amendment interests were implicated during the inspection” because it was “conducted under the auspices of federal, state, and local ordinances, codes, or law.” Id. And because “no allegations of substandard or dangerous conditions were made” before the inspection, he contends that it was “not a reasonable search of private property” under the Amendment. Id.

In evaluating a motion to suppress the fruits of a private search, courts consider “whether the Government knew of and acquiesced in the private search” and “whether the private individual intended to assist law enforcement or had some independent motivation.” United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Howard satisfies neither factor. Although TFO McCann had been investigating Howard before the sprinkler inspection, Howard provides no evidence suggesting that he knew Park Central management planned to inspect Apartment 324. And the inspection was a routine, yearly safety precaution accompanied by advance notice. See Park Central Subpoena Resp. at 2, D.E. 61–3. Thus, Park Central had an independent motivation to search the apartment: community safety.

Howard cites Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), to suggest that the fruits of the search should be suppressed. But Camara does not compel that outcome. That case involved a Fourth Amendment challenge to a city employee's warrantless administrative inspection of the petitioner's property—not a routine inspection conducted by a private apartment complex and its vendor. See id. at 525–26 (noting that the inspector was an employee of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Fransisco Department of Public Health).

*6 In sum, Howard has failed to show that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Park Central management and employees of Fire & Life Safety America entered Apartment 324. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to private searches, and there is no evidence that these private actors' actions can be imputed to the government. Thus, the court should deny Howard's first motion to suppress (D.E. 61).

B. The Home Search Was Constitutional

Howard's second motion to suppress contends that the search of his mother's home on Black Stallion Court violated his Fourth Amendment rights for two reasons. First, Howard alleges that the search warrant application does not establish probable cause. Mot. Suppress at 10. Second, he maintains that the warrant fails the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, rendering it an unconstitutional general warrant. Id. at 14. And given the warrant's allegedly glaring deficiencies, Howard concludes that law enforcement's reliance on it was unreasonable. Id. at 15.

Howard claims that the Black Stallion warrant application fails to establish probable cause because “each sentence of the application referencing the residence must be stricken” as conclusory, undated, or misleading.[4] Id. at 10. He provides a spreadsheet listing all the language in the affidavit he finds objectionable; the challenged statements come from paragraphs 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 30, and 31. See id. at 10–14; Black Stallion Warrant Affidavit at 6–13. These paragraphs contain statements about the Black Stallion house, the alleged drug trafficking ring, and law enforcement's investigation into Howard prior to applying for the warrant. Aside from cursory citations to caselaw, Howard does not explain why the affidavit is conclusory, undated, or misleading. Still, the undersigned will examine each allegation in turn.

First, Howard contends that certain conclusory statements warrant suppression under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See, e.g., Second Mot. Suppress at 10 (urging the court to strike statements alleging that Howard and his mother live at the Black Stallion home and that Howard stores marijuana there). In Gates, the Supreme Court noted that “[a]n affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause,” and “wholly conclusory statement[s]” don't cut it. 462 U.S. at 239. As an example of a conclusory statement, the court pointed to an affiant's sworn statement “that ‘he has cause to suspect and does believe that’ liquor illegally brought into the United States is located on certain premises[.]” Id. (quoting Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933)). The court then explained that “[a]n officer's statement that ‘affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and believe’ that heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate.” Id. (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)).

But unless a judge is presented with a “bare bones” affidavit like those in the Supreme Court's examples, the judge must “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 238–39. Gates does not suggest that every conclusory statement must be stricken from an affidavit on review. Instead, it requires a court to review the affidavit as a whole to determine whether a substantial basis existed for the issuing judge to conclude that probable cause existed to issue the warrant. Id.

*7 Considering the warrant affidavit holistically, the undersigned finds that it is not conclusory. The allegations that Howard challenges stemmed from an investigation into his activities that spanned nearly a year. See Black Stallion Warrant Affidavit at 6 (noting that the investigation began in March 2021). To establish probable cause for the warrant, law enforcement gathered evidence from several sources, including physical surveillance, digital monitoring, confidential informants, financial records, and the search of Apartment 324. See id. at 6–10. Taken together, this evidence suggested “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found at the Black Stallion home. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The court should therefore reject Howard's claim that the warrant application was conclusory.

Second, Howard alleges that the court should suppress the fruits of the Black Stallion search because several pieces of evidence in the warrant affidavit are undated. See, e.g., Second Mot. Suppress at 11 (contending that the court should strike language detailing law enforcement's conversation with a confidential informant because the application does not specify when the conversation took place) (citing United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 475 (4th Cir. 2011)).

A judge may only issue a warrant if it stems from “allegations of ‘facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.’ ” United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1335–36 (quoting Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932)). Assessing whether the information in a warrant is stale involves more than “simply counting the number of days between the occurrence of the facts supplied and the issuance of the affidavit.” United States v. Farmer, 370 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Instead, the court must “look to all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the nature of the unlawful activity alleged, the length of the activity, and the nature of the property to be seized.” Id. (same). And if the warrant application is silent about when relevant criminal activity occurred, the reviewing court must reject the warrant. See Doyle, 650 F.3d at 463–64.

The facts and circumstances of this case do not support Howard's staleness argument. Although DHS didn't provide a date for every paragraph in its affidavit, it did outline the broad timeline for law enforcement's investigation into Howard's alleged criminal activity. As noted above, the investigation into Howard (and his alleged sophisticated drug trafficking organization) began in March 2021. See Black Stallion Warrant Affidavit at 6. And a United States Magistrate Judge issued the warrant in February 2022. See Black Stallion Warrant at 1. Thus, all investigative measures must have taken place in this eleven-month window.

Several pieces of DHS's evidence have dates. The affidavit explains that law enforcement executed the apartment warrant—which linked Howard to the drug trafficking scheme—in September 2021. See Black Stallion Warrant Affidavit at 8. That same month, they spoke to a confidential informant who told them that Howard sold marijuana from the Black Stallion home and from Never Change Auto. See id. Howard kept living at the Black Stallion home until he was arrested. See id. at 6. And all the information associated with Howard's alleged money laundering scheme contains dates—this data suggests that Howard began laundering drug proceeds in late 2020. See id. at 10.

Unlike crimes that are “mere isolated violations of the law,” drug trafficking and money laundering are “criminal activities of a protracted and continuous nature.” Farmer, 370 F.3d at 439 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Howard's alleged drug trafficking operation was “unlikely to have been suddenly abandoned” between September 2021 (when the Apartment 324 warrant was executed) and the following February (when the Black Stallion warrant was issued). Id.; see also United States v. Cisneros-Mayoral, 129 F. App'x 37, 40 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[F]indings of staleness become less appropriate when the instrumentalities of the alleged illegality tend to be retained ... as they do in drug trafficking.”). And because Howard lived at the Black Stallion home when the warrant was executed, there was probable cause to believe that evidence of drug dealing could be found there. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 548 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2008). Taking the totality of the circumstances into account, then, the undersigned cannot conclude that the Black Stallion warrant relied on stale evidence.

*8 Finally, Howard asks the court to grant his motion to suppress because the Black Stallion warrant affidavit contains misleading information. Howard objects to the affidavit's claim that he and other members of the alleged drug trafficking organization used coded language when discussing shipments of marijuana. See Second Mot. Suppress at 12 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171–72). According to the warrant affidavit, Howard and a co-conspirator “discussed the arrival of a ‘box’ at the ‘country.’ ” Black Stallion Warrant Affidavit at 7. The affidavit then explains that, through examining text messages and conducting interviews with other members of the drug trafficking ring, investigators learned that “a ‘box’ refers to a shipment of marijuana and ‘country’ refers to” the home on Black Stallion Court. Id.

Howard does not explain why this statement is misleading. He does not challenge the reliability of the law enforcement officers, their informants, or the intercepted text messages. And although he cites Franks, he does not contend that the officer who submitted the Black Stallion warrant application intentionally or recklessly included this allegation to mislead the court (or that it materially affected the Magistrate Judge's decision to sign the warrant). Put differently, Howard gives the court no basis to conclude that this statement in the affidavit—or any other—is misleading.

In sum, Howard has failed to show that the Black Stallion warrant application is impermissibly conclusory, stale, or misleading. Viewed as a whole, the affidavit established probable cause to search the home for evidence of drug trafficking, conspiracy to traffic drugs, money laundering, wire fraud, and bank fraud. The court should therefore decline to suppress the fruits of the Black Stallion search on this basis.

Howard's final argument for suppression claims that the Black Stallion warrant fails the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. See Second Mot. Suppress at 14–15. As is relevant here, the Amendment mandates that a warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This particularity requirement is designed “to prevent general searches.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). It “ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Id.

The Black Stallion search warrant allowed officers to seize evidence of five crimes: drug trafficking, conspiracy to traffic drugs, money laundering, wire fraud, and bank fraud. Black Stallion Warrant at 3. It also authorized law enforcement to seize contraband, fruits of the alleged offences, property intended for use (or used) in committing the offences, and vehicles within the curtilage of the Black Stallion home. Id. The warrant specifically stated that electronics—such as cell phones, computers, and flash drives—were subject to seizure. Id. And in executing the warrant, officers seized a micro-SD card, a hard drive, a cell phone, and four computers. Id. at 4.

Howard contends that the Black Stallion warrant is an unconstitutional general warrant because it authorized law enforcement to “search, without limitation, all seized electronic equipment.” Second Mot. Suppress at 15. Rather than allowing officers to trawl through the entirety of each electronic device, Howard maintains, the court should have required them to list the specific data within the electronics they sought to seize. Id. In support of his position, Howard cites a Department of Justice publication that urges law enforcement officers to state with particularity the files they hope to recover in searching an electronic device. See id. He does not, however, cite any binding caselaw suggesting that the warrant is unconstitutional.

*9 Nor could he. The Fourth Circuit has found that “the test for the necessary particularity is a pragmatic one. The degree of specificity required may necessarily vary according to the circumstances and type of items involved[.]” United States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir. 1979) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And this court has explained “that a search of a computer impliedly authorize[s] ‘at least a cursory review of each file on the computer.”‘ United States v. Shah, No. 5:12-CR-328-FL, 2015 WL 72118, at *17 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2015) (Flanagan, J.) (quoting United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010)). While “[d]ocuments not covered by the warrant should be suppressed[,]” a defendant must identify the seized documents that fall outside the warrant's scope to exclude them. Id. (citing Williams, 592 F.3d at 520).

Howard does not allege that specific files must be suppressed because they fall outside the Black Stallion warrant's scope. Instead, he maintains that all fruits of the Black Stallion search must be suppressed because the warrant allowed officers to search devices found in the home without specifying which files they hoped to find. See Second Mot. Suppress at 15. But this conclusion finds no support in law. See, e.g., Shah, 2015 WL 72118, at *17; United States v. Almonte, No. 2:21–00160, 2022 WL 662318, at *10 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 4, 2022) (“[O]fficers are generally not required to predict the items of evidence that an electronic search will uncover or predict where on the computer the evidence will be found.”) (citing United States v. Cobb, 970 F.3d 319, 329 (4th Cir. 2020)).

Here, probable cause justifies the warrant's scope. The warrant authorized officers to seize electronic devices that constituted evidence of (or fruits of) drug trafficking, money laundering, conspiracy, and fraud. Black Stallion Warrant at 3. These crimes are sophisticated; it is reasonable to expect that officers could find evidence of them on electronic devices in the home—even if they don't know where, exactly, that evidence is located. See Black Stallion Warrant Affidavit at 2–3 (explaining that, in the applying officer's experience, drug traffickers often use cell phones to facilitate their crimes and store evidence of those crimes on computers); id. at 5 (explaining the government's protocol for searching electronic devices); see also United States v. Ladd, 704 F.2d 134, 136 (4th Cir. 1983) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to a warrant that allowed officers to seize “items ... relate[d] to ‘the smuggling, packing, distribution and use of controlled substances.’ ”). And because the crimes alleged in the affidavit implicated both Howard and his mother (as well as third parties), the seizure of multiple electronic devices was constitutionally reasonable here.

In sum, Howard has not established that the Black Stallion warrant fails the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. Although the warrant allowed law enforcement officers to seize an array of items related to the five listed crimes,[5] the warrant's scope was reasonable given the circumstances of this case.

*10 As discussed above, the Black Stallion warrant did not violate Howard's Fourth Amendment rights. But even if his rights were infringed, the good-faith exception allows the evidence that officers gathered from his mother's home to be used against him.

Under the exclusionary rule, “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” United States v. Kimble, 855 F.3d 604, 610 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). But there is a good-faith exception to this rule, under which “evidence obtained by an officer who acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant will not be suppressed, even if the warrant is later deemed invalid.” United States v. Thomas, 908 F.3d 68, 72 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)).

A law enforcement officer's reliance on an issued warrant “will be deemed objectively reasonable” except in four circumstances. Id.; see also United States v. Wellman, 663 F.3d 224, 228–29 (4th Cir. 2011). First, the good-faith exception does not apply when a warrant application reflects “knowing or reckless falsity.” Wellman, 663 F.3d at 228. Second, when the issuing judicial officer “wholly abandon[s] his role as a neutral and detached decision maker and serve[s] merely as a rubber stamp for the police[,]” there is no good-faith exception. Id. at 228–29. Next, when the affidavit supporting the warrant “[i]s so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” the exception does not apply. Id. at 229. And finally, there is no good-faith exception when the warrant is “so facially deficient that the executing officers could not reasonably have presumed that the warrant was valid.” Id.

Howard alleges that the good-faith exception cannot apply because the agent who applied for the warrant “failed to provide factual details underpinning the conclusory statements purporting to establish probable cause to search the residence in question.” Second Mot. Suppress at 15–16. He also contends that the application's failure to particularize the things that officers could seize renders the warrant “fatally deficient[.]” Id. at 16 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). These deficiencies, Howard maintains, left law enforcement's reliance on the warrant unreasonable.

Even if the search warrant for the Black Stallion home lacked probable cause, evidence obtained from law enforcement's search should not be suppressed. The Black Stallion warrant—which contained evidence from multiple confidential informants, physical surveillance, internet and communications surveillance, a deep dive into Howard's (and his mother's) financial dealings, and the fruits of the apartment warrant's execution—was not so lacking in probable cause that officers could not have reasonably relied on it. And the warrant listed specific items subject to seizure. See Black Stallion Warrant at 3.

In sum, none of Howard's arguments attacking the Black Stallion warrant have merit. And even if they did, the good-faith exception would apply. The district court should therefore deny Howard's second motion to suppress (D.E. 64).

III. Conclusion

*11 For the reasons outlined above, the court should deny Howard's motions to suppress (D.E. 61; 64) and decline to schedule a Franks hearing.

The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”) on each party who has appeared here. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals.