*1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiffs Monarch Air Group, LLC and David Gitman (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)’s Motion for Relief from Judgment [DE 212] (the “Motion”), filed June 7, 2023. The Court has carefully considered the Motion [DE 212], Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”)’s Response [DE 263/267 (sealed)], Plaintiffs’ Reply [DE 268], and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 29, 2021, Plaintiffs filed an action against Chase in Florida state court, which Chase removed to federal court on December 1, 2021. See [DE 1]. Plaintiffs asserted claims against Chase for defamation and tortious interference arising from alleged defamatory statements made to Monarch's customers and Gitman's transferees in connection with cancelled wire transactions to Monarch from or through Chase accounts. See [DE's 1, 21, 78].

On May 12, 2023, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Chase and entered a final judgment. See [DE's 205, 206]. As to the defamation claims, this Court held that Chase's statements to its account holders regarding why Chase was unable to execute the transactions were qualifiedly privileged, and Plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence Chase acted with express malice, as required to overcome the privilege. See [DE 205] at pp. 5–11.

Prior to the entry of the final judgment, Plaintiffs filed four discovery motions, which were before Magistrate Judge Valle pursuant to the Court's discovery referral. The first of such motions was Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Unredacted Documents, filed November 23, 2022. See [DE 59]. Therein, Plaintiffs sought to compel disclosure of material redacted from Chase's document production pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and its implementing regulations, which prohibits banks from disclosing a suspicious activity report (“SAR”) (the “SAR Privilege”). See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Marcus, No. 0:17-CV-60907, 2020 WL 1482250, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2020). Judge Valle denied the motion because “financial institution[s] [are] not permitted to waive” the SAR Privilege and declined to conduct an in-camera review. See [DE 67].

On December 27, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their second discovery motion, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Deposition, seeking to compel a second deposition of Chase's corporate representative on grounds that he was not properly prepared to testify. See [DE 79]. Judge Valle denied the motion because the representative's “overall preparation and testimony on the[ ] [t]opics satisf[ied] Rule 30(b)(6)’s requirements.” See [DE 101].

On February 24, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their third discovery motion, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions, seeking monetary and merits-based sanctions against Chase under Rule 37 based upon late production of documents and Chase's purportedly deficient preparation of its corporate representative on certain deposition topics. See [DE 115]. Judge Valle granted in part and denied in part the motion, finding that while Plaintiffs were entitled to their fees and costs, Plaintiffs had “not established that [Chase]’s untimely document productions were willful, reckless, or in bad faith so as to justify the extreme case-dispositive sanctions” requested. See [DE 175].

*2 On May 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their fourth discovery motion, Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Sanctions, again seeking case-dispositive sanctions following Chase's Motion in Limine to Include Congressional Subpoena in Trial Exhibits [DE 163]. See [DE 170]. After holding a two-hour hearing, Judge Valle granted in part the motion, holding that Defendant was precluded from using the subpoena at trial. See [DE's 203, 210]. However, Judge Valle denied Plaintiffs’ request to strike Chase's pleadings and enter a default judgment against it and declined Plaintiffs’ request for an in-camera review. See id.

Plaintiffs did not appeal any of the four rulings as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

On June 7, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Relief from Judgment (“Motion for Relief”), arguing, among other things, that Chase engaged in discovery misconduct and made material misrepresentations to Plaintiffs and the Court, which prevented Plaintiffs from fully and fairly responding to Chase's qualified privilege defense. See [DE 212]. The same day, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Discovery to Support Their Motion for Relief from Judgment (“Motion for Discovery”). See [DE 213]. In the Motion for Discovery, Plaintiffs requested that the Court: (1) conduct an in-camera review of Chase's redacted documents; and (2) permit discovery, including depositions, into Chase's claim that Plaintiffs were put on Chase's AML Interdiction List because of Plaintiffs’ round-number transactions, the existence of a Congressional subpoena, and Chase's recently discovered bias. See [DE 213]. According to Plaintiffs, such discovery would further confirm Chase's alleged misconduct and misrepresentations forming the basis of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief from Judgment. See id.

The Court referred Plaintiffs’ Motion for Discovery to Magistrate Judge Valle for an evidentiary hearing and appropriate disposition or report and recommendation and stayed the briefing on the Motion for Relief from Judgment. See [DE 215]. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, and after conducting an in-camera review of Chase's redacted documents, Magistrate Judge Valle denied the Motion for Discovery on July 21, 2023. See [DE's 240, 255, 256]. Thereafter, the Court lifted the stay on briefing the instant Motion for Relief from Judgment. See [DE 241].

Plaintiffs filed an Objection to Magistrate Judge Valle's July 21, 2023 Order. See [DE 261]. On December 15, 2023, the Court entered an Order overruling Plaintiffs’ Objection and affirmed Magistrate Judge Valle's order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Discovery. See [DE 276].

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief from Judgment is now ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[R]econsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.” Burger King Corp. v. Ashland Equities, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (citing Mannings v. School Board of Hillsborough County, 149 F.R.D. 235, 235 (M.D. Fla. 1993)). For a court to reconsider its prior judgment the moving party must present facts or law of a “strongly convincing nature” that would induce a court to reverse its prior decision. Id. (citing Sussman v. Salem Saxon & Nielsen, P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 694 (M.D. Fla 1994)). Three major grounds justify reconsideration: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Burger King, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1369. “A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Smith v. Ocwen Fin., 488 F. App'x 426, 428 (11th Cir. 2012).

*3 Here, Plaintiffs seek reconsideration under Rules 59(e), 60(b)(2), and 60(b)(3). A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) must be made within 28 days of the Court's judgment and must demonstrate newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact that must be corrected. Bedtow Grp. II, LLC v. Ungerleider, 684 F. App'x 839, 843 (11th Cir. 2017). “[A] Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).

Rule 60(b)(2) provides relief from a final order in light of “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). Relief under Rule 60(b)(2) is only warranted in extraordinary circumstances. Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000). A movant requesting such relief must show: (1) the evidence has been newly discovered; (2) the movant had exercised due diligence to timely discover the new evidence; (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence is material; and (5) the evidence is such that the Court would probably reach a new conclusion. Id.; see also Waddell v. Hendry Cty. Sheriff's Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).

“Rule 60(b)(3) allows a court to grant relief from a final judgment if the moving party proves by clear and convincing evidence that an adverse party has obtained the verdict through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.” Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc., 205 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000). The moving party must also demonstrate that “the conduct prevented [it] from fully presenting [its] case.” Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1309.

III. DISCUSSION

In the Court's May 12, 2023 Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court held that Chase's statements to its account holders regarding why Chase was unable to execute the transactions were qualifiedly privileged, and Plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence Chase acted with express malice, as required to overcome the privilege. See [DE 205]. The Court also held that Plaintiffs’ claim for tortious interference was barred by the single action rule. Id. Based upon these findings, the Court entered judgment in favor of Chase. See [DE 206]. In their Motion for Relief from Judgment, Plaintiffs seek relief under Rules 59(e), 60(b)(2), and 60(b)(3), arguing that the Court should vacate its judgment [DE 206] because it was unfairly obtained, is incorrect, and fails to consider newly discovered evidence. The Court discusses each argument, in turn.

A. Plaintiffs’ Arguments Regarding the Defamatory Per Se Nature of Chase's Statements

First, Plaintiffs argue that Chase's statements “were defamatory per se, such that Chase's malice and Plaintiffs’ damages were absolutely presumed.” See [DE 212] at p. 20. As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the defamatory per se nature of Chase's statements merely recites arguments Plaintiffs could have made in response to Defendant's summary judgment motion. As such, Plaintiffs waived this argument and, additionally or alternatively, this argument cannot be made by Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 59 because such a motion is not permitted to “raise argument ... that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”[1] Smith, 488 F. App'x at 428; see also Porto Venezia Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. WB Ft. Lauderdale, LLC, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (“The function of a Rule 59(e) motion ‘is not to ... give the moving party another ‘bite at the apple’ by permitting the arguing of issues and procedures that could and should have been raised’ earlier.”) (quoting Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1137 n.69 (11th Cir. 2000)).

*4 Furthermore, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ position on the merits. As the Court explained in its May 12, 2023 Order, Chase's statements to its account holders regarding why Chase was unable to execute the transactions were qualifiedly privileged. See [DE 205] at pp. 5–10. And the Supreme Court of Florida has held that “[t]he determination that a defendant's statements are qualifiedly privileged eliminates the presumption of malice attaching to defamatory statements by law.” Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 810 (Fla. 1984); see also Shaw v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 818 F. Supp. 1539, 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (“As a general rule, there is a presumption of malice where statements are defamatory per se, but that presumption ceases to exist where the Defendant has a qualified privilege to make the statements.”). “The privilege instead raises a presumption of good faith and places upon the plaintiff the burden of proving express malice—that is, malice in fact as defined by the common-law doctrine of qualified privilege.” Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 810. Plaintiffs failed to carry that burden. See [DE 205] at pp. 10–11. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the express malice required to overcome a qualified privilege is presumed where statements are defamatory per se is without merit.

B. Plaintiffs’ Arguments that Chase Failed to Carry its Burden of Proof on its Qualified Privilege Defense

Next, Plaintiffs request relief under Rule 59(e) on grounds that Chase failed to carry its burden on each essential element of its qualified privilege defense. “The essential elements of qualified privilege are: (1) good faith; (2) an interest in the subject by the speaker or a subject in which the speaker has a duty to speak; (3) a corresponding interest or duty in the listener or reader; (4) a proper occasion; and (5) publication in a proper manner.” Falic v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1264 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Thomas v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 761 So.2d 401, 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)). Plaintiffs argue that Chase failed to carry its burden as to the fourth and fifth elements—a proper occasion and publication in a proper manner—and, therefore, Chase was not entitled to a presumption of good faith. The Court disagrees.

In Court's May 12, 2023 Order, the Court found as follows:

See [DE 205] at pp. 7–8. As Chase points out, courts have held that a statement is made on a proper occasion and in a proper manner where, as here, the statement was “limited in scope” to the subject matter of the parties’ corresponding interest, made at the time the interest arose, and was “not disclosed to additional persons.” See Lefrock v. Walgreens Co., 77 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1202 (M.D. Fla. 2015); Shaw, 818 F. Supp. at 1542–43.

*5 It is clear from Plaintiffs’ arguments that Plaintiffs merely disagree with the Court's assessment that Chase's statements were made on a proper occasion and in a proper manner, which is not an appropriate ground for reconsideration. See Burrows v. Waffle House, Inc., 2000 WL 35594556 *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2000). For instance, Plaintiffs suggest that Chase's statements were not made on a proper occasion because those statements were false. See [DE 212] at p. 20 (“[T]he evidence confirms that Chase failed to publish the Sanctions Statement on a proper occasion, since the Sanctions Statement is only said on an occasion when sanctions are not at issue.”). But the Court already addressed this issue in the May 12, 2023 Order. See [DE 205] at p. 6 (“[E]ven assuming the statements are false and defamatory, Chase's communications to Plaintiffs’ customers were privileged.”) (citing Demby v. Eng., 667 So. 2d 350, 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“The publication may be qualifiedly privileged even if it is untrue.”)).

Plaintiffs also dispute the Court's finding that “there is no evidence that this information was disclosed to anyone other than the Chase account holders who were attempting to transact with Monarch through Chase,” see [DE 205] at p. 8, alluding to “loads of untimely produced evidence” purportedly demonstrating that Chase sent the statements to banks around the globe. See [DE 212] at p. 21. In support, Plaintiffs cite to ¶ 4 of the declaration of Anthony Lauro, which states: “Based on my experience and understanding of Chase's processes, as well as speaking with the aforementioned internal stakeholders, Chase only cancels a wire transaction to or from [Monarch] if a party on the remitting or beneficiary side of the transaction is a Chase accountholder. Those accountholders could include ... other financial institutions such as correspondent banks.” See [DE 91-7/94-7 (sealed)] at ¶ 4 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the fact that this evidence was available to Plaintiffs at the time Plaintiffs responded to Chase's summary judgment motion, see Smith, F. App'x at 428, it is unclear how evidence that “accountholders could include ... financial institutions such as correspondent banks” would have compelled a different result.

The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments as to this issue because those arguments, in addition to raising arguments that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment, merely allude to potential factual disputes without any citation to record evidence. See, e.g., [DE 212] at p. 21 (arguing, without citation, that “while Chase claims it was spewing these falsehoods pursuant to it[’s] ‘standard operating processes,’ this is not true either.”). It is not the Court's task to “scour the record” in search of evidence supporting a party's arguments. See Rosa-Nales v. Carnival Corp., No. 12-22172-CIV, 2013 WL 7219411, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2013); see also [DE 205] at p. 8 n.6 (deeming admitted a fact because Plaintiffs failed to “include any citation, let along ‘specific, pinpoint references to particular parts of record material’ as required by the Local Rules’ ”).

C. Plaintiffs’ Arguments that Chase Failed to Plead a Qualified Privilege Defense

Plaintiffs also argue they are entitled to relief from judgment because Chase failed to plead a qualified privilege defense relating to banks. The Court is unpersuaded. As an initial matter, this argument is waived and, additionally or alternatively, cannot be made by Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 59 because Plaintiff is attempting to “raise argument ... that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Smith, 488 F. App'x at 428.

Furthermore, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ position on the merits. First, Chase's qualified privilege defense is not as narrow as Plaintiffs suggest, stating “Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claims because any verbal or written statements by Chase were made pursuant to a conditional privilege.” See [DE 85] at p. 5 (emphasis added). While the privilege defense goes on to state that “Chase allegedly wrote or spoke to a narrow subset of persons, namely, Chase accountholders whose transactions Chase was unable to execute,” see id., as discussed above, the evidence filed with Defendant's summary judgment motion contemplated that “accountholders could include ... financial institutions such as correspondent banks[.]” See [DE 91-7/94-7 (sealed)] at ¶ 4.

*6 Second, affirmative defenses are subject to the same pleading scrutiny imposed by Rule 8(a) and Twombly/Iqbal, which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” sufficient to give the opposing party fair notice of the claim and its grounds. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 & n.3 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Losada v. Norwegian (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 13–cv–22256–JLK, 2013 WL 6622911, * 2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2013). The Court finds that Plaintiffs affirmative defense of privilege, as pled, gave Plaintiffs fair notice of the defense and the grounds on which it rests.

Third, and most importantly, Chase moved for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs’ defamation claims (Counts I, II, and III). See generally [DE 93]; see also id. at p. 4 (defining the term “Defamation Claims” to include Plaintiffs’ claims for “Defamation,” “Slander,” and “Defamation by Implication”); see also id. at p. 7 (arguing that Plaintiffs had “produced admissible evidence of only one allegedly defamatory statement made by Chase”). Thus, Plaintiffs had an obligation to assert any arguments that, in their view, would have precluded entry of that judgment. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a party “cannot readily complain about the entry of a summary judgment order that did not consider an argument they chose not to develop for the district court at the time of the summary judgment motions”). As the Court observed in its May 12, 2023 Order, “Plaintiffs’ Response does not even mention any other alleged defamatory statements, much less argue that admissible evidence of other allegedly defamatory statements exist that would make summary judgment as to all defamation claims improper.” [DE 205] at p. 11 n.7. And while Plaintiffs complain that “Chase did not disclose that financial institutions were sent the Sanctions Statements until after discovery and the summary judgment deadline,” they do not complain that they did not have access to this information before the Court's entry of summary judgment. See Michael Linet, 408 F. 3d at 763 (“[A] Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”) (emphasis added). The Court therefore finds no basis to grant this Rule 59(e) relief.

D. Plaintiffs’ Argument that Chase Committed Discovery Misconduct

Next, Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(3) based on Chase's alleged discovery misconduct. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Chase “lied to the Plaintiffs and the Court—falsely withholding information and redacting documents based on a made-up SAR Privilege,” and that Chase produced certain documents or information after the discovery cutoff, namely, a document titled “SSU Procedure and Governance,” correspondence to banks containing the defamatory statements, an analysis of round-number transactions, and the Congressional subpoena.

Plaintiffs made substantially similar arguments to Magistrate Judge Valle in connection with Plaintiffs’ prior discovery motions and, again, at the two-day evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Discovery. Specifically, as to the SAR Privilege, in Plaintiffs’ November 23, 2022 Motion to Compel Unredacted Documents, Plaintiffs argued that Chase's redactions of material pursuant to the SAR Privilege were improper. See [DE 59]. Judge Valle denied the motion because “financial institution[s] [are] not permitted to waive” the SAR Privilege and declined to conduct an in-camera review. See [DE 67]. Plaintiffs did not appeal that Order. In their May 1, 2023 Second Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiffs again challenged Chase's invocation of the SAR Privilege, requesting that Judge Valle either review in-camera unredacted versions of the documents or appoint a special master to do so. See [DE 170]. Judge Valle denied these requests. See [DE's 203, 210].

*7 As to the document titled “SSU Procedure and Governance” and correspondence to banks, in their February 24, 2023 Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiffs requested that the Court sanction Chase for the timing of those productions. See [DE 115]. Judge Valle denied Plaintiffs’ request for merits-based sanctions, finding that Plaintiffs failed to establish “any lasting prejudice resulting from the untimely document productions, as they effectively deposed the [Rule] 30(b)(6) witness regarding the document productions.”[2] See [DE 175]. Plaintiffs did not appeal that Order.

As to the round-number analysis and Congressional subpoena, in support of their May 1, 2023 Second Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiffs challenged, among other things, Chase's alleged failure to timely disclose its analysis of round-number transactions and the Congressional subpoena. See [DE's 170, 198, 210]. Importantly, at the May 11, 2023 hearing, Judge Valle found that though “there is no evidence of bad faith,” Chase's failure to disclose the Congressional subpoena was not substantially justified or harmless. See [DE 210] at p. 61:17–23. As a result, Judge Valle prohibited Chase “from referencing or otherwise using the subpoena during the trial as evidence or as argument.” See id. at 63:16–19; see also id. at 64:6–8 (finding that “the lesser sanction of precluding all use of the subpoena at trial adequately punishes [Chase] for its failure to disclose on a timely basis, and remedies any potential prejudice that the Plaintiffs may have suffered”). However, Judge Valle disagreed with Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the analysis of round-number transactions, finding that Chase had “sufficiently previously disclosed through Mr. Lauro's testimony that its decision to place Plaintiff on the interdiction list was based, at least in part, on a review of transactional analysis, and transactional analysis would include, of course, the round-number proffer.” See id. at p. 64:8–13.

On June 7, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Discovery, requesting that the Court: (1) conduct an in-camera review of Chase's redacted documents; and (2) permit discovery, including depositions, into Chase's claim that Plaintiffs were put on Chase's AML Interdiction List because of Plaintiffs’ round-number transactions, the existence of a Congressional subpoena, and Chase's recently discovered bias. See [DE 213]. On July 21, 2023, Judge Valle entered an Order, which incorporates the rulings made during the two-day evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Discovery. See [DE 240, 255, 256]. In those rulings, Judge Valle correctly found that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Discovery was “akin to a motion for reconsideration on the court's prior discovery rulings” and that Plaintiffs “cannot resurrect pretrial discovery grievances in the guise of a Rule 60(b) motion.” See [DE 256] at p. 208:3–6. Judge Valle also explained how Plaintiffs’ Motion reiterated issues and arguments raised in pre-judgment discovery motions and found that, as to the Congressional subpoena, the round-number transactions, and the SAR Privilege, Plaintiffs had “not provided sufficient facts or law to warrant a reversal or amendment of [her] prior rulings,” which rulings she incorporated by reference in the Order. See id. at p. 212:8–14. Nevertheless, Judge Valle conducted an in-camera review of Chase's redacted documents and determined that the “overwhelming majority of the redactions were proper based on the SARs privilege.” See id. at p. 211:2–5.

*8 On December 15, 2023, after reviewing the relevant case law, evidence, hearing transcripts, and the record, and after conducting its own review of Chase's unredacted in-camera submissions and the ex parte hearing transcript, the Court affirmed Magistrate Judge Valle's order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Discovery. See [DE 276]. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ request for relief under Rule 60(b)(3) insofar as Plaintiffs raise the same pre-trial discovery grievances Magistrate Judge Valle already considered and rejected. See, e.g., Scutieri v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that a party “cannot resurrect pre-trial discovery grievances in the guise of a Rule 60(b) motion”).

In addition, upon careful review of the parties’ arguments and the record in this case, Plaintiffs fail to show that any of Chase's alleged misconduct prevented Plaintiffs from fully and fairly presenting their case. Plaintiffs do not dispute that all the instances of alleged misconduct—including untimely produced documents and information—occurred before the Court's entry of summary judgment.[3] In fact, apart from the Congressional subpoena, it appears that Plaintiffs had access to the untimely documents and information prior to their extended deadline to respond to Chase's summary judgment motion.[4] While Plaintiffs complain that Chase disclosed this evidence to them “mere days” before the extended deadline, Plaintiffs did not seek additional time to respond to the summary judgment motion by moving for a continuance under Rule 56(d),[5] nor did they move to amend or supplement their response to the summary judgment motion with any such untimely produced evidence.[6] See Levinson v. Landsafe Appraisal Servs., Inc., 558 F. App'x 942, 946 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1310).

And while Plaintiffs did not have access to the Congressional subpoena prior to their response deadline to Chase's summary judgment motion, they clearly had access to the subpoena prior to filing the Second Motion for Sanctions because the subpoena was the subject of that motion. Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Sanctions, however, did not raise any argument regarding Chase's then-pending motion for summary judgment, such as whether Plaintiffs could use the subpoena (or any discovery stemming therefrom) to defend against Chase's summary judgment motion or whether the Court should stay its ruling on the summary judgment motion until those issues were resolved. See, e.g., Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1310 (denying relief from a final judgment based upon fraud under Rule 60(b)(3) after finding that plaintiffs’ own tactical decisions to not seek a stay or continuance prevented them from fully presenting their case, not fraud by defendants). Moreover, while Plaintiffs argue that the subpoena and analysis of round-number transactions could have been used as evidence of Chase's “political ill-will” against Monarch, as Judge Valle recognized at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Discovery, Plaintiffs “did not question [Chase]’s corporate representative as to [Chase]’s purported political bias,” even though some evidence of purported political bias was disclosed to Plaintiffs during discovery. See [DE 256] at p. 213:7–11. In fact, evidence or arguments regarding “political ill-will” or bias were not even mentioned in Plaintiffs’ response to Chase's summary judgment motion. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Chase's alleged misconduct, rather than Plaintiffs’ own tactical decisions, prevented them from fully and fairly presenting their defense.

*9 Additionally, or alternatively, Plaintiffs fail to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Chase obtained summary judgment by fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct. Plaintiffs maintain that Chase not only failed to disclose certain documents and information in a timely manner, but also lied during discovery, concealing evidence that it was required to disclose, thereby misleading the Court and Plaintiffs. For example, Plaintiffs complain about Chase's invocation of the SAR Privilege, concluding that because Chase belatedly produced some information it previously withheld based on a SAR Privilege, Chase must have lied. Such speculation does not satisfy Rule 60(b)(3)’s clear and convincing evidence requirement. Circuitronix, LLC v. Shenzhen Kinwong Elec. Co., No. 17-22462-CIV, 2020 WL 8459195, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-CV-22462-UU, 2020 WL 7767546 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2020) (“Innuendo, speculation and conjecture do not satisfy Rule 60(b)(3)’s clear and convincing evidence requirement.”). While Chase certainly could have been more diligent in its discovery obligations, the Court cannot say that Chase's conduct rose to the level of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct so as to warrant the relief requested. See, e.g., Alarm Grid, Inc. v. Alarm Club.com, Inc., No. 17-80305-CV, 2018 WL 395382, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2018) (denying relief under Rule 60(b)(3) despite “some inconsistencies” because “Plaintiff provides insufficient evidence that Defendant's conduct rose to the level of fraud”). Accordingly, the Court finds no basis to grant Plaintiffs’ requested Rule 60(b)(3) relief.

E. Plaintiffs’ “Newly Discovered Evidence”

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that “new evidence ... confirms that Chase did not rely in good faith on its policy.” [DE 212] at p. 1. The only new evidence cited in the Motion appears to be a news article and a letter referenced in the article alleging that Chase discriminated against some customers because of their religious or political beliefs. Judge Valle considered this same evidence at the two-day evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Discovery. Judge Valle found—and the Court agrees—that the connection between such evidence and this case is speculative at best. As Judge Valle pointed out, “these news articles, including the AG letter, are not relevant to plaintiffs’ claims, [or] defendant's placement on the AML Interdiction List[.]” See [DE 256] at p. 213:3–6. As such, Plaintiffs’ “newly discovered evidence” presents no grounds for relief from the Court's judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, this 18th day of December 2023.