*1 Presently pending before the Court is pro se Defendant Mason L. Wollersheim's Motion to Quash and Dismiss All of the Subpoena, ECF 1, and Motion for Discovery, ECF 7. The administrative subpoena was issued by Plaintiff Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (“DoD OIG”) and seeks financial documents from a credit union in aid of an investigation. For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully recommend denying both Motions and dismissing this case.

DoD OIG and the Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division (“DACID”) are investigating whether Defendant, a member of the U.S. Army, violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) Article 121, Larceny and Wrongful Appropriation, UCMJ Article 124, Pay and Allowance Fraud, and 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Wire Fraud. See Decl. of Special Agent Francis Nguyen, ECF 6-1 ¶ 2. The investigation started on September 22, 2022, and has revealed evidence that Defendant has engaged in multiple insurance fraud schemes by filing fraudulent claims for property losses. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. It has also revealed evidence of suspicious activity related to refunds Defendant received from American Public University System (“APUS”), the parent organization of American Military University (“AMU”), while at the same time receiving payments as part of the Montgomery GI Bill. Id. ¶ 4. GI funds are typically paid directly to the school and not to the student. ECF 6 at 2.

As part of this investigation, DoD OIG seeks information pertaining to Defendant's bank records at Navy Federal Credit Union (“NFCU”). Id. Plaintiff asserts such records are relevant to the investigation because they will provide evidence of the flow of funds in and out of accounts owned by Defendant and potentially corroborate suspicious insurance claim payments and AMU refund payments. Id.; see also ECF 6-1 ¶ 8. To that end, DoD OIG prepared a subpoena to be served on NFCU's Custodian of Records. Id. ¶ 5; ECF 1-1.

Pursuant to the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq., (“RFPA”), DACID Special Agent Nguyen personally served Defendant with a copy of the subpoena DoD OIG intends to serve on NFCU, along with a “Notice to Customer” with several enclosures on August 22, 2023. ECF 6-1 ¶ 6; see also ECF 1-1. The Notice to Customer provided instructions on how to challenge the subpoena consistent with the form language in 12 U.S.C. § 3405(2). ECF 6 at 2. Defendant then notified Special Agent Nguyen, in person, of his intent to challenge the subpoena. Id. After DoD OIG had not received a copy of Defendant's challenge and not identified any challenges filed in federal court by Defendant, DoD OIG personally served Defendant with a letter on September 13, 2023 which again advised him how to challenge the subpoena and noted that if a challenge was not docketed by September 25, 2023, DoD OIG would presume that he was withdrawing his challenge. Id. at 2–3. On September 22, 2023, Defendant filed the present Motion to Quash. ECF 1. Shortly after Plaintiff filed a Response [ECF 6], Defendant filed the instant Motion for Discovery [ECF 7].

*2 Congress passed the RFPA “as a compromise between a bank customer's right of financial privacy and the need of law enforcement agencies to obtain financial records pursuant to legitimate investigations.” Jones v. Dep't of Air Force, 947 F. Supp. 1507, 1510–11 (D. Colo. 1996). The RFPA provides for certain procedures that must be followed when government authorities seek to obtain records relating to customers of financial institutions. A governmental agency such as the OIG may subpoena the records of a financial institution's customers only “if there is reason to believe that the records sought are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry.” 12 U.S.C. § 3405(1). If the agency does elect to subpoena customer records, it is required to inform the customer of this fact via a notice containing specific information. 12 U.S.C. § 3405(2). A customer receiving such notice may, within a specified time frame, move to quash the subpoena or enjoin the agency from obtaining the records. 12 U.S.C. § 3410(a). After hearing from the agency in response, the Court is obligated to determine whether: (i) the movant is the customer to whom the requested records pertain, and (ii) whether there is a “demonstrable reason to believe that the law enforcement inquiry is legitimate and a reasonable belief that the records sought are relevant to that inquiry.” 12 U.S.C. § 3410(c).

The RFPA contains three separate bases for quashing such a subpoena: (1) the agency's inquiry is not a legitimate law enforcement inquiry, (2) the records sought are not relevant to the agency's inquiry, or (3) the agency has not substantially complied with the RFPA. Melissa C. Carnes Revocable Tr. Dated Feb. 10, 2010 v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 22-mc-00203-DDC-TJJ, 2022 WL 1442845, at *3 (D. Kan. May 6, 2022); see also 12 U.S.C. § 3410(a)(2) (requiring that a movant under the RFPA state, in part, the “reasons for believing that the financial records sought are not relevant to the legitimate law enforcement inquiry asserted by the Government authority in its notice”). Here, Defendant challenges all three.

Upon review of the evidence of record, and given the applicable standard, there is a reasonable basis to believe that the investigation into Defendant is legitimate and within the scope of the DoD OIG's enforcement powers. 5 U.S.C. § 6(a)(2). Defendant challenges the legitimacy of the DACID's investigation on the grounds that it has been fraught with delays which rise to the level of malicious prosecution, and that the DACID is “prone to corruption, incompetence, and mistakes.” ECF 1 at 3-7. He has not shown any nexus between this purported corruption and incompetence and the subpoena or the legitimacy of the investigation at issue. Indeed, it is clear that the NFCU financial records would be relevant to the inquiry into whether Defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct by showing the flow of funds in and out of the accounts, and potentially, could corroborate payments arising out of insurance claims and refunds from the AMU, at the time Defendant received GI Bill benefits. “[A] customer challenge proceeding under the [RFPA] ‘is not akin to an application for a warrant,’ and does not require particular specificity. All that is necessary is that the OIG has ‘a good reason to investigate.’ ” Martinez v. Soc. Sec. Admin. Off. of Inspector Gen., No. 19-mc-00004-MSK, 2019 WL 9244884, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 2019) (quoting Nicksolat v. U.S. Dep't. of Transp., 277 F. Supp. 3d 122, 128 (D.D.C. 2017)).

In addition, to the extent Defendant challenges the subpoena on the grounds it is overburdensome, clearly the subpoena is directed to NFCU, not him, and he provides no basis for the argument that its enforcement would cause him harassment or inconvenience. In addition, while it is unclear if he so argues, Defendant appears to challenge whether the NFCU is within the RFPA's statutory definition of “financial institution.” It is.

*3 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (emphasis added). Finally, the DACID complied with the procedural requirements of the RFPA. Special Agent Nguyen personally served on Defendant a copy of the subpoena DoD OIG intended to serve on NFCU, along with a “Notice to Customer” with several enclosures in conformity with the notice requirements of the statute, and the Notice to Customer provided instructions on how to challenge the subpoena. ECF 6-1 ¶ 6; see also ECF 1-1.

Accordingly, given the stated purpose for seeking the records and the procedures followed thus far, the challenge to the subpoena lacks sufficient basis. I respectfully recommend denying the Motion to Quash.

Defendant has also filed a Motion for Discovery, which, even if it were not moot by operation of a denial of the Motion to Quash, lacks a sufficient legal basis. ECF 7. He argues that the subpoena and the investigation are sought for an improper purpose, that his constitutional rights have been violated, and that discovery materials are needed in that regard. Id. The law does not favor discovery in this circumstance.