*1 Plaintiff alleges that on December 18, 2019, he was subjected to a warrantless search of his car and person in an incident of racial profiling by the Los Angeles Police Department. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Dkt. No. 65). After Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and Defendants' qualified immunity defense were denied, (Dkt. No. 105), Plaintiff obtained pro bono counsel, (Dkt. Nos. 110-112), and the District Judge reopened discovery. (Dkt. No. 123). Pursuant to a subsequent stipulation of the parties, the District Judge continued the trial date and pre-trial deadlines. (Dkt. No. 129). The operative discovery cut-off is December 22, 2023. (Id. at 1).

Pending before the Court are two Motions to Compel filed by Plaintiff. The first Motion, filed on September 29, 2023, seeks an order requiring Defendants to (1) amend their privilege log, (2) produce TEAMS and field data reports, and (3) serve supplemental responses to certain Requests for Admission.[1] (“First MTC,” Dkt. No. 130). The First MTC is supported by the declaration of Nathanial Haas, (“Haas Decl. 1,” Dkt. No. 130-1), the declaration of Tracie Noggle, (“Noggle Decl.,” Dkt. No. 130-23), and accompanying exhibits.[2] Plaintiff later filed an optional Supplemental Memorandum in connection with the First MTC.[3] (“P Supp. Memo. 1,” Dkt. No. 144). The second Motion, filed on October 11, 2023, seeks an order requiring Defendants to supplement their production of electronic communications by applying specific search terms to an expanded universe of potentially responsive documents. (“Second MTC,” Dkt. No. 134). The Second MTC is supported by the declaration of Nathanial Haas, (“Haas Decl. 2,” Dkt. No. 134-1), and accompanying exhibits. Plaintiff also filed an optional Supplemental Memorandum in connection with the Second MTC.[4] (“P Supp. Memo. 2,” Dkt. No. 147).

*2 The Court took the Motions under submission without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7-15. For the reasons stated below and on the record at the hearing, Plaintiff's First MTC is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's Second MTC is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants' request for in camera review is DENIED as moot. Defendants shall make supplemental productions as required by this Order no later than December 8, 2023, except that Defendant must produce an amended privilege log within ten days of the date of this Order.

In an order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's prior motion to compel, the Court set forth at length the standards applying to the scope of permissible discovery and requests for production of documents and incorporates those explanations by reference here. (See “Order,” Dkt. No. 51 at 7-12). The same Order addressed the official information privilege and privacy protections applicable in federal court in federal question cases such as this, which the Court similarly incorporates by reference here. (Id. at 21-23).

A. Privilege Log

Plaintiff served a second set of Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”) on May 31, 2023, consisting of RFP Nos. 38-41. (Haas Decl. 1, Exh. A). Defendants served responses and objections on July 10, 2023, as well as a privilege log purportedly identifying documents withheld from the responses to RFP Nos. 39 and 41. (Id., Exh. B). Plaintiff maintains that the privilege log is deficient because it does not identify the documents with any particularity and asserts numerous privileges that this Court already concluded were inapposite under federal law. (First MTC at 3-4). The Court agrees that Defendants' privilege log is utterly indefensible and GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to compel production of an amended privilege log. Defendants are ORDERED to produce an amended privilege log consistent with the guidelines in this Order within ten days of the date of this Order. The amended log must also include entries for documents previously produced with unexplained redactions. Defendants are advised that redactions for relevancy are improper. If any previously-produced documents included redactions for relevancy, they must be re-produced without redactions.

Defendants' privilege log consists of one entry for each of the five named Defendants. (Haas Decl., Exh. B at 10).[5] Because each of the five entries is identical to all the others except for the name of the Defendant whose personnel records are being withheld, the Court will transcribe in full only the first entry, for Officer Cesar Wences:

Plaintiff raises two primary challenges to Defendants' privilege log. First, Plaintiff contends that the log fails to identify any specific documents with any detail whatsoever, and does not show why any particular asserted privilege applies to any particular document so that Plaintiff can evaluate whether the assertion of a privilege is proper. (First MTC at 5). Plaintiff further states that Defendants have redacted various documents that they have produced, but have not explained the redactions on any privilege log. (Id. at 5-6). Second, Plaintiff notes that Defendants are continuing to assert state law privileges and rely on authority that this Court has already rejected. (Id. at 6-8). Defendants do not seriously attempt to argue that their privilege log adequately identifies the specific documents being withheld, but state that they have served “additional documents on Plaintiff concurrently with this joint stipulation” responsive to RFP Nos. 38-41 , bates-stamped DEF 2021 - DEF 2342. (Id. at 9). Defendants further argue that their blanket privilege assertions are proper. (Id. at 10-17).

*3 Defendants' so-called “privilege log” does not offer any meaningful information that would permit Plaintiff -- or the Court -- to evaluate whether the assertion of a particular privilege as to a particular document is proper. As such, it does not even begin to fulfill the primary purpose of a privilege log.

The information to be disclosed when potentially responsive documents are withheld from production on grounds of privilege and the purpose of a privilege log have been amply addressed by many courts. As one Court in the Central District has very recently explained:

RG Abrams Ins. v. L. Offs. of C.R. Abrams, 342 F.R.D. 461, 494 (C.D. Cal. 2022); see also id. at 496-97 (rejecting as deficient privilege log subject matter descriptions that provided insufficient information to determine whether attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine actually applied and date information that repeatedly stated “various”); Hupp v. San Diego Cnty., 2014 WL 1404510, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2014) (“ ‘Generally, a privilege log is adequate if it identifies with particularity the documents withheld, including their date of creation; author, title or caption; addressee and each recipient; and the general nature or purpose for creation. In addition, the particular privilege relied on must be specified. A privilege log may be supplemented by an affidavit, deposition testimony, or other evidence, if necessary, to establish that each element of the asserted privilege has been met.’ ”) (quoting 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 26.47(l)(b), at 26-318 to 26-329 (3d ed. 2013)).

Of course, the City of Los Angeles is already familiar with these standards as it has recently been expressly admonished by another Court in the Central District that privilege logs of the type it is attempting to continue to produce in this case do not comply with the Federal Rules. The Court in Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles unambiguously rejected a similar privilege log, explaining:

Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles, 2021 WL 3914260, at *17 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2021).

As noted above, Defendants have not seriously attempted to justify their failure to provide any meaningful information in their privilege log. While Defendants correctly note that Rule 34(b)(2)(C) does not require the production of a privilege log, as stated in the Advisory Committee notes, they apparently do not understand that Rule 34(b)(2)(C) applies only to the initial written response to a request for production. Rule 34 simply requires a notification that some documents have been withheld pursuant to a given privilege in order to signal to the other party that documents are being withheld and further discussion is warranted. Rule 34 does not displace a party's more exacting disclosure requirements under Rule 26(b)(5). Defendants' so-called “privilege log” in no way complies with the Federal Rules. The City is strongly advised to cease attempting to circumvent the disclosure requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) if it wishes to litigate civil rights actions in federal court.

Defendants' privilege log generically asserts several state law privileges, including “Peace Officer Personnel Records”; “Self Critical Analysis Privilege”; and “Subsequent and Remedial Measures.” In its prior discovery order in this case, the Court painstakingly explained why Defendants' repeated and extensive reliance on state law privileges in this action is improper. (Dkt. No. 51 at 18-19) (citing, inter alia, Chatman v. Felker, 2009 WL 173515, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009) (expressly rejecting objections based on Cal. Penal Code §§ 823.7 & 6126.3(c)(1), Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043 & 1046, and Cal. Gov. Code § 6254(f) on the ground that state privilege law does not control in federal court)). The Court reminds counsel for Defendants that Defendants removed this action from the Los Angeles County Superior Court to this Court, and in so doing, necessarily accepted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the federal law of privilege would now apply to the litigation of this case. If Defendants wished to continue to invoke state law privileges, their option was to litigate Plaintiff's claims in state court, where Plaintiff initiated this action.

While the Official Information Privilege and the Right to Privacy have been recognized in federal court, they are subject to a balancing of interests, and Defendants have not seriously addressed the important constitutional rights at issue in civil rights actions that allege abuses by police officers, or persuasively explained why the Protective Order in this case is not sufficient to protect their interests. As the Hernandez Court explained,

*5 Hernandez, 2021 WL 3914260, at *17. Furthermore, Defendants' references to the declarations of Detective Tracie Noggle and Detective Javier Lozano in connection with their assertion of the Official Information privilege are not persuasive. (First MTC at 12). In the first instance, the privilege assertions are free-floating as they are not tied to any particular documents. Therefore, the Court has no basis for finding that the Official Information Privilege applies to any document that Defendants are currently withholding. Furthermore, Detective Noggle's declaration discloses on its face that the Detective did not review Plaintiff's second set of production requests. (Haas Decl., Exh. B at 11 ¶ 2). The Court previously considered the declaration of Javier Lozano, which addresses in more detail the grounds for Defendants' assertion of the official information privilege in connection with the first set of production requests, and determined that Defendants “failed to make a sufficient showing for a blanket application of the official information privilege.” (Dkt. No. 51 at 23). Additionally, Detective Lozano's declaration is not attached to Defendants' responses to the second set of requests for production, (Haas Decl, Exh. B), and even if it were, it is not signed, and thus has no evidentiary value. (Id., Exh. G at 46).[6]

Plaintiff represents that some of the documents that Defendants have already produced contain redactions, but the reasons for the redactions are not explained on any privilege log. According to Plaintiff, some of the redactions may be because Defendants have unilaterally deemed the redacted materials irrelevant.

It is obvious that partially redacted documents fall under the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(b)(5) and the reasons for the redactions must be disclosed on a privilege log. The Court has no basis at present for determining whether the redactions were made on relevancy grounds, but admonishes the parties that courts in this Circuit typically conclude that the unilateral redaction of documents on the ground that the producing party deems the information irrelevant is generally improper. As one court explained:

Doe v. Trump, 329 F.R.D. 262, 275-76 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (some internal citations omitted). This general rule would seemingly apply whether the redaction is of a portion of a single document or of an entire document in a set of documents collectively deemed responsive to a request and relevant to the claims and defenses in an action.

There are many reasons why redactions for relevancy are disfavored. A bright-line “no redactions for relevancy” rule is easy to enforce, while a party's selective redactions for relevancy breed suspicion and may lead to litigation over matters that may ultimately prove to be entirely unrelated to the case. See In re Medeva Securities Litigation, 1995 WL 943468, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 1995) (“The Court does not welcome unilateral editing of documents by the producing party. Even when implemented with restraint and in good faith, the practice frequently gives rise to suspicion that relevant material harmful to the producing party has been obscured.”). As such, redactions for relevancy, if generally allowed, would have the potential to create a drain on the Court's and the parties' resources, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which requires that the Rules of Civil Procedure “be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2, which addresses when redaction is permitted, does not expressly authorize redactions for relevancy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a); see also Francisco v. Emeritus Corp., 2017 WL 11036693, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2017) (“ ‘[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not grant parties the power to unilaterally redact information on the basis of relevance.’ ”) (quoting Bartholomew v. Avalon Capital Grp., Inc., 278 F.R.D. 441, 452 (D. Minn. 2011)). Finally, a party's concern about the disclosure of irrelevant information should be afforded particularly slight deference where there is a protective order in place. Id.

*6 At the same time, some courts have, in specific circumstances, permitted relevancy redactions, especially when the redacted information plainly has no potential relevancy to the litigation or is particularly sensitive. For example, in Federal Trade Comm'n v. AMG Servs., Inc., 291 F.R.D. 544 (D. Nev. 2013), an action brought by the FTC against internet-based short-term lenders, defendants sought, in part, unredacted copies of all bank statements for consumers who claimed to have been defrauded by them, even though those statements would inevitably reveal unrelated transactions with no bearing on whether defendants deceived the consumers. Id. at 550. The FTC contended that “the consumers' bank activity with any entity other than the defendants is not relevant to any issues in this action.” Id. at 554. In response, defendants argued that redaction for relevancy is not permitted under the Federal Rules, and claimed that the redacted transactions may be “highly relevant” to their defenses and their ability to have a complete understanding of the documents. Id. at 555. The court determined that the consumers were required to disclose their transactions with any payday lender, not just defendants, but otherwise authorized redaction of the consumers' bank statements on the grounds that any other transactions reflected in them were irrelevant. Id. at 557; see also Nazar v. Harbor Freight Tools USA Inc., 2019 WL 9828534, at *1-*2 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 27, 2019) (recognizing “relevancy” as a valid basis for redaction in product liability case and upholding defendant's unilateral redactions of information such as “aggregate insurance coverage limits, contact information for Defendant's vendors, price and quantity information in vendor contracts, ... and ‘[p]roducts not SKU 61476’ ” where plaintiff could not articulate a need for the information); Joseph v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 2010 WL 5136010, at *7 (D. Nev. Dec. 10, 2010) (declining to order production of police department's entire policy and procedures handbook in excessive force case because plaintiffs could not explain “why they must have the entire manual, including those sections related to matters such as uniforms, grooming, driving, juveniles, and fiscal affairs, or how these sections could be relevant to their claims”). Here, it is unknown whether any redactions were made on the basis of relevancy because Defendants have not explained why any of their partially redacted documents were produced.

Based on the arguments presented, coupled with the privilege log produced by Defendant, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request and ORDERS Defendants to produce a privilege log in compliance with the Federal Rules. Plaintiff shall also include any previously produced, partially redacted documents on the privilege log to explain any redactions. Finally, Defendants are ordered to produce in unredacted form any previously produced documents where the redaction was made solely on relevancy grounds.

B. TEAMS And Field Data Reports

Plaintiff seeks production of two kinds of reports for each Defendant called a “Field Data Report” and a “TEAMS Report” (also known as a “Training Evaluation and Management System” Report) for the five-year period preceding the incident. (First MTC at 19-20).

Plaintiff represents that TEAMS Reports “contain a global summary of both training records and prior misconduct allegations in the form of a ‘spreadsheet-style computerized record’ for each Defendant officer.” (P First Supp. Memo. at 3) (quoting First MTC at 24). Plaintiff maintains that TEAMS Reports are “indisputably relevant” because documents produced by Defendants “indicate that investigating officers customarily review an officer's TEAMS reports when they investigate complaints of biased policing or excessive force.” (P First Supp. Memo. at 3) (footnote omitted). TEAMS reports are used to identify patterns of conduct consistent with allegations of racial profiling, and may in fact exonerate an officer. (First MTC at 20). However, Plaintiff complains that Defendants have “refused to produce these TEAMS Reports,” (id.), even though evidence of other wrongs or acts is admissible to show proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. (Id. at 21) (citing Duran v. City of Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000).

Defendants argue that TEAMS reports contain “various categories of confidential information protected by privileges” and are “not proportionate to the needs of the case.” (First MTC at 24). Defendants maintain that the list of complaint histories listed in the TEAMS Reports is also “duplicative (and reductive) of [the personnel complaints] the Court has already ordered from its in camera review and order in October 2021.” (Id.) (citing Dkt. No. 54). In light of this in camera review, Defendants contend that the “Court has already determined which specific complaint packages should be disclosed to Plaintiff.” (Id. at 25). However, if the Court chooses to order production of TEAMS Reports, Defendants request that they be submitted to the Court for in camera review. (Id.).

*7 The Court has already reviewed in camera personnel complaints against the officers and determined which ones may be relevant to the parties' claims and defenses. Plaintiff has not persuasively shown what non-duplicative, incremental evidence TEAMS Reports could reasonably be expected to provide that would still be proportionate to the needs of this case. Accordingly, the First MTC is DENIED to the extent that it seeks production of TEAMS Reports.

According to Plaintiff, Field Data Reports provide statistical data regarding the ethnicity of individuals stopped by each Defendant officer in a calendar year. (First MTC at 22-23). Plaintiff states that the LAPD has disclosed Field Data in both public releases and in Defendants' responses to discovery requests in this action. (Id. at 23-24). As such, Plaintiff states that Defendants should be required to produce Field Data Reports for each of the five Defendants. Defendants contend that the request for every Automated Field Data report for each Defendant for a five-year period is “unduly oppressive, overly burdensome, not proportional to the needs of the case, and duplicative of material already produced.” (Id. at 25). Defendants explain that an Automated Field Data Report is generated during any public contact with a civilian when the contact leads to an arrest, detention or search, or when evidence is obtained. (Id. at 26). Defendants further state that the format of the reports changed on July 1, 2018, and the reports are stored in separate software database systems, meaning that each of the searches would have to be conducted in two databases. (Id.). According to Defendants, most LAPD patrol officers have hundreds or thousands of Automated Field Data Reports every year. (Id.). Defendants claim that generating each of the reports for all five Defendants for five years would take approximately one month to complete and cost about $16,000.00 in man-hour wages. (Id.). Finally, Defendants argue that a comprehensive production is not proportional to the needs of this case because Plaintiff has already been provided with personnel complaint investigations that would have any tendency to show any pattern of “racial profiling.” (Id. at 27).

Plaintiff's request for Field Data Reports for each Defendant for a five-year period is overbroad and would likely require review and production of a large amount of documents of questionable relevance to the issues in this case. Plaintiff has not persuasively shown what non-duplicative, incremental evidence Field Data Reports could reasonably be expected to provide that would still be proportionate to the needs of this case and not impose an undue burden on Defendants. (See Noogle Decl. ¶ 4). Accordingly, the First MTC is DENIED to the extent that it seeks production of Field Data Reports.

Defendants asked the Court conduct an in camera review before any production of TEAMS Reports or Field Data Reports is required. While the Court would not be inclined to conduct another in camera review in this case, Defendants' request is moot because the Court is not ordering production of TEAMS Report or Field Data Reports.

C. Requests For Admission

According to Plaintiff, only two disputes regarding Defendants' responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admission (“RFA”) survive: the City of Los Angeles's response to RFA No. 6 and Officer Covarrubias's response to RFA No. 2. (P Supp. Memo. 1 at 5). RFA No. 6 asks the City to admit or deny whether the City “is aware of the dozens of complaints each year from the public involving LAPD officers racially profiling, unlawfully stopping and searching members of the public.” (Id.; see also First MTC at 35). In its supplemental response, the City asserts a long list of state and federal objections, then states: “Without waiving previously-asserted objections and subject to them, Responding Defendant further responds as follows: Admit that the Los Angeles Police Department has a policy of investigating personnel complaint by the public.” (First MTC at 36-37). Plaintiff contends that this response is “non-responsive.” (P Supp. Memo. 1 at 5). RFA No. 2 asks Officer Covarrubias to admit that he “did not ask Mr. Clark for consent to search his vehicle on December 18, 2019, according to your BWV [body-worn video].” (P Supp. Memo. 1 at 5; see also First MTC at 32). According to Plaintiff, Officer Covarrubias admits that Plaintiff did not verbally consent to the search of his vehicle, but did not admit or deny whether he asked Plaintiff for consent to search his vehicle. (P Supp. Memo. 1 at 5; see also First MTC at 43). Defendants contend that their supplemental responses to RFP No. 6 (the City) and RFP No. 2 (Covarrubias) have rendered Plaintiff's complaints moot. (First MTC at 35).

*8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). Because requests for admission clarify not only those issues upon which the parties agree but also those which are “genuinely contested,” where issues in dispute “are requested to be admitted, a denial is a perfectly reasonable response.” United Coal Companies v. Powell Const. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 967 (3rd Cir. 1988). The Rule specifically provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). “If the party requesting the admission later proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter requested, the court may order the party that denied the request to pay the costs of her opponent in making that proof.” McFadden v. Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, 243 F.R.D. 1, 7 (D. D.C. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2)).

The City admitted that the “Los Angeles Police Department has a policy of investigating personnel complaint by the public” in response to RFA No. 6 asking for an admission that the City “is aware of the dozens of complaints each year from the public involving LAPD officers racially profiling, unlawfully stopping and searching members of the public.” Officer Covarrubias admitted that Plaintiff did not verbally consent to the search of his vehicle in response to RFA No. 2 seeking an admission that he “did not ask Mr. Clark for consent to search his vehicle on December 18, 2019, according to your BWV [body-worn video]”.RFA No. 6 is compound and to that extent, is difficult to decipher. RFA No. 2 is similarly confusing to the extent that it seeks an admission “according to [Officer Covarrubias's] BWV,” as the video would seemingly speak for itself. The City's and Officer Covarrubias's amended responses adequately address the core issue in RFA Nos. 6 and 2. Accordingly, the First MTC is DENIED to the extent that it seeks supplemental RFA responses.

D. Email Search Term Protocols

In the Second MTC, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have not conducted a reasonable search for electronic communications concerning “(1) the incident, (2) the training of the Defendant officers involved, and (3) the relevant policies and procedures that were in place at the time of the incident,” despite multiple requests from Plaintiff. (Second MTC at 1). According to Plaintiff, Defendants have searched only for emails sent between or among the five Defendants for the four-day period following the incident, i.e., December 18, 2019 through December 21, 2019. (Id. at 5). Defendants told Plaintiff that the search did not result in any hits. (Id.). Although Defendants promised to conduct a search for communications between the officers from December 21, 2019 to August 18, 2020 (the day the internal investigation was finalized) using the terms “Clark” and “the incident number” associated with this matter, to date Defendants have not reported the results of that search. (Id.; see also P Supp. Memo. 2 at 1 (“To date, Defendants have produced zero communications.”) (emphasis in original)). Plaintiff notes that there are actually two incident numbers associated with his complaint, and it is not clear whether Defendants searched for emails using “and” or “or” as a limiter. (Second MTC at 5).

*9 Plaintiff proposes the following search protocol:

(Second MTC at 7). Plaintiff maintains that this search protocol is “narrowly tailored to hit on documents that are relevant to Plaintiff's claims and defenses in this litigation,” including “Plaintiff's first, middle, and last name, the model of Plaintiff's car, the two incident numbers associated with Plaintiff's report, [and] the street where Plaintiff was searched,” as well as terms corresponding to “discrete issues related to the incident, including Mr. Clark's contention that Defendants improperly initiated the stop because of Mr. Clark's race and searched his car to discover evidence of marijuana.” (Id. at 8).

Defendants contend that terms like “Honda” or “Sony” or “stash” or “Black” or “African” are “universal” and in the course of law enforcement could yield “hundreds if not thousands” or inapplicable or nonresponsive hits. (Id. at 9). Defendants specifically note that the term “ ‘stash’ ... could refer to thousands of scenarios related to anything from drugs to money laundering” and the term “ ‘Black’ could relate to BLM Protests that occurred in early 2020 which encompasses the time frame sought by Plaintiff.” (Id. at 10). Furthermore, Defendants argue that the “sheer volume of information that would need to be reviewed not only requires the LAPD's Information Technology Bureau but a review from the City Attorney's Office to ensure no third-party privacy rights are being violated or that any sensitive or confidential information is appropriately redacted.”[8] (Id.). Despite their reservations, Defendants state that they “have agreed and reiterated several times that they are willing to conduct the requested search.”[9] (Id.). Defendants state that they hope that “by the time this motion is heard, the requested information is either produced or it is verified not to exist,” (id.), as Plaintiff acknowledges. (Id. at 1-2).

*10 Defendants' contentions about the purported burden of conducting Plaintiff's proposed search are undercut first by Defendants' failure to quantify the number of hits that are generated by Plaintiff's search terms as proposed and by Defendants' stated willingness “to conduct the requested search.” (Id. at 10). Additionally, Defendants' unilateral decision to impose drastic and largely untenable limitations on their prior search severely damaged the credibility of Defendants' cries of burden. Defendants initially conducted a search for emails only between the five named Defendants over the four-day period from December 18, 2019 to December 21, 2019, which resulted in no hits. (Second MTC at 5; see also Haas Decl. 2, Exh. I at 14-15). Defendants represented that they were conducting another search, again limited to communications between Defendants only, for the period from December 21, 2019 to August 18, 2020 (the day the internal investigation closed), with hits for “Clark” and only one of the two incident numbers associated with this matter. (Second MTC at 5; see also Haas Decl. 2, Exh. I at 15). Defendants do not even attempt to justify why they limited their searches only to communications between Defendants, as opposed to emails sent to or by each of the Defendants regardless of the sender or recipient, why they applied only one incident number, and why the did not use more than two search terms; nor have they clarified for Plaintiff whether their search terms used “AND” or “OR” as connectors. The Court has very little confidence in the reasonableness of Defendants' searches conducted to date. However, the Court agrees that certain search terms, such as “Honda,” “Sony,” and “stash” are too generic and common such that they would yield too many inapplicable or nonresponsive results. For these reasons, these search terms are eliminated.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Second MTC is GRANTED IN PART to the extent that Defendants are ORDERED to conduct a search as Plaintiff has proposed, eliminating the terms “Honda,” “Sony,” and “stash.” To the extent that any documents are withheld on the basis of a federal privilege, Defendants shall produce a privilege log specifically identifying each document withheld and the privilege under which it is withheld. Defendants may not withhold any documents solely on the basis of a state law privilege. However, the Second MTC is DENIED to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking production of every non-privileged document identified by his proposed search. Although the Protective Order in place should be sufficient to protect against unwarranted disclosures, Defendants are required to produce only those documents responsive to the claims and defenses in this action, broadly construed to include not just the specific incident at issue, but also, at a minimum, other incidents of racial profiling of African Americans and/or African nationals or that reflect animosity towards African Americans and/or African nationals.

For the reasons stated above and on the record at the hearing, Plaintiff's First MTC is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's Second MTC is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants' request for in camera review is DENIED as moot. Defendants shall make supplemental productions as required by this Order no later than December 8, 2023, except that Defendant must produce an amended privilege log within ten days of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.