*1 At the parties' request, the Court conducted an informal telephonic discovery conference on December 8, 2023, to address the parties' disputes regarding whether Defendant is entitled to discovery regarding the decedent's competency, autonomy, and intention to cancel his life insurance policy. (Dkt. No. 76). The Court encouraged the parties to continue their discussions regarding the discovery disputes and attempt to reach a resolution. (Id.).

On December 21, 2023, after the parties failed to resolve their discovery disputes, Jackson National Life Insurance Company (“Jackson”) filed a Motion to Compel. (“Motion,” Dkt. No. 79). The Motion seeks to compel documents and information responsive to Jackson's First Requests For Production of Documents (“FRPD”) Nos. 11, 13, 15-17, 19–22, 24–26, 32, and 34; Second Requests For Production of Documents (“SRPD”) Nos. 36, 38, 39, 49, 51, and 53; Interrogatory Nos. 7, 9–11, 13, 17, 18, and 20; and Request for Admission (“RFA”) No. 6 (the “Discovery Requests”). (Motion at 2). The parties submitted a joint stipulation pursuant to Local Rule 37-2, setting forth each side's position on the disputes. (“Joint Stip.,” Dkt. No. 80). On December 26, 2023, Jackson filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its positions (Dkt. No. 81), along with the declaration of Monika Sehic (“Sehic Decl.,” Dkt. No. 81-1) and accompanying exhibits (Dkt. Nos. 81-2 through 81-6).

On January 9, 2024, the Court held an in-person hearing. For the reasons stated below and on the record at the hearing, Jackson's Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART.

On March 17, 2021, Enciso sued Jackson in San Luis Obispo County Superior Court. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8–18). On November 24, 2021, Jackson removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1). On January 22, 2022, Enciso filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging (1) financial elder abuse, (2) breach of life insurance contract, (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (4) negligence per se, (5) negligence, and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress—bystander. (“FAC,” Dkt. No. 19).[1]

In 1995, Jackson executed a life insurance policy (“the Policy”) with Donald Regan, listing his wife (Plaintiff Carmen Enciso) as the beneficiary. (FAC ¶ 14). In February 2018, Regan was diagnosed with terminal cancer and told he had nine months to live. (Id. ¶ 20). By June 2020, when the events giving rise to this lawsuit began, Regan's “physical and mental condition had deteriorated.” (Id. ¶ 23).

*2 In or about June 2020, after paying Policy premiums for 20 years, Regan received a letter from Jackson notifying him that his premiums would increase from $273.63 to $4,150.34, but the notice was unclear as to whether the increased amount was for a monthly or annual premium. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22). The notice warned Regan that failure to pay the increased premium would result in termination of the Policy. (Id. ¶ 21). Regan called Jackson on June 26, 2020, and an employee informed Regan that the $4,150.34 premium was an annual amount, with a new monthly premium of $347.04. (Id. ¶ 26). Confusingly, however, Jackson then debited both a $273.65 and a $4,150.34 payment from Regan's bank account for the same August 2020 period. (Id. ¶ 27). Thereafter, Jackson sent Regan a letter, which he received on August 13, 2020, stating that he had requested to cancel the Policy, instructing him to return a Term Cancellation Request form, and advising him that the Policy would remain in force until he returned the form or failed to pay the premiums due. (Id. ¶ 30). Regan immediately called Jackson and employee Ally Ferris advised him that he should ignore the letter. (Id. ¶ 31).

As Regan's “physical and mental condition continued to deteriorate,” he received additional notices of unpaid premiums from Jackson. (Id. ¶ 32). On August 13, 2020, Regan received a payment notice stating $4,150.34 as the premium due by September 2, 2020. (Id.). On August 14, Regan received a payment notice stating $8,300.68 was due as of August 2, 2020. (Id.). On August 17, Regan received two “Notices of Past Due Premium,” listing different amounts due ($4,150.34 and $273.62) and advising him that his Policy had entered its Grace Period and would terminate effective September 2, 2020, or August 2, 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 28–29). On August 17, he also received a “Payment Notice” listing $8,574.30 as the Monthly Premium Due by July 2, 2020. (Id. ¶ 32). On August 21, he received a “Payment Notice” with a due date of August 2, 2020, listing $8,300.68 as the amount for two months of premiums due. (Id.). And on August 24, he received a “Second Notice” warning him that $4,150.34 was the “Monthly Premium Due” as of August 2, 2020. (Id.). These notices warned him that if payment was not received by the due date(s) shown, his Policy would enter its grace period and terminate. (Id.).

On August 24, 2020, Regan also received another notice that he had requested to cancel the Policy and directing him to return the Term Cancellation Request form. (Id. ¶ 38). Regan called Jackson on August 25, and an employee advised him to “complete the forms he received and ... ‘payment notices will stop now.’ ” (Id.). That day, Regan signed and returned the cancellation request form, although he did not check the box to request cancellation. (Id.). The very same day that Regan signed and returned the cancellation form, Jackson sent a letter to Regan stating that as of August 24, 2020—the day before he allegedly spoke to Jackson and returned an incomplete cancellation form—he had requested to cancel the Policy, and that the cancellation was effective August 2, 2020. (Id. ¶ 40).

Enciso learned by September 30, 2020, that Jackson had cancelled the Policy and requested that it be reinstated. (Id. ¶ 42). She alleges that Jackson “knew or should have known that [Regan] was terminally ill and experiencing obvious signs of diminished capacity and impairment.” (Id.; see also id. ¶ 53). Jackson, however, required Enciso and Regan to apply to reinstate the Policy, even though Jackson knew that reinstatement would be futile due to Regan's terminal cancer diagnosis. (Id. ¶ 43). Regan died on October 2, 2020. (Id. ¶ 47). Four days later, Jackson advised Enciso that the Policy would not be reinstated. (Id. ¶¶ 47–48).[2]

In October 2023, Jackson served Enciso with Requests for Production (Set Two), Interrogatories (Sets Two and Three), and Requests for Admissions (Set One). (Sehic Decl. ¶ 1).[3] On December 6, 2023, the Court entered the parties' stipulated protective order. (Dkt. No. 75). On December 15, 2023, Jackson took Enciso's deposition. (Sehic Decl. ¶¶ 14–15 & Ex. D). On December 19, 2023, the Court extended the discovery cut-off date until January 9, 2024 “for the sole purpose of allowing Defendant to decide whether to file a Motion to Compel further discovery responses from Plaintiff. The discovery cut-off date includes the hearing of discovery motions.” (Dkt. No. 77).

*3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), as amended on December 1, 2015, provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “The relevance standard is commonly recognized as one that is necessarily broad in scope in order to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Raya v. Barka, 2022 WL 686460, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2022) (citation omitted); see Sci. Games Corp. v. AGS LLC, 2017 WL 3013251, at *2 (D. Nev. July 13, 2017) (“Even after the 2015 amendments, courts continue to recognize that discovery relevance remains ‘broad’ in scope.”). “The proportionality inquiry [in Rule 26(b)(1)] focuses, at bottom, on analyzing the marginal utility of the discovery being sought.” V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 314 (D. Nev. 2019) (citation omitted).

While the scope of permissible discovery may be broad, because discovery must be both relevant and proportional to the needs of the case, the right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. The 2015 amendments to Rule 26 “were designed to protect against over-discovery and to emphasize judicial management of the discovery process, especially for those cases in which the parties do not themselves effectively manage discovery.” Noble Roman's, Inc. v. Hattenhauer Distrib. Co., 314 F.R.D. 304, 308 (S.D. Ind. 2016); see Davita HealthCare Partners, Inc. v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 394, 398 n.3 (2016) (the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules “contribute to the overall goal of regulating the time and expense of litigation”). “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance. In turn, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that discovery should not be allowed, and also has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections with competent evidence.” United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 2014 WL 1647385, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (citations omitted); see DIRECTV, Inc. v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.”).

In responding to a request to produce documents, the responding party must affirmatively state whether any responsive materials are being withheld based on that objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C) (“An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”). Indeed, parties could avoid unnecessary expenses and disputes by strictly complying with Rule 34(b)(2)(C). “A proper written response should also provide sufficient information for the requesting party, and the court, to be satisfied that the responding party conducted an adequate investigation for responsive materials.” In re Rivera, No. CV 16-4676, 2017 WL 5163695, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2017); see Atcherley v. Clark, No. 12 CV 0225, 2014 WL 4660842, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (“In responding to discovery requests, a reasonable inquiry must be made, and if no responsive documents or tangible things exist, the responding party should so state with sufficient specificity to allow the Court to determine whether the party made a reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence.”) (citations omitted).

A. Discovery Objections

*4 “[B]oilerplate objections do not suffice and there is no ground upon which to reasonably argue otherwise.” Marti v. Baires, No. 08-CV-00653, 2012 WL 2029720, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2012); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (“For each item or category, the response must either state that inspection ... will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.”) (emphasis added); Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981) (“objections should be plain enough and specific enough so that the court can understand in what way the [discovery requests] are alleged to be objectionable”) (emphasis added). Indeed, boilerplate assertions of any type are improper in federal court. See, e.g., A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper—especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections. ... Similarly, boilerplate relevancy objections, without setting forth any explanation or argument why the requested documents are not relevant, are improper.”); Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 379 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[U]nexplained and unsupported boilerplate objections are improper.”); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 408 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (boilerplate privilege assertions are ineffective, and a failure to properly assert a privilege may “waive or otherwise abandon the privilege”). In responding to the Discovery Requests, Enciso asserts multiple boilerplate objections, including (1) “vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible”; (2) “seeks application of law to facts”; (3) “lacks foundation”; (4) “asks for the responding party to speculate on the facts”; (5) “seeks documents for which the responding party lacks foundation”; (6) “seeks an improper layperson's opinion”; and (7) “seeks expert witness information and testimony prematurely.” (Joint Stip. at 8–30). These objections lack specificity, are nonsensical and improper, and are all OVERRULED.

Enciso summarily contends that many of the Discovery Requests seek “all the possible documents in the universe and all documents that might possibly exists.” (See Joint Stip. at 8–30). Not only is this objection nonsensical, but it is also clearly not the case and cannot be taken seriously. To the extent that Enciso is arguing that these requests are overbroad and burdensome, she has not met her burden ”to demonstrate that production of nonprivileged, responsive documents ... would be disproportionately burdensome.” City of Seattle v. ZyLAB N. Am., LLC, No. C17-0790, 2017 WL 4418636, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2017); see N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins. v. Philpot, No. 08 CV 270, 2009 WL 10672468, at *4 & n.2 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2009) (overruling party's discovery objections because it did not quantify its asserted burden to producing the requested information). “It is well-established that the burden is on the objecting party to show grounds for failing to provide the requested discovery.” Baykeeper v. Kramer Metals, Inc., No. CV 07-3849, 2009 WL 10671577, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2009); see Bible v. Rio Properties, Inc., 246 F.R.D. 614, 618 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 233 F.R.D. 573, 575 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Defendant cannot simply invoke generalized objections without describing, in specific detail, how each request is overbroad and unduly burdensome by See Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 296–97 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (The responding party ”must show specifically how, despite the broad and liberal construction afforded the federal discovery rules, each interrogatory is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden.”).

Enciso vaguely contends that she is not obligated to provide responsive information until Jackson “subpoena[s] records from known third parties or conduct[s] its own investigation for the records.” (Joint Stip. at 5; see also id. at 7 (“Defendant should not be allowed to force Mrs. Enciso to scour every corner for records that Defendant could have subpoenaed ....”)). But whether responsive information is “equally available, if not already in the possession, custody and control of the propounding party” (Joint Stip. at 8–30) does not make the requests overbroad. See Nat'l Acad. of Recording Arts & Scis., Inc. v. On Point Events, LP, 256 F.R.D. 678, 682 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting objection that a discovery request seeks information that is equally available to the other party). Indeed, Enciso cannot avoid her obligation to provide responsive information by asserting that a nonparty or Jackson has the information. Enciso's “all possible documents” and “equally available” objections are OVERRULED.

*5 Enciso objects to some of the Discovery Requests as seeking documents and information protected from disclosure under the “privacy, financial, and confidential information privilege.” (E.g., Joint Stip. at 8, 10–19, 23, 25, 26). When parties to a federal diversity action raise privilege issues during discovery litigation, state law privileges apply to the extent that state law provides the rule of decision. See Fed. R. Evid. 501; see also In re Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 892 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1989) (“In diversity actions, questions of privilege are controlled by state law.”). Under California law, the right to privacy is not absolute; instead, it receives only qualified protection from pretrial discovery. As the California Supreme Court has explained:

John B. v. Superior Ct., 38 Cal. 4th 1177, 1199 (2006) (citations omitted); accord Jiae Lee v. Dong Yeoun Lee, No. CV19-8814, 2020 WL 7890868, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2020). Further, “[w]here there is a prima facie showing of relevance, the party opposing disclosure on the basis of a conditional privilege has the burden to establish the preliminary facts essential to the claim of privilege.” Gonzalez v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. App. 4th 1539, 1548 (1995).

Here, Enciso has neither raised a timely relevancy objection to any of the Discovery Requests at issue nor established the preliminary facts essential to her privacy claim. (Joint Stip. at 8–30). And she does not argue that the protective order in this case is insufficient to protect her privacy interests. Indeed, in responding to Jackson's argument that her right to privacy does not preclude production of relevant information (Joint Stip. at 39–40), Enciso acknowledges that because the protective order is sufficient to protect her interests, she is not withholding any responsive documents. (Joint Stip. at 40) (“Plaintiffs have answered and produced all relevant information documents and have properly responded to the discovery at issue. Plaintiffs have marked the confidential materials accordingly.”). Accordingly, Enciso's privacy, financial, and confidential information privilege objections are OVERRULED.

B. It Is Not Clear Whether Enciso Is Withholding Responsive Information.

In responding to the Discovery Requests, Enciso does not affirmatively state whether any responsive materials are being withheld based on an applicable objection or privilege. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C) (“An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”). Instead, Enciso vaguely asserts that she is producing nonprivileged documents without waiving her objections. (Joint Stip. at 8–30). And regarding documents that are properly protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, Jackson must affirmatively state whether any are being withheld and if so, promptly provide a privilege log. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

C. Relevance

Enciso contends that “Dr. Regan's autonomy and competency ... is not very probative in this case.” (Joint Stip. at 6–7). She also argues that the Discovery Requests “constitute[ ] an impermissible fishing expedition into [her] private financial records.” (Id. at 32). But Enciso did not raise a relevancy objection in her responses to the Discovery Requests and therefore has arguably waived such objection. See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is well established that a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.”); Gee v. Gallardo, No. CV 18-2717 JGB (PVC), 2020 WL 2083018, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2020) (“Where a party fails to timely respond to properly-served discovery requests, a court may deem any objections to the requests to have been waived.”). In any event, Enciso alleges that Jackson “knew or should have known that [Regan] was terminally ill and experiencing obvious signs of diminished capacity and impairment.” (FAC ¶ 42; see also id. ¶ 53 (“DONALD E. REGAN was over the age of 65 years old and suffered a terminal illness and disability as a result of the advancement of bladder cancer, which Defendants and each of them knew or should have known above, at all times herein.”)). She also asserts that during the relevant time period, Regan's physical and mental condition was deteriorating. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 32). Thus, Enciso has placed the decedent's autonomy, competency, and decision-making ability at issue and Jackson is entitled to seek discovery relevant to these issues.

*6 Despite her vague relevancy objections, Enciso contends that “personal medical records and banking records would be produced.” (Joint Stip. at 5; see also id. at 32 (“Whether or not the discovery is relevant to the issue of the cancellation, Plaintiffs have nevertheless provided adequate responses and have supplied the documents and materials the Defendant has requested.”)). She nevertheless argues that Jackson should have “subpoenaed records from known third parties or conducted its own investigation for the records.” (Id. at 32; see id. at 5). But as discussed above, these “equally available” objections are improper and are OVERRULED.

Finally, Enciso argues that certain business and financial records are “not in her possession, custody and control” and should not be forced to “scour every corner for records.” (Joint Stip. at 6). But Enciso is not only suing Jackson in her individual capacity but also as Trustee of The Donald E. Regan and Carmen Enciso Family Trust and as successor in interest to the Estate of Donald E. Regan. (See FAC ¶ 1). Thus, even if she does not have custody or possession of the information responsive to the Discovery Requests, it would appear that she has control of the relevant documents.

Regan's work records from 2018 through 2020 are relevant to test Enciso's allegation that Jackson should have known of Regan's “obvious signs of diminished capacity and impairment.” (See FAC ¶ 42). Any objections to producing them—including objections raised at Enciso's December 15 deposition—are OVERRULED.

Enciso asserts that she closed Regan's audiologist practice after he passed away. (Joint Stip. at 6). Nevertheless, while Enciso is both Trustee of The Donald E. Regan and Carmen Enciso Family Trust and successor in interest to the Estate of Donald E. Regan (FAC ¶ 1), she incredibly contends that she has no control over Regan's work records. (Id.). “[D]ocuments are considered to be under a party's control when that party has the right, authority, or practical ability to obtain the documents from a non-party to the action.” Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010) (citation omitted), aff'd in part, modified in part, No. CV MJG-06-2662, 2010 WL 11747756 (D. Md. Nov. 1, 2010); see, e.g., Coral Grp., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 286 F.R.D. 426, 441 (W.D. Mo. 2012) (“It is well-established that financial records held by a party's accountant are within the party's ‘control’ for purposes of discovery.”), aff'd sub nom. Sentis Grp., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 763 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2014). At the hearing, her counsel was not aware whether Enciso had even attempted to retrieve the work records.

On the other hand, Jackson has not met its burden to prove that Enciso has control of Regan's work records. See Ramos v. Swatzell, No. EDCV 12-1089, 2013 WL 12377466, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013) (“The party seeking production bears the burden of proving that the opposing party has ‘control’ of the requested documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a).”); Steele Software Sys., Corp. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 561, 565 (D. Md. 2006) (“Because the burden of proof rests with that party seeking production, therefore an unsubstantiated assertion of control generally does not suffice.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further disputes, Jackson should subpoena Regan's work records from the appropriate third party. See E.E.O.C. v. Randall Ford, Inc., 298 F.R.D. 573, 575 (W.D. Ark. 2014) (because fighting over whether a party has ‘control’ over a nonparty can be expensive and time-consuming, it is often easier to serve a subpoena on the nonparty holding the sought-after information).

*7 Regan's bank records from 2018 through 2020, including those of his medical practice, are also relevant to test Enciso's allegation that Jackson should have known of Regan's “obvious signs of diminished capacity and impairment.” (See FAC ¶ 42). Any objections to producing them—including objections raised at Enciso's December 15 deposition—are OVERRULED.

Enciso has no objection to producing the responsive bank records, instead arguing that some of the records are “not in her possession, custody or control.” (Joint Stip. at 6 & nn. 1–3). While Regan's work records and documents in the possession of accountants or tax-preparers are arguably under her control, in the interest of efficiency, Jackson should subpoena any missing responsive information from the appropriate third party.

Regan's tax records from 2018 through 2020, including those of his medical practice, are also relevant to test Enciso's allegation that Jackson should have known of Regan's “obvious signs of diminished capacity and impairment.” (See FAC ¶ 42). However, California law provides an implied privilege against forced disclosure of tax returns in civil proceedings. See Schnabel v. Superior Ct., 5 Cal. 4th 704, 719 (1993). Nevertheless, “[t]he privilege is not absolute.” Id. at 721. Accordingly, the privilege cannot be asserted where the party intentionally or impliedly waived it or where a public policy greater than that of a confidentiality of tax returns is involved. Id.

Here, it is unnecessary for the Court to determine if the taxpayer privilege has been waived or superseded by public policy considerations. Instead, the Court finds that the tax records are cumulative of the work records and bank records, which the Court is ordering be produced. Accordingly, Jackson's request to produce tax records is DENIED.

Finally, Regan's medical records from 2018 through 2020 related to his mental capacity are also relevant to test Enciso's allegation that Jackson should have known of Regan's “obvious signs of diminished capacity and impairment.” (See FAC ¶ 42). Any objections to producing them—including objections raised at Enciso's December 15 deposition—are OVERRULED.

Enciso does not object to Regan's medical providers producing these records. (See, e.g., Joint Stip. at 5 (“Plaintiff's counsel had advised Defendant's counsel ... that personal medical records ... would be produced ....”)). Indeed, on December 7, 2023, Plaintiff indicated that she would gather the responsive medical records. (Sehic Decl. ¶¶ 6–8 & Ex. A). Nevertheless, on December 20, 2023, Enciso offered Jackson a medical release that Enciso asserted could be served on Regan's medical providers. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20 & Ex. E). However, the medical release “does not include all of the relevant medical providers as it excludes Dr. Srinivas and does not authorize the full disclosure of medical records that could be related to Dr. Regan's competency.” (Dkt. No. 81 at 4; see Sehic Decl, Ex. E).

Enciso shall provide Jackson with medical authorizations for all of Regan's medical providers from 2018 through 2020 that authorize full disclosure of medical records related to Regan's mental capacity.

As discussed above, Jackson's Motion to Compel (Dkt. No. 79) is GRANTED IN PART. Enciso's multiple boilerplate objections, “all possible documents” and “equally available” objections, and privacy objections are OVERRULED. Any objections to producing Regan's work records, bank records, tax records, and medical records from 2018 through 2020, including any raised at Enciso's December 15 deposition, are OVERRULED. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Enciso's tax records are privileged and need not be produced. No later than January 17, 2024, Enciso shall provide Jackson with medical authorizations for all of Regan's medical providers from 2018 through 2020 that authorize full disclosure of medical records related to Regan's mental capacity. No later than January 26, 2024, Enciso SHALL (1) amend its discovery responses, removing all overruled objections and clearly describing whether it is withholding any responsive information pursuant to Rule 34(b)(2)(C); (2) provide a privilege log, if applicable, that substantially meets the requirements of Rule 26(b)(5); and (3) produce all non-privileged responsive information in its possession, custody, or control.