*1 In this “lemon law” action, Jesse Santos Teixeira (“Plaintiff”) has alleged that BMW NA (“Defendant”) breached its express and implied warranties for a BMW X5 M Competition that Plaintiff has under lease. ECF Docket Nos. (“Dkts.”) 15-1 at 9–10; 1-1 at 11–14. The Court has detailed the background extensively in prior orders. Dkts. 70 at 1–9; 48 at 1–4.

Relevant here is that, on April 24, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's March 14, 2023 Motion to Compel (“Motion to Compel”) in full, ordering Defendant to provide further discovery by May 5, 2023 and to pay Plaintiff's reasonable expenses incurred in bringing the Motion to Compel. Dkt. 22. On September 26, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's Second Motion for Sanctions, ordering, among other things, that Defendant and their counsel pay Plaintiff's reasonable costs in bringing the motion. Dkt. 70 at 13. The Court also renewed its order that Defendant and their counsel pay the costs in bringing the underlying Motion to Compel. Id. The Court ordered that Plaintiff's counsel submit his declaration regarding expenses by October 6, 2023, and that Defendant file objections to Plaintiff's declaration within seven (7) days. Id.

On October 6, 2023, Plaintiff's counsel submitted two (2) declaration regarding expenses. Dkts. 73–74. Defendant filed objections on October 13, 2023. Dkt. 76. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff's request for expenses, with certain reductions.

A. APPLICABLE LAW

When an award of attorneys' fees and expenses is authorized, the court must calculate the proper amount of the award to ensure that it is reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983). Reasonableness is generally determined using the “lodestar” method, where a court considers the work completed and multiplies “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate.” Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). “The district court has a great deal of discretion in determining the reasonableness of the fee[s]” sought by an applicant, including the number of hours of attorney time billed and the hourly billing rates. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992). The moving party has the burden to produce evidence that the rates and hours worked are reasonable. See Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int'l, 6 F.3d 614, 623 (9th Cir. 1983).

In determining reasonable hourly billing rates, the Court must look to the prevailing rate in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). A declaration of a party's attorney regarding prevailing billing rates in the district in which the Court sits and rate determinations in other cases “are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Declarations of the ‘prevailing market rate in the relevant community ... are sufficient to establish the appropriate billing rate.” (cleaned up) (quoting Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1547 (9th Cir. 1992))).

*2 “Although in most cases, the lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee award, the district court may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar to account for other factors which are not subsumed within it.” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978 (internal citations omitted). The court may consider “a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” PLCM Grp. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1096 (2000), as modified (June 2, 2000). Courts may also reduce the hours billed where “the hours expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986).

B. ANALYSIS

Two different attorneys have filed declarations seeking fees:

On behalf of the Law Offices of Adam Zolonz, APC, Plaintiff's lead counsel, Stephen Parnell, requests $58,465.00 in attorneys' fees. Dkt. 73, Declaration of Stephen Parnell (“Parnell Decl.”) ¶ 88. Parnell calculates this figure by multiplying 106.3 working hours by a rate of $550 per hour. Id. ¶ 88. To support his hourly rate, Parnell submits his declaration detailing his experience, the 2017–18 U.S. Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report (“Report”), and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' consumer price index calculator (“inflation calculator”). Id. ¶¶ 54–55, Exs. 1–2. Parnell's declaration asserts that he has nearly twenty (20) years' experience practicing law, but only six (6) years' experience practicing in automotive consumer warranty litigation. Id. ¶¶ 4–20. Parnell notes that the Report indicates that:

Id. ¶ 34. Parnell admits that, after reviewing this Report initially, his rate was kept at $450 per hour, but explains that his rate was increased to $550 in 2022 to account for inflation. Id. ¶¶ 35–40. Parnell also notes that several state superior courts and at least one (1) federal district court have found his previous rate of $450 per hour reasonable, and that one (1) arbitrator has found his rate of $550 per hour reasonable. Id. ¶¶ 44–53.

Also on behalf of the Law Offices of Adam Zolonz, APC, Lisa Ziperman requests $51,615.00 in attorneys' fees. Dkt 74, Declaration of Lisa Ziperman (“Ziperman Decl.”) ¶ 35. In support of the request, Ziperman submits her declaration, with no exhibits. Id. Ziperman's declaration states that she spent a total of 114.7 hours working on the two (2) motions, at a rate of $450 per hour. Id. ¶ 35. Ziperman's declaration indicates that she has nearly twenty (20) years' experience practicing law, but only has three (3) or so years of experience practicing automotive consumer warranty litigation. Id. ¶¶ 7–23.

The Court notes that $450–$550 is on the higher end of rates recently found reasonable by courts in this district for similar cases, particularly given that neither Parnell nor Ziperman are partners and that the majority of their experience is not in this area of expertise. See Rahman v. FCA US LLC, 594 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1204–05 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (approving rate from fourteen attorneys ranging from $285–$595, all but four at or below $450); Lange v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:21-CV-05376-FWS, 2023 WL 3149274, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2023) (approving rates from twelve attorneys ranging from $335–$595, all but three at or below $450); Pacheco v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:18-CV-09006-ODW-ASX, 2022 WL 845108, at *3–*4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2022) (noting that several courts in this district, as well as the Eastern and Northern districts, have relied on the 2018 Report to find the prevailing hourly rate for lemon law work to be around $325 for partners and $225 for associates; approving rates from seventeen attorneys ranging from $225 to $550, with $550 being reserved for managing partners). Accordingly, the Court will reduce Parnell's rate to $450—the rate his own declaration admits has been approved by many courts in California. Parnell Decl. ¶¶ 44–53. Furthermore, the Court will reduce Ziperman's rate to $300, given that she has practiced in this area of specialization for less than five years. Pacheco, 2022 WL 845108, at *3–*4 (“The $400 per hour rate charged by Altman Group's CJU is unreasonable given that CJU appears to have practiced consumer protection law for five years or less. ...The Court reduces CJU's hourly rate to $300/hour.”).

*3 Furthermore, the Court finds that the hours expended on these matters are unreasonable. As an initial matter, only time spent actually preparing the moving papers is compensable under Rule 37(a)(5)(A). Berryhill v. Johnson, No. SACV 11-1468-AG (RNBx), 2012 WL 13020328, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2012). Though a part of the attorneys' responsibilities under local and federal rules, hours spent attempting to resolve the dispute without court intervention are not compensable. Id.; Dish Network L.L.C. v. Jadoo TV, Inc., No. 2:18-CV-9768-FMO-KSX, 2019 WL 7166067, at *5–*6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2019) (finding hours spent “in meet and confer communications and conferences, while necessary to the overall pursuit of discovery in the case, are not compensable as hours reasonably spent in preparing the actual motion to compel” under the language of Rule 37(a)(5)(A)). Neither are ministerial acts that could have been performed by an administrative assistant. Berryhill, 2012 WL 13020328, at *2. Accordingly, the Court finds that the following entries are not compensable: 8.3 hours spent researching and analyzing federal and local rules regarding discovery obligations and filing requirements (Ziperman Decl. ¶ 30); 3.2 hours spent to break down Defendant's initial discovery responses (Parnell Decl. ¶ 63); 3.3 hours spent for expert consultation in determining what production was incomplete and necessary to the litigation (Parnell Decl. ¶ 64); 20.5 hours spent meeting and conferring for motion to compel (Parnell Decl. ¶ 65); 0.4 hours to draft and file request for remote appearance (Parnell Decl. ¶ 68); 1.8 hours spent to review and break down further production (Parnell Decl. ¶ 70); 2.2 hours spent for expert consultation in determining what production was incomplete (Parnell Decl. ¶ 71); 4.6 hours spent meeting and conferring for motion for sanctions (Parnell Decl. ¶ 72); and 0.2 hours spent to draft the request for remote appearance (Parnell Decl. ¶ 75).[1]

Next, the Court finds certain entries to be excessive. The declarations indicate that, together, Parnell and Ziperman spent eighty-one (81) hours drafting the joint stipulation supporting the Motion to Compel. Parnell Decl. ¶ 66; Ziperman Decl. ¶ 31. Though the joint stipulation was comprehensive, and the discovery involved technical information, the dispute did not present any novel legal issues that would have required extensive research. The Court finds that eighty-one (81) is an unreasonable number of hours for two (2) attorneys to spend drafting the stipulation. Similarly, according to Parnell and Ziperman, the two attorneys together spent forty-six (46) hours responding to Defendant's fourteen (14) page opposition to the Second Motion for Sanctions. Parnell Decl. ¶ 74; Ziperman Decl. ¶ 34. Though Plaintiff's Reply contained thousands of pages of exhibits, the Reply itself was only thirteen (13) pages. See Dkt. 65. The Court cannot find that forty-six (46) hours is a reasonable number to spend responding to a brief opposition to the third motion related to the same discovery dispute, even if this response involved compiling several lengthy exhibits. Accordingly, the Court will reduce each attorney's entry by 50%, resulting in 11.3 hours drafting the joint stipulation and 14.9 hours drafting the opposition for Parnell and 29.2 hours drafting the joint stipulation and 8.1 hours drafting the opposition for Ziperman. In total, these still appear to be generous figures.

Finally, the Court notes that counsels' declarations do not include invoices or other documents indicating contemporaneous billing hours; rather, they consist of summaries of the total time spent on given tasks. While counsel is correct that this does not preclude them from obtaining fees generally, courts strongly prefer contemporaneous timekeeping, and may reduce reconstructed hours to account for potentially inflated time. See Young v. Wolfe, CV 07-03190, 2017 WL 3184167, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 26, 2017). Indeed, after the above reductions, the remaining entries detail 43.9 hours purportedly spent by Parnell working on these motions, and 69.1 purportedly spent by Ziperman. Though the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff's comprehensive filings and Defendant's lack of cooperation may have caused counsel to expend significant time on these discovery matters, in the absence of contemporaneous billing records to indicate to the contrary, these figures appear severely inflated. Accordingly, the Court will reduce the hours by a further 30% across the board. Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting block-billing “may increase time by 10% to 30%”). Though this a large reduction, the total number of hours spent is still far above the hours found reasonable in similar cases in this district. See, e.g., O.T. v. BabyBjorn Inc., No. CV 20-4517-MCS (KSX), 2022 WL 3013216, at *6–*7 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022) (reducing hours spent on motion to compel and motion for sanctions to 36.3 total hours between two attorneys).

*4 Accordingly, the Court finds that counsel is entitled to 30.73 hours at $450 hour and 48.37 hours at $300 an hour for a total of $28,339.50. The Court notes that this is still greater than even the higher awards for recent similar discovery matters in this circuit. See, e.g., O.T., 2022 WL 3013216, at *7 (awarding $27,239.64 as expenses for 36.3 total hours spent bringing motion to compel and motion for sanctions); Flynn v. Love, No. 3:19-CV-00239-MMD-CLB, 2023 WL 2795869, at *3–*4 (D. Nev. Apr. 5, 2023) (awarding $25,830 as expenses for 75.1 total hours spent bringing two motions to compel and two motions for sanctions). The Court finds this higher award justified due to the expansive quantity and technical nature of the disputed discovery items.[2]

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's request for expenses in connection with the Motion to Compel and Second Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED in part. Defendant and their counsel, jointly and severally, shall pay Plaintiff's counsel the sum of $28,339.50 as reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A).