*1 This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of Frankfort's Motion to Quash Plaintiff's subpoena duces tecum and Motion for Protective Order. [R. 26 & 27]. The motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion for protective order, and consequently deny as moot the motion to quash.

This matter arises out of Plaintiff Gregory Rogers’ claim that the Defendant, City of Frankfort (“the City”) discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ch. 344 et seq. (“KCRA”). [R. 1 at ¶ 1]. Rogers worked for the City as a Superintendent of Public Transportation until he retired in June 2017. [Id. at ¶ 6]. While he worked for the City, Rogers’ direct supervisor was Public Works Director Tom Bradley. [Id. at ¶ 7]. Bradley's secretary, who was later promoted to Foreman, Jennifer Hall, also worked with Rogers while he was employed by the City. [Id. at ¶ 8]. After Rogers retired, Bradley promoted Hall to Superintendent of Public Transportation. [Id. at ¶ 18]. Rogers claims to have been concerned about Hall's rapid promotion the and that he suspected “sexual harassment and [an] inappropriate relationship” between Bradley and Hall. [Id. at ¶¶ 18–20]. These concerns led him to writing a letter to the Mayor of the City of Frankfort, Billy May, on or about November 16, 2018.

In the Letter, Rogers recounted “some serious issues” related to Bradley and a Human Resources employee for the City, Kathy Fields. [Id. at ¶ 9]; see also [R. 1-1 at pg. 2]. He discussed Hall's allegedly inexplicable rise through the ranks despite her lack of experience in public transportation. [R. 1-1 at pg. 2]. He alleged that, before he retired, he observed Hall struggling in her Foreman position even though she received high marks on several Public Works assessments. [Id.]. He further alleged he was told by two Public Works Superintendents that Bradley and Hall were in an “unprofessional relationship while she was his secretary,” but he initially dismissed the allegations. [Id.]. Rogers claimed in the Letter that it was only after he witnessed Hall take an after-hours phone call from Bradley that he suspected a relationship between Hall and Bradley. [Id.]. After he retired, his suspicions escalated upon learning of Hall's promotion to Superintendent of Public Transportation over the applications of other qualified applicants. [Id. at pg. 3]. The Letter further opined about internal problems with Public Works, such as lack of employee discipline, tardiness, and “[d]ouble standards.” [Id.]. He concluded the letter by stating, “FYI I have applied for a seasonal transit driver, I hope this [Letter] is not held against me for future employment.” [Id.].

Indeed, Rogers applied for the position of Transit Driver on November 5, 2018. [R. 1 at ¶ 22]. He received a denial letter regarding his application on or about December 16, 2018. [Id. at ¶ 24]. Rogers claims that his not being hired for the position is traceable to his sending the Letter and reporting the relationship between Bradley and Hall. [Id. at ¶¶ 25–26]. Moreover, he claims that Hall informed other City employees that Rogers was not hired because he sent the Letter. [Id. at ¶ 28]. Based on this information, Rogers filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights on February 5, 2019, wherein he alleged he was not hired by the City because he wrote the Letter to the Mayor “detailing discrimination,” and he was therefore “retaliated against for complaining of discrimination” in violation of Title VII. [R. 1-5 at pg. 2]. Rogers was issued a Right to Sue letter on March 8, 2021. [R. 1-6 at pg. 2].

*2 On June 4, 2021, Rogers initiated the instant action, alleging one count of retaliation in violation of Title VII and the KCRA. [R. 1]. On July 19, 2022, Rogers filed a Notice stating that subpoenas duces tecum had been served upon City employees Bradley, Hall, and Fields. [R. 21]. Each subpoena commands the production of the following:

[R. 21-1, 21-2, & 21-3]. The subpoenas indicate that the documents should have been produced at Roger's attorney's law firm on August 22, 2022 at 10:00 A.M. [Id.].

On September 6, 2022, the City filed a Motion to Quash Roger's subpoenas duces tecum and a Motion for Protective Order to prevent the discovery of communications on Bradley, Hall, and Fields’ private electronic devices. [R. 26 & 27]. Rogers filed Responses in opposition to each motion, [R. 29 & 34], and the City replied, [R. 42].

The City claims it has conferred with Rogers to narrow the scope of production as to the subject matter of the communications requested, to no avail. [R. 27-1 at pg. 4]. It characterizes Rogers’ request as a fishing expedition, as it seeks the production of all communications—including emails, text messages, instant messages, and social media messages—between three non-party employees of the City over a period of approximately three months. [Id.]. In Response, Rogers again argues that the breadth of discovery is necessary and relevant to prove or disprove the claims set forth in his Complaint.

Any discovery request must be within the scope provided under Federal Rule 26(b)(1), which provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case ...” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Court maintains the “authority to confine discovery to the claims and defenses asserted to the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 Amendment. Thus, under the Rule, the Court may issue a protective order to protect a party from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). To satisfy the requirements of Rule 26(c), “the moving party must show ‘good cause’ for protection from one (or more) harms identified in Rule 26(c)(1)(A) ‘with a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.’ ” In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., 845 F.3d 231, 236 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 901 (6th Cir. 2012)). Courts have broad discretion to determine whether a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).

At the outset, the Court notes that a motion for a protective order is available to “a party or any person from whom discovery is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Thus, several courts in this Circuit have interpreted the rule to allow parties to file motions for protective orders on behalf of non-parties. See Proto Gage, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 21-12286, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90334, at *6 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2022) (collecting cases). Thus, the City has properly brought the motion for protective order in terms of standing. In sum, the Court should first consider whether the communications sought by Rogers are relevant under Rule 26(b)(1). If Rogers satisfies his burden, then the burden shifts to the City to demonstrate that “good cause” exists to issue a protective order, under Rule 26(c), as to the communications on the personal electronic devices.

*3 Rogers argues that the communications sought are relevant because the crux of his action is that the City retaliated against him when he reported an “unprofessional relationship” between Bradley and Hall by not hiring him for a new position with the City. [R. 29 at pg. 6]. Accordingly, he claims that the jury will consider three “key questions of fact” to determine whether such retaliation took place: Did the city not hire Rogers because (1) he was not qualified for the position; (2) he made false allegations regarding Hall and Bradley's relationship; or (3) he revealed the relationship between Hall and Bradley? [Id.]. Evidence supporting any conclusion, according to Rogers, will “weigh heavily on the outcome of this case,” making such evidence relevant and within the scope of discovery. [Id.].

In this Circuit, a plaintiff may support a Title VII retaliation claim “either by introducing direct evidence of retaliation or by proffering circumstantial evidence that would support an inference of retaliation.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Imwalle v. Reliance Medical Products, Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)). For instance, evidence that the City's decision not to hire Rogers was based on Rogers’ reporting an allegedly inappropriate relationship to the Mayor could serve as direct evidence of retaliation. But it is dubious that evidence of the existence or non-existence of a romantic relationship between two City employees could serve as circumstantial, let alone direct evidence of retaliation. It appears that Rogers seeks access to electronic communications based on his unsubstantiated belief that there are communications that will prove the City's decision not to hire him was pretextual and based on his writing the Letter to the Mayor. The briefing does not reflect that Rogers has any evidence that such communications exist.

Given the breath of the requests, and the speculation underpinning them, the Court is reticent to allow the disclosure of private communications on non-party employees’ personal electronic devices without any evidence that relevant communications may exist. Therefore, Rogers’ broad request for private communications on employees’ personal electronic devices fails to conform with Rule 26(b)(1), especially when considering Rogers’ sole claim is one of retaliation. See e.g., Hawn v. Vitas Hospice Servs. LLC, No. 1:19-cv-220, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160166, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 2, 2020) (rejecting plaintiff's discovery request for text message on employees’ private devices when plaintiff's showing of relevance “extremely conclusory and insufficient” with respect to her gender discrimination claim); Blount v. Stanley Eng'g Fastening, No. 5:19-CV-00109-BJB-LLK, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45839, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 11, 2021) (granting defendant's motion for protective order to prevent disclosure of nonparty employee personal cell phone records when the request was unduly burdensome and could have been obtained from other sources). By failing to demonstrate that the communications sought are, at a minimum, relevant, it is within this Court's discretion to enter a protective order to prevent the disclosure of such information. Pictsweet Co. v. R.D. Offutt Co., No. 3:19-cv-0722, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262109, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 23, 2020) (“[A] showing of irrelevancy of proposed discovery can satisfy the good cause requirement of Rule 26(c).”) (citing Anwar v. Dow Chemical Company, 876 F.3d 841, 854 (6th Cir. 2017)).

The Court finds that Rogers’ request for “[a]ll electronic communications between Kathy Fields, Tom Bradley, and Jennifer Hall” during an approximate three-month period, “including but not limited to emails, text messages, instant messages, social media messages,” is not tailored to lead to the discovery of relevant information. Thus, the Court finds that the issuance of a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) is proper. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (“On motion or on its own, the court must limit ... discovery otherwise allowed ... if it determines that the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).”). Having fully considered the matter, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised,

*4 IT IS ORDERED that The City's Motion for Protective Order [R. 27] is GRANTED, and the Motion to Quash [R. 26] is therefore DENIED as MOOT.