*1 Pending before the Court is Defendant Wells Fargo's motion to compel discovery. Docket No. 96.[1] Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition. Docket No. 106. Defendant filed a reply. Docket No. 107. Supplements were filed. Docket Nos. 117, 118. The motion is properly resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons discussed more fully below, the motion to compel discovery is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of allegations that Matthew Beasley and Jeffrey Judd operated a large-scale Ponzi scheme through which they duped investors to pay them money purportedly used for advance loans to plaintiffs awaiting payments on personal injury settlements. See Consol. Class Action Compl. (Docket No. 37) at ¶ 1; see also United States v. Beasley, No. 2:23-cr-00066-JAD-DJA (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 2023). Those allegations initially generated civil lawsuits against the alleged schemers, but Plaintiffs eventually turned their attention to Defendant Wells Fargo, with whom hundreds of millions of dollars from the scheme were allegedly deposited. See Consol. Class Action Comp. at ¶ 3. Several of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant survived a motion to dismiss. Docket No. 74. The parties are currently before the Court on a discovery dispute.

II. STANDARDS

“The discovery process in theory should be cooperative and largely unsupervised by the district court.” Sali v. Corona Reg'l Med. Ctr., 884 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2018). When an amicable resolution to a discovery dispute cannot be attained, however, a party seeking discovery may move the Court to issue an order compelling that discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). The party seeking to avoid discovery bears the burden of showing why that discovery should not be permitted. V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 306, 309 (D. Nev. 2019). “[B]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Blank Questionnaire

Defendant seeks an order requiring Plaintiffs to produce questionnaires their attorneys sent to potential class members. See Docket No. 96 at 11-17; Docket No. 107 at 11-14. Plaintiffs respond that the questionnaires are protected by the attorney-client privilege and attorney work-production protection. Docket No. 106 at 12-13.

The Court analyzes the existence of the attorney client privilege in diversity cases based on state law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 501. That rule does not, however, explain which state's privilege law applies and a variety of methods have been suggested. KL Grp. v. Case, Kay & Lynch, 829 F.2d 909, 918 (9th Cir. 1987). The questionnaire in dispute here appears to have been sent from counsel in California[2] to recipients located in unspecified states[3] regarding this litigation in Nevada. The motion papers assume that Nevada law applies, but do not provide a choice of law analysis on this issue. See Docket No. 106 at 12. Moreover, although there is a passing suggestion that California and Nevada privilege laws are similar, see Docket No. 106 at 12, there is no discussion as to whether other potentially applicable states’ privilege laws are similar. Without briefing on the threshold issue of which law applies, the Court declines to opine on whether the questionnaire is subject to the attorney-client privilege.[4]

*2 The Court analyzes the existence of attorney work-product protection in diversity cases based on federal law. Metzler Constr'g Co. v. Stephens, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1204 (D. Haw. 2009) (collecting cases). The work-product protection “is not a privilege but a qualified immunity protection from discovery documents and tangible things prepared by a party or his representative in anticipation of litigation.” Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989). To qualify for work-product protection, materials must “(1) be prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial and (2) be prepared by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative.” United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2011). The party invoking work-product protection bears the burden of establishing these elements. E.g., United States v. City of Torrance, 163 F.R.D. 590, 593 (C.D. Cal. 1995).

Plaintiffs’ counsel attests that they used the questionnaire to collect information for purposes of this litigation from investors who contacted counsel. Docket No. 106-1 at ¶ 7. Thus, the questionnaire is subject to work-product protection. E.E.O.C. v. ABM Indus. Inc., 261 F.R.D. 503, 512 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“This questionnaire was clearly prepared by the EEOC's legal staff during the course of this litigation in order to pursue the interests it sought to vindicate by way of its lawsuit. As such, the questionnaire itself is covered by the attorney work product doctrine”).[5]

Defendant raises conclusory arguments that the questionnaire must be disclosed despite the finding that it is subject to work-product protection. First, Defendant appears to invoke the exception to work-product protection based on a substantial need for disclosure. See Docket No. 107 at 12.[6] This contention appears to be aimed at the responses to the questionnaire, though, as opposed to the blanket questionnaire itself. See id. at 12-13. Since meaningfully developed argument has not been presented as to any substantial need to obtain the blank questionnaire sent by counsel, the Court will not find this exception applies here. See Kor Media Grp., LLC v. Green, 294 F.R.D. 579, 582 n.3 (D. Nev. 2013).

Second, Defendant argues that any work-product protection for the questionnaire was waived when Plaintiffs’ counsel sent the questionnaires to “an unspecified number of class members.” Docket No. 107 at 12-13.[7] This waiver issue was not addressed in the motion or response, but rather for the first time in reply. The Court does not address arguments raised for the first time in reply. Brand, 575 F. Supp. 3d at 1273.[8]

*3 Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be denied.

B. Completed Questionnaires

Defendant seeks an order compelling production of the completed questionnaires returned by the potential class members. See Docket No. 96 at 14-15. It is axiomatic that a court will not compel the production of documents that are beyond the scope of the discovery request that was served. E.g., Barnum v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 2018 WL 1245492, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 9, 2018). The plain language of the request for production here seeks the questionnaires sent by counsel, not the completed questionnaires returned by the potential class members. See, e.g., Docket No. 102 at 12 (“Produce any questionnaire (including any attachments) sent by Plaintiffs and/or their counsel to any putative class member”).[9] Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be denied on that ground.[10]

C. Privilege Log

Defendant next asks for an order compelling Plaintiffs to identify on their privilege log all documents being withheld in the case. See Docket No. 96 at 20-25. Plaintiffs respond that they have logged all withheld documents except those involving communications with outside counsel that postdate the filing of the complaint, which Plaintiffs contend are exempted from the logging requirement by prior agreement of counsel. Docket No. 106 at 8-9. Defendant responds that, inter alia, the prior agreement did not contemplate the exemption as Plaintiffs understand it. Docket No. 107 at 16 n.14. Plaintiffs have the better argument.

Generally speaking, a party withholding documents on the basis of privilege must provide a log by which the opposing party is provided sufficient information to understand the basis for the privilege assertion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A). Nonetheless, parties are permitted to modify their discovery obligations by agreement, so long as doing so does not interfere with judicially-imposed deadlines or court proceedings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 29; see also Docket No. 61. In this case, the parties agreed that certain communications or documents need not be included on any privilege log, including “communications with the outside law firm that postdate the filing of the initial class complaint(s).” Docket No. 60 at 8. By the plain language of this agreement, the only documents in dispute (communications with Plaintiffs’ outside counsel) need not be included in a privilege log.[11]

*4 Defendant argues confusingly that the agreed-upon exception to the logging requirement does not relieve a party of explaining the basis for its privilege invocation, including identifying the documents being withheld and providing sufficient information to show an adequate basis for invoking the privilege. Docket No. 107 at 15. Indeed, Defendant contends that a party must “establish privilege applies” before avoiding the need to identify a document and accompanying information on a privilege log. Id. This circular reasoning is not persuasive. A privilege log is the means to obtain information about the privilege invocation to enable the opposing party to assess the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A). If the parties agree to forego a logging requirement for a specific set of documents, then they are by necessity foregoing the receipt of the details pertinent to that privilege invocation. That is the point of the agreement.[12] It makes little sense that a party must “establish privilege applies” to a document before avoiding the need to identify that same document and information on a privilege log.

Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be denied.

D. Information Regarding Class Members

Defendant seeks an order compelling an answer to its interrogatory requiring that Plaintiffs identify all known putative class members, along with the contact information of their counsel. Docket No. 96 at 17. Plaintiffs object to this interrogatory on a variety of grounds, including attorney-client privilege, invasion of privacy rights, irrelevance, and inferior access to information. Docket No. 106 at 15-18. Defendant counters that these objections lack merit. See Docket No. 107 at 7-11.

On motion or on its own, the Court must limit discovery when it “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative” or it “can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). Plaintiffs do not have fulsome access to the information being requested. See Docket No. 106 at 17. On the other hand, the Receiver appointed in the related case was tasked with identifying creditors in relation to the alleged Ponzi scheme. See S.E.C. v. Beasley, No. 2:22-cv-00612-CDS-EJY, Docket No. 88 at 18 (D. Nev. June 3, 2022). Moreover, after the motion to compel was filed, the Court granted the stipulation to coordinate discovery in this action with discovery in the Receiver's related case. Docket No. 110. Among other reasons advanced for that order, the parties sought to minimize discovery burdens by “coordinat[ing] discovery between the cases to the extent practicable in order to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of time, effort, and expense by the parties, courts, and witnesses associated with duplicative discovery.” Id. at 2; see also Winkler v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:23-cv-00703-GMN-NJK, Docket No. 38 at 3 (D. Nev. July 27, 2023) (“The Parties intend to further coordinate these two actions where possible to maximize efficiencies and conserve resources for the Parties and the Court” (emphasis added)). That agreement specifically accounted for the expedited production of documents held by the Receiver for Defendant's review, and vice versa. See Docket No. 110 at 2.

In supplemental filings, the Receiver represents that he has already provided Wells Fargo with a subset of the information sought through disclosure of promoter lists containing the names of hundreds of investors. Docket No. 118 at 3. In addition, the Receiver “is prepared to produce the list to Wells Fargo,” though there is some dickering remaining as to the protection of such information after its production, whether a formal discovery request must be served, and how the information may be used after it has been produced. Id. at 2.[13] At bottom, however, it appears that the information now being sought from Plaintiffs is more conveniently obtained from the Receiver. Given the circumstances, the Court is persuaded that an order compelling production by Plaintiffs is unwarranted under Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i).

*5 Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be denied.[14]

E. General Objections

Defendant argues that the Court should strike general objections lodged by Plaintiffs in responding to discovery. Docket No. 96 at 11. Plaintiffs respond that this aspect of the motion is premature in that the objections are not at issue for any of the discovery currently in dispute and, further, that the general objections are proper. Docket No. 106 at 18-19. Defendant replies that it requires relief now as it cannot determine whether any documents are being withheld based on a general objection. Docket No. 107 at 6. Defendant has the better argument.

The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ contention that this dispute is not ripe because they have not yet asserted any of the general objections in countering particular discovery efforts. See Docket No. 106 at 18. Plaintiffs’ logic is backwards. It is Plaintiffs—the parties opposing this motion to compel—who bear the burden of “clarifying, explaining, and supporting” their objections. Cable & Comp. Tech., Inc. v. Lockheed Saunders, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 646, 650 (C.D. Cal. 1997). A responding party's failure to identify particular instances in which their general objection is implicated or to substantiate their general objections is a ground for rejecting the objections, not for finding the dispute unripe. See WeRide Corp. v. Kun Huang, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 160378, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2019) (rejecting contention that dispute on general objection was unripe and, instead, affirming magistrate judge's overruling of general objection). Indeed, a finding that this dispute is unripe would hinder any disputes ever coming to fruition, as the papers do not provide sufficient guidance as to whether documents are being withheld based on the general objections. See Docket No. 107 at 6. As such, the Court is not persuaded that this aspect of the motion is premature.

Turning to the merits of the arguments presented, the Court concludes that the general objections are improper. Courts have long frowned on the use of general objections in responding to discovery. See, e.g., Bible v. Rio Props., Inc., 246 F.R.D. 614, 619 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (collecting cases). Such practice is confusing and lacking in specificity as to what objection is being lodged with respect to any particular discovery request, as well as the specific reasoning for the objection, which has led to incessant fighting and attempts to avoid accountability for late disclosure or other discovery violations. See, e.g., Infanzon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 333 F.R.D. 305, 311 (C.D. Cal. 2020). Not surprisingly, courts have routinely rejected reliance on general objections. E.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Malibu Canyon Investors, LLC, 2012 WL 112592, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 12, 2012). This line of reasoning has become all the more persuasive after the 2015 amendments to the discovery rules, which require that, “[f]or each item or category,” the request for production response must “state with specificity the grounds for objecting to that request, including the reasons,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added), and further that the responding party must “state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C). Quite plainly, “Rule 34 was amended precisely to rid federal discovery practice of [the] hide-and-seek games” inherent in the use of general objections. Infanzon, 333 F.R.D. at 311; see also Kim v. Crocs, Inc., 2017 WL 10379587, at *4 (D. Haw. Nov. 28, 2017) (addressing 2015 amendments in relation to raising general objections).[15] Plaintiffs’ position here is that they “would like to reserve the right [to rely on their general objections] for a future motion if Plaintiffs’ General Objections are relevant to the other requests or interrogatories,” Docket No. 106 at 18, which is precisely the type of “hide-and-seek” game that the rules are designed to avoid.

*6 Accordingly, this aspect of the motion to compel will be granted in that Plaintiffs’ general objections are stricken.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed more fully above, Defendant's motion to compel discovery is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.