*1 On January 3, 2023, Plaintiffs TIW Holdings LLC and Puff Labs LLC (“Plaintiffs”) filed their Complaint asserting trademark infringement, unfair competition, and related claims arising out of Defendants' allegedly unauthorized use of Plaintiffs' “Puff” marks on e-cigarette and e-liquid products and services. Compl. ¶¶ 23–26. Defendants filed a First Amended Answer and Counterclaims (“FACC”) alleging that they own the Puff brand and its related marks, and thus Plaintiffs are the infringers. FACC ¶ 9. There is also a pending related case, EVO Brands, LLC v. Al Khalifa Grp. LLC, No. 2:22-cv-3909, where Defendants EVO Brands LLC and PVG2, LLC allege that several other entities have infringed on their Puff marks by using confusingly similar marks. See EVO Brands, LLC v. Al Khalifa Grp. LLC, No. 2:22-cv-3909, Second Amended Complaint, ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 44.

On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff TIW Holdings LLC (“TIW”) filed two motions to compel, one seeking further responses from Defendant Umais Abubaker (“Abubaker”) and one seeking further responses from Defendant Saquib Shoaib (“Shoaib”). Dkt. 109 (“Abubaker Mot.”); Dkt. 110 (“Shoaib Mot.”). The motions are substantially similar, but not identical. Id. TIW broadly alleges that both Abubaker and Shoaib have refused to produce documents that TIW knows must exist and continue to frustrate TIW's attempts to engage in discovery. TIW also filed two substantially similar supplements. Dkts. 115–16.

The Court finds these matters suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the May 8, 2024 hearing is VACATED. For the reasons discussed below, the Motions are GRANTED.

Generally, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevancy is broadly defined to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). However, a court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed” if “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

*2 “A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, ... production, or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii), (iv). “[A]n evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). “In moving to compel the production of documents, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating ‘actual and substantial prejudice’ from the denial of discovery.” Grossman v. Dirs. Guild of Am., Inc., No. EDCV 16-1840-GW (SPx), 2018 WL 5914242, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2018) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). In other words, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the sought discovery is relevant. Cabrales v. Aerotek, Inc., No. EDCV 17-1531-JGB-KKX, 2018 WL 2121829, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2018). In addition, “[r]elevancy alone is no longer sufficient to obtain discovery, the discovery requested must also be proportional to the needs of the case.” Centeno v. City of Fresno, No. 1:16-CV-653 DAD (SAB), 2016 WL 7491634, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2016) (citing In re Bard IVC Filters Prod. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016)).

However, ultimately, “[i]t has long been settled in this circuit that the party resisting discovery bears the burden of showing why discovery should not be allowed.” United States ex rel. Poehling v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. CV 16-8697 MWF (SSX), 2018 WL 8459926, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2018) (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The party who resists discovery has the burden to show discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.”)).

A. INITIAL RESPONSES[1]

TIW contends that all ninety-seven of Abubaker and Shoaib's initial responses to TIW's Interrogatories and Requests for Production (“RFP”) asserted the same thirteen boilerplate objections, and, as a result, Abubaker and Shoaib have waived their right to assert any objections. Abubaker Mot. at 12–14; Shoaib Mot. at 10–12. TIW is correct that “general or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper – especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections.” A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (faulting defendant for making “boilerplate objections to almost every single request for production, including broad relevancy objections, objections of ‘overly burdensome and harassing,’ ‘assumes facts not in evidence,’ privacy, and attorney-client privilege/work product protection”). However, as Abubaker and Shoaib note, counsel subsequently withdrew all objections except for those as to relevance. Abubaker Mot. at 14–15; Shoaib Mot. at 13–14. Accordingly, the issue is moot with respect to every objection other than relevance.

With respect to relevance, the Court declines to find that the objection has been waived. Exclusive reliance on boilerplate objections can constitute a waiver of those objections. See Gorrell v. Sneath, 292 F.R.D. 629, 635 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008), for the proposition that “boiler-plate objections waive any legitimate objections responding party may possess”); Cengage Learning, Inc. v. Davis Textbooks, No. 2:15-CV-2401 TLN AC, 2016 WL 8730880, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016) (citing Gorrel to hold that “[e]xclusive reliance on such boilerplate objections waives any legitimate objection that could have been raised.”). However, the waiver is not automatic. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1147–49 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting Rule 34 “does not contain an explicit prohibition against boilerplate objections” and rejecting a “per se waiver rule” that deems a privilege waived if it is asserted through a boilerplate objection and not otherwise timely asserted); United States v. Pac. Dermatology Inst., Inc., No. 520CV01906JGBSHK, 2024 WL 1136395, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2024) (applying Burlington factors to determine whether boilerplate objections constituted waiver). Furthermore, where a party has attempted to clarify boilerplate objections—and thus has not “exclusively” relied on boilerplate objections—courts often decline to find objections waived and proceed to review the merits of the objections. See Anson v. Weinstein, No. CV 17-8360-GW (KSX), 2019 WL 6682167 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019) (“Here, however, the deficiencies in Miramax's written responses can be remedied by supplementation. Therefore, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff's request that all Miramax's [boilerplate] objections to Plaintiff's First Set of RFPs be deemed waived.”); Del Socorro Quintero Perez v. United States, No. 13CV1417-WQH-BGS, 2016 WL 304877, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2016) (rejecting Plaintiffs request for automatic waiver, noting that “the proper procedure when in receipt of seemingly boilerplate objections is to challenge them on their merits.”); Gersh v. Anglin, No. CV 17-50-M-DLC-JCL, 2019 WL 265800, at *3 (D. Mont. Jan. 18, 2019) (reviewing merits of boilerplate objections and citing Nei v. Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company, 326 F.R.D. 652, 657 (D. Mont. 2018) for the proposition that “even when the objecting party fails to carry its burden, the Court has an obligation to review the discovery requests to ensure that they are not frivolous”).

*3 Ultimately, here, given that Abubaker and Shoaib have supplemented their boilerplate objections, withdrawn most of them, and attempted to clarify their remaining relevance objections, the Court will address the merits of their remaining relevance objections and not deem them waived.

B. INTERROGATORY NOS. 1–2

Interrogatory Nos. 1–2 ask Abubaker and Shoaib to identify all companies “involved in the sales of VAPORIZER or nicotine products where [they] provide(d) services, INCLUDING as owner, investor, officer, director, consultant, independent contractor, employee, manager, or collaborator from 2015 to the present,” and to identify their responsibilities at any companies where they provided such services. Abubaker Mot. at 15–17; Shoaib Mot. at 14–16. Abubaker and Shoaib have only provided partial responses to these interrogatories. Id. Abubaker and Shoaib argue that the interrogatories seek irrelevant information because they are involved in multiple facets of the vaping industry, much of which does not involve the “Puff” mark, and thus requiring them to provide information about all of their activities in the industry are beyond the scope of claims and defenses in this lawsuit. Abubaker Mot. at 20–21; Shoaib Mot. at 19–20.

TIW, however, has submitted evidence showing that both Abubaker and Shoaib are involved with several entities in the vaping industries that have documented ties to Cool Clouds Distribution (“Cool Clouds”), a named Defendant in this case that is central to the issue of the status of the disputed “Puff” marks. This evidence includes:

*4 TIW alleges that Abubaker and Shoaib continue engage in a “corporate shell game” whereby they continue to incorporate new entities to expand the illicit sale and distribution of the allegedly infringing “Puff” products. Mot. at 19–20; Shoaib Mot. at 18–19. Indeed, TIW's evidence could reasonably be read to support this allegation. However, even putting aside TIW's allegation that these companies are all set up to engage in the illicit sale of “Puff” products, the evidence TIW has submitted shows, at the very least, that Abubaker and Shoaib are tied to various entities in the vaping industry that have documented connections to the Cool Clouds, the entity that originally owned and sold the “Puff” marks at issue and that remains a named Defendant in this case. This is more than sufficient to demonstrate that Abubaker and Shoaib's corporate ties in the vaping industry bear on, or reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, issues in this case—namely, the status of the “Puff” marks and distribution of allegedly infringing products.

For their part, Abubaker and Shoaib have done nothing to refute this evidence. Rather, they simply argue that Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2 are overbroad and could intrude on their personal and professional lives. Mot. at 20–21; Shoaib Mot. at 19–20. Abubaker and Shoaib have not cited any authority indicating this is a valid basis to deny a party access to otherwise relevant information. Indeed, as noted above, Abubaker and Shoaib withdrew all other objections, including that providing the information would be unduly burdensome or implicate privacy concerns. Accordingly, TIW's motions are GRANTED with respect to Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2.

C. INTERROGATORY NOS. 6, 12–13[3]

Interrogatory No. 6 asks Abubaker and Shoaib to “IDENTIFY and DESCRIBE all agreements, INCLUDING both written and oral agreements, with any PERSON RELATING TO ownership of any trademark that contains the term “puff,” including COOL CLOUDS, [DS Technology Licensing, LLC], EVO, MINAS, and BELTRAN.” Abubaker Mot. at 21; Shoaib Mot. at 20. Interrogatory No. 12 asks Abubaker to “IDENTIFY and DESCRIBE all members, owners, officers, managers, and directors of [DS Technology Licensing, LLC], INCLUDING their title, the amount and nature of their ownership interest, job description, and responsibilities.” Abubaker Mot. at 24. Interrogatory No. 13 asks Abubaker and Shoaib to do the same for Cool Clouds Distribution. Id.; Shoaib Mot. at 22.

Abubaker and Shoaib have responded to these interrogatories, but TIW argues that Abubaker and Shoaib's responses are either incomplete or verifiably untrue. For example, with respect to Interrogatory No. 6, Abubaker and Shoaib essentially state that they have never entered into any agreements regarding the ownership of any trademark containing the term “puff.” However, TIW submits: (1) exhibits showing that, at Abubaker's direction, Cool Clouds filed the first trademark application for “Puff Bar” and later sold/assigned the rights to DS Technology Licensing LLC (“DS Technology”); and (2) an operating agreement for Puff Bar, Inc., naming Shoaib as the majority shareholder and purchaser of the www.puffbar.com domain. See RFJN Exs. 8, 10–11; Declaration of Milord A. Keshishian in Support of Motions to Compel (“Keshishian Decl.”), Ex. 8. Given this evidence, TIW is understandably confused at how Abubaker and Shoaib can continue to assert that they have never been involved in an agreement relating to any mark containing the term “puff.” Abubaker and Shoaib make no effort to reconcile this discrepancy, but simply continue to maintain that they have fully responded to Interrogatory No. 6.

Similarly, with respect to Interrogatory Nos. 12 and 13, Abubaker and Shoaib maintain that they lack “information, knowledge, and belief” regarding the personnel of DS Technology and Cool Clouds. However, TIW notes that Abubaker self-identifies as the former owner and sole shareholder of Cool Clouds and has himself brought a lawsuit against DS Technology specifically naming the entity's owner. Abubaker Mot. at 25–26. Furthermore, TIW believes Shoaib's company, GG Distribution, purchased thousands of “Puff Bar” vapes from Cool Clouds, and thus Shoaib must have some knowledge of Cool Clouds's personnel. Shoaib. Mot. at 23.

*5 Overall, the Court finds that TIW has produced convincing evidence that Abubaker and Shoaib's responses to Interrogatory Nos. 6, 12, and 13 are incomplete. Accordingly, TIW's motions are GRANTED with respect to these interrogatories. Whether the responses are incomplete due to intentional gamesmanship, a misunderstanding of certain terms, or some combination of both remains unclear. In any case, TIW has presented evidence that Abubaker and Shoaib should have some knowledge of agreements they have entered into regarding trademarks using the term “puff,” and that they should have some knowledge of the relevant personnel for Cool Clouds and/or DS Technology. To the extent that Abubaker and Shoaib have withheld some knowledge on the basis that their knowledge is not complete, they should respond to the best of their ability. To the extent that Abubaker and Shoaib are answering based on a particular definition of a certain term, they should clarify this to TIW and cooperate in good faith to reach a common understanding. Indeed, Abubaker and Shoaib are reminded that they have “an obligation to construe ... discovery requests in a reasonable manner” and “should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized.” Boston v. ClubCorp USA, Inc., No. CV 18-3746 PSG (SS), 2019 WL 1873293, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2019) (quoting Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 618–19 (D. Colo. 2007); McCoo v. Denny's Inc., 192 F.R.D. 675, 694 (D. Kan. 2000)); accord King-Hardy v. Bloomfield Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. 3:01CV979 (PCD), 2002 WL 32506294, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 8, 2002) (responding party must give discovery requests a reasonable construction rather than strain to find ambiguity); Adolph Coors Co. v. American Insurance Co., 164 F.R.D. 507, 518 (D. Colo. 1993) (in responding to discovery requests, a responding party is “obliged ... to put the collective heads of its lawyers and agents together ...to give those requests a reasonable construction.”).

Ultimately, however, the Court cannot compel Abubaker and Shoaib to provide specific responses, even if the provided responses ultimately prove to be untrue. To the extent Abubaker and Shoaib continue to maintain that their responses are true and complete, they may satisfy their obligations with respect to this order by certifying that their responses are complete providing a brief explanation rebutting TIW's evidence showing that their responses appear to be incomplete. In this case, if TIW maintains that the responses are incomplete or untrue, their remedy will be to seek evidentiary sanctions or impeach Abubaker and Shoaib at trial; in other words, further discovery motions on these interrogatories are not likely to be successful. See AECOM Energy & Constr., Inc. v. Ripley, No. CV 17-5398-RSW-LSSX, 2018 WL 4762782 , at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2018) (collecting cases, declining to find a party in contempt because the purported contradictions the plaintiff identified in an interrogatory did “not yet rise to the level of fraud on the court and [were] more properly characterized as disputed issues of fact to be resolved by a trier of fact at trial”); Lal v. Felker, No. 2:07-cv-2060-KJM-EFB P, 2015 WL 7736874, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2015) (“Whether or not the response is truthful is a matter to be resolved at trial, not in a motion to compel.”).

D. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

The disputed RFPs fall into nine broad categories:

*6 With respect to the first group, Abubaker and Shoaib make the same relevance argument as they did with respect to Interrogatory Nos. 1–2—indeed, these RFPs seek documents concerning similar information that the interrogatories sought. See Abubaker Mot. at 33–47; Shoaib Mot. 30–44. Accordingly, the objections are overruled for the same reasons discussed in subsection III.B.

With respect to the remainder of the categories, Abubaker and Shoaib do not appear to stand on any objections. Rather, they either state that they have provided all responsive documents in their possession, custody, or control or that no responsive documents exist. Abubaker Mot. at 58, 63, 66, 68–69, 76, 78, 80, 82; Shoaib Mot. at 54, 58, 61, 67, 69. Generally, when a party avers that no further responsive documents exist, absent any evidence to the contrary, courts presume the parties are answering honestly, lest courts become mired in disputes over search adequacy. See Khan v. Boohoo.com USA, Inc., No. CV-20-03332-GW-JEMX, 2021 WL 3882970, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2021) (“Defendants fail to present any declaration setting forth facts that Plaintiffs' search was inadequate. Defendants state, ‘It appeared that counsel for Plaintiffs may have asked their client whether responsive documents exist.’ ...This is pure speculation. Every document production would be mired in disputes over search adequacy if it were sufficient that a propounding party merely believed without any factual or evidentiary showing that documents have been withheld.”). However, where the seeking party presents convincing evidence that further responsive documents do exist, courts find that the defending party is not relieved of their discovery obligations. See Strategic Partners, Inc. v. FIGS, Inc., No. CV 19-2286-GW (KSX), 2021 WL 4813646, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2021) (“Although the Court generally presumes the accuracy of a party's representation that its document production is complete, here, SPI has presented convincing “contrary evidence” that additional documents likely exist such that FIGS is not yet relieved of its discovery obligations as to its HAI claim.”). Here, the Court finds that TIW has produced convincing evidence that additional responsive documents exist.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Abubaker and Shoaib's arguments are incredibly brief—with respect to most of the categories of documents, they offer only a few sentences in opposition to Plaintiff's position. Abubaker and Shoaib primarily rely on the fact that they are no longer involved with the relevant entities: Abubaker sold his shares in Cool Clouds in 2020, and Shoaib terminated Green Generation in 2022 and GG Distribution in 2019. However, as discussed above, TIW has produced public records showing that both Abubaker and Shoaib continue to be tied to numerous entities in the vaping industry that are connected to the sale of products related to the “puff” mark. See above, subsection III.B. TIW has also submitted evidence showing that:

Taken together, this evidence tends to suggest that Abubaker and Shoaib continue to be involved with the sale of “Puff” products, or at the very least that they have current business ties to entities connected to Cool Clouds, Green Generation, and GG Distribution, entities that no one disputes were involved with the sale of “Puff” products. To be sure, Abubaker and Shoaib have provided limited documents responsive to some of these RFPs (two import duty payments, one tax payment, one hundred thirty-seven invoices for August 2019 to February 2020, twenty-five manufacturer invoices for 2019 only, one agreement related to “Puff Xtra” vapes, one check for over $400K from Al Khalifa Group, LLC to Green Generation Distribution, and a single text message between two individuals, neither of whom is Abubaker or Shoaib). However, given the evidence of Abubaker and Shoaib's extensive ties to numerous entities and individuals involved in the prior and ongoing sale of “Puff” products, TIW is reasonably skeptical that Abubaker and Shoaib have no other responsive documents.

Specifically, TIW notes that Abubaker and Shoaib have not produced the following:

*8 It is difficult believe that Abubaker and Shoaib have none of these documents in their possession, custody, or control. Abubaker and Shoaib are reminded that in the context of RFPs under Rule 34, “control” is a broadly construed term, extending even to documents that the party has a legal right to obtain from other parties. Bryant v. Armstrong, 285 F.R.D. 596, 603 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“The term ‘control’ is broadly construed, and it includes documents that the responding party has the legal right to obtain from third parties.”). Furthermore, a “party responding to a Rule 34 production request is under an affirmative duty to seek that information reasonably available to it[.]” Putz v. Golden, No. C10-0741-JLR, 2012 WL 13019220, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2012) (cleaned up); see also Burnett v. United States, No. EDCV 15-1707-CAS (KKx), 2016 WL 3392263, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2016) (noting the responding party has a duty to undertake a diligent search and reasonable inquiry in order to produce documents within its possession, custody, or control). Finally, absent a concern as to potential burden, the fact that the documents may be available elsewhere does not relieve parties of their duty to produce documents within their possession, custody, or control. See Morgan v. Haviland, No. 2:09-cv-2155 WBS KJN P., 2011 WL 2433648, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2011) (noting that courts reject the objection that the information sought is equally available to the requesting party or publicly available). With these principles in mind, even putting aside TIW's allegations that Abubaker and Shoaib continue to engage in the sale of “Puff” products—and thus would obviously have access to myriad responsive documents—TIW's evidence of Abubaker and Shoaib's extensive ties to entities connected to Cool Clouds, Green Generation, and GG Distribution suggests that they should at least have access to responsive documents concerning the “Puff” mark and prior sale of “Puff” products. Abubaker and Shoaib have an obligation to undertake a reasonably diligent search to locate and produce these documents.[4]

Accordingly, TIW's motions are GRANTED with respect to all RFPs.[5] The Court again emphasizes that, other than their relevance objection that the Court overruled above, Abubaker and Shoaib have appeared to withdraw all objections. Indeed, to the extent they did not withdraw them, they have now waived them by not arguing any of them in the joint stipulations supporting the motions. See Gold v. Kaplan, No. 2:21-CV-03204-FLA-JDE, 2021 WL 6618643, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2021) (collecting cases).

Finally, as the Court discussed above, while there is significant evidence that Abubaker and Shoaib may be withholding responsive documents or may not have conducted an adequate search, if they continue to maintain that no further responsive documents exist, the Court will be unable to compel a different response. Thus, to the extent that Abubaker and Shoaib maintain that they have no further responsive documents under their control, they may satisfy their obligations with respect to this order by certifying that no further responsive documents exist, explaining their search methodology, and providing a brief explanation rebutting TIW's showing regarding why such documents are likely to exist. In this case, as discussed above, if TIW maintains that Abubaker and Shoaib are still withholding documents, Plaintiff's remedy will be seek evidentiary sanctions and/or impeach Abubaker and Shoaib at trial.

E. COSTS AND FEES

TIW requests costs and fees from Abubaker and Shoaib, collectively, for a total of $16,927. Abubaker Mot. at 83, Shoaib Mot. at 70. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) (“Rule 37”), if a discovery motion is granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees,” unless the opposing party's objection was “substantially justified” or “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).

Here, in opposing an award of costs and fees, Abubaker and Shoaib argue only that their withdrawal of boilerplate objections and subsequent supplementing of discovery demonstrates good faith engagement in the discovery process, which renders an award of expenses unjust. Abubaker Mot. at 83–84; Shoaib Mot at 70–71. However, Abubaker and Shoaib would not have had to withdraw their improper boilerplate objections or supplement discovery responses if they had made proper objections and made more efforts to comprehensively respond to discovery requests in the first instance. The fact that Abubaker and Shoaib began efforts to comply with their discovery obligations only after TIW objected to Abubaker and Shoaib's responses is not particularly strong evidence of good faith discovery engagement and is surely not an extenuating circumstance that would render an award of costs and fees unjust.

*9 Indeed, as discussed above, TIW has produced hundreds of pages of evidence that tends to show that Abubaker and Shoaib are either withholding responsive documents or have not undertaken a sufficiently diligent search. Abubaker and Shoaib do almost nothing to contradict or explain TIW's evidence in the joint stipulations, offering only conclusory statements that no responsive documents exist. Furthermore, as discussed above, their lone relevance objection is also halfheartedly argued and ultimately unpersuasive. Indeed, Abubaker and Shoaib cite essentially no legal authority to support their arguments in the joint stipulations. Even if Abubaker and Shoaib have diligently searched and cannot provide any further responsive documents, their failure to substantively explain their efforts or explain TIW's evidence necessitated that this motion be filed and ultimately granted. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that their arguments were substantially justified, nor can the Court discern any other circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust.

However, the Court finds that TIW's requested fees should be reduced. When an award of attorneys' fees and expenses is authorized, the court must calculate the proper amount of the award to ensure that it is reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1983). Reasonableness is generally determined using the “lodestar” method, where a court considers the work completed and multiplies “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate.” Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). “The district court has a great deal of discretion in determining the reasonableness of the fee[s]” sought by an applicant, including the number of hours of attorney time billed and the hourly billing rates. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992). The moving party has the burden to produce evidence that the rates and hours worked are reasonable. See Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int'l, 6 F.3d 614, 623 (9th Cir. 1983).

“Although in most cases, the lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable fee award, the district court may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar to account for other factors which are not subsumed within it.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). The court may consider “a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” PLCM Grp. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1096 (2000), as modified (June 2, 2000). Courts may also reduce the hours billed where “the hours expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986).

Here, Abubaker and Shoaib do not contest TIW's hourly rate or hours calculations. TIW seeks fees at the following rates: for Milord A. Keshishian, principal, 3.8 hours at a rate of $650; for Kirstin A. Jensvold-Rumage, associate attorney, 28.5 hours at a rate of $375; for Meagan Ekaphan, paralegal, 8.8 hours at a rate of $250; and for Marlen Millan-Osuna, paralegal, 6.4 hours at a rate of $250. Though TIW has not provided much support for their hourly rates, the Court notes that the rates appear within the range that courts in this district have recently found reasonable for civil discovery. See O.T. v. BabyBjorn Inc., No. CV 20-4517-MCS (KSX), 2022 WL 3013216, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022) (reducing inadequately supported rates to $750 per hour for partner and $585 per hour for associate); Schonbrun v. SNAP, Inc., No. CV 21-7189-PSG-MRWX, 2022 WL 2903127, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2022) (using 2021 Real Rate Report to identify the median hourly rates for contract disputes as $901 for partners, $753 for associates, and $250 for paralegals). However, the Court notes that counsels' declarations do not include invoices or other documents indicating contemporaneous billing hours; rather, they consist of summaries of the total time spent on given tasks.[6] While this does not preclude them from obtaining fees generally, courts strongly prefer contemporaneous timekeeping, and may reduce reconstructed hours to account for potentially inflated time. See Young v. Wolfe, CV 07-03190, 2017 WL 3184167, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 26, 2017). Documenting itemized hours is particularly important here, where TIW requests fees for paralegal work, because where paralegal work is compensable generally, time spent for ministerial or administrative tasks are not. See Berryhill v. Johnson, No. SACV 11-1468-AG (RNBx), 2012 WL 13020328, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2012); Matlink, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 07-CV-1994-DMS BLM, 2008 WL 8504767, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2008) (finding paralegal's administrative work was not attributable to losing party's misconduct and thus declining to award fees for paralegal's work).

*10 Ultimately, though the Court acknowledges that TIW's comprehensive filings may have caused counsel to expend significant time on these discovery matters, in the absence of contemporaneous billing records to indicate to the contrary, TIW's figures appear inflated compared to the normal number of hours spent compiling a motion to compel. See, e.g., It's My Seat, Inc. v. Hartford Cap., LLC, No. CV 20-06378-ODW (AFMx), 2022 WL 3574402, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2022) (finding twelve hours expended at $550 hourly rate reasonable in bringing motion to compel and awarding total of $6,600 in fees); Engineered Floors, LLC v. Lakeshore Equip. Co., No. CV 21-02078-JAK (DFMx), 2021 WL 9095761, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2021) (finding ten hours expended by two attorneys at $525 and $415 hourly rates reasonable in bringing motion to compel and awarding total of $4,480 in fees). Because the Court is unable to determine whether the paralegal hours were spent doing administrative tasks, the Court will not include their hours in the award. Furthermore, the Court will reduce the hours by a further 30% across the board, bringing the total hours to 22.61 and total fee award to $9,210.25. Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting block-billing “may increase time by 10% to 30%”). Though this a large reduction, the total number of hours and fees are still both higher than many fee awards for motions to compel in this district, even when factoring in that TIW drafted two separate—but substantially similar—motions in this case. To the extent the award is greater than the average award, the Court finds it is justified due to the fact that TIW filed two motions with extensive supporting evidence.

Based on the foregoing reasons, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: