*1 On November 7, 2023, plaintiff Oscar Corona filed a motion to compel defendant U-Haul Co. of California to supplement its discovery responses. Docket no. 124. The parties' positions are set forth in a joint stipulation (“JS”). Plaintiff's motion is supported by the declaration of his counsel Brian Olney (“Olney Decl.”) and exhibits. Defendant's arguments are supported by the declaration of its counsel Tamara A. Bush (“Bush Decl.”) and exhibits. Plaintiff filed a supplemental memorandum on November 14, 2023 (“P. Suppl. Mem.”), supported by the further declaration of his counsel (“Olney Suppl. Decl.”) and exhibits. Docket no. 134.

The court held a hearing on the motion on November 21, 2023. After considering the parties' written and oral arguments, and for the reasons discussed below and stated at the hearing, the court now grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's motion.

Plaintiff filed the present action on January 7, 2022, and amended his complaint twice. Plaintiff's operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges that on January 28, 2021, plaintiff rented a trailer from U-Haul Moving & Storage at Foothill Blvd. He was given a trailer that, unbeknownst to him at the time, had previously been reported as stolen and remained reported as stolen, and was not the trailer listed in his rental contract. An automated license plate reader identified the trailer as being stolen and sent an alert to the Fontana Police Department (“FPD”). Fontana police officers then pulled plaintiff over under the suspicion he was driving a vehicle stolen from U-Haul, held him at gunpoint, forced him onto his knees, handcuffed him, searched his vehicle, and locked him inside a police car where he suffered a panic attack. Based on these events, plaintiff brings various federal and state claims against the FPD and its officers. Plaintiff also alleges against U-Haul Co. of California, U-Haul Co. of Washington, and U-Haul International, Inc. claims for violation of the Bane Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. See generally SAC.

On May 2, 2023, plaintiff served defendant U-Haul Co. of California with his first set of Requests for Production (“RFPs”), Interrogatories, and Requests for Admission (“RFAs”). Bush Decl. ¶ 2, Exs. A-B. Defendant served its responses on June 2, 2023. Olney Decl., Exs. 4-6.

On October 5, 2023, plaintiff sent defendant a meet and confer letter regarding deficiencies in defendant's responses. Olney Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1. The parties met and conferred via video conference on October 10, 2023. Olney Decl. ¶ 2. Plaintiff sent defendant a second letter on October 11, 2023. Olney Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 2. The parties met a second time via video conference on October 18, 2023. Olney Decl. ¶ 2; Bush Decl. ¶ 3. During this conference, defendant represented that a statewide search of documents responsive to RFP Nos. 41-44 was not feasible. See Olney Suppl. Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff sent defendant a third letter on October 19, 2023. Olney Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 3; Bush Decl. ¶ 3. The letter memorialized the following with respect to RFP Nos. 41-44:

Olney Decl., Ex. 3. The letter also confirmed the parties were at an impasse with respect to RFA Nos. 22-24 and that defendant would supplement its responses to Interrogatory Nos. 8-9. Id.

On October 23, 2023, the parties met again via video conference. Olney Decl. ¶ 2; Bush Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. Defendant informed plaintiff it was conducting a keyword search of documents responsive to RFP Nos. 41-44 from San Bernardino and Los Angeles Counties that had returned 385 hits, and shared the search terms used to conduct the search. Olney Decl. ¶ 3; Bush Decl. ¶ 5; Olney Suppl. Decl. ¶ 3. Because 385 hits was a lower number than plaintiff had expected the search to return, his view of the burden imposed by RFP Nos. 41-44 changed, and he requested that defendant produce all responsive documents from the 385 hits across all California counties instead of limiting the production to responsive documents from San Bernardino and Los Angeles counties. Bush Decl. ¶ 5; Olney Suppl. Decl. ¶ 4.

On October 27, 2023, defendant confirmed that it would review the results of its keyword searches for responsive materials and produce only responsive materials from San Bernardino and Los Angeles Counties. Olney Suppl. Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 7. Defendant also stated that it could not confirm that it would produce a supplemental response to RFP No. 48, because it was not included in the parties' meet and confer discussions. Id.

Defendant served supplemental responses to plaintiff's discovery requests on November 1, 2023. Bush Decl. ¶¶ 6-9, Olney Suppl. Decl., Exs. 8-9. Plaintiff now seeks an order compelling defendant to further supplement its discovery responses and document production.

Plaintiff moves to compel supplemental responses to RFP Nos. 41-44 and 48 and RFA Nos. 22-24.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) permits “discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). To be relevant, the information sought “need not be admissible in evidence”; however, it must be “proportional to the needs of the case.” Id. In determining proportionality to the needs of the case, the court “consider[s] the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. A “relevant matter” under Rule 26(b)(1) is any matter that “bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1978). Relevancy should be “construed ‘liberally and with common sense’ and discovery should be allowed unless the information sought has no conceivable bearing on the case.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992)).

*3 The local rules of this court require the parties to meet and confer in good faith, or the moving party must submit a declaration that the opposing party failed to confer in a timely manner. L.R. 37-1, 37-2.4. The moving party must serve a letter requesting a conference, identifying the issues or discovery requests in dispute, providing any legal authority it believes is dispositive of the dispute, and specifying the terms of the discovery order sought. L.R. 37-1. The moving party is responsible for arranging the parties' meet and confer session. Id. Courts have discretion to deny discovery motions that do not comply with the local rules. See Tri-Valley CARES v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a motion as the result of a failure to comply with local rules is well within a district court's discretion.”); Lumber Liquidators, Inc. v. Sullivan, 2012 WL 4464867, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012) (denying discovery motion that failed to comply with L.R. 37); So v. Land Base, LLC, 2009 WL 2407954, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (same).

A. RFP Nos. 41-44

RFP Nos. 41-44 request documents related to vehicles defendant rented out where the rented vehicle was reported as stolen when the rental was made, including complaints, demands for arbitration, and lawsuits related to such incidents. Defendant argues the court should deny plaintiff's motion as to these requests for failure to sufficiently meet and confer and because they are disproportionate to the needs of the case.

Defendant first argues plaintiff's motion as to RFP Nos. 41-44 should be denied for lack of adequate meet and confer. Specifically, defendant argues that it already supplemented its responses on November 1, 2023, pursuant to the parties' agreement, and that the parties have yet to met and confer about those supplemental responses. JS at 16-17. It argues that plaintiff knew when preparing his portion of the joint stipulation and before filing his motion that defendant planned to supplement its responses, and that the original responses he discusses in his portion are no longer at issue in light of defendant's supplemental responses. Id. Plaintiff argues that defendant's supplemental responses improperly narrowed his request, and that plaintiff had stated at the parties' October 23, 2023 meet and confer session that such geographically narrowed responses would not resolve the parties' dispute. P. Suppl. Mem. at 1-2. Plaintiff argues that for that reason, he was not required to meet and confer again after those supplemental responses were served. Id.

By all accounts, plaintiff made clear at the parties' October 23, 2023 meet and confer session that RFP Nos. 41-44 requested responsive documents for the entire state of California. Bush Decl. ¶ 5; Olney Suppl. Decl. ¶ 4. But the supplemental responses defendant produced after that meeting were limited to San Bernardino and Los Angeles counties. As such, additional meet and confer regarding those responses would have been futile considering that plaintiff had already made his position on the geographical scope of the RFPs clear. Defendant notes that plaintiff had previously agreed to a search limited to San Bernardino and Los Angeles counties prior to the parties' October 23, 2023 meet and confer session. But as plaintiff explains, any such agreement was made in reliance on his understanding that a broader search would be unduly burdensome, which in his view turned out to be incorrect. In sum, at the time defendant served its supplemental responses, it knew that those responses would not resolve the parties' dispute. For that reason, the court will not require additional meet and confer regarding the supplemental responses.

The court next turns to the issue of whether RFP Nos. 41-44 are proportionate to the needs of the case. Plaintiff argues that the information sought is relevant “to show foreseeability with regard to Plaintiff's claim for negligence, deliberate indifference with regard to his claim under the Bane Act, reckless disregard as to IIED, and malice with regard to his claim for punitive damages.” JS at 12. He claims that because “U-Haul Co. of California is a statewide company, has statewide operations throughout California, and has statewide policies governing its various locations ... The existence of prior instances in any part of the state would provide notice of the need to prevent such incidents from happening again.” Id. Plaintiff claims the discovery is proportional to the needs of the case because of (a) the importance of the issues at stake, given the ubiquity of U-Haul's services in California; (b) the estimated $750,000 amount in controversy; (c) the inability of plaintiff to access the records of defendant's history of providing customers with equipment reported as stolen; (d) the disparity of resources between the parties; and (e) the relevance of the discovery to proving foreseeability of the incident in question. JS at 13-15. Defendant claims that the documents sought by plaintiff are only minimally relevant to his claims. JS at 18. It argues that plaintiff has not addressed why a search limited to Los Angeles and San Bernardino counties is insufficient for his purposes. Id. It argues that plaintiff has already conceded that a geographically narrowed search was sufficient and is now going back on this agreement to burden defendant. JS at 20.

*4 After reviewing the parties' positions as set forth in the joint stipulation and their arguments at the hearing, the court finds plaintiff has shown his need for the discovery sought in RFP Nos. 41-44 on a statewide basis is particularly critical as compared to the burden on defendant. Plaintiff notes generally that defendant is a statewide corporation, but has not provided any specific information about the nature or extent of communications between U-Haul locations – or between U-Haul of California and specific U-Haul locations about events occurring at other locations – to support his claim that the discovery is likely to help him prove the foreseeability of the incident in question. As such, the court is not persuaded that the discovery is proportionate to the needs of the case. For these reasons, plaintiff's motion to compel supplemental responses to RFP Nos. 41-44 is denied.

B. RFP No. 48

RFP No. 48 requests “All DOCUMENTS IDENTIFIED in response to Interrogatory No. 8 to YOU.” Olney Decl., Ex. 6; Bush Decl., Ex. A. Interrogatory No. 8, in turn, asks defendant to “IDENTIFY all instances between January 19, 2018, and the present in which YOU provided a customer with a vehicle (including trailers) other than the vehicle listed on the customer's rental contract.” Olney Decl., Ex. 5.

As a result of the parties' meet and confer discussions, defendant agreed to supplement its response to Interrogatory No. 8. See Olney Suppl. Decl., Ex. 7. In an email following the parties' discussion, plaintiff asked if defendant intended to produce a supplemental response to RFP No. 48 as well, given that RFP No. 48 consists solely of a request for the documents identified in Interrogatory No. 8. Id. The parties did not resolve the issue prior to the filing of the joint stipulation and instead agreed to include RFP No. 48 in the instant motion. Id.

Defendant now argues that plaintiff's motion should be denied as to RFP No. 48 because the parties did not meet and confer about the request. JS at 27-28. Plaintiff argues that because defendant agreed to supplement its response to Interrogatory No. 8, it follows that it should also produce the documents identified in that response, as requested by RFP No. 48. JS at 27.

The parties' dispute about the necessity of additional meet and confer under these circumstances aside, the court notes that defendant's supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 8 states only that an investigation is ongoing without identifying any incidents or associated documents. See Olney Suppl. Decl., Ex. 9 at 5-6. As such, it appears that the instant dispute about RFP No. 48 is moot. That said, the court recognizes plaintiff's point that RFP No. 48 is essentially derivative of Interrogatory No. 8, and for that reason, when defendant further supplements its response to Interrogatory No. 8 as its investigation proceeds, it must supplement its response to RFP No. 48 accordingly.

C. RFA Nos. 22-24

RFA No. 22 asks defendant to “Admit that YOU rented out multiple vehicles prior to January 19, 2021, that were reported as stolen or embezzled at the time of the rental.” Olney Decl. Ex. 4; Bush Decl., Ex. B. RFA No. 23 asks defendant to “Admit that YOU rented out multiple vehicles prior to January 19, 2021, that were reported as stolen or embezzled at the time of the rental and the customer was stopped by the police on suspicion of driving a stolen vehicle.” Id. And RFA No. 24 asks defendant to “Admit that YOU rented out multiple vehicles prior to January 19, 2021, that were reported as stolen or embezzled at the time of the rental and the customer was arrested by the police on suspicion of vehicle theft.” Id. In response to each, defendant asserted objections and referred plaintiff to its responses to Interrogatory Nos. 8-9. Olney Decl., Ex. 4.

A party to litigation may serve on any other party a written request to admit the truth of any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense relating to facts, the application of law to fact or opinions about either, or relating to the genuineness of any described documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Generally, admissions “are sought, first, to facilitate proof with respect to issues that cannot be determined from the case, and second, to narrow the issues by eliminating those that can be.” Conlon v. U.S., 474 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2007). In this respect, Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a) “seeks to serve two important goals: truth-seeking in litigation and efficiency in dispensing justice.” Id. “The very purpose of the request [for admission] is to ascertain whether the answering party is prepared to admit or regards the matter as presenting a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 advisory committee's note to 1970 amendment.

*5 Conversely, “requests to admit may be so voluminous and so framed that the answering party finds the task of identifying what is in dispute and what is not unduly burdensome. If so, the responding party may obtain a protective order under Rule 26(c).” Id. Further, “requests for admission should not be used to establish ‘facts which are obviously in dispute,’ or to ‘demand that the other party admit the truth of a legal conclusion,’ even if the conclusion is ‘attached to operative facts,’ or to ask the party to admit facts of which he or she has no special knowledge.” Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. American Home Assur. Co., 177 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Minn. 1997); Tuvalu v. Woodford, 2006 WL 3201096 at *7 (E.D.Cal. Nov.2, 2006) (quoting Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Area, 234 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).

In its portion of the joint stipulation, defendant argued that RFAs should be simple and direct and that parties are not required to admit or deny requests that consist of statements that are vague or ambiguous. Id. It specifically argued that plaintiff's “definition of ‘YOU’ to include anyone who might hold themselves out to act on behalf of UHCA – even if unauthorized – makes this request overly broad, vague, and ambiguous.” JS at 26-27. Defendant further argued that “the phrase ‘reported as stolen and/or embezzled’ is vague and ambiguous.” JS at 27. Plaintiff responded that “[t]hese terms are given their plain and ordinary meaning: did Defendant rent vehicles that were reported as either stolen or embezzled at the time of the rental?” JS at 25. Defendant also claimed that plaintiff “has never quantified what he means by multiple – two, one hundred or something else.” JS at 27. Plaintiff responded that “multiple” means “more than one.” P. Suppl. Mem. at 5.

After discussion at the parties' hearing, defendant indicated no objection to providing responses to RFA Nos. 22-24 subject to the parties' understanding that “multiple” means two or more. This seems something defendant should be able to do after reasonable inquiry. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to compel as to RFA Nos. 22-24 is granted. Defendant is ordered to respond to RFA Nos. 22-24 after conducting a reasonable inquiry into all readily obtainable information.

For these reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's motion to compel U-Haul Co. of California's Further Discovery Responses and Productions (docket no. 124), as set forth above.