*1 Pro se Plaintiff Mohammad Mosharrof Hossain has moved to quash a subpoena issued by Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation (PHH) to nonparty Bank of America, N.A. (Doc. No. 55.) PHH has responded in opposition to Hossain's motion to quash. (Doc. No. 56.) Hossain did not file an optional reply.

For the reasons that follow, Hossain's motion to quash (Doc. No. 55) will be denied.

I. Background

In his third amended complaint (Doc. No. 48), Hossain alleges that errors made by PHH in the servicing of two mortgage accounts resulted in the wrongful foreclosure on Hossain's property. Hossain had two mortgage accounts that were serviced by PHH, identified in the parties' filings as the 2287 Account and the 2253 Account. In January 2020, Hossain sent funds to PHH to pay off the 2253 Account. PHH erroneously applied those funds to the 2287 Account. In June 2020, after Hossain filed a lawsuit against PHH in Davidson County General Sessions Court, PHH reversed the application of the funds to the 2287 Account and applied them to the 2253 Account. PHH then sought to collect the payments it claims Hossain failed to make to the 2287 Account from February 2020 to June 2020. Hossain alleges that he made those payments “through sending physical checks” but that the payments “have been seriously either missed by PHH, or misapplied by PHH to inaccurate account or entries, or applied directly to 2253, or returned by PHH as insufficient funds.” (Doc. No. 48, PageID# 1101 ¶ 52.)

PHH argues that Hossain “did not make the payments necessary to bring the 2287 Account current” and, instead, “continued to send single monthly payments to PHH, which PHH rejected each month because a single monthly payment was insufficient to bring the account current.” (Doc. No. 56.) Ultimately, PHH foreclosed on the 2287 Account and sold the property that secured Hossain's mortgage.

Hossain now brings claims against PHH and Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Willson & Associates, PLLC, under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, federal RICO, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and common law claims of misrepresentation, “misapplication of payments,” negligence, breach of contract, wrongful foreclosure, defamation, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, “barred to make payments/payment rejection,” and “reckless and wanton misconduct.” (Doc. No. 48.)

II. Legal Standard

Ordinarily, a party has no standing to challenge a subpoena issued to a non-party unless the party can claim some personal right or privilege regarding the documents sought. Mann v. Univ. of Cincinnati, Nos. 95-3195, 95-3292, 1997 WL 280188, at *4 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2459 (1995)). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3)(A), the Court must, pursuant to a “timely” motion, quash or modify a subpoena that “fails to allow a reasonable time to comply;” “requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specific in Rule 45(c);” “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies;” or “subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). While Rule 45 does not list irrelevance or overbreadth as grounds for quashing a subpoena, courts have found that the scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery under Rule 26. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 275 F.R.D. 251, 253 (S.D. Ohio 2011). Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 allows discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevant evidence in this context is that which “ ‘has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence,’ if ‘the fact is of consequence in determining the action.’ ” Grae v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 326 F.R.D. 482, 485 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401).

III. Analysis

*2 PHH's subpoena directs Bank of America to produce:

Hossain argues that the Court should quash PHH's subpoena because he “has already provided most relevant documents related to the transaction between the Bank and PHH or Ocwen, to the Court and the opposite parties as various Exhibits,” including as exhibits to his third amended complaint. (Doc. No. 55.) Hossain also argues that PHH's request is too broad and will include “all kinds of expenditures information [that is] not relevant to our helpful to prepare the PHH defenses or claims in the pending case.” (Id.) Finally, Hossain argues that PHH received checks from Hossain that it did not credit to his account or return to him and has those relevant documents in its possession. (Id.)

PHH responds that the bank records it seeks are relevant for purposes of Rule 26 because Hossain claims that PHH “accepted, misapplied, or refused to return payments [he] made towards the 2287 Account.” (Doc. No. 56.) While the documents Hossain has attached to his filings show that he “issued and sent checks to PHH,” they do not show “that PHH accepted those payments and that [Hossain's] bank debited his checking account.” (Id.) PHH argues that it requires the full set of requested records to establish whether PHH accepted his payments. Further, PHH argues that the records will establish whether Hossain sustained the damages he seeks to recover. PHH argues that Hossain “should have had the funds to bring his account current after the Payoff Fun[d]s were reversed from the 2287 Account” and that, if he did have sufficient funds but did not make his mortgage payments, “he did not sustain damages as a result of the Payoff Funds being applied to the 2287 Account rather than the 2253 Account.” (Id.)

Hossain's claims in this action address mortgage payments he made from the accounts from which PHH subpoenaed records. Records documenting activity from those accounts during the timeframe addressed by his claims are relevant to his claims and PHH's defenses and therefore discoverable under Rule 26. Further, as the Supreme Court has established, “checks are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions,” and “financial statements and deposit slips ... contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.” United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). For this reason, courts in the Sixth Circuit have routinely upheld subpoenas to nonparty banks for a party's relevant financial records. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Physiomatrix, Inc., Civil Action No. 12-cv-11500, 2013 WL 10572229, at *3 (E.D. Mich., Aug. 13, 2013) (collecting cases).

*3 Because PHH has established that the requested records are relevant under Rule 26, and because Hossain has not established that the records are privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure, the subpoena to Bank of America may be executed.

IV. Conclusion

Hossain's motion to quash PHH's subpoena to nonparty Bank of America (Doc. No. 55) is DENIED.

It is so ORDERED.