*1 Defendants HSBC Bank USA, National Association, as Trustee for MASTR Reperforming Loan Trust 2005-2 and Specialized Loan Servicing LLC filed a joint Motion to Quash Plaintiff Lester Lorenzo Rummans' Interrogatories and Requests for Production, Motion for Protective Order, and Request for Oral Hearing. As set forth below, Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 45) is DENIED. Defendants must serve their responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests no later than June 10, 2024.

After denying, in part, Defendants' summary judgment motion, the District Judge set this case for jury trial on the Court's three-week docket beginning October 22, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. See Scheduling Order (ECF No. 43). Plaintiff timely served written discovery requests on counsel for Defendants. See id. (establishing June 21, 2024 as the deadline for completing discovery). Defendants responded by filing their motion to quash and for a protective order, arguing that Plaintiff's discovery requests are “nothing but pure harassment [ ] served for the purpose of needlessly increasing the cost of this litigation.” Mot. 3. Defendants assert that Plaintiff's remaining claim is “extremely narrow and straightforward” and does not justify the 25 interrogatories and 93 requests for production Plaintiff's counsel served using “his typical ‘form’ discovery requests.” Id. at 5. Defendants specifically identify a handful of allegedly irrelevant requests and insist that “under no circumstance is it reasonable to serve 93 Requests for Production on EACH Defendant in a very simple case involving one remaining simple allegation.” Id. Defendants accuse Plaintiff's counsel of “intentionally fail[ing] to narrow the scope of the Written Discovery in an effort to cause Defendants undue burden and expense.” Id. Defendants ask the Court quash Plaintiff's discovery requests and require Plaintiff to serve new or different requests “narrowly limited to the sole remaining issue in the case.” Id. at 6. Defendants also request attorneys' fees and costs under Rule 37(a)(5) in the amount of $1,200. Id.

Under Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Conversely, Rule 26(c)(1) authorizes the Court to issue a protective order, for good cause shown, “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Under Rule 26(c), a court may impose a protective order that forbids “the disclosure or discovery” or prohibits “inquiry into certain matters, or limit[s] the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A), (D). “The burden is upon the party seeking the protective order to show the necessity of its issuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Meisenheimer v. DAC Vision Inc., 2019 WL 6619198, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2019) (brackets omitted) (quoting In re Terra Int'l, 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 1998)). Courts have generally concluded that to obtain a protective order, the moving party must show both “good cause and a specific need for protection.” Id. (citing Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 901 F.2d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 1990)).

*2 Defendants have not met their burden here. Defendants fail to make specific objections to any particular interrogatory or document request or show that the requested discovery fails the proportionality calculation. Indeed, they rely almost entirely on their blanket assertions that Plaintiff's requests are “overly broad and unduly burdensome,” “harassing,” “abusive,” “irrelevant,” and “not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of any admissible evidence.” Such conclusory statements fall far short of the specific demonstration of fact required to obtain a protective order. See Kilmon v. Saulsbury Indus., Inc., 2018 WL 5800759, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2018) (finding movant's “blanket assertions of irrelevancy and disproportionality” did not “establish good cause and a specific need for protection ..., as is required to obtain a protective order from such discovery”); Ford Motor Co. v. Versata Software, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 925, 948 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (denying defendant's request for protective order under Rule 26(c)(1) where defendant did not articulate a specific need for the order but instead only argued that the discovery sought was irrelevant).

Moreover, Plaintiff's discovery requests are not “unduly burdensome” or “harassing” simply because Defendants believe they should have prevailed on summary judgment or will ultimately prevail at trial—or in some other procedural context.[1] “[A] party cannot refuse to engage in – and should not be excused from being subjected to – discovery simply because the discovery is relevant to a claim on which the resisting party believes that he will or should prevail.” Randstad General Partner (US), LLC v. Beacon Hill Staffing Group, LLC, 2021 WL 4319673, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2021); Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 489 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“Similarly, a party cannot refuse to produce a requested document or information simply because it is relevant to a claim or defense on which the producing party believes that it will prevail.”).

Accordingly, Defendants' Motion, including their request for attorneys' fees, is DENIED. Defendants must respond to Plaintiff's discovery requests no later than June 10, 2024.

The Court invites counsel for Defendants and counsel for Plaintiff to meaningfully confer—by phone or Zoom—on Plaintiff's requests in a good faith effort to avoid future disputes that do not advance the disposition of this litigation. The Court specifically reminds counsel of their affirmative duties under Rule 26(g).[2]

SO ORDERED.