UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOSHUA SCOTT LANDERS Case No. 8:23-cr-108-WFJ-CPT United States District Court, M.D. Florida Filed June 21, 2024 Tuite, Christopher P., United States Magistrate Judge REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION *1 Before me on referral is Defendant Joshua Scott Landers's motion to suppress evidence the Manatee County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) acquired from his iPhone and iPad following his arrest for domestic battery and other offenses he allegedly committed against his wife, Ms. Nicole Landers.[1] (Docs. 27, 62). Mr. Landers's iPhone was seized incident to his arrest and stored with the property custodian at the Manatee County jail where he was housed. The iPad—which is the mirror image of Mr. Landers's iPhone—was turned over to the MCSO by Ms. Landers roughly a week afterwards due to Ms. Landers's concerns that the iPad contained illicit images of her minor child, T.H., who is also Mr. Landers's stepdaughter. Two MCSO officials, Sergeant Bradley Patterson and Detective Steven Luke, subsequently took steps to secure the iPhone at another location so that it was not available to Mr. Landers. Detective Luke—who works in the MCSO's Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) section and is also a task force agent with the FBI—later obtained a search warrant for both the iPhone and the iPad, the execution of which led to the discovery of child sexual exploitation material, including voyeuristic images of T.H. In support of his instant motion, Mr. Landers argues that the MCSO's transfer of his cell phone from the jail to a different site amounted to a warrantless seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The government does not dispute this contention but insists that the iPhone's seizure was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement or, alternatively, that the results of the iPhone search are not subject to suppression under the inevitable discovery doctrine. I conducted an evidentiary hearing on the matter, at which the parties called the following witnesses: Sergeant Patterson, Detective Luke, Ms. Landers, and Lieutenant Tammy Ambrus, the latter of whom oversaw the records at the Manatee County jail during the relevant period. (Doc. 59). Mr. Landers elected not to take the stand. Id. After the hearing, I entered an Order directing the parties to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Doc. 57). Of import here, I instructed the parties in that Order to set forth in their briefs all the facts and legal authority they wished the Court to consider and cautioned them that they risked waiving any claims for which they did not do so. Id.[2] The parties timely filed their respective memoranda (Docs. 61, 62), and I then heard oral argument regarding the factual and legal issues raised in those submissions (Doc. 71). Based upon the testimony and exhibits adduced at the evidentiary hearing, as well as the contentions made by the parties in their filings and at oral argument, I respectfully recommend that Mr. Landers's motion be granted relative to his iPhone but denied as to his iPad. *2 Below are my findings of fact and conclusions of law that lead me to these recommendations. Unless otherwise indicated, my factual findings are predicated upon my assessment of the weight of the evidence offered by the parties, including the testimony of the above-referenced witnesses. I. On October 31, 2022, officers with the MCSO arrested Mr. Landers for domestic battery and other crimes directed towards his wife. (Doc. 59 at 17, 32); (Doc. 61 at 2); (Doc. 62 at 1). When Mr. Landers was booked into the Manatee County jail later that day, several items were taken from his person and stored in a property bag in accordance with the jail's standard operating procedures. (Doc. 59 at 116). These items included a set of keys and an iPhone belonging to Mr. Landers. (Doc. 75-1). Although Mr. Landers eventually posted bond, he was “rearrested” on November 2, 2022, before being released because he allegedly contacted his wife in violation of his pretrial release conditions. (Doc. 59 at 17, 32); (Doc. 62 at 1). The next day, on November 3, 2022, Ms. Landers contacted Sergeant Patterson to request the keys to her vehicle which were part of the keys seized from Mr. Landers. (Doc. 59 at 17). Sergeant Patterson was not involved in Mr. Landers's domestic battery case but was a supervisor over the unit responsible for that investigation. Id. Four days later, on November 7, 2022, Ms. Landers spoke with Sergeant Patterson to coordinate the return of her car keys. Id. at 24. During that conversation, Ms. Landers mentioned to Sergeant Patterson that she suspected Mr. Landers had previously placed a camera in T.H.’s room and that she had several “pieces of media” she wished to be examined. Id. at 24–25. The same day, Ms. Landers met with an assistant state attorney to prepare for the domestic battery case against her husband. Id. at 97; (Doc. 61 at 6). Consistent with her earlier comments to Sergeant Patterson, Ms. Landers informed the prosecutor that she believed Mr. Landers had secreted a camera in a ceiling smoke detector in T.H.’s bedroom. (Doc. 59 at 97–98). In response, the prosecutor recommended that Ms. Landers file a complaint with the MCSO. Id. at 97–99. Ms. Landers followed the prosecutor's advice and went to the MCSO immediately after her conference with the prosecutor. Id. at 106. Once there, Ms. Landers met with MCSO Deputy Ross Fuller and advised him that T.H. told her in July 2022 there appeared to be a recording device in her bedroom smoke detector.[3] See (Doc. 70-2). Ms. Landers further reported to Deputy Fuller that due to this revelation, she removed the smoke detector and discovered what she believed to be a camera hidden inside it. Id. Ms. Landers also explained to the deputy that upon confronting Mr. Landers with this evidence, he took the smoke detector away from her and asserted both that it was not a camera and that he did not place it there. Id. Ms. Landers disclosed to Deputy Fuller as well that around the same time frame, she observed what appeared to be a “stopped” video image of the interior of T.H.’s bedroom on Mr. Landers's iPhone and that when she questioned Mr. Landers about this image, he “snatched” his cell phone from her. Id.; (Docs. 75-2, 75-3). Ms. Landers additionally informed Deputy Fuller that this device was being held at the jail as a result of Mr. Landers's arrest for battering her. (Doc. 70-2). *3 Ms. Landers then met with Sergeant Patterson to obtain her car keys and to provide the sergeant with the electronic media she wanted inspected. (Doc. 59 at 24–25). At the time, Ms. Landers had with her a number of devices[4] but not the iPad, which remained locked in her and her husband's truck. Id. at 24–26, 107–109. While not entirely clear, Ms. Landers apparently informed Sergeant Patterson during their exchange that she spoke with Deputy Fuller about, among other things, the paused video image of T.H.’s bedroom on Mr. Landers's iPhone. Id. at 25–26. Concerned that Mr. Landers was involved in child exploitation offenses, Sergeant Patterson relayed Ms. Landers's information to Detective Luke, who then directed Sergeant Patterson to take custody of Mr. Landers's iPhone from the jail. Id. at 26–27, 70. At the evidentiary hearing, Detective Luke testified he took this step because he believed there was probable cause that Mr. Landers's cell phone contained evidence of a crime and because he did not believe he needed a warrant to seize the device. Id. at 80, 84. Detective Luke did not know at that juncture, however, how long Mr. Landers had been incarcerated or that Ms. Landers had challenged her husband about the image of T.H.’s bedroom on his phone months earlier. Id. at 77–79. Pursuant to Detective Luke's instructions, Sergeant Patterson removed Mr. Landers's iPhone from the jail on the evening of November 7, 2022, drove it to the MCSO's office roughly twenty to thirty minutes away, and placed it in a locker. Id. at 28–30, 69–71. Like Detective Luke, Sergeant Patterson did not believe a warrant was required to seize the cell phone. Id. at 43. The next day, on November 8, 2022, Detective Luke retrieved the iPhone from the locker and secured it in an ICAC office within the MCSO. Id. at 70–71. Detective Luke then placed the cell phone in “airplane mode,” which prevented the device from receiving any signals. Id. at 85. According to both Detective Luke and Sergeant Patterson, once they took these steps, Mr. Landers could not gain access to the iPhone until his case was resolved, and neither he nor any third parties could alter or destroy any information stored on the cell phone in the interim. Id. at 29–30, 76, 85. Also on November 8, 2022, Ms. Landers and T.H. came to the MCSO and were interviewed by Detective Luke and another MCSO Detective, Carmine Luper,[5] about Mr. Landers's alleged voyeurism of T.H. Id. at 72, 85; (Doc. 75-2). This interview was scheduled in advance by Sergeant Patterson at Detective Luke's direction and was recorded. (Doc. 59 at 58); (Docs. 75-2, 75-3). When Ms. Landers arrived for this meeting, she had Mr. Landers's iPad with her.[6] (Doc. 59 at 60–61, 110, 112). According to Ms. Landers, no one with law enforcement told her to bring the iPad to the station, a fact which Sergeant Patterson and Detective Luke confirmed at the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 24, 60, 110–12. During the interview with Detectives Luke and Luper, Ms. Landers and T.H. conveyed much of the same information that Ms. Landers had previously disclosed to Deputy Fuller and Sergeant Patterson. (Docs. 75-2, 75-3). Ms. Landers added that as she was cleaning her residence the day before (i.e., on November 7), she found a pair of T.H.’s “pink laced underwear” in one of Mr. Landers's tennis sneakers situated on the top shelf of the closet the couple shared. (Docs. 75-2, 75-3). *4 Later in the day on November 8, 2022, Detective Luper—working closely with Detective Luke—applied for a state search warrant for the Landers's home. (Doc. 59 at 61–63). The probable cause section in the affidavit submitted in support of this warrant included a detailed summary of the information Detectives Luper and Luke learned from speaking with Ms. Landers and T.H. hours earlier. (Doc. 59 at 86); (Doc. 75-2). Detective Luper, however, did not request as part of this warrant that the court authorize the MCSO's continued seizure of Mr. Landers's iPhone, even though the MCSO knew at the time about Mr. Landers's apparent installation of a secret camera in T.H.’s bedroom, the video still image of T.H.’s bedroom on Mr. Landers's iPhone, and Ms. Landers's discovery of T.H.’s underwear in one of Mr. Landers's shoes. (Doc. 75-2). The warrant for the Landers's residence was approved by a Manatee County judge and executed by law enforcement the same day (i.e., on November 8, 2022). (Doc. 59 at 63–64, 73); (Doc. 75-2). During the course of this search, officers found unusual wiring and holes in the ceiling surrounding the smoke detector in T.H.’s bedroom, as well as a “partial smoke detector” that Ms. Landers had previously discovered. (Doc. 59 at 64–65). In addition, consistent with Ms. Landers's statements in her interview with Detectives Luke and Luper, officers located a pair of T.H.’s underwear in Mr. Landers's sneakers stored in the master bedroom closet. Id. at 65. The next day, on November 9, 2022, Detective Luper sought a state search warrant for all of Mr. Landers's electronic devices, including Mr. Landers's iPhone and the iPad transported to the station by Ms. Landers. Id. at 65–66. Like the warrant application for the Landers's home, the probable cause section in the supporting affidavit contained a detailed summary of Detectives Luke and Luper's November 8 interview of Ms. Landers and T.H. Id. at 67; (Doc. 75-3). It also included the results of the search of the Landers's residence, along with facts relating to the devices themselves. (Doc. 75-3). A Manatee County judge issued the warrant the same day. (Doc. 59 at 66–67). Detective Luke searched the iPhone on November 9 and the iPad several weeks later. Id. at 75. His examination revealed that both devices were mirror images of each other and contained numerous photos and videos depicting child exploitation material, including illicit images of T.H. Id. at 67–68, 75. Mr. Landers was ultimately indicted by a grand jury on three counts of producing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e), and one count of possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2). (Doc. 1). In his original suppression motion, Mr. Landers asked that the Court suppress the contents of both his iPhone and his iPad, as well as any testimony about those devices, on the ground that this evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 27). In his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law filed after the evidentiary hearing, however, Mr. Landers argued only for the suppression of the information found on his iPhone. (Doc. 62). Given the Court's prior admonition that the parties include in their post-hearing submissions all the facts and arguments they wished the Court to consider (Doc. 57); (Doc. 59 at 131–32), defense counsel was afforded another opportunity to brief the suppression of the iPad's contents (Doc. 74). Counsel declined to do so, stating that pursuing such an argument would create a conflict between his obligation to engage in zealous advocacy and “avoiding frivolous claims.” (Doc. 76). While I believe Mr. Landers's failure to substantiate a basis for suppressing the iPad at this stage amounts to a waiver on the matter, I will address the suppression of both the iPhone and the iPad out of an abundance of caution. II. A. *5 The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. As the plain language of the Fourth Amendment connotes, “ ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’ ” Bailey v. Swindell, 89 F.4th 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). A search or seizure will generally be deemed to be “reasonable” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment if it is conducted pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause. Howell v. Bradshaw, 2009 WL 10710388, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2009) (“The Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable typically requires a warrant issue[d] upon probable cause....”) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989)), aff'd, 349 F. App'x 399 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests” in his property. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); see also United States v. Babcock, 924 F.3d 1180, 1186 (11th Cir. 2019) (same) (citing United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007)). As pertinent here, such a seizure can happen even when the property at issue belongs to an inmate and is stored at the prison where the inmate is being held. In Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1969),[7] for example, the defendant was arrested, jailed, and his clothing and other possessions placed in the prisoners’ property room. Id. at 405. An agent investigating the case later came to the facility, inspected the contents of the defendant's property bag, and discovered drug paraphernalia in it. Id. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit found that the agent's search was invalid because it was not exempted from the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Id. at 405–06 (“The fact that the police have custody of a prisoner's property for the purpose of protecting it while he is incarcerated does not alone constitute a basis for an exception to the requirement of a search warrant.”). The court reasoned in part that “[t]he clothing was not in danger of being removed elsewhere ... or of being destroyed, and it was not available to [the defendant] as the source of escape weapons.” Id. at 406. Here, Mr. Landers maintains that Sergeant Patterson's removal of Mr. Landers's cell phone from the Manatee County jail and the subsequent stowing of the device at the MCSO rises to the level of a Fourth Amendment seizure. See (Doc. 62 at 7). The government does not contest this assertion. See (Doc. 61 at 10) (“The government does not dispute that S[ergeant] Patterson's retrieval of [Mr.] Landers’[s] iPhone from his inmate property at the Manatee County [j]ail was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment[.]”). Instead, as noted earlier, the government argues that the MSCO lawfully took custody of Mr. Landers's cell phone pursuant to the exigent circumstances to the warrant requirement or, alternatively, that the MCSO's later search of the iPhone is not subject to suppression under the inevitable discovery doctrine. (Doc. 61). I turn to these arguments now. B. Where, as here, the government engages in a warrantless seizure, it bears the burden of proving that the seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983). To cross this threshold, the government must establish that (1) there was probable cause to believe that the seized property contained contraband or evidence of a crime, and (2) the seizure fell within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1186; Freire, 710 F.2d at 1519. *6 The probable cause showing necessary to satisfy the first prong does not present a “high bar,” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (citation omitted), and demands only that a person of reasonable caution believe “evidence will probably be found in a particular location,” Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1192 (quoting United States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2012)); see also Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018). This requires only “ ‘a substantial chance’ that evidence of criminal activity exists,” Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1192 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983)), as opposed to proof that a criminal offense actually took place or is then occurring, Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13). In assessing whether this standard has been met, courts look to the “facts within the collective knowledge of law enforcement officials, derived from reasonably trustworthy information.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298 (quoting Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010)). With respect to the second prong, one of the recognized exemptions to the warrant requirement—as relevant here—is the “exigent circumstances” exception. United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 446 (11th Cir. 1990). This exception applies when “ ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). Under this doctrine, a warrantless seizure is justified when “the facts ... would lead a reasonable, experienced agent to believe that evidence might be destroyed before a warrant could be secured.” Young, 909 F.2d at 446 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 825 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 475 (11th Cir. 1996) (same). The government's burden in this regard is a “heavy” one, since “the protections of the [F]ourth [A]mendment are crucial to a free and viable society.” United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1325 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)). To prevail on a claim of exigent circumstances, the government must show that the officers who performed the warrantless seizure had an “objectively reasonable basis” for concluding that “imminent action” was needed. Young, 909 F.2d at 446. A “mere suspicion that an exigency may exist” is insufficient. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1262 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Rather, “the court must be able to identify specific facts that constitute an exigency.” Id. at 1262 (citation omitted). Of significance to this case, the Eleventh Circuit has found that the exigent circumstances exception is “particularly compelling” in scenarios where “contraband and records can be easily and quickly destroyed while a search is progressing,” including in investigations involving “electronic files.” Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Young, 909 F.2d at 446). The Eleventh Circuit has specifically applied this reasoning to cell phones as well. Id.; Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1262. In doing so, however, the court has emphasized that something more than the presence of evidence on an electronic device is necessary: To be clear, it's not that a cell phone itself creates an exigent circumstance. Taken to its logical conclusion, that would permit police officers to seize now-ubiquitous cell phones from any person, in any place, at any time, so long as the phone contains photographs or videos that could serve as evidence of a crime—simply because the ‘nature’ of the device used to capture that evidence might result in it being lost. *7 Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In Babcock, for example, the court examined whether the exigent circumstances exception supported the warrantless confiscation of a defendant's cell phone. Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1184. In that case, law enforcement responded to a domestic disturbance call that there was a “ruckus” coming from a trailer parked at the defendant's residence. Id. at 1184–85. Upon knocking on the camper door, the defendant exited the residence, closed the door, and claimed no one was inside. Id. at 1185. Almost immediately, a minor female with a cut on her leg came out of the trailer. Id. In an apparent effort to explain this situation, the defendant showed the police a video on his cell phone of the girl sitting on a bed holding a knife to her throat, as the defendant berated her. Id. After viewing this clip, the officers conducted an interview of the defendant, during which he denied being in a relationship with the girl and being aware of her age despite also admitting he had known the girl for several years and used to be her neighbor. Id. By contrast, the girl—whose license indicated she was sixteen—told law enforcement in a separate interview that she and the defendant went together the night before to a Halloween party, where she consumed alcohol, cocaine, and other substances. Id. Along with this conflicting information, the police discovered “blood on the bedsheets and prescription pills scattered about” the camper upon searching it with the defendant's consent. Id. When law enforcement then asked the defendant if they could inspect his cell phone in more depth, the defendant refused and requested that the phone be returned to him. Id. The defendant did, however, offer to e-mail the police the video clip of the girl with the knife. Id. The police elected to maintain custody of the defendant's cell phone and searched it two days later pursuant to a warrant. Id. The government argued that exigent circumstances excused the officer's warrantless seizure of the phone, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed, finding that “a reasonable, experienced agent certainly could have believed that [the defendant] ... would delete any incriminating evidence on his phone before a warrant could be obtained.” Id. at 1194. To buttress this conclusion, the court noted, among other things, that the defendant tried to deceive the responding officers by initially denying there was anyone in the camper and subsequently claiming he was unaware of the minor's age. Id. The court also remarked that the defendant “surely knew ... he was under suspicion once [the detective] asked to search the camper and to further inspect his phone” and that the electronic files on the defendant's phone could have been “quickly destroyed while [the] search [wa]s progressing.” Id. (quoting Young, 909 F.2d at 446). The Eleventh Circuit in Babcock drew a favorable comparison between the facts before it and those it confronted in its prior decision in Bradley, which involved the warrantless seizure of a company's computer servers during a police raid. Babcock, 924 F. 3d at 1194 (citing Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1261). As detailed in Bradley, this company was believed to be engaged in a fraudulent scheme that “supposedly infected” not only the firm but also “its principals and officers, its suppliers, and numerous other individuals and businesses with whom it did or had done business.” Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1259. The agents investigating the organization located its servers during the raid and asked an employee for access to them. Id. at 1261. Worried that there were other company workers who could corrupt or erase data before that information could be copied, the agent in charge instructed an employee to shut down the servers and later obtained a warrant to search the servers’ hard drives. Id. *8 As the Eleventh Circuit also described in Bradley, the district court determined that an exigency justified law enforcement's warrantless seizure of the servers based on the particular facts of the case which the district court took some pains to identify. Id. at 1262. The district court explained: [The agent directing the search] was well aware that the servers were accessible by other computers connected to the [company], including systems administrators who could dial in from home or any remote location (and likely did so as a routine practice). [The agent also] recognized that as long as the servers remained connected to the outside world[,] their data could be maliciously changed or corrupted and that a person making such changes could easily “hide their tracks.” ... And given the scope of the criminal scheme, the number of targets of the investigation, and the scale of [the company's] operations, the agents could reasonably infer that there were a number of people with both the ability and the incentive to access and alter that data while a warrant was being sought. Id. After careful review, the Eleventh Circuit in Bradley upheld the district court's exigency finding, concluding that because the company's “employees had the ability and incentive to, after learning of the raid, destroy damning information contained on the computer servers,” the agent had a “specific reason to fear that data might be lost if he did not intervene.” Id. at 1262–63. The Eleventh Circuit deemed this decision to be reasonable because the agent only took “those steps necessary to ensure that data [was] not destroyed while he sought a warrant[, and] did no more than was reasonably required to maintain the evidence.” Id. at 1263. The Eleventh Circuit in Babcock contrasted the demonstrated exigency in Bradley with the fact pattern it faced in Crocker. Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1194. In Crocker, an officer seized a cell phone belonging to an individual who had taken photos at the scene of a car crash but who was not involved in the accident itself. Crocker, 886 F.3d at 1135. The Eleventh Circuit found that although the officer fretted this bystander would not preserve the potential evidence on the cell phone, there was “no indication whatsoever ... [the bystander] would have soon deleted the photographs and videos he had just taken the time to capture himself.” Id. at 1136. The court determined that simply because the nature of the cell phone could result in the information being lost was not enough to condone the officer's warrantless seizure of that device. Id. at 1137. Applying Babcock’s two-part test here (i.e., whether there was probable cause to believe that the seized property contained evidence of a crime and whether the seizure fell within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement), it is evident that the MCSO had probable cause to believe that Mr. Landers's iPhone contained contraband or evidence of a crime. Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1196. As discussed previously, Ms. Landers reported to Deputy Fuller that she suspected Mr. Landers had placed a video recorder in the bedroom of her minor child, T.H., and that she soon thereafter discovered what she believed to be a camera installed inside the bedroom's smoke detector. See (Doc. 70-2). Ms. Landers also told Deputy Fuller that she had seen what appeared to be a “stopped” video of T.H.’s bedroom on Mr. Landers's phone before Mr. Landers “snatched” the device away from her. Id. Ms. Landers then repeated at least some of those allegations to Sergeant Patterson. (Doc. 59 at 25–26). Looking at the collective knowledge of law enforcement, a reasonable, experienced officer could objectively conclude that evidence of video voyeurism of T.H. would probably be found on Mr. Landers's iPhone. Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298. Notably, Mr. Landers does not contend otherwise. See (Docs. 27, 62). *9 While the government makes the requisite showing relative to Babcock’s first prong, it does not meet its “heavy” burden, Blasco, 702 F.3d at 1325, of establishing that evidence on Mr. Landers's iPhone would be removed or destroyed before a warrant for it could be obtained, Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1194; Young, 909 F.2d at 446. The gist of the government's argument in this regard is that Mr. Landers posed an imminent threat to the integrity of the data on his cell phone despite being incarcerated because he could have deleted that information through a third party or upon gaining custody of the phone if and when he was released. (Doc. 61 at 12). To bolster this contention, the government posits that “[c]ommon sense dictates that once an individual[, such as Mr. Landers,] finds out [he is] the subject of a criminal investigation, [he is] more likely to try and conceal or erase incriminating evidence.” Id. I find the government's exigent circumstances claim unpersuasive. It bears highlighting at the outset that at the time Sergeant Patterson retrieved Mr. Landers's iPhone from the jail on November 7, 2022, Mr. Landers had already been imprisoned for about a week on the domestic battery charges. (Doc. 59 at 17, 28). It stands to reason that even if—as the government maintains—Mr. Landers was fearful of the images on his cell phone being discovered upon being detained, he would have immediately taken steps to eliminate any such incriminating evidence or to instruct another person to do so. The fact that Detective Luke felt there was probable cause that illegal material was still located on Mr. Landers's device approximately seven or eight days after Mr. Landers's arrest undermines the government's assertion that the urgency of the situation was “so compelling” that a warrantless seizure of the iPhone was necessary at that juncture. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394. Further detracting from the government's exigent circumstances argument is the fact that the government did not introduce any testimony or exhibits at the hearing demonstrating that Mr. Landers was at all aware of the MCSO's voyeurism investigation before Sergeant Patterson removed the iPhone from the jail. Although it is true—as the government points out—that Ms. Landers had allegedly accused Mr. Landers of recording T.H. in July 2022, that was nearly four months before his arrest on the domestic battery charges. Nor did the police confront Mr. Landers with his wife's suspicions about his prurient interest in T.H. or otherwise reveal to him that they were looking into the matter. To the contrary, Detective Luke admitted at the hearing that “so far as [Mr. Landers] knew, he was [only] arrested for domestic assault” and—to Detective Luke's understanding at least—Mr. Landers had not been told by anybody that he was the subject of a probe involving any additional illegal behavior. (Doc. 59 at 81). I find the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662 (11th Cir. 2000) instructive in this respect. In that case, agents utilized a confidential informant to investigate the defendants in the weeks leading up to a heroin deal at the defendants’ apartment with the confidential informant. Id. at 664–67. In the midst of that heroin deal, the agents entered the apartment, detained the defendants, and engaged in a warrantless search of the premises. Id. When the defendants moved to suppress the results of the search, the government insisted that the search fell within the ambit of the exigent circumstances exception because it was essential to prevent the destruction of evidence and the defendants’ escape. Id. at 667. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, noting that the record revealed the defendants did not know “they were under police investigation.” Id. at 669. Id. The court also cited its longstanding precedent “that ‘[c]ircumstances are not normally considered exigent where the suspects are unaware of police surveillance.’ ” Id. at 669–70 (quoting United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1991)). *10 The situation in Santa is akin to that present here relative to Mr. Landers and the MCSO's voyeurism investigation. This case is thus readily distinguishable from those instances where courts have found the exigent circumstances exception to be applicable. See, e.g., Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1194; Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1261–63; United States v. McGhee, 2023 WL 3945576, at *3, *7–8 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 22, 2023) (applying the exigent circumstances exception to a warrantless seizure of the defendant's phone taken immediately after the police interviewed the defendant about a runaway minor female who, the defendant confessed, he had allowed to stay in his hotel room and who the defendant also acknowledged “had been ‘selling herself’ ”), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3319364 (M.D. Ala. May 9, 2023). In sum, the government does not establish “specific facts” that created the requisite level of urgency necessitating the immediate seizure of Mr. Landers's iPhone before a warrant could be acquired. Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1262 (citation omitted). Instead, it predicates its exigent circumstances argument largely on speculation as to what Mr. Landers may or may not have been thinking in the months preceding his arrest and in the days after his apprehension. Such conjecture amounts to nothing more than a “mere suspicion that an exigency may exist,” id. (citation omitted), and falls short of satisfying the government's “heavy” burden, Blasco, 702 F.2d at 1325, of demonstrating that “imminent action,” Young, 909 F.2d at 446, was required. See also Santa, 236 F.3d at 671 (noting that “[m]ere speculation” without any factual support “is not enough to overcome the warrant requirement”).[8] I therefore conclude that the government's exigent circumstances claim is without merit. C. A determination that the warrantless seizure of Mr. Landers's iPhone was unlawful does not resolve the question of whether the results of the later search of that device should be suppressed. The Court must still consider whether the admission of such evidence is barred by the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); United States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007). The purpose of the exclusionary rule, as the Supreme Court has made clear, is “to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011); see also Virden, 488 F.3d at 1322 (observing that the aim of the exclusionary rule is to discourage “police misconduct by preventing the introduction of evidence obtained through police illegality”) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442–43 (1984)). In recognition of the “high social cost of allowing guilty persons to go unpunished,” however, courts have developed exceptions to the exclusionary rule “where the deterrence rationale has little basis.” Virden, 488 F.3d at 1322 (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 443–44). *11 Here, as referenced previously, the government invokes one such exception: the inevitable discovery doctrine. United States v. Watkins, 13 F.4th 1202, 1210 (11th Cir. 2021).[9] This doctrine “allows for the admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source.” Utah v. Streiff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016) (citation omitted). The reasoning behind the doctrine is that the police should be put “in the same, not a worse, position tha[n] they would have been if no police error or misconduct had occurred.” Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. To hold otherwise, the Supreme Court has found, would fail to account for the “enormous” societal harm of “excluding truth in the search for truth in the administration of justice.” Id. at 445. That said, “[t]he mere assertion by law enforcement that the information would have been inevitably discovered is not enough.” Virden, 488 F.3d at 1322 (citing United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1048 (5th Cir. 1980)). Rather, the government must demonstrate (1) by a preponderance of the evidence that the information in question would have been uncovered by “lawful means” even if there had not been a constitutional violation; and (2) that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable was “being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.” Watkins, 13 F.4th at 1210–11 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also United States v. Watkins, 10 F.4th 1179, 1185 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (“[W]e hold that the standard of predictive proof the government must satisfy in order to establish the proper application of the ultimate discovery exception is preponderance of the evidence[.]”). The first prong of the inevitable discovery test is readily satisfied here. It is clear from the evidence adduced at the hearing that law enforcement would have found the incriminating information stored on Mr. Landers's iPhone through lawful means even if it had not impermissibly seized the device. In fact, the MSCO acquired a search warrant for Mr. Landers's cell phone that resulted in the extraction of this inculpatory data two days after the illegal seizure. (Doc. 75-3). The second component of the inevitable discovery test involves a more extended analysis, one that centers around several Eleventh Circuit opinions that address the contours of this prong, especially the “active pursuit” requirement. (Doc. 61 at 13–15); (Doc. 62 at 12–17). The first of these decisions is United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Edwards, 728 F.3d 1286, 1292 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2013)). In Satterfield, a kidnapping victim who escaped from her abductors informed the police that her captors committed a murder and that one of them, Satterfield, was at a nearby house. 743 F.2d at 831–32, 843. The police then went to Satterfield's residence, entered the home without a warrant, arrested Satterfield, and searched the house to confirm that no one else was there. Id. at 832, 843. After placing Satterfield in a patrol car, the police continued their search of the residence and eventually located a shotgun that was used in the homicide in the room adjoining the one where Satterfield was arrested. Id. The police obtained a warrant to search Satterfield's home several hours afterwards. Id. at 845. In response to a motion by Satterfield to suppress the shotgun, the government relied in part on the inevitable discovery doctrine, asserting that the police would have come across the weapon anyway while executing the warrant to search Satterfield's home. Id. at 845. The district court agreed that Satterfield's suppression motion lacked merit and denied it. Id. at 843. *12 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit overturned the district court's ruling, concluding that the shotgun should have been excluded. Id. at 846–47. In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that it would be “contrary to the public interest” to apply “the exclusionary rule when the police probably would have discovered the evidence through pursuit of a legal right they already possessed and were actively pursuing,” as such a result “would place the [g]overnment in a worse position than before the illegal conduct occurred.” Id. at 846 (emphasis added) (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 444). The court pointed out, however, that this concern was not implicated on the facts before it since the government had not yet initiated the lawful measure that would have directed them to the location of the shotgun in Satterfield's home. Id. As the court explained, “at the time the [g]overnment violated Satterfield's fourth amendment right, [the government] did not possess the legal means that would have led to the discovery of the shotgun. That means did not exist until several hours later when the warrant [for Satterfield's residence] was [secured].” Id. at 846. The court then went on to state: [I]f evidence is obtained by illegal conduct, the illegality can be cured only if the police possessed and were pursuing a lawful means of discovery at the time the illegality occurred. The [g]overnment cannot later initiate a lawful avenue of obtaining the evidence and then claim that it should be admitted because its discovery was inevitable. This is a sound rule, especially when applied to a case in which a search warrant was constitutionally required. Because a valid search warrant nearly always can be obtained after the search has occurred, a contrary holding would practically destroy the requirement that a warrant for the search of a home be obtained before the search takes place. Our constitutionally-mandated preference for substituting the judgment of a detached and neutral magistrate for that of a searching officer would be greatly undermined. Id. at 846–47 (citations omitted); see also Hernandez-Cano, 808 F.2d at 784 (“The [Eleventh Circuit in Satterfield] held that the inevitable discovery exception applied only if the government had initiated the lawful means ... that would have led to the discovery of the evidence prior to the unlawful conduct. Any other rule would effectively emasculate the exclusionary rule because, in most illegal search situations, the government could have obtained a valid search warrant if it had waited.”) (internal citations omitted). The next decision of import here is United States v. Johnson, 777 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2015), overruled in part by Watkins, 10 F.4th at 1180–81, where the Eleventh Circuit again addressed the “active pursuit” element of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. at 1272. In that case, a police officer stopped a truck driven by the defendant and determined after running the truck's license plates that it was registered to a deceased person. Id. When the defendant admitted he was operating the vehicle with a suspended driver's license, the officer engaged in an illegal search of the truck and came across a sawed-off shotgun. Id. The officer then arrested the defendant, conducted an inventory search, and had the truck impounded. Id. The defendant moved to suppress the shotgun, but the trial court refused to do so, ruling that the shotgun was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. The defendant appealed, contending that the officer was not “actively pursuing” a proper avenue of discovery at the time of the illegal conduct. Id. at 1274. To bolster this claim, the defendant asserted that at the time of the officer's unlawful search, the officer had not yet instituted the procedure for having the truck impounded and an inventory search performed. Id. The defendant further argued that “[e]ven if there was a reasonable probability that [the officer] would eventually initiate a valid inventory search, ... the government still [had to] prove [the officer's] ‘plans’ to engage in that search.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's challenge, finding that it stemmed from a “misunderstand[ing]” of the “[a]ctive pursuit” requirement. Id. The court held that, contrary to the defendant's position, the government did not have to demonstrate that the “police [had] already planned the particular search [which] would obtain the evidence,” but only that the police “would have discovered the evidence ‘by virtue of ordinary investigations of evidence or leads already in their possession.’ ” Id. (quoting Virden, 488 F.3d at 1323). Applying this principle to the facts before it, the court determined that the officer's inquiry “into the ownership of the truck was the ‘lawful means which made discovery inevitable,’ ” and that the “ ‘active pursuit’ of the ‘ordinary investigation’ of the evidence ‘already in [the officer's] possession’ would have led him to the shotgun.” Id. at 1274–75. *13 The Eleventh Circuit again had occasion to discuss the parameters of the inevitable discovery doctrine and its “active pursuit” requirement three years ago in Watkins. In that case, law enforcement agents investigated a supervisory postal employee believed to be involved in the receipt of two packages of cocaine that were imported from a foreign country. Watkins, 13 F.4th at 1205–06. After seizing the packages and discovering the cocaine inside, the agents placed a GPS tracking device in each parcel. Id. at 1203. The tracking devices, however, stopped working while the agents were in the midst of conducting their investigation. Id. During that time frame, the agents maintained surveillance of the post office where the postal employee worked and then searched the facility when the defendant left at the end of day to see if the two packages were still there. Id. at 1206. The agents also began to formulate plans for performing a “knock and talk” that same night at the defendant's house, believing that they would ultimately have to take this step since the defendant was their “only suspect.” Id. at 1207. One of the tracking devices later began to function again, however, and revealed that the packages were at a location which the agents had previously identified as being the defendant's residence. Id. As a result, the agents went to the defendant's home and knocked on the front door. Id. The defendant answered and, in response to an agent's question “Do you know why we are here?” the defendant stated “Yes, the boxes,” or “The packages.” Id. Following a further brief exchange with the agents, the defendant turned and, without saying anything, walked back into the house, which the agents interpreted as the defendant consenting to having them join her. Id. Before the agents did so though, a security sweep of the premises was performed because the agents detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the house and were concerned that evidence of the marijuana might be destroyed. Id. The agents also anticipated seeking a search warrant afterwards based on the smell of marijuana. Id. During the security sweep, the agents saw the two packages in the defendant's bedroom in plain view. Id. The agents thereafter secured a warrant to search the house but no additional evidence was found. Id. The district court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence seized during the search, concluding, in pertinent part, that the government wrongfully monitored the tracking device inside the defendant's house. Id. at 1209. The government moved the court to reconsider its ruling, citing the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. at 1209, 1215. The government contended, inter alia, that the suppressed evidence would eventually have been uncovered because the defendant “was the sole suspect,” law enforcement had already figured out where the defendant lived, and the agents planned to do a knock and talk at her home the same night, as “[t]hey had no other leads.” Id. at 1209. The district court denied the government's reconsideration request relying, in part, on Satterfield. Id. at 1215. The district court ruled that “although the lawful means of obtaining the evidence—the knock and talk— was being considered, it ‘was not actually being pursued when the unlawful tracking [of the parcels] occurred[.]” Id. at 1209. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed this ruling, finding that the district court's reliance on Satterfield was misplaced. Id. at 1215. In doing so, the appellate court discussed the differing circumstances under which the Satterfield and Johnson approaches to the active pursuit requirement applied: [U]nder our Satterfield decision and others, the prosecution must demonstrate that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct of the police.... We have since made clear Satterfield’s requirement that the alternative means of discovery be actively underway before the constitutional violation occurs is limited to cases where that alternative means of discovery is a search warrant. As we have explained: In Satterfield, we were concerned with the efficacy of the warrant requirement.... Any concern about circumnavigating warrants is misplaced ... where no one argues that [the officer] would have applied for a search warrant. *14 Johnson held that in cases where the means by which the challenged evidence would have been discovered anyway is not a search warrant, “active pursuit” does not require the government to have already planned the particular legal search that would obtain the evidence. Instead, the government must show only that the police would have discovered the evidence by virtue of ordinary investigations of evidence or leads already in their possession. That requirement, we noted, is enough to serve the purpose of the active pursuit requirement, which is to exclude evidence that was not being sought in any fashion. Watkins, 13 F.4th at 1215 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. Gilbert, 2023 WL 8257943, at *1 (11th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (recognizing that the “active pursuit” element is applied differently depending on whether a search warrant is involved) (citing Watkins, 13 F.4th at 1211); United States v. Hugger, 2022 WL 2702626, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2022) (“The ‘requirement that the alternative means of discovery be actively underway before the constitutional violation occurs is limited to cases where the alternative means of discovery is a search warrant.’ ”) (quoting Watkins, 13 F.4th at 1215). Based upon the above reasoning, the court in Watkins deemed Satterfield to be inapplicable because the alternative means of discovery was the agents’ knock and talk at the defendant's residence, not a search warrant. Watkins, 13 F.4th at 1215–16. Accordingly, the court employed the Johnson approach and found that the government had met its burden of showing the police would have discovered the challenged evidence “through [their] ongoing investigation and the pursuit of leads that were already in the [agents’] possession.” Id. at 1215. Applying the teachings of Watkins, Johnson, and Satterfield here, I find that the government's inevitable discovery argument fails. As an initial matter, it bears highlighting that the government does not reference Satterfield at all in its proposed factual findings and legal conclusions, much less explain why it does not apply in this case. (Doc. 61 at 13–15). This omission is especially notable since it cannot be fairly disputed that the alternative means of discovery at issue here was the search warrant for Mr. Landers's iPhone. Indeed, the government concedes as much in its post hearing submission. See id. at 15 (“Ultimately, the content of [Mr.] Landers’[s] iPhone would have been discovered via a warrant to seize and search his device[.]”). Thus, by Watkins’s plain language, Satterfield governs. See Watkins, 13 F.4th at 1215 (“We have ... made clear Satterfield’s requirement that the alternative means of discovery be actively underway before the constitutional violation occurs is limited to cases where that alternative means of discovery is a search warrant.”) (citing Johnson, 777 F.3d at 1274–75) (emphasis added). As discussed above, under Satterfield, the government must prove that the MCSO was actively pursuing a search warrant for Mr. Landers's iPhone prior to the MCSO's unlawful seizure of that device. See Watkins, 13 F.4th at 1215. The government does not make such a showing here. It is clear from the evidence adduced at the hearing that neither Detective Luke, Detective Luper, nor anyone else at the MCSO had initiated the formal procedure for acquiring the iPhone search warrant before Sergeant Patterson removed the cell phone from the Manatee County jail on November 7 and secured it at the MCSO's office. (Doc. 59 at 65–66). As Detective Luke candidly acknowledged on cross examination: *15 Q. At the time that you told Sergeant Patterson to go get the phone from Manatee County [j]ail on November 7[ ], you had not yet started the process for getting a warrant for the electronic devices; correct?[10] A. That is correct. * * * Q. And when you told Sergeant Patterson to go get the phone, Detective Luper hadn't started the process of getting a warrant yet on the phone; correct? A. That is correct. Q. By the time of the next morning, November 8[ ], when you received the phone from Sergeant Patterson, once you took possession of it at ICAC, at that point, you still had not started the process of getting a warrant yet; correct? A. No, sir. Q. And Detective Luper hadn't started that process either? A. No, sir. See (Doc. 59 at 71–72); see also United States v. Turner, 2019 WL 2287967, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2019) (Jung, J.) (concluding that the “active pursuit” requirement was met where, unlike in Satterfield, the detective “prepared and drafted [the] warrant [for the cell phone in question] and obtained approval from [upper management]” before the illegal search of that device transpired), aff'd, 2022 WL 4137756 (11th Cir. Sept. 13, 2022) (per curiam). Not only did the MCSO not commence the process of obtaining the iPhone warrant in advance of the device's seizure on November 7, it appears from the evidence that the MCSO did not even begin drafting that warrant application until two days later, on November 9. Detective Luke testified in this respect: Q. Now, after the execution of the residential search warrant was completed, did you and Detective Luper secure any additional search warrants? A. Yes. Q. What search warrants? A. That would have been the search warrant for the Apple iPhone[ and the other electronic devices]. Q. Did you author and submit that search warrant immediately after ending the residential search warrant? A. No, ma'am. I believe it was on the 9th—11/9/2022.[11] Q. What was happening in between that? A. In between, it was trying to collect the evidence.... So our biggest concern was making sure we got the evidence from the residence and nothing was missed. *16 Q. Is [the] execution of a residential search warrant a quick endeavor? A. No, ma'am. See (Doc. 59 at 65–66) (emphasis added).[12] It is plain from Detective Luke's testimony, in fact, that he arranged to have the MCSO take custody of Mr. Landers's iPhone simply to preserve it for a possible future examination. Id. at 59, 66. As he explained, it was “important [for the MCSO] ... to at least seize [the iPhone], so ... if we had anything, we could execute a search warrant” for the device at some later date. Id. at 59 (emphasis added). Although Detective Luke did not state so explicitly, it is fair to infer that he deemed the seizure of the iPhone to be wholly unexceptional for Fourth Amendment purposes because, in his view, such a seizure did not require a warrant at all. Id. at 83–84. At oral argument, the government admitted that, “technically speaking,” the MCSO did not institute the protocol for securing the iPhone search warrant prior to the phone's seizure. It nonetheless seemingly posits two contentions in an attempt to salvage its inevitable discovery claim. The first of these is that the MCSO was “actively pursuing its investigation into [Mr.] Landers[’s] misconduct” in the period preceding the illegal seizure of his cell phone. (Doc. 61 at 15) (emphasis added). This line of argument misapprehends Satterfield. As detailed previously, the government must establish under Satterfield that the MCSO was actively pursuing the search warrant for Mr. Landers's iPhone—not merely its investigation of Mr. Landers—prior to unlawfully taking custody of that device. Watkins, 13 F.4th at 1215. To find otherwise, the Eleventh Circuit cautioned in Satterfield, would “greatly undermine[ ]” the warrant requirement because a valid warrant “nearly always can be obtained” later on in an investigation after the illicit conduct has occurred. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 846–47; see also Watkins, 13 F.4th at 1215 (stating that to ensure “the efficacy of the warrant requirement,” Satterfield mandates that the process of securing a search warrant be “actively underway” before the constitutional violation takes place); Hugger, 2022 WL 2702626, at *3 (concluding that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied because a detective “was actively pursuing a lawful [search warrant] to obtain the information on [the d]efendant's iPhone before law enforcement obtained the same information unlawfully”); Turner, 2019 WL 2287967, at *5 (same); United States v. Bunch, 2012 WL 11799873, at *26 n.25 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2012) (finding that the inevitable discovery doctrine was inapplicable “[s]ince there [was] no showing that the police were actively pursuing a search warrant for [the residence] prior to [the police's challenged] entry into the home”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. United States v. McCullough, 2014 WL 3955556 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 13, 2014); United States v. Lisbon, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1368 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (rejecting the government's assertion that, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, the warrantless seizure of cell phones from an apartment should not be excluded because “the government did not prove that [a] search warrant for [that apartment] was being actively pursued at the time of the [warrantless] seizures”); Saez v. United States, 2023 WL 1781684, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2023) (invoking the inevitable discovery doctrine as a basis for denying the defendant's challenge to a warrantless residential search because the police “sought [a] warrant before searching [the premises]” and, according to the defendant, the police “were simply waiting for it to issue”). *17 The government's second contention appears to be that the MCSO was “actively pursuing search warrants” (plural) in connection with its seizure of Mr. Landers's iPhone. (Doc. 61 at 15). This assertion is fatally flawed as well. There is only one warrant that is relevant to the active pursuit element here and that is the search warrant for Mr. Landers's iPhone. As discussed above, this search warrant constitutes the alternative means of discovery under Satterfield and is also tied to the alleged constitutional violation at issue—namely, the warrantless seizure of Mr. Landers's cell phone. The fact that the MCSO may have been seeking other warrants during its voyeurism investigation of Mr. Landers is immaterial for purposes of the Satterfield analysis. The government conspicuously does not provide any case law demonstrating otherwise.[13] D. Lastly, as noted earlier, Mr. Landers seeks to suppress evidence obtained from his iPad which Ms. Landers brought to the station during the voyeurism investigation. It is well settled that a seizure does not implicate the Fourth Amendment if it is “effected by a private party on [her] own initiative,” unless that person “acted as an instrument or agent of the [g]overnment.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614 (citations omitted). A corollary to this long-established principle is that where an individual's expectation of privacy in certain information has been “frustrated” by a non-state actor, law enforcement may later lawfully use that information without a warrant. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1334 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ross, 963 F.3d 1056, 1057 (11th Cir. 2020). *18 In his motion to suppress, Mr. Landers originally maintained that the warrantless seizure of the iPad was unconstitutional because the government would be unable to prove that “the police did not encourage, participate in, or endorse [Ms.] Landers's removal of the iPad from the home.” (Doc. 27 at 14). The government countered in its response that no federal or state official instructed Ms. Landers to bring the iPad (or any of Mr. Landers's other electronic devices) to the MCSO. (Doc. 30 at 12). As explained previously, Mr. Landers declined to pursue his challenge to the iPad's seizure even when offered a further opportunity to brief the issue following the evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 76). To the contrary, he indicated that taking such a position would be frivolous. Id. I therefore submit that Mr. Landers has waived this argument. Irrespective of whether the Court finds a waiver on the matter, the iPad should not be suppressed in any event given the record before the Court. The evidence adduced at the hearing overwhelmingly demonstrates that Ms. Landers acted on her own accord in bringing the iPad to the MCSO. Ms. Landers credibly testified, for example, that no one with law enforcement told her to bring the iPad or any of the other electronic devices to the police station. (Doc. 59 at 110). And Sergeant Patterson and Detective Luke both confirmed that to be the case when they took the stand. Id. at 24, 60. As such, Mr. Landers's motion to suppress the iPad is unsupported. IV. In light of the foregoing, I respectfully recommend that Mr. Landers's motion to suppress (Doc. 27) be granted relative to his iPhone, the contents thereof, and any testimony regarding that device, but that his motion be denied as to his iPad. Respectfully submitted this 21st day of June 2024. NOTICE A party has fourteen (14) days from this date to file written objections to the Report and Recommendation's factual findings and legal conclusions. A party's failure to file written objections, or to move for an extension of time to do so, waives that party's right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual finding(s) or legal conclusion(s) the District Judge adopts from the Report and Recommendation. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Footnotes [1] Mr. Landers specifically seeks to suppress, inter alia, the contents of the iPhone and iPad, as well as any testimony about these devices. (Doc. 73). [2] I reviewed this approach with counsel in detail at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing as well to make sure there was no confusion about it. (Doc. 59 at 131–32). Neither counsel expressed any concerns. Id. at 132. [3] Deputy Fuller's interview of Ms. Landers was captured on the deputy's body camera and played at the evidentiary hearing. [4] This media consisted of two SD cards, two thumb drives, and two laptops which Ms. Landers indicated belonged to her children. (Doc. 59 at 25–26, 35). The evidence introduced at the hearing demonstrated that Ms. Landers turned these items over to Sergeant Patterson without any prompting by law enforcement. Id. at 24, 60, 110–12. [5] Detective Luper also worked in the ICAC section. (Doc. 59 at 61, 71). [6] Ms. Landers was able to retrieve the iPad from her and her husband's truck by having a key made for the vehicle. (Doc. 59 at 110). [7] The Eleventh Circuit, in its en banc decision in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), adopted as precedent the opinions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981. [8] In light of this finding, I need not address Mr. Landers's alternative claim that the exigent circumstances exception does not apply here because “ ‘any exigencies inherent in the situation could have been removed’ by [law enforcement] taking steps short of the challenged police action.” (Doc. 62 at 10) (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Cano, 808 F.2d 779, 782 (11th Cir. 1987)). I note only that the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Babcock could be read as cutting against this assertion. See Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1195; see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686–87 (1985) (“A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But ‘[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by less intrusive means does not, itself, render the search unreasonable.’ ”) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973)). [9] The inevitable discovery doctrine is also sometimes referred to as the ultimate discovery exception. Watkins, 13 F.4th at 1210. I will use the former designation for the sake of simplicity. [10] Detective Luke attempted to clarify on redirect examination that he understood the “process” of obtaining a warrant to refer to “physically writing the warrant.” (Doc. 59 at 82–83). While it is true that the drafting of the warrant was a component of the MCSO's protocol for acquiring such court authorization, it was only one of a number of steps. As Detective Luke attested elsewhere in his testimony: [The process of applying for and securing a warrant] begin[s] when we ... develop probable cause. Once probable cause is established, we'll actually write out the physical warrant, explaining what we're looking for[,] ... [and then] hand it to a supervisor. They will approve it. Once a supervisor approves it, then we need to send it to the district attorney's office. They will actually read it, review it, approve it. If there's anything that needs to be changed, we'll make those changes. And after everything is cleared, then we'll actually scan it, and ... send it to the judge electronically. Id. at 61–62. There is no credible evidence that the MCSO undertook any of these measures before unlawfully seizing Mr. Landers's iPhone. [11] The warrant itself bears a date and time stamp indicating that it was signed by the state court judge at 1:16 p.m. on November 9, 2022. See (Doc. 75-3); (Doc. 59 at 67, 74). [12] Detective Luke's subsequent testimony that he “start[ed] to author the search warrant” after interviewing Ms. Landers and her daughter (Doc. 59 at 83) (emphasis added) does not alter my conclusion that the MCSO waited until November 9 to begin drafting the iPhone warrant. As an initial matter, it is not at all clear from Detective Luke's testimony precisely when, following the interview of Ms. Landers and T.H., the MSCO actually commenced compiling the iPhone warrant. More fundamentally, I cannot discern what warrant Detective Luke is even discussing in this portion of his testimony. This is because, during the pertinent exchanges between Detective Luke and government counsel, the two reference both the residential warrant (i.e., Doc. 75-2) and the iPhone warrant (i.e., Doc. 75-3), but then confusingly describe them in the singular as either “the warrant” or “that warrant.” (Doc. 59 at 83). [13] There is a line of decisions which stands for the proposition that “[a] temporary warrantless seizure supported by probable cause is reasonable as long as ‘the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period of time.’ ” United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608, 613 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 334 (2001)); see also Turner, 2019 WL 2287967, at *2 (“A seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches.... [Thus,] if law enforcement unreasonably delays obtaining a warrant to search the item, a reasonable seizure can become unreasonable.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Neither party, however, has briefed whether this body of law has any application here. Indeed, the government does not mention it at all in any of its filings, including in its proposed factual findings and legal conclusions, nor did it raise it at oral argument. Accordingly, the government has waived any such contention. See (Doc. 57); see also United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th Cir. 1983) (concluding that the government waived alternative justifications for a search because it failed to raise such theories at the suppression hearing); Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he failure to make arguments and cite authorities in support of an issue waives it.”), overruled on other grounds in part by United States v. Durham, 795 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015); Mendoza v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1286 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding an issue to be abandoned where no argument was made) (citations omitted). Although I do not decide the matter, I note that a preliminary review of the pertinent case law suggests that it only comes into play when the seizure at issue was lawful at the outset. See, e.g., Laist, 702 F.3d at 610–11 (addressing the delay in obtaining a warrant for a computer which law enforcement originally seized with the defendant's consent); United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the lawful seizure of a hard drive may be deemed unconstitutional if the police act with unreasonable delay in securing a warrant); United Sates v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029, 1031 (7th Cir. 2012) (resolving the propriety of law enforcement's delay in securing a warrant for a phone that was properly seized under the exigent circumstances exception); United States v. Meyung, 2024 WL 271129, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 2024) (deciding whether law enforcement's delay in obtaining a warrant for “lawfully seized” electronic devices was too long).