*1 This discovery dispute arises from a suit filed by Plaintiffs Jared Lee, Dana Ellis, Matthew Counts, Gregory McClendon, and Barry Russell against Defendants, seeking damages for alleged violations of their constitutional rights. See ECF No. 62. Plaintiffs seek discovery from nonparties Matthew and Tara Friez (the Friezes) through a subpoena duces tecum. ECF No. 56. The Friezes move to quash the subpoena, alleging that it seeks privileged, irrelevant, and unduly burdensome information, as well as documents that the Friezes do not possess. See ECF No. 51. Senior United States District Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn has referred the motion to the undersigned for “recommendation or determination.” ECF No. 57.

For the reasons provided below, the Court finds that the subpoena seeks non-privileged materials and some information that, if in the Friezes' possession, custody, or control, must be produced because it would not be unduly burdensome to do so. The Court further finds that some of the information Plaintiffs seek is irrelevant. Thus, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Friezes' Motion to Quash.

To determine the evidence relevant to Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants, the Court must first examine the case's procedural history and Plaintiffs' allegations.

A. Procedural History and Factual Allegations

Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants City of Midland (Midland), Jennie Alonzo, Rosemary Sharp, and Camilo Fonseca, alleging, among other claims, false arrest, conspiracy, and failure to supervise. 2d Am. Compl. 1–2, 31, 35, ECF No. 62.[1] Defendants Alonzo, Sharp, and Fonseca (Defendant-officers) are law enforcement officers with the Midland Police Department (MPD). Id. at 13.

Plaintiffs assert that Defendant-officers arrested them on February 16, 2022, for failure to report child abuse, without probable cause and in retaliation for their response to a rumored sexual assault that occurred on January 18, 2022, at Midland Christian School (MCS). Id. at 2, 10, 20, 31, 39. Plaintiffs aver Midland was complicit in the arrests because even though “a grand jury nobilled every ... case against” Plaintiffs on May 11, 2022, after filing the instant lawsuit on August 30, 2022, Defendants “brought new, retaliatory, and vindictive charges against Plaintiffs ... again, for failure to report child abuse.” Id. at 7, 31. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant-officers signed arrest warrant affidavits that led to their false arrest for “felony failure to report child abuse with the intent to conceal,” despite Plaintiffs handling the incident appropriately and cooperating during the police investigation. Id. at 17–20. Plaintiffs contend Defendant-officers prompted their arrests by including “deliberate and reckless” false allegations or misstatements in the arrest warrants, and “creating] the ... false impression that ... [Plaintiffs] were aware that a student had been sexually assaulted,” even though Plaintiffs had already determined the rumor to be unfounded. Id. at 17, 21–22. Plaintiffs aver these “false allegations” were based largely on the “inaccurate [and] exaggerated” report made by Matthew Friez to Defendant-officers. Id. at 17–18, 21 (emphasis omitted).

*2 On August 30, Plaintiffs issued subpoenas to the Friezes, directing them to produce certain documents and provide answers to depositions on written questions by September 9, 2023. Mot. to Quash 1, ECF No. 51 [hereinafter Mot.];[2] Pls.' Resp. 1, ECF No. 56. Plaintiffs and the Friezes agreed to extend the response deadline to October 9, 2023. Mot. 1. The Friezes then filed the instant motion on October 6, 2023. ECF No. 51. Plaintiffs filed their Response on October 27, 2023 (ECF No. 56), and the Friezes filed their Reply on November 10, 2023. ECF No. 58.

B. The Parties' Positions

Plaintiffs' subpoenas seek the following:

ECF Nos. 51-1, 51-2.

The Friezes argue that the Court must quash the subpoenas because they “seek privileged, protected, or irrelevant material, production places an undue burden on nonparties, and these nonparties do not have a duty to produce documents outside their possession.” Mot. 2. Specifically, the Friezes contend that items three through five seek privileged information. Id. at 2-3. Because “Plaintiffs allege that Defendants unlawfully arrested them for offenses under the Texas Penal Code[,] ... Texas law governs any claim of privilege in this action.” Id. at 2. And “[u]nder Texas Rule of Evidence 502, a person who is required to make a report has a privilege to refuse to disclose it.” Id. at 3. Matthew Friez asserts he is a physician, and Tara Friez maintains she is a teacher at MCS, placing them in occupations that mandate reporting suspected child abuse. Id. As mandatory reporters, the Friezes aver they have the privilege to refuse to disclose such reports and, as such, items three through five are privileged. Id.

As to items one and seven through eighteen, the Friezes assert that producing these items would subject them to an undue burden. Id. at 3–4. The Friezes contend that item one “requests the records of every single phone call made over a period of four and a half months on at least five separate phone lines,” and items seven through eighteen “request all communications over a twenty-month period, not limited to phone calls.” Id. at 4. Because “[t]here are no limitations regarding the subject matter of the communications and its relevance to this litigation,” the Friezes aver it would be unduly burdensome to gather the requested communications. Id. at 4–5. In addition, the Friezes contend items one and two, six through eighteen, and twenty-two and twenty-three seek irrelevant information because “they do not have any bearing on a fact of consequence to Plaintiffs' claims regarding Defendants' investigation and probable cause for arrest.” Id. at 7–9. Because the Friezes are non-parties, they assert their communications, intentions, motives, and actions are not relevant and that the requests therefore seek information beyond the scope of discovery. Id. at 9. Lastly, the Friezes argue that items nineteen through twenty-one must be quashed because they “do not have a duty to obtain and provide documentation possessed by a third party, namely [MCS], being the author of the [materials] ... requested.” Id.

*4 In their Response, Plaintiffs submit that while the Friezes maintain they “have no personal knowledge of the police investigation or arrest,” they “are not simply nonparties with no connection to the facts forming Plaintiffs' claims.” Pls.' Resp. 1–2. Rather, Plaintiffs aver Matthew Friez “reported to the police the unsubstantiated and false gossip his son had heard in a school lunchroom” and previously “had a lengthy history of emailing Plaintiff Lee and the [MCS] administration ... a litany of complaints.” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs contend “[t]he content of what Friez reported to law enforcement, ... is crucial to understanding whether Defendants had probable cause and acted reasonably in arresting Plaintiffs ... a central fact issue.” Id. In addition, Tara Friez bolstered Matthew Friez's report to the police when she purportedly “provided a hearsay account of the alleged sexual assault similar to the report previously made by her husband.” Id.

According to Plaintiffs, “[t]he Friezes then continued assisting police with the investigation” and “provided police with a host of information ... such as:” (1) Dr. Friez's emails with police and school administrators; (2) Tara Friez's text messages with third parties about the incident; and (3) a timeline of events created by Tara Friez. Id. at 2–3. Some of these third parties—those listed in requests seven through eighteen—are identified in Defendants' Fourth Amended Disclosures as individuals “likely to have information [Defendants may use to support their defenses and refute [Plaintiffs' claims and allegations, including information regarding their concerns and interactions with school officials and others.” ECF No. 56-5, at 1, 3. Plaintiffs also contend information from the Friezes is pertinent because “[f]ollowing the Friezes' report and subsequent interviews, Defendants wrote the false probable cause affidavit used to secure Plaintiffs' wrongful arrests.” Pls.' Resp. 3.

In addition, Plaintiffs assert the Friezes' motion should be denied because: (1) “the Friezes failed to offer any evidence to support their conclusory and unsupported claim of privilege;” (2) “the Friezes failed to comply with Rule 45(e)(2)(A)(ii) by describing the nature of the information withheld;” (3) “the [s]ubpoenas request information that is relevant and nonprivileged; and” (4) “the Friezes failed to follow the Court's local rules by seeking to confer with Plaintiffs' counsel before filing the [m]otion.” Id. at 3–4 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiffs further maintain that the Friezes failed to provide evidence showing they are professionals who may assert a privilege under the Texas Family Code, but to the extent any privilege applies, it “would only apply to the report itself”; [i]t does not attach to all communications with law enforcement.” Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted). In addition, Plaintiffs contend the Friezes' asserted privilege is excepted under Texas Rule of Evidence 502, preventing a privilege from applying “in an action involving perjury, [or] false statements.” Id. at 8 (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 502(b)). “Plaintiffs assert that their arrests were unlawful based on false information ... supplied, in large part, ... by the Friezes,” and thus, the privilege is inapplicable. Id. Lastly, even if the privilege applies, Plaintiffs argue Defendants waived it by producing in discovery the Friezes' initial call and interviews with MPD. Id. at 6.

Plaintiffs also aver that the information sought is relevant because item one only seeks “records during the relevant period of the law enforcement investigation, the unlawful arrests, and the subsequent no-bills,” and items seven through eighteen request “communications with specific individuals that the Friezes spoke to about the alleged incident.” Id. at 7. On their face, however, the Court notes the requests are not so limited. See ECF Nos. 51-1, 51-2. Apparently recognizing this, Plaintiffs “offered to limit the scope” of requests one and seven through eighteen. Pls.' Resp. 7. Because Plaintiffs assert that the requested “information will inform whether Defendants had probable cause and acted reasonably in arresting Plaintiffs[,]” they conclude it is relevant. Id. at 8.

*5 Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the Local Rules for the Northern District of Texas require a movant to attach a Certificate of Conference to opposed motions, and that the Western District maintains such a requirement for all motions. Id. at 9. In Plaintiffs' view, because the Friezes did not attempt to confer with Plaintiffs or attach such certificate prior to filing, the Court may deny the motion on that basis alone. Id. at 9–10.

In their Reply, the Friezes assert that “Plaintiffs fail to legally justify their request for any of the subpoenaed documents.” Non-Parties' Reply 1, ECF No. 58 [hereinafter Reply]. The Friezes re-assert that they are professionals under the Texas Family Code and attach a duplicative affidavit from Matthew Friez to support that assertion. Id. at 1–2; ECF Nos. 58-2, 58-3. Moreover, they aver that the privilege applies to all communications under items three through five, and not just the initial call as Plaintiffs contend. Id. at 3. The Friezes also reject Plaintiffs' argument that their privilege was waived by Defendants' disclosures through their discovery responses, positing that “a privilege or protection cannot be waived involuntarily” by someone beyond control of the privilege holder disclosing such information. Id. at 4.

The Friezes then describe the documents being withheld based on their privilege claim: email communications between the Friezes and Detective Alonzo and Officer Fonseca from MPD, and Investigator Villarreal from DFPS, regarding the suspected child abuse. Id. at 5. The Friezes also contend that the relevant period for the subpoenaed items “is limited to anything that predated the Plaintiffs' arrest on February 16, 2022,” because Plaintiffs argue that “relevance hinges on what the police had in their possession when drafting the probable cause for the arrest warrants.” Id.

Concerning the remaining documents, the Friezes argue that “communications with other parents at the school or members of the media are [not] ... relevant to what knowledge the police had when acquiring the warrants.” Id. at 6. The Friezes also contend that “Plaintiffs have already admitted to having items in their possession that show what the Defendants did or did not know when obtaining arrest warrants” and thus do not need the information. Id. The Friezes, however, do not specify which subpoena request(s) this argument references. Lastly, the Friezes argue that they “are not parties to this suit” and are therefore “not privy to any proceedings before or procedures adopted by this Court,” such as the Northern District's Local Civil Rules. Id. at 7. Even assuming application of such procedures, the Friezes contend that Plaintiffs' Response shows the parties have now in fact conferred (despite not having conferred before filing their motion), and that the parties nevertheless have been unable to resolve their differences. Id. The motion is therefore still opposed and ripe for consideration. Id.

Two rules govern this dispute: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45. “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 explicitly contemplates the use of subpoenas in relation to non-parties and governs subpoenas served on a third party, such as [the Friezes], as well as motions to quash or modify or to compel compliance with such a subpoena.” Ford Motor Co. v. Versata Software, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 3d 925, 931 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rule 45(d)(3) provides that “[o]n timely motion, the court... must quash or modify a subpoena that” either “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies,” or “subjects a person to undue burden.”[5]FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii), (iv) (emphasis added). Where the moving party asserts the subpoenaed information is privileged or protected, the party must: (1) “expressly make the claim; and” (2) “describe the nature of the withheld documents, communications, or tangible things in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable the parties to assess the claim.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(e)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).

*6 In analyzing whether a subpoena presents an undue burden, courts consider the following factors: “(1) relevance of the information requested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the document request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). “Whether a burdensome subpoena is reasonable must be determined according to the facts of the case, such as the party's need for the documents [or information] and the nature and importance of the litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, “if the person to whom the document request is made is a non-party, the court may also consider the expense and inconvenience to the non-party.” Id.

The party seeking to quash the subpoena bears the burden of demonstrating “that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable and oppressive,” or that compliance will lead to disclosing privileged or protected material. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams v. City of Dallas, 178 F.R.D. 103, 109 (N.D. Tex. 1998)). “The moving party opposing discovery must show how the requested discovery was overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden.” Lead GHR Enters., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., No. 3:17-mc-91-M-BN, 2017 WL 6381744, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2017) (quoting Andra Grp., LP v. JDA Software Grp., Inc., 312 F.R.D. 444, 449 (N.D. Tex. 2015)). Modifying the subpoena “is preferable to quashing it outright.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818.

When “a subpoena is issued as a discovery device, relevance for purposes of the undue burden test is measured according to the standard of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(b)(1).” MetroPCS v. Thomas, 327 F.R.D. 600, 609 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 110). Rule 26(b) provides that:

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Information must therefore be nonprivileged, relevant, and proportional to the needs of the case to constitute discoverable material. See Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Chung, 321 F.R.D. 250, 279 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (“Under Rule 26(b)(1), discoverable matter must be both relevant and proportional to the needs of the case—which are related but distinct requirements.” (citing Rocha v. S.P. Richards Co., No. 5116-CV-411-XR, 2016 WL 6876576, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2016))); see also Thomas, 327 F.R.D. at 609–10 (noting that “discovery from a third party as permitted through a subpoena issued under Rule 45 is limited to the scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26(b)(1) in the underlying action, and [d]iscovery outside of this scope is not permitted” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

A. Plaintiffs' attachments to their Response.

Plaintiffs filed four Exhibits under seal in their Response to the Friezes' motion. See ECF Nos. 56-1–56-4. These Exhibits are apparently provided to show the Friezes' heavy involvement with Defendant-officers' investigation. See Pls.' Resp. 2 (identifying Exhibits under seal as various interviews of the Friezes with Defendant-officers). Plaintiffs did not seek leave to file such documents under seal, nor do they make any argument as to why they should remain sealed. The Court recognizes that “the working presumption is that judicial records should not be sealed.” Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d 410, 419 (5th Cir. 2021). In this case, however, the Court has not relied on Plaintiffs' attachments in evaluating the Friezes' motion.[6] The Court therefore finds that under these circumstances, the need to maintain the documents under seal, at least in regard to resolving this discovery issue, outweighs the public's interest in access to the records and furthers judicial efficiency, i.e., avoiding a gratuitous parsing of unnecessary records to separate the wheat from the chaff.

B. The Friezes' failure to confer before filing the instant motion does not warrant its denial.

*7 The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Friezes did not comply with the Western District's Local Rules[7] in that they failed to confer in an attempt to resolve matters raised in the motion and certify in their motion the specific reason why agreement could not be reached. See W.D. TEX. CIV. R. CV-7(g) (allowing the court to “deny a nondispositive motion unless the movant advises the court within the body of the motion that counsel for the parties have conferred in a good-faith attempt to resolve the matter by agreement and certifies the specific reason that no agreement could be made”). The Friezes initially make the troubling argument that because they “are not parties to this suit” they are “not privy to any proceedings before or procedures adopted by this Court.” Reply 7. This position approaches, if not crosses, the line of being frivolous. The Friezes, by filing a motion and seeking relief from this Court, generally subject themselves to all applicable rules and procedures of same, even as non-parties. See, e.g., Infernal Tech., LLC v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 1:21-MC-406-LY-SH, 2021 WL 2292804, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 4, 2021) (applying local rule requiring certificate of conference to non-party's motion seeking to quash subpoena, admonishing non-party of obligation “to certify ‘the specific reason that no agreement could be made’ ”); cf. Orix USA Corp. v. Armentrout, No. 3:16-mc-63-N-BN, 2016 WL 3926507, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 21, 2016) (“[A] non-party's Rule 45(d)(2)(B) objections to discovery requests in a subpoena are subject to the same prohibition on general or boiler-plate [or unsupported] objections and requirements” as a party. (citation omitted)). Moreover, the Friezes' counsel, as attorneys admitted to the Western District of Texas, are required to be familiar with and comply with all Local Court Rules. See, e.g., ECF No. 50 (Attorney Rebecca P. Linehan's application to appear pro hac vice, wherein she agreed that she “ha[d] read and is familiar with the Local Rules ... and will comply with the standards of practice set out therein.”).[8]

Based on the Friezes' mistaken belief this Court's local rules held no sway over them, thus resulting in their failure to make a good-faith effort to resolve the motion prior to filing, the Court has the discretion to “refuse to hear or ... deny” the motion outright. See W.D. TEX. CIV. R. CV-7(g). Because, however, both parties' filings confirm a belated conference did occur as to the substance of the motion (see ECF Nos. 51, 56, 56-6), the Court will not deny the motion on that basis. See McCallum v. Camping World, Inc.,No. SA-19-CV-01021-OLG, 2019 WL 9197839, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2019) (“The Local Rules ‘good faith’ requirement ‘mandates a genuine attempt to resolve the dispute through non-judicial means’ and the ‘conferment’ requirement requires two-way communication which is necessary to genuinely discuss any issues and to avoid judicial recourse.” (citation omitted)). The Court nevertheless admonishes counsel of their obligation to follow the Local Court Rules and make a ‘ “good faith’ effort to confer with opposing counsel and resolve ... [future] discovery dispute[s] before filing the motion.” Rainbow Energy Mktg. Corp. v. DC Transco, LLC, No. 1:21-CV-313-RP, 2022 WL 2820670, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 18,2022).

C. The state law privilege is inapplicable because the Federal Rules of Evidence apply.

The Friezes contend that items three through five seek privileged information. Mot. 2-3. Citing Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, they assert that because “Plaintiffs allege that Defendants unlawfully arrested them for offenses under the Texas Penal Code[,] ... Texas law governs any claim of privilege in this action.” Id. at 2. Specifically, “[u]nder Texas Rule of Evidence 502, a person who is required to make a report has a privilege to refuse to disclose it.” Id. at 3. Matthew and Tara Friez both claim status in professions (physician and teacher) that require reporting suspected child abuse. Id. Thus, as mandatory reporters, the Friezes invoke the state privilege as the basis for refusing to disclose such a report in response to items three through five. Id.

Plaintiffs counter that the Friezes' privilege claim should be denied because: (l)the Friezes offered no evidence showing they are professionals under Texas Family Code § 261.101; (2) they did not describe the withheld documents, as required by Rule 45(e)(2)(A)(ii); (3) the requested information is relevant and not privileged; and (4) Defendants waived the Friezes' privilege. Pls.' Resp. 3–6. In their Reply, the Friezes describe the documents being withheld as privileged email communications between the Friezes, Detective Alonzo and Officer Fonseca from MPD, and Investigator Villarreal from DFPS, regarding the suspected child abuse. Reply 5. They also provide an affidavit from Matthew Friez, swearing he is a physician with a duty to report child abuse. ECF Nos. 58-2, 58-3.[9]

*8 While Plaintiffs have identified valid deficiencies in the Friezes' motion, neither side's briefing addresses the determining issue. Rule 501 provides that “in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rale of decision.” FED. R. EVID. 501. That is, “Federal Rule of Evidence 501 dictates that federal common law, not state law, governs the privileges in federal question cases.” Roque v. City of Austin, No. 1-17-CV-00932-LY, 2018 WL 5848988, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2018).

As previously noted, Plaintiffs filed the instant case in federal court, alleging federal question jurisdiction. See 2d Am. Compl. 10 (asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343). Because Plaintiffs' claims arise under federal law, federal common law governs applicable privileges in this case. Willy v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 423 F.3d 483, 495 (5th Cir. 2005) (“As [plaintiff's] claims arise under federal law—and are before us on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331—the federal common law of... privilege governs our analysis.”). While the Friezes argue that because “Plaintiffs allege that Defendants unlawfully arrested them for offenses under the Texas Penal Code[,] ... Texas law governs any claim of privilege in this action,” courts have consistently rejected this notion, holding that in § 1983 cases pending in federal court, federal common law determines privilege claims. See Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Miss., Inc. v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1342–43 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (“Since the only claims and defenses asserted here relate to federal [§] 1983 claims, ... any privilege created by [Mississippi law] ... does not apply in federal court....”); Ambler v. Nissen, No. l :20-cv-1068-LY, 2023 WL 443806, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2023) (holding defendant's asserted privilege under Texas Local Government Code § 143.089 inapplicable because “federal common law ultimately controls the privileges in § 1983 actions filed in federal court” (citation omitted)); Roque, 2018 WL 5848988, at *2 (“[F]ederal common law controls the privileges in federal court § 1983 actions.”).

The Friezes raise no other privilege. Because the state law privilege they do assert does not apply in this federal § 1983 action, their request to quash the subpoena as to items three through five is denied. See, e.g., Finch, 638 F.2d at 1345 (reversing “district court's order to the extent it holds that [state law] renders [state commission's] files privileged from production in federal court”); Ambler, 2023 WL 443806, at *2 (overruling state statutory privilege claim in § 1983 action and requiring production of “investigative files concerning ... Internal Affairs investigations”); Est. of Rossiter v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Arapahoe Cnty., No. 08-cv-01661-LTB-KLM, 2009 WL 1609398, at *4–5 (D. Colo. June 9, 2009) (ordering plaintiffs to produce medical records that “may be privileged” under state law but recognizing that in a § 1983 federal court action “[t]here is no physician-patient privilege”).

D. The Friezes did not satisfy their burden of establishing the unduly burdensome nature of requests one and seven through eighteen.

“A party resisting discovery must show specifically how each interrogatory or document request is overly broad, unduly burdensome, or oppressive.” Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 490 (N.D. Tex. 2014). When asserting undue burden, a party must “present an affidavit or other evidentiary proof of the time or expense involved in responding to the discovery request.” S.E.C. v. Brady, 238 F.R.D. 429, 437 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (quoting Waddell & Reed Fin., Inc. v. Torchmark Corp., 222 F.R.D. 450, 454 (D. Kan. 2004)); see Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 490 (explaining that to meet his burden, “the party resisting discovery [must] show how the requested discovery was overly broad, unduly burdensome, or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden”). “Broad-based, non-specific objections are almost impossible to assess on their merits, and fall woefully short of the burden that must be borne by a party making an objection to” a discovery request. Brady, 238 F.R.D. at 437 (citation omitted).

*9 Other than conclusory or broadly stated objections, the Friezes present no affidavit or other evidence supporting their assertion that these requests are unduly burdensome. They object to the requests as being unlimited in subject matter or irrelevant to the litigation. Mot. 4. They also take issue with the breadth of the requests because they cover “all communications,” rather than just phone calls. Id. at 7. In addition, they contend the period asserted for requests seven through eighteen—approximately twenty months as of the date the Friezes filed their motion—is vast. Id. Lastly, the Friezes argue that “communications with other parents at the school or members of the media are [not] relevant to what knowledge the police had when acquiring the warrants.” Reply 6.

Plaintiffs contend that these items are limited to “communications with specific individuals that the Friezes spoke to about the alleged incident, the Plaintiffs' investigation of the alleged incident, and the MPD's investigation of the alleged incident.” Pls.' Resp. 7. Moreover, the requested communications “will demonstrate what information the police possessed, or lacked, when Defendants wrongfully arrested Plaintiffs [and] ... will inform whether Defendants had probable cause and acted reasonably in arresting Plaintiffs.” Id. at 8.

The Friezes' objections are insufficient to meet their evidentiary burden. “Despite th[e] well established authority on the level of detail needed to support an undue burden objection, [the Friezes] did not submit an affidavit or otherwise attempt to describe how the discovery requests were unduly burdensome in terms of time, expense, or procedure.” Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 491 (citation omitted); see Tijerina-Salazar v. Venegas, No. PE:19-CV-00074-DC-DF, 2022 WL 1085620, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2022) (“When a party fails to present an affidavit or other evidentiary proof supporting their resistance to discovery, ‘as a general matter, the failure makes such unsupported objection nothing more than unsustainable boilerplate.’ ” (brackets omitted) (quoting Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 491)). The Friezes merely assert that “the time period ... is vast, there's no particularity ...,” “[t]o sufficiently gather all communications ... would impose an undue burden[,]” and “[t]here are no limitations regarding subject matter ... and its relevance to the litigation.” Mot. 4–7. This “provide[s] the Court with no information about the burden involved in responding to these discovery requests.” Heller, 303 F.R.D. at 490 (quoting Presbyterian Manors, Inc. v. Simplexgrinnel, L.P., No. 09-2656-KHV, 2010 WL 4942110, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 30, 2010)); see, e.g., Chevron Midstream Pipelines LLC v. Settoon Towing LLC, Nos. 13-2809, 13-3197, 2015 WL 269051, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 21, 2015) (explaining that an objection “is boilerplate when it merely states the legal grounds for the objection without: (1) specifying how the discovery request is deficient and (2) specifying how the objecting party would be harmed if it were forced to respond to the request” (citation omitted)).

Because the Friezes only presented boilerplate objections regarding the burden involved in producing requests one and seven through eighteen, their motion is denied as to these specific grounds and objections. The Court addresses their remaining objections to these requests below.

E. The subpoena seeks both relevant and irrelevant information.

The Friezes assert that items one and two, six through eighteen, and twenty-two and twenty-three are not relevant because “they do not have any bearing on a fact of consequence to Plaintiffs' claims regarding Defendants' investigation and probable cause for arrest.” Mot. 9. In addition, they contend because they are not parties, “[t]heir communications, intentions, motives, and actions are not relevant.” Id. (cleaned up). Plaintiffs counter that the information sought is relevant because item one only seeks “records during the relevant period of the law enforcement investigation, the unlawful arrests, and the subsequent no-bills,” and items seven through eighteen request “communications with specific individuals that the Friezes spoke to about the alleged incident.” Pls.' Resp. 7. Plaintiffs, however, advance no argument for items two, six, twenty-two, and twenty-three's relevancy. See id. at 6–9.

*10 “As an initial matter, non-party subpoenas are ‘subject to Rule 26(b)(1)'s overriding relevance requirement.’ ” Mont. Res., Inc. v. ASARCO LLC, No. 18-MC-434(AJN), 2019 WL 130579, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2019) (citation omitted); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment (stating Rule 26 authorizes discovery of “any matter relevant to any party's claim or defense ... and proportional to the needs of the case”). “The relevancy evaluation necessarily begins with an examination of Plaintiff[s'] claims.” Tate v. DG La. LLC, 653 F. Supp. 3d 316, 320 (E.D. La. 2023), “When the discovery sought appears relevant, the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance ....” Scott v. Leavenworth Unified Sch. Dist. No. 453, 190 F.R.D. 583, 585 (D. Kan. 1999). That is, the party must show “that the requested discovery ‘either does not come within the broad scope of relevance as defined under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) or is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.’ ” Id. (citation omitted); accord McKinney/Pearl Rest. Partners, L.P. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:14-cv-2498-B, 2016 WL 2997744, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2016) (“The party resisting discovery must show specifically how each discovery request is not relevant or otherwise objectionable.”).

Item two requests “[c]opies of communications with any member of the media relating to the Incident, the Arrests, or the Delmas Arrest, including but not limited to any reporters with Big 2 News, KM1D-TV, or KPEJ-TV.” Mot. 7; see ECF No. 51-1, at 7; ECF No. 51-2, at 7. The Friezes generally assert that these items “are not relevant as they do not have any bearing on a fact of consequence to Plaintiffs' claims,” and the Friezes “are not parties to the suit”; thus, “[t]heir communications ... are not relevant to a case alleging misconduct by ... Midland and [MPD] employees.” Id. at 9. Plaintiffs, for their part, conclusorily aver that this request is relevant because the incident and their arrests “received significant media attention.” Pls.' Resp. 7. Their Second Amended Complaint—while alleging with more factual specificity the media's involvement (see 2d Am. Compl. 2, 7, 20–21, 39, 42, 44 (contending their arrests received “worldwide media attention” and that Defendant-officers pre-arranged the media's presence at the arrests “to create a public spectacle and lasting humiliation”))—nevertheless lends no support to the conclusion that (1) any connection existed or communication occurred between the Friezes and the media, and (2) such communication between the two in any way informed or impacted decisions made by either Plaintiffs or Defendants.

Thus, despite the Friezes' summary objection to this request, the Court finds that based on the record as developed, Plaintiffs' request does not clear the initial relevancy hurdle, and this request is facially irrelevant to Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants. Distilled to its essence, Plaintiffs claim Defendants initiated charges against them without probable cause. Plaintiffs have made no showing, either through their pleadings or briefing, that the requested material, i.e., purported communication between the Friezes and media, has any “possible bearing on” (Tate, 653 F. Supp. 3d at 320 (citation omitted)) Defendants' (1) belief that probable cause existed or (2) decision to pursue criminal charges. Plaintiffs simply claim the investigation, arrests, and subsequent no-bills “received significant media attention” and that Defendant-officers utilized the media to create a spectacle and humiliate Plaintiffs. Pls.' Resp. 7; 2d Am. Compl. 20–21. The evidence may or may not ultimately support such a conclusion, but the Court nevertheless finds no allegations in the operative complaint, and Plaintiffs provide no argument or evidence in their response, suggesting that any communication between the Friezes and the media (as opposed to Defendants) actually occurred or in any way informed charging decisions ultimately made by Defendants. Without such an alleged connection, Plaintiffs present nothing more than speculation that the Friezes may have spoken to the media, and they fail to demonstrate how that fact, if it occurred, produces material relevant to either Defendants' decision to prosecute or Plaintiffs' decision to report. See Ducharme v. Nova Cas. Co., No. 6:13-3108, 2015 WL 631131, at *2-3 (W.D. La. Feb. 10, 2015) (granting non-party's motion to quash because the sought after documents had “no direct connection or relevance to the plaintiff's claims or alleged injuries or any defense thereto presented by the defendants”); Dileo v. Lane, No. 12-522-BAJ-SCR, 2013 WL 5409214, at *1 (M.D. La. Sept. 25, 2013) (quashing request for cell phone records where “defendants ha[d] not shown that any such communications ever occurred” and was more akin to a fishing expedition “based on the speculative premise that [plaintiff] communicated ... with [others]” rather “than discovery reasonably calculated to lead to the” discoverable evidence); Sherrod, Teed, Vanderhagen & Ware v. VNA, No. 5:17-cv-10164-JEL-KGA, 2022 WL 2678820, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. July 11, 2022) (denying plaintiffs' motion to compel all documents related to tweets made during trial that potentially caused the public to question party's legal position or attorney's integrity, because such information was “not relevant to the claims or defenses” in the trial); cf. Davis v. Carmel Clay Schs., 286 F.R.D. 411, 413 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (concluding that communication between non-party prosecutors related to investigation of criminal matter arising from alleged bullying incident at school would not lead to discovery of relevant information, such as the defendant-school's alleged knowledge about the incident).

*11 Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate such information's relevance, and the Court therefore grants the Friezes' Motion to Quash item two.

Item one requests “[c]opies of your call records on any cell phone, landline, and/or office phone from January 18, 2022 through May 31, 2022.” Mot. 7; see ECF No. 51-1, at 7; ECF No. 51-2, at 7. Item six requests “[c]opies of communications with MCS relating to the Incident, Arrests, or the Delmas Arrest.” Mot. 7; see ECF No. 51-1, at 7; ECF No. 51-2, at 7. Item twenty-two requests “communications with MCS regarding any other incident(s) which would trigger the duty to report to law enforcement authorities pursuant to Chapter 261 of the Texas Family Code from January 2020 to date,” Mot. 8; see ECF No. 51-1, at 9; ECF No. 51-2, at 9. Item twenty-three requests from Tara Friez “[c]opies of documentation relating to any work performed by you for MCS.” Mot. 8; see ECF No. 51-2, at 9. The Friezes lump this request in with the other purportedly irrelevant requests and advance the same argument laid out above, arguing generally that the requests seek irrelevant information. See Mot. 9. In their Response, Plaintiffs argue item one requests records during the relevant period for the facts forming the basis of this suit. See Pls.' Resp. 6–9.

As originally drafted, the Court agrees item one seeks both relevant and irrelevant material.[10] While limited in time, it is unconstrained in topical scope—it seeks from the Friezes copies of all “call records on any cell phone, landline, and/or office phone,” with no corresponding criteria appropriately restricting its breadth. It therefore covers all phone calls to individuals and businesses regardless of subject, many of which would be wholly unrelated to the dispute at hand: family, friends, colleagues, patients, clients, etc. Recognizing this, Plaintiffs have appropriately agreed to restrict the request to “[c]opies of your call records on any cell phone, landline, and/or office phone from January 18, 2022 through May 31, 2022 relating to Plaintiffs, the Incident, the Arrests, or the Delmas Arrest.” See ECF No. 56-7, at 4 (emphasis added). The Court considers the Friezes' relevancy objection in this revised context. See Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 110 (finding that the original request was not reasonably limited but as modified by plaintiff, was “considerably narrower and more focused” to discovering relevant materials).

*12 Similar to the Court's previous conclusion concerning the Friezes' unduly burdensome objections, their generalized relevancy objections are unsupported and thus unsustainable boilerplate. See McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that simply objecting to requests as “overly broad, burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant,” without showing “specifically how” each request “is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive,” is inadequate to “voice a successful objection” (citations omitted)). Nevertheless, while the Court finds the revised inquiry more focused, i.e., now limited in both time and scope, as revised it continues to suffer from some of the same preliminary relevancy deficiencies identified above in relation to Plaintiffs' media inquiries—it ensnares calls made to anyone, regardless of their connection with or involvement in the events at hand.

The Friezes concede that they communicated with Defendant-officers about the incident throughout this period. Mot. 3 (admitting that they, as “mandatory reporters of suspected child abuse,” made a “report to law enforcement regarding suspected child abuse” at MCS); Reply 5 (“maintain[ing] their privilege and protection regarding any currently undisclosed communications with law enforcement regarding their reasonable cause to believe the occurrence of child abuse”); see also Pls.' Resp. 2 (listing communications provided to the police by the Friezes and averring that the Friezes “provided police with a host of information”). Plaintiffs argue that what the Friezes “reported to law enforcement, and later repeated to others, is crucial to understanding whether Defendants had probable cause and acted reasonably in arresting Plaintiffs for felony failure to report.” See, e.g., Pls.' Resp. 2. Moreover, it is conceivable the Friezes called Plaintiffs at some point concerning these events. Any calls made by the Friezes to Plaintiffs or Defendants concerning “Plaintiffs, the Incident, the Arrests, or the Delmas Arrest” would constitute relevant discovery—such communication could certainly produce evidence pertinent to decisions made by Defendants and Plaintiffs that give rise to claims and defenses asserted herein. See Marchionda v. Embassy Suites Franchise, LLC, No. 4:15-cv-00479-JEG-SBJ. 2018 WL 8458792, at *1, *6 (S.D. Iowa July 10, 2018) (finding relevant the request for “electronically stored communications and information related to the incident..., including on their cell phones,” from non-parties tangentially involved in the underlying incident because it related to claims or defenses in the case); see also Camoco, LLC v. Leyva, 333 F.R.D. 603, 606 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (“Relevancy is broadly construed, and a request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is ‘any possibility’ that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” (citation omitted)). Plaintiffs have made no showing, however, supporting discovery of calls made to any other person or entity—at this juncture such discovery would be little more than an unauthorized fishing expedition, which the law does not countenance.

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs' proposed modifications sufficiently limit the time and scope of this request, but it further modifies the request (Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818) to cover only persons potentially involved in reporting, investigating, and/or pursuing charges concerning the incident in question, i.e., communications relevant to the instant claims and defenses herein. Thus, the Friezes must produce item one, as modified: copies of call records between them and Plaintiffs or Defendants on any cell phone, landline, and/or office phone from January 18, 2022, through May 31, 2022, relating to Plaintiffs, the Incident, the Arrests, or the Delmas Arrest. This modification does not prejudice Plaintiffs' future ability to seek similar records from other sources upon a proper showing of relevance, proportionality, etc.

*13 Next, items six, twenty-two, and twenty-three generally seek copies of all communications between the Friezes and MCS related to the incident and other similar events triggering a duty to report, as well as copies of communication concerning work performed by Tara Friez for MCS. See Mot. 7–8. The Friezes argue these requests seek irrelevant information because “they do not have any bearing on a fact of consequence to Plaintiffs' claims regarding Defendants' investigation and probable cause for arrest” and, because they are non-parties, their communications, intentions, motives, and actions are irrelevant. Id. at 7–9. The Court finds no response from Plaintiffs as to requests six, twenty-two, or twenty-three. See, e.g., Pls.' Resp. 6–9.

Despite Plaintiffs' lack of argument on the question, the Court holds that the Friezes' position is unsupportable. Item number six, which seeks “[c]opies of communications with MCS relating to the Incident, the Arrests, or the Delmas Arrest,” clearly targets information that goes to a core issue in this case, i.e., what did the Friezes communicate to MCS concerning the incident and did it give rise to a duty by Plaintiffs to report? Because Plaintiffs allege that Defendantofficers falsely arrested them for failure to report child abuse, all parties' claims and defenses turn on resolving the question of whether such a duty existed and, if so, whether Plaintiffs lawfully fulfilled that obligation. As such, the Friezes' communications with MCS relating to the incident and arrests, i.e., item number six, is relevant to Plaintiffs' claims. See Rodriguez v. CHRISTUS Spohn Health Sys., No. C-09-95, 2011 WL 3652189, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2011) (explaining that defendant's investigative documents regarding the actions taken by defendant after the alleged sexual assault were relevant to plaintiffs § 1983 action); Tim Long Plumbing, Inc. v. Kinsale Ins. Co., No. 4:20-CV-00042, 2020 WL 6559869, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2020) (finding communications relevant that “would show whether the results of [d]efendant's investigation allegedly merit[ed] denial of the claim”). Such evidence also bears on potential bias and may also lead to other discoverable information.

Item twenty-two is relevant because past reports made by the Friezes to MCS under the Texas Family Code—which the Friezes themselves assert is the basis for their report in this incident—may go towards bolstering or undermining the Friezes' credibility (e.g., as to the veracity of their report to MCS in this case and Plaintiffs' response to same), showing bias or past relationship status with the school and Plaintiffs, etc. See Pls.' Resp. 2 (alleging “Dr. Friez had a lengthy history of emailing Plaintiff Lee and [MCS] with a litany of complaints”); Jones v. Pitchford, No. 1:19-cv-00396-DAD-FIBK, 2021 WL 2954634, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2021) (requiring defendants to produce past complaints or reports of misconduct against them because it was “discoverable and highly relevant to showing propensity and character, or to show bias, or a pattern or practice of unprofessional behavior”); Hamilton v. Quinonez, No. 1:14-cv-1216-LJO-MJS (PC), 2015 WL 3660138, at *3 (E.D. CaL June 10, 2015) (finding “[p]revious complaints against [defendants ... relevant insofar as they could help establish possible pattern ... or practice,” because “[w]hile admissibility of character evidence is a trial objection, discovery is much broader ... [and] may be admissible for ... purposes” other than character).

Lastly, item twenty-three requests “documentation [from Tara Friez] relating to any work performed by [her] for MCS.” Mot. 8. Such request is also relevant to the Friezes' relationship with the parties. See Bonano v. James River Ins. Co., No. 19-14764, 2020 WL 6157846, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2020) (denying plaintiff's motion to quash because the information sought about “plaintiff's treating physician's relationship with plaintiff's counsel and/or their litigation funding company” was relevant to “the issue of bad faith and/or as impeachment evidence”); Narcisse v. All Ways Transp., LLC, No. 22-387-JWD-RLB, 2023 WL 6545423, at *6 (M.D. La. July 7, 2023) (“[I]nformation regarding the bias of a witness ... may fall within the scope of discovery ... [and] may include evidence of special relationships.”).

*14 In sum, because request one seeks some irrelevant information, the Friezes' Motion to Quash is granted and denied in part and the request is modified as follows: the Friezes shall produce copies of call records between them and Plaintiffs or Defendants on any cell phone, landline, and/or office phone from January 18, 2022, through May 31, 2022, relating to Plaintiffs, the Incident, the Arrests, or the Delmas Arrest. The Court further finds that the information sought via requests six, twenty-two, and twenty-three is relevant, and the Friezes' motion is therefore denied as to these requests.

The Court has already determined that the Friezes failed to carry their burden in establishing that requests seven through eighteen are unduly burdensome. See supra Section III.D. Significantly, concerning relevance, Plaintiffs have again voluntarily narrowed the scope of the requests to “communications ‘relating to Plaintiffs, the Incident, the Arrests, or the Delmas Arrest.” ’ Pls.' Resp. 7. As such, it appears Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 26(b)(1)'s initial relevance requirement (Mont. Res., 2019 WL 130579, at *1) in arguing that the anticipated discovery “seeks communications with specific individuals that the Friezes spoke to” concerning the alleged incident, specifically as related to the Plaintiffs' and MPD's investigation into the event. Pls.' Resp. 7; id. at 2–3 (alleging further that the Friezes “provided police with a host of information,” including Tara Friez's text messages with third parties about the incident); see Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (stating that Rule 26's relevance requirement “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case” (citation omitted)). Bolstering this conclusion is Defendants' Fourth Amended Disclosures, which identify all the individuals named in requests seven through eighteen, save two, as “likely” having information Defendants “may use to support its defenses.” ECF No. 56-5, at 1–6.

Here, the Friezes again challenge the requests in only a conclusory fashion, stating that the sought after items “do not have any bearing on a fact of consequence to Plaintiffs' claims regarding Defendants' investigation and probable cause for arrest.” Mot. 9. The Court disagrees. See Chung, 321 F.R.D. at 283 (“The party resisting discovery must show specifically how each discovery request is not relevant or otherwise objectionable.” (citation omitted)).

In this context, the central issues are: (1) what information was available to MCS and Plaintiffs concerning the incident, and did it give rise to a duty to further investigate and/or report; and (2) what information was provided to or available to Defendants in making a probable cause determination and deciding to pursue criminal charges? A number of individuals identified in requests seven through eighteen apparently are parents of students at MCS and reportedly (1) possess information about the incident, (2) made reports about the incident, and/or (3) had communication with the Friezes concerning allegations of abuse. ECF No. 56-5, at 1, 3. Plaintiffs also allege that the Friezes provided “Tara Friez's text messages with third parties about the incident” to police (Pls.' Resp. 2–3), and Defendants' disclosures assert that four individuals identified in requests seven through eighteen “exchanged texts with Tara Friez regarding their concerns about the allegations of abuse.” ECF No. 56-5, at 3. These contentions render such third party communication potentially relevant to either or both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' operative decisions. See Donovan v. City of Boston, No. 1:20-cv-1 1976-AK, 2023 WL 349851, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 20, 2023) (ordering non-party, “who has had an active role in the events forming the basis of the claims in th[e] case,” to produce “any communications that she ... had with various parties that [we]re involved ... relevant to deciding any issues in th[e] case,” including other non parties). Moreover, such communications could be relevant to the Friezes' and others' veracity and also used for impeachment purposes against the Friezes, any third-party witness, or Defendants. M.H v. City of Bernardino, No. EDCV 20-242-JGB (KKx), 2020 WL 7247341, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2020) (“[C]ommunications directly relating to the incident are relevant to bias and credibility and therefore relevant to [plaintiffs claims.”).

*15 As noted above, however, these requests are modified in line with Plaintiffs' acknowledged topical limitation (see ECF No. 56-7), with the additional restriction that these requests also be constrained to the relevant time period. See Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 110 (modifying the request, which was unlimited in time, to “documents relating to the allegations made by [the third party] which gave rise to th[e] suit”). Thus, the Friezes must produce communications from January 18, 2022, to May 31, 2022, specified in items seven through eighteen, only as they relate to “Plaintiffs, the Incident, the Arrests, or the Delmas Arrest.”

F. The Friezes must produce items within their possession, custody, or control.

The Friezes argue that requests nineteen through twenty-one should be quashed because they “do not have a duty to obtain and provide documentation possessed by a third party, namely [MCS], being the author of the [materials] requested.” Mot. 9. While a correct statement of the law, the Friezes' objection nevertheless fails.

Fairly read, the requests simply seek items the Friezes may possess. The Court finds no language in the requests purporting to direct or require the Friezes to obtain items from a third party—only documents they already possess that were either created or provided by a third party. And in an apparent attempt to assuage the Friezes' concerns in this regard, Plaintiffs modified the requests, expressly limiting them to items “in your possession.” See ECF No. 56-7, at 6; Pls.' Resp. 7–8 n.1. As such, the requests fall well within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45's provisions, which provide that a party may serve a subpoena on a non-party commanding it “to ... produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person's possession, custody, or control.” FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). Because the requests seek only documents in the Friezes ' possession, their objection to a perceived demand that they “obtain and provide documentation possessed by a third party” is both improper and now moot. The Friezes should either produce responsive documents in their possession, custody, or control, or simply respond that they do not possess the requested materials, if in fact they do not. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches, No. 05-4182, 2007 WL 1852184, at *5 (E.D. La. June 27, 2007) (“[T]he response, that ‘[defendant] does not possess or control such documents,’ is sufficient, as long as it is true.”).

The Court thus denies the Friezes' motion as to items nineteen through twenty-one and directs them to produce the identified items in their “possession, custody, or control.” See Reeves v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. EP-14-CV-00187-DCG, 2014 WL 12493288, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2014) (“[N]onparties are not required to produce documents not in their possession, custody, or control.” (citation omitted)); Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 821 (limiting the subpoena request to documents in the non-party's “possession, control, or custody” after determining “[t]he phrase ‘to which he has access' [wa]s overbroad” because “it would require the retrieval of documents ... not under [his] custody, control, or possession, but to which he could conceivably have access”).

Plaintiffs, through their subpoenas, seek information from the Friezes, non-parties herein, that is both discoverable and non-discoverable. Accordingly, the Friezes' Motion to Quash is: (1) GRANTED as to item two; (2) GRANTED, in part, as modified as to items one and seven through eighteen; and (3) DENIED as to all other requests. Thus, the Friezes shall produce: (1) items three through six and nineteen through twenty-three as originally requested; (2) item one as modified herein: copies of call records between the Friezes and Plaintiffs or Defendants on any cell phone, landline, and/or office phone occurring between January 18, 2022, and May 31, 2022, relating to Plaintiffs, the Incident, the Arrests, or the Delmas Arrest; and (3) items seven through eighteen as modified herein: communications from January 18, 2022, to May 31, 2022, between the Friezes and the individual identified in the request, related to Plaintiffs, the Incident, the Arrests, or the Delmas Arrest. The Friezes shall comply with the subpoenas as modified by this Order within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order.

*16 SO ORDERED.