*1 MINUTE ORDER (paperless) DENYING defendant's 61 Motion for Reconsideration of the May 19, 2023 Minute Order (“Def.’s Mot.”), which, in relevant part, required defendant to produce to plaintiffs “full and complete responses to plaintiffs’ requests for financial information in RFP Nos. 40 and 41,” May 19, 2023 Minute Order (“May Order”), and DIRECTING defendant to comply with the May Order to produce responses to plaintiffs’ Request for Production (“RFP”) Nos. 40 and 41 by June 30, 2023, in accordance with the May Order (as amended by the June 16, 2023 Minute Order).

Plaintiffs’ RFP Nos. 40 and 41 request certain financial information from defendant. See Pls.’ 44 Motion to Compel Discovery, For Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, and For Sanctions at 8-9 n.4 (providing text of plaintiffs’ RFP Nos. 40 and 41); see also Pls.’ 64 Combined Opposition to Def.’s 61 Motion for Reconsideration and Response to Defendant's Declaration (“Pl.’s Opp'n”) at 8-11. While defendant fails to cite any authority for reconsideration, his motion is construed as seeking reconsideration, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which allows “any order” that “adjudicates fewer than all the claims” in a case to “be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and thereby gives district courts “discretion to hear motions for reconsideration ‘as justice requires.’ ” Lin v. District of Columbia, 47 F.4th 828, 838-39 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Servs., Inc., 630 F.3d 217, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (approving flexible “as justice requires” standard)); see also Shatsky v. PLO, 955 F.3d 1016, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (observing that “a minute order is open to reconsideration on the same terms as a lengthy opinion reaching the same result”). “Justice may require revision when the Court has patently misunderstood a party, has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension, or where a controlling or significant change in the law or facts has occurred since the submission of the issue to the Court.” Singh v. George Washington Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (cleaned up). Despite the flexibility allowed under Rule 54(b), given the tax on parties’ and judicial resources from revisiting issues already resolved and the concomitant perverse incentive to invite litigation delay by such reconsideration requests, “a court ‘should be loathe’ to grant a motion for reconsideration ‘in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’ ” Kirwa v. U.S. Dep't of Def., No. CV 17-1793 (ESH), 2018 WL 7141989, at *1 (D.D.C. May 23, 2018) (quoting Marshall v. Honeywell Tech. Sols., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 57, 59 (D.D.C. 2009)).

Defendant presents no new argument warranting reconsideration. See Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc., 630 F.3d at 227 (affirming district court's denial of reconsideration where party seeking reconsideration “raised no arguments for reconsideration the court had not already rejected on the merits”). Defendant argues discovery of financial information, as demanded in plaintiffs’ RFP Nos. 40 and 41, should be granted only after plaintiffs have made a prima facie case supporting a claim for punitive damages, see Def.’s Mot., contending that this “view [ ] has been recognized repeatedly in this District,” id. (citing D'Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., 247 F.R.D. 43, 52 (D.D.C. 2008)). While in D'Onforio v. SFX Sports Group, the production of “[i]nformation pertaining to [ ] defendant's financial condition” was postponed until the defendant's financial condition was placed at issue or in the event that the jury considered punitive damages, the magistrate judge deciding this case acknowledged that “a majority of federal trial courts” “have permitted pretrial discovery of financial information of the defendant without requiring plaintiff to establish a prima facie case on the issue of punitive damages.” 247 F.R.D. at 52 (cleaned up). By contrast to the non-binding decision in D'Onforio, three persuasive justifications underpin the majority approach. “First, knowledge of defendant's net worth will be of value to both sides in making a realistic appraisal of the case, and may lead to settlement and avoid protracted litigation.” Mid Continent Cabinetry, Inc. v. George Koch Sons, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 149, 152 (D. Kan. 1990). “Second, the requirement that claimant establish a prima facie case applies to the admissibility of evidence about financial status, not its discoverability.” Id. Delaying plaintiffs’ ability to discover relevant information to develop their claims for punitive damages “would only lead to delay and confusion while plaintiff reviews the information for the first time.” Id. “Third, while a party does have an interest in nondisclosure and confidentiality of its financial records, this interest can be adequately protected by a protective order.” Id. Under the governing 54 Protective Order in this case, defendant may designate his financial records for special confidential treatment to ensure that his financial information is used for the limited purposes of discovery and not otherwise shared with the public.

*2 Moreover, D'Onforio, and the two cases on which it relies--Skinner v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, No. 83-cv-0679, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19817 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 1984) (“Skinner”) and John Does IVI v. Yogi, 110 F.R.D. 629 (D.D.C. 1986) (“Yogi”)--are distinguishable on their facts not only because the policy underpinnings of the majority view were not considered, but also because the requested financial information was found not to be relevant to the claims or was not at issue. See D'Onforio, 47 F.R.D. at 52-53 (magistrate judge denying plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of defendants’ financial information in a Title VII discrimination case because the information was not relevant to claims but only relevant “to the issue of whether punitive damages should be awarded”); Skinner, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19817, at *2-3 (magistrate judge denying motion to compel production of defendant's financial information in a breach of contract action because information was only relevant to a claim for punitive damages); Yogi, 110 F.R.D. at 631-33 (considering issue of whether “confidential” designation of defendant's financial records would too “severely restrict access” and not whether production of such documents was appropriate). By contrast, here, defendant's financial condition is relevant to both liability and punitive damages. As plaintiffs argue, these financial records, including changes in defendant's financial status over time, may indicate that defendant had a financial motive to make certain claims concerning plaintiffs to allow him to earn “additional income or increased viewership or followers[.]” See Pls.’ Opp'n at 10-11. See also, e.g., US Dominion, Inc. v. Byrne, 600 F. Supp. 3d 24, 33 (D.D.C. 2022) (explaining that plaintiff's allegation that defendant “had a financial motive to make his false claims” could show alleged actual malice in a defamation claim); US Dominion, Inc. v. Powell, 554 F. Supp. 3d 42, 63-64 (D.D.C. 2021) (holding that allegations of a “profit motive” could, with supporting factual allegations, “satisfy the actual malice standard” in a defamation claim). Defendant has filed no reply in support of his reconsideration motion, see May 31, 2023 Minute Order (setting June 21, 2023 as due date for any reply), and has made no request for an extension of time to file such reply, despite the opportunity to do so orally at today's video conference in this case, and thus leaves undisputed plaintiff's argument that his financial information is relevant to both liability and punitive damages.

Accordingly, defendant's 61 Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

Signed by Judge Beryl A. Howell