*1 Plaintiff Gene Raymond Bell (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action in Michigan state court on September 5, 2019. ECF No. 1, PageID.7. He brought several claims against the City of Southfield and three Southfield police officers, including excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, because of events that took place during a June 23, 2019 traffic stop.[1] Defendants removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441 on December 3, 2019. ECF No. 1, PageID.3. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 11, 2020, and he now proceeds only on his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. ECF No. 21. Defendant officers Anthonie Korkis, Arthur Bridgeforth, and Thomas Langewicz II (“Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff's remaining claim because of asserted discovery violations, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37. ECF No. 55.

Upon review of the parties' submissions, the Court finds that oral argument will not aid in the disposition of this matter. Accordingly, the Court will resolve Defendants' present motion on the briefs. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies Defendants' Motion.

Defendants served interrogatories and requests for production on Plaintiff on October 6, 2022. ECF No. 55-2, PageID.491-507. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33(b)(2) and 34(b)(2)(A), Plaintiff was required to respond on November 7, 2022, within 30 days of being served with Defendants' written discovery requests. Plaintiff did not serve responses by this deadline. Instead, on November 14, 2022, Plaintiff's counsel at the time filed a Motion for Withdrawal, citing a communication breakdown with Plaintiff. ECF No. 42, PageID.399. Defendants filed a motion to compel Plaintiff's responses that same day. ECF No. 43. The Court referred Defendants' motion to compel to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford, who granted the motion on December 5, 2022 and ordered Plaintiff to respond to Defendants' discovery requests by January 5, 2023. ECF No. 46, PageID.433-434.

After Plaintiff missed the second deadline, the Court held a hearing on the Motion for Withdrawal on January 6, 2023 and granted the motion on January 20, 2023. ECF No. 49. The Court then held a status conference by video on February 6, 2023 and gave Plaintiff until March 6, 2023 to retain counsel or proceed pro se. ECF No. 51. Plaintiff successfully retained the assistance of the Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance Clinic, which entered a limited appearance on March 8, 2023 for the purpose of “responding to and preparing written discovery requests ...”. ECF No. 52, PageID.448.

After Plaintiff was again represented by counsel, the parties agreed to, and the Court entered, a Stipulated Order to Extend Scheduling Order Dates on March 21, 2023. ECF No. 53. This Order gave Plaintiff until April 3, 2023 to serve responses to Defendants' October 6, 2022 written discovery requests. Id. at PageID.451. With assistance from the Clinic, Plaintiff timely served his written discovery responses on April 3, 2023.

*2 The parties did not correspond again until May 4, 2023, when Defendants' counsel sent Plaintiff's counsel a letter outlining asserted deficiencies in Plaintiff's discovery responses. ECF No. 55-4, PageID.534-538. Plaintiff's counsel responded to the deficiency letter the next day, indicating that she would review the letter and hopefully be prepared to discuss Defendants' concerns the following week. ECF No. 62-3, PageID.772. The parties then scheduled and held a call to discuss Plaintiff's alleged discovery deficiencies on May 24, 2023, but the parties were unable to resolve their differences.[2] This would be the last call, as Defendants requested that any further responses be made in writing. ECF No. 55, PageID.465.[3]

On May 31, 2023, Plaintiff's counsel emailed Defendants' counsel with an update regarding Defendants' requested written deficiency letter response. ECF No. 62-6, PageID.778. Defendants' counsel stated in response that Defendants would be filing another motion to compel discovery, the instant motion, the following day. ECF No. 62-2, PageID.770. Defendants filed their Motion for Dismissal and Other Sanctions on June 2, 2023 and have asked that this Court dismiss Plaintiff's action for failure to adequately provide discovery responses.[4] The Court considers this Motion below.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a court to dismiss an action where a party fails to obey discovery orders and where a plaintiff fails to comply with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v), 41(b). Dismissal is a severe sanction “that may be imposed only if the court concludes that a party's failure to cooperate in discovery is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Peltz v. Moretti, 292 F. App'x 475, 478 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Reg'l Refuse Sys. v. Inland Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d 150, 153-54 (6th Cir. 1988)). Even though dismissal may be granted to punish a party for intentionally obstructing discovery, “justice requires that any sanction be imposed proportionate to the circumstances.” Clark v. Abdallah, No. 21-10001, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38788, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 8, 2023) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Motors v. Bill Davis Racing, Inc., No. CIV.A. 03-72265, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38162, 2005 WL 3502172, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2005)).

“ ‘District courts have discretion to limit the scope of discovery when the information sought is overbroad or unduly burdensome. ’The district court ‘may limit the scope of discovery ‘proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.’ ” Glob. Tech. v. Ningbo Swell Indus., No. 19-10934, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226225, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 27, 2021) (quoting Fears v. Kasich (In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig.), 845 F.3d 231, 236 (6th Cir. 2016)).

The Court considers four factors when determining whether a party's discovery violations warrant dismissal: (1) whether the party's failure is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault; (2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by the non-compliant party's conduct; (3) whether the non-compliant party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered. See Marsh v. Rhodes, No. 17-1211, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 25354, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2017). The Court applies these factors in considering Defendants' Motion below.

A. Plaintiff's Delay in Serving Responses

*3 As Defendants highlight, the winding history of written discovery in this case begins with Plaintiff's months of delayed responses and missed deadlines. Though Plaintiff is now complying with the amended discovery schedule (ECF No. 53), Defendants contend that the responses he served in April are deficient and are a continuation of his prior dilatory behavior. See ECF No. 55, PageID.484 (“Now, however, Mr. Bell has abused this Court's leniency and has enlisted the Pro Se Clinic to obstruct, rather than cooperate in, discovery.”). The Court disagrees with this characterization and, for the reasons stated below, will not consider Plaintiff's prior discovery misconduct in considering Defendants' requested sanctions.

To start, it is uncontested that Plaintiff repeatedly failed to observe his discovery obligations after Defendants served written discovery requests on October 6, 2022: Plaintiff did not serve the required response by the initial November 7 deadline and, again, did not serve a response by January 5, 2023, as required by Judge Stafford's Order granting Defendants' Motion to Compel (ECF No. 46, PageID.433-434). As Plaintiff reminds the court, his second failure to serve discovery responses occurred while his former counsel's Motion for Withdrawal, filed November 14, 2022, had yet been decided. ECF No. 62, PageID.764. However, the Motion for Withdrawal makes clear that prior counsel ended representation because of Plaintiff's failure to cooperate in this litigation. ECF No. 42, PageID.399 (“There has been a breakdown of the attorney-client relationship in that counsel is unable to make contact with the client despite numerous attempts for several weeks.”). Plaintiff has never provided a competing explanation for the breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Thus, even if the then-pending withdrawal motion adequately explains why Plaintiff did not meet his second deadline to serve written discovery responses, it is clear from the record that each lapsed deadline, and the intervening withdrawal by counsel, resulted from Plaintiff's conduct.

The Court, nonetheless, finds that it would be inappropriate at this stage to impose sanctions on Plaintiff for these discovery failures. This does not mean that Plaintiff's repeated delays are taken lightly. Adherence to the discovery schedule is necessary to protect both parties' interests and to protect the integrity of pretrial proceedings. See Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980). However, the Court has already considered Plaintiff's missteps and chosen a course of action. To be sure, the Court was aware of Plaintiff's repeated discovery delays when it held the February 6, 2023 status conference, and it chose not to impose sanctions at that time. Instead, the Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to seek new representation. ECF No. 51. He complied with this directive and appeared at the March 6 conference accompanied by the Pro Se Clinic. ECF No. 52. Further, after the parties agreed to an amended discovery schedule on March 21, 2023 (ECF No. 53), Plaintiff timely served responses to written discovery on April 3, 2023.

In other words, since being given an opportunity to correct his behavior with new counsel, Plaintiff has not neglected his discovery deadlines. Further, the Court finds that there is an insufficient connection between the present dispute over the content of Plaintiff's responses and the dispute over his prior delays to warrant considering the issues collectively. Unlike before he obtained new counsel, Plaintiff is actively participating in the litigation. As such, the Court is not motivated to double-back and impose sanctions for conduct that has already been sufficiently addressed.

*4 Accordingly, the Court will not impose sanctions for, or in consideration of, discovery violations having occurred before Plaintiff received assistance from the Pro Se Clinic.

B. Plaintiff's Objections and Responses

Defendants also take issue with the discovery responses Plaintiff served on April 3, 2023. According to Defendants, Plaintiff (1) waived his right to object to Defendants' discovery request by failing to timely serve responses, (2) improperly admits information to limit the scope of discovery, and (3) submits baseless objections while failing to properly respond to the full scope of Defendants' requests. ECF No. 55, PageID.473-482. The Court takes these arguments in turn below.

First, Plaintiff did not waive his right to object to Defendants' discovery requests by failing to timely serve responses. While it is true generally that “failure to object to discovery requests within the thirty days provided by rules 33 and 34 constitutes a waiver of any objection,” waiver is neither an automatic nor a required sanction. Baker v. City of Trenton, No. 16-12280, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229445, at *8 (E.D. Mich. May 31, 2018) (quoting In re Continental Capital Inv. Services, Inc., 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3853, 2011 WL 4624678 at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2011)). Rather, courts exercise broad discretion when determining whether to enforce the waiver provisions found in Rules 33 and 34. See In re Haynes, 577 B.R. 711, 725 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2017) (citing Sellars v. CRST Expedited, Inc., No. C15-0117, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125026, 2016 WL 4771087, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 13, 2016)). As such, courts have agreed that “[t]he general rule governing responses to written discovery is that an extension of time to respond includes an extension of time to object.” Koenig v. USA Hockey, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-1097, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122809, at *18 (S.D. Ohio June 14, 2010).

Here, Plaintiff did not serve discovery responses within the thirty-day limit imposed by Rules 33 and 34. However, this Court subsequently entered the parties' Stipulated Order to Extend Scheduling Order Dates, which permitted Plaintiff to provide discovery responses by April 3, 2023. ECF No. 53, PageID.451. Plaintiff met this deadline. Accordingly, the extension to serve responses also extended Plaintiff's time to serve objections.

The Court has been given no reason to find differently. Defendants did not make their waiver argument in their first Motion to Compel Discovery (ECF No. 43), which they filed prior to the stipulated extension. Nor did the parties agree as a condition of the extension that Plaintiff's right to object would be waived. See Koenig v. USA Hockey, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-1097, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122809, at *18 (S.D. Ohio June 14, 2010) (No waiver where there was no clear correspondence that “if USA Hockey were granted an extension, it would waive any objection to the discovery.”). Thus, the Court finds that the parties entered the stipulation with the understanding that Plaintiff was retaining his right to object.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff timely served responses to Defendants' discovery requests under the amended discovery schedule (ECF No. 53), he did not waive his right to object to the requests.[5]

*5 Defendants next argue that Plaintiff abused the discovery process when he “prefaced his answers to interrogatories with ‘admissions’ that demonstrate his responses are neither ‘formed after a reasonable inquiry,’ nor are they ‘correct and complete’ as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(A).” ECF No. 55, PageID.473. Plaintiff argues in response that his admissions are an effort to limit his damage claims and that limits “necessarily affect the scope of discovery.” ECF No. 62, PageID.752. Having considered these arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiff was justified in attempting to stipulate to facts to limit the discovery burden. But Plaintiff may not limit discovery unilaterally.

To start, Plaintiff did not violate the discovery rules when he attempted to stipulate to (or admit) facts for the purpose of limiting the scope of discovery. Doing so is expressly permitted by Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 (“Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may stipulate that ... (b) other procedures governing or limit discovery be modified ...”). In fact, Courts “often encourage parties to ‘stipulate to any relevant disputed facts in order to tailor the scope and the need for discovery.’ ” Graff v. Haverhill N. Coke Co., No. 1:09-cv-670, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197665, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2012) (quoting Enkhbayar Choimbol v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 475 F. Supp.2d 557, 564 (E.D. Va. 2006)).

The Court is guided by the analysis in Graff v. Haverhill N. Coke Co., where the Southern District of Ohio was faced with a substantially similar question. There, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to compel and ordered the defendants to produce previously withheld financial documents. See Graff v. Haverhill N. Coke Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197665, at *7. Rather than produce the documents, the defendants “inferred from [the order] ... the purpose of the requested discovery ... and, in the interest of economy, offered to stipulate that SunCoke was liable for any financial obligations of Haverhill stemming from this lawsuit.” Id. at * 8. Over the plaintiff's motion for sanctions, the court found the defendants' actions permissible given the purpose of the proposed stipulation—to limit the need for unnecessary discovery. Id. at *9. The Graff court thus ruled that “there is no evidence that defendants' failure to provide the financial discovery by the scheduled deadline was due to willfulness or bad faith.” Id.

The Court finds the reasoning in Graff compelling on the instant facts. Like the Graff defendants, Plaintiff did not fully comply with Defendants' discovery request and, instead, attempted to stipulate to certain facts that would limit the damages issues left for discovery and trial. This was permissible. There is no disputing that “stipulations can obviate the need for parties to engage in expensive discovery and can limit the issues presented at trial ...”. Id. at *8 (citing Banks v. Yokemick, 214 F. Supp.2d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that judicial admissions such as stipulations obviate the need for discovery, thus narrowing the scope of discovery and reducing trial time)). This interest should be as compelling to the parties as it is to the Court. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff was not engaged in sanctionable behavior, as it is not clear that he was acting in bad faith or willfully attempting to shirk his discovery obligations.[6]

*6 Nonetheless, Plaintiff may not on his own limit the scope of discovery through a unilateral stipulation. Stipulations are by nature an agreement between the parties. See In re Nicholson Indus., Inc., 73 B.R. 266, 268 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (“A stipulation represents an agreement between the parties to which there has been mutual assent.”). But the Court may limit the scope of discovery in light of the damages Plaintiff intends to pursue. Thus, the Court will analyze Plaintiff's discovery requests considering Plaintiff's self-imposed limitations on damages. Separately, the parties are encouraged to stipulate to facts on which there is no dispute to streamline this case and limit the issues to be presented at trial. The parties should not waste time with discovery disputes related to claims Plaintiff is not pursuing.

Next, Defendants contend that Plaintiff improperly objects to Defendants' discovery requests and, accordingly, improperly withholds the requested documents and information. Plaintiff argues generally that Defendants' requests are neither relevant nor proportional to the claims in this case or the damages Plaintiff is seeking. The Court considers the parties' arguments below.

Defendants seek information related to whether Plaintiff has been “investigated for, arrested, indicted, or convicted of a crime in the State of Michigan, or in any other state.” This request is overbroad, as it is not limited in time and seeks information that is not “relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Courts in this Circuit have found discovery into a plaintiff's criminal history permissible where the “allegation[ ] puts Plaintiff's criminal history at issue ...”. White v. City of Grand Rapids, No. 1:19-cv-877, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 270197, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 1, 2020). Plaintiff here claims only that a traffic stop resulting from his invalid license plate resulted in an arrest during which officers used excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights. ECF No. 21. These allegations do not put Plaintiff's own criminal history at issue, and his criminal history does not become relevant simply because he seeks emotional distress damages.

Accordingly, the Court will not compel discovery beyond what Plaintiff has provided.

According to Defendants, “Plaintiff refuses to provide a complete medical history for the preceding 15 years because he is limiting his injuries to those sustained and treated for the day of the incident.” ECF No. 55, PageID.478. For example, Plaintiff objects to the relevance and proportionality of Interrogatory 18, through which Defendants seek Plaintiff's medical records for the prior 15 years, and instead offers records relating to his treatment on the night of the incident and relating to an unrelated ankle injury. ECF No. 55, PageID.469-470. Plaintiff asserts that these limitations are justified “given the limited nature of Mr. Bell's claimed physical injuries, his admission that he has not received mental health treatment in the last fifteen years, and that he now seeks only ‘garden variety’ mental distress damages.” ECF No. 62, PageID.759.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff: Defendants' medical record interrogatories and requests for production are overbroad in time and scope. First, Defendants are incorrect that Plaintiff has opened the door to broad discovery into his medical history. See ECF No. 55, PageID.478. Plaintiff makes clear that he only seeks damages for the “treatment he received for his injuries through the June 23, 2019 emergency room visit to Ascension Providence in Southfield.” ECF No. 55, PageID.466. Because Defendants simply wish to “probe the extent of injuries [Plaintiff] now claims were caused by Defendants,” Defendants are only entitled to discovery of records reflecting Plaintiff's medical condition at time he was seen and treated. See Hunt v. Frank, No. 1:20-CV-00035-GNS-HBB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223777, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 30, 2020) (similarly limiting medical records discovery where the defendant only articulated relevance as to the plaintiff's medical condition “at the time of and immediately following” the incident). Accordingly, the Court will not compel discovery beyond what Plaintiff has already provided.

*7 Further, Defendants are not entitled to 15 years of mental health records where Plaintiff is seeking “garden variety” emotional distress damages. See ECF No 62, PageID.748 (“Mr. Bell will be seeking non-economic damages, as allowed by law, including but not limited to pain, suffering, humiliation, outrage and embarrassment caused by the incident.”). On this issue, “[t]he majority of courts have held that plaintiffs do not place their mental condition in controversy merely by claiming damages for mental anguish or ‘garden variety’ emotional distress.” Gaines-Hanna v. Farmington Pub. Schs, No. 04-CV-74910-DT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21506, at *32 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 7, 2006) (quoting Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 553 (N. D. Ga. 2001)). Plaintiff offers that he has not sought mental health treatment in the last 10 years, has not sought such treatment for the incident in question, and is not seeking damages for such treatment now or in the future. Id. Plaintiff has thus not placed his mental condition at issue. Butler v. Rue 21, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-9, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42392, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 19, 2011) (“[A] plaintiff who merely claims she has suffered the sort of damages that would ordinarily flow from the alleged wrong has not placed her actual mental condition at issue.”). With damages limited only to garden variety mental distress, Defendants cannot justify seeking such broad discovery.

For these reasons, the Court will not compel mental health discovery or medical history discovery beyond the preceding five years of records that Plaintiff has provided. The Court will also not compel discovery “for any social services or government benefits,” as this request it outside of the scope of the injuries claimed.

C. Sanctions

Both parties ask the Court to impose sanctions on the other for asserted discovery violations. Defendants seek dismissal (ECF No 55, PageID.483), and both parties seek expenses related to briefing this Motion. See Id. at PageID.485; ECF No. 62, PageID.765. The Court denies both parties' requests.

First, the Court will not grant Defendants' Motion for dismissal. Given the Court's rulings on this motion, there is no evidence that Plaintiff's discovery objections and responses have prejudiced Defendants or that the asserted violations were due to willfulness or bad faith. See Marsh v. Rhodes, No. 17-1211, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 25354, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2017). Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff's objections and limitations to his discovery responses were substantially justified under Rule 37(d)(3). Finally, given the contentious history of discovery in the case, the Court will not award fees and costs to Plaintiff's counsel for the time spent responding to this Motion.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Dismissal and Other Sanctions [#55] is DENIED. Plaintiff's counsel will serve signed objections to Defendants' discovery requests no more than 7 days from the entry of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.