*1 Presently before the Court are Defendants Naval Criminal Investigative Service, U.S. Department of the Navy, and U.S. Department of Defense's (together, “NCIS” or “Defendants”) Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 56, “Defs.’ MSJ”) and Revised Vaughn Index (ECF No. 56-2, “Vaughn Index”) and Plaintiffs Will Huntsberry and the Voice of San Diego’s (together, “Plaintiffs”) Renewed Omnibus Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 57, “Pltfs.’ MSJ”) (together, the “Motions”). Both Motions are opposed and fully briefed according to the schedule set forth by the Court. (See ECF Nos. 58 (“Defs.’ Opp'n”), 59 (“Pltfs.’ Opp'n”).) The Court held a hearing and took the Motions under submission on September 12, 2024. (See ECF No. 60.) Having carefully considered the Parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Renewed Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Undisputed Material Facts

The Parties have agreed to the following undisputed material facts:

“Plaintiff Will Huntsberry filed a [Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552,] request on January 26, 2022, seeking NCIS's investigations into the deaths of 20 individuals who allegedly died by suicide in 2020 and 2021 while serving in the Navy and Marine Corps, in the San Diego area.” (See ECF No. 59-2 (“Jt. Stmt.”) ¶ 1.) Plaintiff Huntsberry, who is a reporter for Plaintiff Voice of San Diego news organization, “identified himself as a member of the media in the request.” (Id.; see also ECF No. 15 (“First Amended Complaint” or “FAC”) ¶¶ 1–2.)

“NCIS responded to Plaintiffs’ FOIA request on February 2, 2022.” (Id. ¶ 2.) In its response, “NCIS stated that its search had yielded no responsive records for two of the 20 individuals.” (Id.) “NCIS explained that 14 of the investigations that Plaintiffs had requested were closed, while four of the investigations were still pending.” (Id.) “NCIS further explained that the 14 closed investigations had not yet been entered into the electronic database at Headquarters (the Records Imaging Management System) for retention.” (Id.) “NCIS stated that, because the records required coordination with another office, Plaintiffs’ request fell within ‘unusual circumstances.’ ” (Id.) “Accordingly, NCIS needed to extend the time limit to respond beyond the 10 additional days provided by the FOIA statute.” (Id.) “NCIS further stated that once coordination was complete, Plaintiffs’ request would be placed in NCIS's routine queue, which was managed on a first-in, first-out basis based on the date of the request, and which at that time had a backlog of approximately 12 to 16 weeks.” (Id.)

“On April 26, 2022, Plaintiff Will Huntsberry wrote to NCIS, asking it to clarify ‘what office currently holds these records and why it is an unusual circumstance’ for NCIS to obtain the records.” (Id. ¶ 3.) “He also asked whether it was possible to appeal the ‘unusual circumstance’ determination.” (Id.)

*2 “On April 27, 2022, NCIS responded, explaining that, ‘in this instance[,] the “unusual circumstances” means that we are waiting for the completed investigations to be submitted to NCIS Headquarters for retention in our Records Management System.’ ” (Id. ¶ 4.) “NCIS explained that ‘[o]nce investigations are closed in the field, they are packaged up and sent via USPS to NCIS Headquarters in Quantico, VA,’ and that ‘[o]nce they have arrived, they are scanned and uploaded into our Records Management System.’ ” (Id.) “NCIS stated that ‘[t]he whole process can take months to complete.’ ” (Id.) “NCIS explained that once the files were made available to the FOIA office, the request ‘will go into our Regular queue, which is managed on a first in/first out bas[i]s.’ ” (Id.) “NCIS also stated that ‘[w]e have advised all offices concerned that there are pending FOIA requests for these files, so that they can expedite their processes.’ ” (Id. ¶ 4.) “NCIS also stated, ‘We could process the CLOSED reports to these investigations. Closed reports are normally around 2 to 3 pages in length. Please advise if you would like us to process the closed reports to these 14 investigations. Electing to receive the closed reports will not prevent you from receiving the full Reports once they are all available.’ ” (Id. ¶ 5.)

“Plaintiffs sued under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. on June 8, 2022.” (Jt. Stmt. ¶ 6; see also generally ECF No. 1.) “Defendants filed a motion to partially dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint on July 11, 2022.” (Jt. Stmt. ¶ 7; see also generally ECF No. 12.)

“Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (‘FAC’), removing references to the four investigations that had not yet closed and the two individuals for whom NCIS had located no investigations.” (Jt. Stmt. ¶ 8; see also generally FAC.) “Accordingly, the FAC focused on fourteen identifiable investigations that had closed.” (Jt. Stmt. ¶ 8.) “Defendants answered the FAC on August 11, 2022.” (Id. ¶ 9; see also generally ECF No. 16.)

“NCIS provided its first release of records in response to Plaintiffs’ FOIA request on August 10, 2022, producing investigations related to the deaths of nine individuals.” (Jt. Stmt. ¶ 10.) NCIS subsequently produced “investigations related to the deaths of three individuals on August 31, 2022,” and “investigations related to the deaths of two individuals on October 11, 2022.” (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.) In its October 11, 2022, production, one of the files “related to the investigation into the death of Xavier Maldonato-Soto.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Those records are no longer at issue. (See ECF No. 51, “Order” at 35.)

Enclosed with each release of records was a cover letter from “Karen Richman of NCIS's Government Information Sharing Unit,” which “stated that the files ‘contain personal identifiers (such as names and social security numbers) of third parties, the release of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’ ” (Id. ¶¶ 10–12). “NCIS therefore partially denied the FOIA request pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).” (Jt. Stmt. ¶¶ 10–12.) “Ms. Richman's cover letter also attached ‘an enclosure explaining the various exemptions of the FOIA,’ including Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C).” (Id. ¶¶ 10–12.)

“NCIS produced the investigative file related to the death of Alberto CJ Sanchez Larson on January 17, 2023, which had been inadvertently omitted from a previous production.” (Id. ¶ 14.) As with the other productions, enclosed with the January 17, 2023, production was a cover letter from Ms. Richman stating that the file “contained personal identifiers (such as names and social security numbers) of third parties, the release of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and that the FOIA request had been “partially denied ... pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).” (Jt. Stmt. ¶ 14.)

“The parties participated in an Early Neutral Evaluation and Case Management Conference on January 4, 2023.” (Id.) “Prior to the ENE, the parties exchanged settlement proposals pursuant to the order of Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo.” (Id.) “Plaintiffs’ December 14, 2022 settlement proposal included a list of items from NCIS's releases whose redaction or withholding Plaintiffs disputed.” (Id.) “Following the ENE, Judge Gallo ordered that ‘[n]o later than Wednesday, February 8, 2023, Defendants shall review and produce all non-exempt documents responsive to Plaintiff's December 14, 2022 settlement proposal and Plaintiff's January 25, 2022 FOIA Request.’ ” (Id.)

*3 “Defendants sent Plaintiffs a Vaughn index on February 3, 2023[,] addressing the disputes Plaintiffs had raised in their December 14, 2022 list.” (Id. ¶ 15.) “Defendants also released four pages from the investigative files with some redactions removed.” (Id.)

“On March 17, 2023, Defendants sent Plaintiffs a ‘Supplemental’ Vaughn index addressing additional disputes Plaintiffs had raised on March 2, 2023.” (Id. ¶ 16.) “Defendants also re-released one page from the August 10, 2022 production with certain redactions removed.” (Id.)

“On March 20, 2023, Plaintiffs sent Defendants a complete list of redactions and withheld files that Plaintiffs disputed.” (Id. ¶ 17.) “On May 22, 2023, Defendants sent Plaintiffs a ‘Second Supplemental’ Vaughn index addressing the complete disputes raised by Plaintiffs on March 20, 2023.” (Id. ¶ 18.) “Defendants also released six PDFs (roughly 15 pages) comprising supplemental releases or removals of redactions from NCIS's previous productions.” (Id.)

II. Relevant Procedural History

The First Amended Complaint alleges a single cause of action for violation of FOIA and seeks injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff Huntsberry's FOIA request for a copy of the investigative files regarding the deaths of the following fourteen U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel:

(FAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs also seek declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs. (See generally FAC Prayer.)

Because discovery is generally unavailable in FOIA cases, see, e.g., Wheeler v. C.I.A., 271 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D.D.C. 2003); see also, e.g., Wiener v. F.B.I., 943 F.2d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 1991), the Court vacated the relevant discovery deadlines. (See ECF No. 27.) The Parties completed an Early Neutral Evaluation with the Honorable William V. Gallo and subsequently appeared before him for a series of joint status conferences. (See generally Docket.)

Unable to resolve their dispute, both Parties moved for summary judgment. (See ECF Nos. 40, 43.) The Court held a hearing on the motions on November 16, 2023, and took the matter under submission. (See ECF No. 50.) On December 15, 2023, the Court issued an Order (1) Granting in Part and Denying Without Prejudice in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (2) Denying Without Prejudice Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and (3) Ordering Defendants to Supplement the Record. (See generally Order.) As relevant here, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the adequacy of their search (see id. at 13) but otherwise denied the motion without prejudice because the Vaughn Index Defendants prepared failed to meet the Ninth Circuit's standards, which prevented the Court from determining whether NCIS's withholdings were appropriate. (See id. at 28–29.) Consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent, the Court granted NCIS leave to prepare a revised supplemental Vaughn Index and supporting declarations addressing the deficiencies identified in the Order. (See id. at 35–36.) The Court further ordered the Parties to engage in robust meet-and-confer efforts within thirty days of NCIS's provision of a supplemental Vaughn Index to resolve entirely or narrow their dispute over the withheld information. (See id.)

*4 Following an extension of NCIS's time to prepare the supplemental Vaughn Index (see ECF Nos. 52, 53), the Parties filed a joint status report in which they represented that Plaintiffs no longer disputed NCIS's application of the exemptions to 45 items on the supplemental Vaughn Index and that the dispute would be limited to the remaining 55 items on the supplemental Vaughn Index. (See ECF No. 54 at 2.) At the Parties’ request, the Court set a briefing schedule for the instant Motions and for filing the revised Vaughn Index, which are now ripe for the Court's review. (See id. at 2–3, ECF No. 55.)

I. Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a party may move for summary judgment as to a claim or defense or part of a claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Although materiality is determined by substantive law, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit ... will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. When considering the evidence presented by the parties, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls on the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party may meet this burden by “identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, ‘it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’ ” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. This requires “more than simply show[ing] that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts’ ” that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Accordingly, the nonmoving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by “rest[ing] upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Where, as here, the parties have filed cross-motions, the court considers each motion “separately, giving the nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” See SEC v. Feng, 935 F.3d 721, 728 (9th Cir. 2019). The Court must “consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and submitted in support of both motions, and in opposition to both motions, before ruling on each of them.” Tulalip Tribes of Wash. v. Washington, 783 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2015).

II. FOIA

*5 “FOIA ‘was enacted to facilitate public access to Government documents.’ ” Lahr v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173, 112 S.Ct. 541, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991)). Accordingly, “[u]pon request, FOIA mandates disclosure of records held by a federal agency” unless disclosure is prohibited by law or the requested records fall within the statute's nine exemptions enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Dep't of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 7–8, 121 S.Ct. 1060, 149 L.Ed.2d 87 (2001) (internal citations omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i).

The nine exemptions to disclosure carved out in FOIA “do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is [FOIA's] dominant objective.” Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976). FOIA's presumption in favor of disclosure means that these exemptions “ ‘are to be interpreted narrowly.’ ” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 973 (quoting Assembly of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1992)). The presumption in favor of disclosure also means that an agency invoking a statutory exemption “bears the burden of demonstrating that the exemption properly applies to the documents.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 973; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). An agency must articulate “tailored reasons” for the application of an exemption in response to a FOIA request. Shannahan v. I.R.S., 672 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2012). Neither boilerplate nor conclusory statements will suffice. Id.

The FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 (“FIA”), which agencies must satisfy for all FOIA requests filed after the bill's June 30, 2016 enactment, P.L. 114-185, 130 Stat. 538 (2016), further clarifies that even where one of the nine exemptions applies, the requested information only may be withheld if “the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption described in subsection (b)[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I); Transgender L. Ctr. v. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 46 F.4th 771, 782 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that, in case involving Exemptions 6 and 7(C), withholding is permissible only where agency reasonably foresees disclosure would harm an interest protected by exemption and only after taking reasonably necessary steps to segregate and release nonexempt information) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)); Ecological Rts. Found. v. U.S. Env't Prot. Agency, 607 F. Supp. 3d 979, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2022), aff'd 2023 WL 4342100 (9th Cir. July 5, 2023) (explaining that FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 “strengthened FOIA's preference for disclosure by requiring that” an “agency seeking to avail itself of an exemption articulate why it is reasonably foreseeable that disclosure would harm an interest protected by the exemption” (internal citation omitted)); Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., 424 F. Supp. 3d 771, 780 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Consequently, even if information falls within the scope of a discretionary exemption, it cannot be withheld from the public unless the agency also shows that disclosure will harm the interest protected by that exemption.”). “Post-FIA, the foreseeable harm standard applies to all exemptions, and is not restricted to” any one exemption. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 780.

Additionally, even when an exemption applies to a document, FOIA requires that any “reasonably segregable portion of a record” be disclosed after the exempted portions of the document are deleted. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “[i]t is reversible error for the district court ‘to simply approve the withholding of an entire document without entering a finding on segregability, or the lack thereof,’ with respect to that document.” Hamdan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 797 F.3d 759, 779 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Wiener, 943 F.2d at 988). Rather, a district court must make a “ ‘specific finding that no information contained in each document or substantial portion of a document withheld is segregable.’ ” Id. (quoting Wiener, 943 F.2d at 988).

*6 The agency asserting the exemption bears the burden of establishing that all reasonably segregable portions of a document have been disclosed. Id. To satisfy this burden, an agency can provide “the district court with a reasonably detailed description of the withheld material and ‘alleg[e] facts sufficient to establish an exemption.’ ” Id. (quoting Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 539 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. FDA, 836 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2016)). While a district court must “take seriously its role as a check on agency discretion,” the court need not engage in “a page-by-page review of an agency's work.” Id.

III. Summary Judgment in FOIA Cases

A federal court reviews an agency's response to a FOIA request de novo. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). “Because facts in FOIA cases are rarely in dispute, most such cases are decided on motions for summary judgment.” Yonemoto v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 686 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Animal Legal Def. Fund, 836 F.3d at 989; see also Our Children's Earth Found. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 85 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“FOIA cases are typically decided on motions for summary judgment.”). “[I]f there are genuine issues of material fact in a FOIA case, the district court should proceed to a bench trial or adversary hearing. Resolution of factual disputes should be through the usual crucible of bench trial or hearing, with evidence subject to scrutiny and witnesses subject to cross-examination.” Animal Legal Def. Fund, 836 F.3d at 990.

For an agency to prevail at summary judgment regarding the application of an exemption, an agency typically must “submit an index and ‘detailed public affidavits’ that, together, ‘identify[ ] the documents withheld, the FOIA exemptions claimed, and a particularized explanation of why each document falls within the claimed exemption.’ ” Yonemoto, 686 F.3d at 688 (quoting Lion Raisins v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Animal Legal Def. Fund, 836 F.3d at 990). The index, also known as a Vaughn index, must “describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemptions, and show that the justifications are not controverted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of [agency] bad faith.” Transgender L. Ctr., 46 F.4th at 781 (quoting Hunt v. C.I.A., 981 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added). Collectively, the agency's Vaughn index and supporting materials must be “detailed enough for the district court to make a de novo assessment of the government's claim of exemption.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 989 (quoting Lion Raisins, 354 F.3d at 1082).

An agency's FOIA affidavits, such as the Vaughn index, “are presumed to be in good faith,” Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 772, and should be accorded “substantial weight,” Shannahan, 672 F.3d at 1148. Indeed, courts may rely entirely on government affidavits “so long as the affiants are knowledgeable about the information sought and the affidavits are detailed enough to allow the court to make an independent assessment of the government's claim.” Lane v. Dep't of the Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lion Raisins, 354 F.3d at 1079). Provided the affidavits “contain reasonably detailed descriptions of the documents and allege facts sufficient to establish an exemption, ‘the district court need look no further.’ ” Lewis v. I.R.S., 823 F.2d 375, 378 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Animal Legal Def. Fund, 836 F.3d at 990).

*7 A court may grant partial summary judgment where an exemption was properly applied to some, but not all, of the records. See Nat'l Archives & Recs. Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 175, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004) (identifying district court's grant of partial summary judgment on claims of exemption as “the correct approach”); see, e.g., Trucept, Inc. v. U.S. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 15-cv-447, 2017 WL 2869531, at *6–9 (S.D. Cal. July 5, 2017) (deferring summary judgment as to documents withheld pursuant to exemptions 3, 6, and 7(c); granting partial summary judgment as to four pages of documents withheld pursuant to exemption 5, three pages pursuant to exemption 7(A), and forty pages pursuant to exemption 7(D); and denying as to nine pages pursuant to 7(E)).

Through the instant Motions, Plaintiffs and Defendants each seek summary judgment in their favor as to Plaintiffs’ FOIA claim. (See Pltfs.’ MSJ at 1–2; Defs.’ MSJ at 1–2.) Alternatively, to the extent the Court concludes NCIS has improperly withheld any records, or portions thereof, Defendants seek partial summary judgment as to those records the Court finds have been withheld properly pursuant to an exemption. (Defs.’ MSJ at 13.) NCIS's revised Vaughn Index reflects that 56 items remain in dispute pertaining to the following deceased U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel:

(See generally Vaughn Index.) Accordingly, it appears that Plaintiffs are abandoning their claims related to: (1) Kellen Steven Watelet, U.S. Navy; (2) Emilea Elayna Johnson, U.S. Navy; (3) Tyson Barry Brown, U.S.M.C.; (4) Victor Ramon Figueroa, U.S.M.C.; and (5) Angel Antonio Bielostozky, U.S.M.C. (Compare id. with FAC ¶ 7.) For purposes of this action, the Court considers the absence of these individuals from the revised Vaughn Index as a judicial admission that Plaintiffs are no longer pursuing their FOIA claims based on documents pertaining to these individuals. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 17-cv-2477, 2023 WL 2667757, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023).

Because the Court previously granted summary judgment for Defendants as to the adequacy of their search for responsive records (see Order at 13), the Court first identifies the applicable exemptions, Exemptions 6 and 7(C), and the privacy interests at stake, and then considers the adequacy of NCIS's supplemental Vaughn Index and supporting declarations. Provided there is an adequate factual basis for the Court's review of NCIS's application of the FOIA exemptions, the Court then turns to the applicable FOIA exemptions and examines whether NCIS has met its burden of demonstrating nontrivial privacy interests in the withheld information. Finally, the Court considers whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated a significant public interest in the withheld information and balances the private interests against the public interests.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Renewed Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Exemptions 7(C) and 6

FOIA sets forth nine exemptions that permit an agency to withhold information in response to a FOIA request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). These exemptions “reflect a recognition that ‘legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by release of certain types of information.’ ” Am. C.L. Union of N. Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 880 F.3d 473, 483 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152, 110 S.Ct. 471, 107 L.Ed.2d 462 (1989)). Defendants must prove that the withheld information falls within each of the FOIA exemptions applied. Lahr, 569 F.3d at 973; 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).

*8 Here, Defendants have applied the same two exemptions to each of the 56 entries in the Vaughn Index that were either partially redacted or withheld in full: Exemptions 7(C) and 6. (See Vaughn Index at 1); ECF No. 56-1 (“Richman Decl.”) ¶ 5.) Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that they properly redacted and withheld production of records pursuant to these exemptions. (Defs.’ MSJ at 5.) Plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment on the grounds that Defendants improperly applied these exemptions and further request that the court conduct an in camera review of the five records on the Vaughn Index that have been withheld in full. (See Pltfs.’ MSJ at 2–3.)

FOIA Exemption 7(C) protects from disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” to the extent that their disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Exemption 6 applies to “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).

Both exemptions “speak of an ‘unwarranted’ invasion of personal privacy, not any invasion.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 973. Therefore, to determine whether a record properly has been withheld pursuant to either exemption, “[the court] must balance the privacy interest protected by the exemptions against the public interest in government openness that would be served by disclosure.” Id.

While Exemptions 7(C) and 6 are similar, however, the two provisions command different analyses, as “Exemption 7(C)’s privacy language is broader than the comparable language in Exemption 6 in two respects.” U.S. Dep't of Just. v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989). First, Exemption 6 “requires that the invasion of privacy be ‘clearly unwarranted,’ a requirement omitted from the language of Exemption 7(C).” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 974 (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756, 109 S.Ct. 1468) (emphasis in original). Second, while Exemption 7(C) prevents disclosure of information that “could reasonably be expected to constitute” an unwarranted invasion of privacy, Exemption 6 restricts disclosure of information that “would constitute” an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Id. (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 755–56, 109 S.Ct. 1468).

Exemption 7(C), therefore, is more protective of privacy interests than Exemption 6, as the “threatened invasion” of privacy “need not be as likely as where personnel, medical, or similar files are at issue (Exemption 6).” Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Buckovetz v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, No. 14-cv-2115, 2016 WL 4801335, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) (“Exemption 7(C) is similar to, but broader than, Exemption 6.”); Ray, 502 U.S. at 172, 112 S.Ct. 541 (“[T]he Government's burden in establishing the requisite invasion of privacy to support an Exemption 6 claim is heavier than the standard applicable to Exemption 7(C).”); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (“[T]he standard for evaluating a threatened invasion of privacy interests resulting from the disclosure of records compiled for law enforcement purposes is somewhat broader than the standard applicable to personnel, medical, and similar files.”). Further, “although both exemptions require the court to engage in a similar balancing analysis, they ‘differ in the magnitude of the public interest that is required to override the respective privacy interests protected by the exemptions.’ ” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 974 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 496 n.6, 114 S.Ct. 1006, 127 L.Ed.2d 325 (1994)). Where the government has established that a nontrivial privacy interest is at stake, “Exemption 7(C) requires a somewhat higher showing of public interest to overcome it than does Exemption 6.” Yonemoto, 686 F.3d at 693 n.7.

*9 The Court previously determined that all the records at issue were compiled for law enforcement purposes—a conclusion Plaintiffs do not challenge. (See Order at 15 (noting Plaintiffs’ concession of issue); see also generally Pltfs.’ MSJ.) Accordingly, the lower threshold for Exemption 7(C) governs. See Lahr, 569 F.3d at 974 (applying Exemption 7(C) standard where government claimed both Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C) for disputed redactions); Hunt, 972 F.2d at 288 (applying Exemption 7(C) where parties conceded file was compiled for law enforcement purposes). To determine whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the applicability of Exemption 7(C), the Court must evaluate the Vaughn Index and submitted affidavit attached to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Unless otherwise rebutted, the affidavit is accorded substantial weight and entitled to a presumption of good faith and will carry Defendants’ burden if sufficient detail is included to permit the Court to conclude that the withheld information “logically falls” within the claimed exemption. Transgender L. Ctr. v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 33 F.4th 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022).

II. The Adequacy of the Vaughn Index

Before undertaking the balancing test required by Exemption 7(C), the Court first considers the adequacy of the revised Vaughn Index. In its prior Order, the Court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because the initial Vaughn index and supporting declarations were insufficiently detailed to permit Plaintiffs to challenge, or the Court to evaluate, NCIS's application of the exemptions to the withheld information. (See Order at 17–29.) To satisfy their burden under FOIA, Defendants explain that they have modeled the revised Vaughn Index after the Environmental Protection Agency's Vaughn index in Ecological Rights Foundation v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which the Court previously identified in its Order as having been approved by the Ninth Circuit. (Defs.’ MSJ at 3; see also Order at 27–28.) In their renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs appear only to challenge the adequacy of the revised Vaughn Index and Richman Declaration with respect to the segregability of the five withheld records, which the Court addresses separately below.

Following NCIS's substantial revisions, the Court finds it appropriate to take NCIS's Vaughn index at “face value,” as to all but the five records that have been withheld in full. On the whole, the Vaughn Index now contains sufficiently specific, detailed entries for the Court to perform the balancing test under Exemption 7(C). Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 779. Indeed, with the benefit of the more detailed explanations and the Court's guidance, the Parties independently have halved the number of items in dispute. (See Vaughn Index; Defs.’ MSJ at 3–4; Pltfs.’ MSJ at 2.) There is also “ample evidence” that NCIS has “acted in good faith in its dealings” by undertaking multiple reviews of the materials to be released, as Plaintiffs acknowledge. Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 779; (see Defs.’ MSJ at 2 n.2 (incorporating by reference Ms. Richman's earlier declarations, ECF Nos. 40-1, 45-1); ECF No. 40-1 at ¶¶ 33, 36, 41, 45, 51 (describing multiple rounds of review).)

III. Segregability/Plaintiffs’ Request for in Camera Review

FOIA requires that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this section.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The Court therefore must make segregability findings as to the withheld documents. Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 779; Wiener, 943 F.2d at 988 (explaining that a district court errs “by failing to make specific findings on the issue of segregability”). In their Renewed Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants still have not met their burden on the issue of segregability and urge the Court to conduct an in camera review of the five records that have been withheld entirely. (See Pltfs.’ MSJ at 19–22.)

Under FOIA, the Court may conduct an in camera review of the records in its discretion to determine whether exemptions have been properly asserted. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). “[T]he burden is on the agency to sustain its action.” Id. In camera inspection should “not be resorted to lightly.” Lewis, 823 F.2d at 378. As set forth above, (see Order supra at 12), “[t]o meet its burden, the agency must offer oral testimony or affidavits that are ‘detailed enough for the district court to make a de novo assessment of the government's claim of exemption.’ ” Maricopa Audubon Soc'y, 108 F.3d at 1092 (internal citation omitted). Courts should “only” rely on in camera review of the materials at issue when the “affidavits and oral testimony cannot provide a sufficient basis for a decision ....” Id.; see also Lion Raisins, 354 F.3d at 1079 (“In camera inspection of documents is disfavored, however, where the government sustains its burden of proof by way of its testimony or affidavits.”). In making a segregability determination, a district court is not required to “conduct a page-by-page review of an agency's work” and need not conduct an in camera review of each withholding “unless an agency declaration lacks sufficient detail or bears some indicia of bad faith by the agency.” Hamdan, 797 F.3d at 779.

*10 Stated more simply, if the Court finds that the government affidavits are “too generalized,” the Court may examine the disputed documents in camera to make a “first-hand determination of their exempt status.” Lewis, 823 F.2d at 378. “In camera review of the withheld documents by the court is not an acceptable substitute for an adequate Vaughn Index,” however, because the Court's review “does not permit effective advocacy.” Wiener, 943 F.2d at 979; see also Church of Scientology, 611 F.2d at 743. It may, nonetheless, be appropriate when the “preferred alternative to in camera review—government testimony and detailed affidavits—has first failed to provide a sufficient basis for a decision.” Pollard v. FBI, 705 F.2d 1151, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 1983).

Here, Defendants have withheld five records entirely “[b]ecause the withheld pages consist of exempt images” and “no segregable non-exempt material (e.g., white background space) would be meaningful.” (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 18, 19, 38, 43, 53; see also Richman Decl.; ECF No. 58-3 (“Supp. Richman Decl.”).) As the Court indicated at the hearing, the Court found that in camera review of the five withheld records was appropriate in this case and GRANTED Plaintiffs’ request for in camera review. (See ECF No. 60.) The Court now has conducted a thorough in camera review and concludes that Defendants properly applied Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to the withheld materials for the reasons set forth below.

IV. The Privacy Interests at Stake

As set forth above, Exemption 7(C) calls for a balancing of private interests against public interests. Lahr, 569 F.3d at 973. The Court first must “evaluate the personal privacy interest at stake to ensure that disclosure implicates a personal privacy interest that is nontrivial or more than de minimis.” Cameranesi v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 856 F.3d 626, 637 (9th Cir. 2017). To this end, “[a] showing that the interest is more than de minimis will suffice.” Id. at 638.

In evaluating the privacy interests at stake, the Supreme Court has underscored that “the concept of personal privacy under Exemption 7(C) is not some limited or cramped notion of that idea.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 165, 124 S.Ct. 1570. “Instead, personal privacy interests encompass a broad range of concerns relating to an ‘individual's control of information concerning his or her person,’ and an ‘interest in keeping personal facts away from the public eye.’ ” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 974 (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763, 769, 109 S.Ct. 1468); see also Cameranesi, 856 F.3d at 638 (“Rather, a disclosure implicates personal privacy if it affects either ‘the individual's control of information concerning his or her person’ or constitutes a ‘public intrusion long deemed impermissible under the common law and in our cultural traditions.’ ” (internal citations omitted)). Under Exemption 6, which is relevant in construing Exemption 7(C),[1] disclosures that “would subject individuals to possible embarrassment, harassment, or the risk of mistreatment” are considered nontrivial. Cameranesi, 856 F.3d at 638.

Here, Ms. Richman explains that NCIS applied Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to protect the privacy interests of three types of people: (1) the deceased servicemembers, (2) their surviving next of kin and family members, and (3) third parties. (See Richman Decl. ¶¶ 9–10.) NCIS has asserted these privacy interests with respect to twelve categories of records: (1) mental health information; (2) medical information; (3) toxicology results; (4) intimate/sexual information; (5) arrest/law enforcement information; (6) substance use information; (7) performance evaluation; (8) disciplinary record information; (9) suicide note/journal entries; (10) images/screenshots; (11) webs searches; and (12) internet use/social media information. (Richman Decl. ¶ 7.) Many items on the Vaughn Index fall into more than one of these categories. (See generally Vaughn Index.) Below, the Court groups these twelve categories into five broader categories, evaluates the privacy interests asserted with respect to the five categories, and balances any nontrivial privacy interests against the public interest in disclosure.

*11 Defendants have categorized twenty of the items in the Vaughn Index as pertaining to private “mental health information,” which “may identify a specific mental health condition or struggle of the deceased servicemember, or may relay specific treatment information directly from their mental health records.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 11; see also ¶ 7.) As to these twenty records, Defendants variously assert privacy interests on behalf of the deceased individuals, their families, and third parties. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 4, 10–15, 20–24, 26–27, 30–33, 53, 56.)

Defendants also have categorized twenty-two of the items in the Vaughn Index as pertaining to “medical information,” which “may identify a specific medical condition of the deceased servicemember, or may relay specific information directly from their medical records.” (Id. ¶ 12; see also ¶ 7.) As to these twenty-two records, Defendants again variously assert privacy interests on behalf of the deceased individuals, their families, and third parties. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 5, 12, 15, 20–24, 26–28, 30–32, 34–35, 40, 47–50, 52.)

Finally, a further seven items “contain specific toxicology results from the decedent's autopsy or postmortem examination.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 13.) As to these seven records, Defendants have asserted privacy interests on behalf of the deceased servicemembers and their families. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 1, 6, 36–37, 45–46, 50.)

“[T]he death of the subject of personal information does diminish to some extent the privacy interest in that information, though it by no means extinguishes that interest; one's own ... interest in privacy ordinarily extends beyond one's death.” Schrecker v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 254 F.3d 162, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “The fact of death, therefore, while not requiring the release of information, is a relevant factor to be taken into account in the balancing decision whether to release information.” Id. The outer bounds of a deceased individual's diminished privacy interests are still developing, and there are few cases that reach the question. See, e.g., Wessler v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 381 F. Supp. 3d 253, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (concluding decedents had cognizable privacy interest in their own medical records that, though “greatly diminished,” was not extinguished and “presumably remains more than de minimis”); Fiduccia v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 185 F.3d 1035, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e need not decide whether ... people are entitled to protection of their reputations under the ‘unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ exemption from law enforcement disclosures after they die.”).

Courts have recognized that deceased individuals have “a continuing privacy interest in their sensitive medical data[.]” Am. Civ. Lib. Union Found. S. Cal. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, 2024 WL 3370532, at *12 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2024); see also Wessler, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (“Medical records most certainly implicate a protected privacy interest[.]”). Indeed, Exemption 6 expressly carves out “medical files” as being exempt from disclosure if their release “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).

The Court has no trouble in finding that the deceased servicemembers retain a privacy interest in their medical history records and mental health treatment records that, while diminished, is greater than de minimis. See Am. Civ. Lib. Union Found. S. Cal., ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2024 WL 3370532, at *13 (finding decedent had non-trivial privacy interest in information regarding how decedent contracted HIV); Wessler, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 259 (finding decedents retained privacy interest in their own medical and autopsy records). These same privacy interests necessarily extend to summaries of treatment records and interviews with medical personnel describing the treatment a deceased servicemember received. Similarly, the Court finds that the deceased servicemembers retain a privacy interest in their toxicology results, which analyses were conducted in conjunction with final life-saving treatments or their autopsies. See Am. Civ. Lib. Union Found. S. Cal., ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2024 WL 3370532, at *13; Wessler, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 259. Thus, Defendants have shown that the deceased servicemembers have nontrivial privacy interests in Vaughn Nos. 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 40, 47, 49, and 50 and that it is reasonably foreseeable that those interests may be invaded by the disclosure of the information contained in those records.

*12 Many of the remaining records in this broader category summarize interviews with the deceased servicemembers’ friends, family members, partners, colleagues, and commanding officers or summarize law enforcement records connected with the deceased servicemembers. (See generally Vaughn Index.) During the course of the death investigations, these individuals disclosed—or NCIS obtained records from these sources disclosing—information about the decedents’ medical and mental health histories. Similarly, one record contains the decedent's own “answers to questions for a Medical History Provider Interview” that were provided prior to active service.[2] (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 5.)

Ms. Richman avers generally in her Declaration that “individuals have a personal privacy interest in these [twelve] categories of information and normally would not desire them to be disseminated to the public for the sake of their own reputation and peace of mind.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 9.) Releasing the disputed items “would harm that privacy interest, which does not terminate upon death.” (Id.) She further notes that releasing this information “can cause embarrassment, shame, reputational harm, and could cause other servicemembers to be chilled from seeking treatment out of fear their information will be released as well.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 30.)

Plaintiffs respond that the decedents’ privacy interests are diminished by their deaths and point to a recent decision from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Biear v. U.S. Dep't of Just., No. 14-cv-1488, 2023 WL 4868443 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2023), aff'd 2024 WL 837039 (3d Cir. 2024). (See Pltfs.’ MSJ at 10.) In Biear, the plaintiff submitted FOIA requests to various federal agencies for documents containing his own name. Id. at *1. The FBI produced documents pursuant to the requests, but, as relevant here, redacted information pertaining to deceased individuals based on the decedents’ own privacy interests. Id. at *8. The Biear court concluded, based on Third Circuit precedent, that the deceased third parties whose names appeared in the records had no privacy interests whatsoever. Id. (citing Frankenberry v. F.B.I., 567 Fed. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2014)). As a result, the court ordered the FBI to remove redactions from “interviews, statements, and writings of these now-deceased individuals ... except to the extent they discuss other individuals whose privacy rights are subject to invasion.” Id. at *9. Similarly, the court found that references to the deceased individuals “contained in statements made by other individuals are not exempted under 6/7(C), except to the extent those references would ‘reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion’ of another individual's privacy.’ ” Id. at *10 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)).

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Biear is misplaced for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs are not in the Third Circuit and have identified no binding Ninth Circuit precedent holding that deceased individuals lack any privacy interests under FOIA. Second, Plaintiffs themselves do not even advance the position that the deceased servicemembers have no privacy interests in the records at issue here. (See generally Pltfs.’ MSJ at 8–13 (arguing decedents have “diminished” interests only).) And third, as best the Court can determine from its own research, the other two Circuits to have considered the issue have recognized that exemption 7(C) protects the personal privacy interests of deceased individuals to some degree. See Sikes v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 896 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The Supreme Court has held that such exemption protects the personal privacy of both the person to whom the information pertains as well as his family[.]” (citing Favish, 541 U.S. at 171, 124 S.Ct. 1570)); Schrecker, 254 F.3d at 166 (“[T]he death of the subject of personal information does diminish to some extent the privacy interest in that information, though it by no means extinguishes that interest; one's own ... interest in privacy ordinarily extends beyond one's death.”); see also Am. Civ. Lib. Union v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 750 F.3d 927, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (same). In the absence of guidance from the Ninth Circuit, the Court presumes that the appellate court would follow the weight of Circuit authority.

*13 Thus, in considering whether the records summarizing third-party interviews and third-party investigations that mentioned the decedents’ medical history or mental health history, the Court is mindful that Exemption 7(C) protects from disclosure information that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Further, courts “must also account for the fact that certain reputation interests” survive death. Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 1998). NCIS sufficiently explains in the Vaughn Index that disclosure of such information pertaining to the deceased servicemembers’ medical treatments and mental health struggles, including suicide attempts and suicidal ideation, “would violate the expected privacy interests of the deceased.” (See, e.g., Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 10; see also Vaughn No. 23 (“There is a substantial privacy interest in medical treatment sought or received, and release of that information would compromise the expected privacy interest in personal medical, mental health, and substance use-related records.”); Vaughn No. 33 (“The decedent retains a reputational privacy interest in not having stigmatizing or embarrassing information publicly released.”).)

The Court agrees that, although these interview and investigation summaries are not themselves medical records, the deceased servicemembers retain “a measurable privacy interest” in information concerning their medical histories and mental health struggles because such information is of the type “that a person ordinarily would not wish to make known about himself or herself.” See Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Dep't of Def., 453 F. Supp. 3d 508, 517 (D. Conn. 2020) (quoting Associated Press v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 554 F.3d 274, 292 (2d Cir. 2009)) (finding deceased veterans retained privacy interest in “bioassay records including data-entry sheets and spreadsheets reflecting the analysis of their urine samples taken to measure the plutonium contamination levels in their bodies”); see also Am. Civ. Lib. Union Found. S. Cal., ––– F. Supp. 3d at –––– – ––––, 2024 WL 3370532, at *12–13 (finding public disclosure of decedent's HIV status and third cause of death supported finding trivial privacy interest in that information but concluding decedent retained nontrivial privacy interest in information about how decedent contracted HIV and why defendants failed to screen decedent for HIV). Defendants, therefore, also have shown that the deceased servicemembers have nontrivial privacy interests in Vaughn Nos. 1, 4–6, 10, 13–15, 23–24, 28, 33, 36–37, 45–46, 48, 50, 52, 53, and 56 and that it is reasonably foreseeable that those interests may be invaded by the disclosure of the information contained in those records.

Courts have recognized that decedents’ surviving family members likewise have protected privacy interests. See, e.g., Favish, 541 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 1570. In Favish, the FOIA requester sought pictures from the investigation into the suicide of Vincent Foster, Jr., deputy counsel to President Clinton. Id. at 160–61, 124 S.Ct. 1570. The government agencies involved refused to produce the pictures pursuant to Exemption 7(C). Id. at 161, 124 S.Ct. 1570. In construing the language of Exemption 7(C), the Court concluded that the exemption is “intended to permit family members to assert their own privacy rights against public intrusions long deemed impermissible under the common law and in our cultural traditions.” Id. at 167, 124 S.Ct. 1570. As the Court explained, “family members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord the deceased person who was once their own.” Id. at 168, 124 S.Ct. 1570. However, the Court acknowledged that this conclusion “does not mean that the family is in the same position as the individual who is the subject of the disclosure.” Id. The Supreme Court went on to say, nevertheless, that it had “little difficulty” in finding that family members have a “right to direct and control disposition of the body of the deceased and to limit attempts to exploit pictures of the deceased family member's remains for public purposes.” Id. Therefore, the Court held that “FOIA recognizes surviving family members’ rights to personal privacy with respect to their close relative's death-scene images” and concluded that the family's privacy interests outweighed the relevant public interest. Id. at 170–73, 124 S.Ct. 1570.

*14 Courts likewise have recognized that surviving family members have cognizable privacy interests in the medical records and autopsy reports of their close relatives. See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 517–18 (“Because of the nature of the information that would be disclosed about them, the survivors of deceased veterans have a more than de minimis privacy interest in their family medical histories.”); Wolk Law Firm v. U.S.A. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 392 F. Supp. 3d 514, 527 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (concluding agency properly withheld “death scene photographs, autopsy reports, and medical case reviews” under Exemption 6 in light of the “strong privacy interests of the deceased and the relatives of the deceased”); Wessler, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 259 (“[T]he decedents’ family members have a privacy interest in the medical and autopsy records at issue here, even if the records do not depict graphic death scenes, as in Favish.”); see also Schrecker, 254 F.3d at 166 (“[O]ne's own and one's relations’ interests in privacy ordinarily extend beyond one's death.”); Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 194 F.3d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (recognizing surviving family members have privacy interest under Exemption 7(C) in preventing disclosure of their loved ones’ death scene and autopsy photographs); Katz v. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., 862 F. Supp. 476, 485–86 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd 68 F.3d 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding agency properly withheld pursuant to Exemption 6 both x-rays and optical photographs taken during President Kennedy's autopsy because “the Kennedy family has a clear privacy interest in preventing the disclosure” of such materials).

Here, Defendants argue that Favish repeatedly has been applied to uphold the application of FOIA exemptions to comparable records implicating the privacy interests of the deceased servicemembers’ family and next-of-kin. (Defs.’ MSJ at 9.) Defendants further contend that “there is a reasonably foreseeable risk” that the information sought “would be disseminated or sensationalized in the public realm if released, thus causing unnecessary pain and renewed grief for the decedent's family and survivors.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 9.) She points out that “[h]aving a deceased servicemember's sensitive private information or images unwillingly posted online—forever publicly linked to his or her identity by a simple Google search—can and does cause additional anguish and suffering to the family of that servicemember.” (Id. ¶ 4.) “[T]he internet has created a voyeuristic and exploitative marketplace in which unsavory websites sometimes publish the details of gruesome military deaths for prurient interest and monetary gain.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Additionally, “[t]here is also the foreseeable risk that the media will report on or otherwise expose derogatory or stigmatizing information—such as the deceased servicemember's mental health struggles, drug and alcohol history, sexual history, or legal or disciplinary issues—in a way that blames the decedent for their death or results in the family's humiliation in the public eye.” (Id.); see also Lahr, 569 F.3d at 975–76 (“The case law establishes that protection from such unwanted contact facilitated by disclosure of a connection to government operations and investigations is a cognizable privacy interest under Exemptions 6 and 7(C).”).

Plaintiffs counter that other district courts have taken a narrower view of Favish, limiting it to its holding that surviving family members have privacy rights only with respect to “death-scene images,” and finding that family members have minimal privacy interests in preventing the disclosure of anything else. (See Pltfs.’ MSJ at 9.) Because Plaintiffs are “not seeking the disclosure of graphic images,” they reason, “the privacy interests are diminished due to the nature of these investigations and the types of information that Plaintiffs are seeking.” (Id. at 10.) In support of their arguments, Plaintiffs rely on two district court cases: Huddleston v. F.B.I., No. 20-cv-447, 2022 WL 4593084 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2022) and Mobley v. C.I.A., 924 F. Supp. 2d 24, 70 (D.D.C. 2013) aff'd, 806 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Both are distinguishable.

In Huddleston, the plaintiff sought records pertaining to Seth Rich, the Democratic National Committee employee who was killed in a botched robbery in Washington, D.C., and who was speculated to be involved in the release of thousands of DNC emails related to the involvement of Russian hackers in the 2016 election. 2022 WL 4593084, at *1. The FBI withheld the contents of Rich's laptop in its entirety pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. at *22. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas concluded that Favish was limited to privacy interests in “death-scene images” and noted that “courts have generally only expanded a family member's privacy interests to include autopsy reports and audio files of their close relative's final moments.” Id. at *23. For that reason, the court concluded that the decedent's survivors did not have a privacy interest in “withholding the entirety of information contained on Seth Rich's laptop” and found that the FBI had not carried its burden of showing more than a de minimis privacy interest under Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. at *24. The FBI, notably, was unable to confirm the accuracy of the contents of the laptop and speculated that it “may contain information of family (parents and siblings), friends or acquaintances (professional or personal), his favorite music and other material that would reveal details concerning both personal and sensitive relationships[.]” Id. In rejecting the FBI's assertion of survivor privacy interests in the laptop, the court observed that “preventing the public from knowing Seth Rich's favorite band is in no way comparable to releasing his autopsy report or photographs from when he was shot.” Id.

*15 In Mobley, the plaintiffs sought disclosure of the names of deceased foreign law enforcement personnel, which the FBI had withheld pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). 924 F. Supp. 2d at 70. As in Huddleston, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that Favish was limited to its facts but acknowledged that the “D.C. Circuit has repeatedly held that the close relatives of a deceased person retain a certain amount of privacy interests after the decedent has passed away.” Id. The court reasoned that while disclosure of the deceased individual's identity “would almost surely impose a lesser invasion of privacy than the information at issue in Favish,” it still would “impose some unwarranted invasion of personal privacy upon the deceased officer's close relatives.” Id. at 71 (emphasis in original). Because the FBI had established “at least a moderate privacy interest,” while the plaintiff had failed to proffer any public interest that would be served by disclosure, the court granted the FBI summary judgment on its withholding decision. Id.

Here, Plaintiffs are seeking far more than disclosure of mere names, as in Mobley, and Defendants have described sufficiently in the Vaughn Index the specific information at issue and the individuals who would be affected by disclosure, unlike the FBI in Huddleston. Further, the Court in Huddleston conceded that “[w]ith autopsy reports and death-scene photographs, the survivors have a recognized privacy interest because publicly revealing often-gruesome photos of their loved one and intimate details about their loved one's death may cause the survivors ‘additional pain, disruption to peace of mind, additional anguish, or annoyance or harassment.’ ” Huddleston, 2022 WL 4593084, at *23 (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 170, 124 S.Ct. 1570). While Plaintiffs may not be seeking “death-scene images,” as in Favish, they still are seeking the disclosure of intimate information about, for example, the decedents’ medical and mental health diagnoses, (Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 27, 34), and whether an illegal or controlled substance was in the decedents’ bloodstream at their time of death, (Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 1, 36). Indeed, if the family members in Mobley had “at least a moderate privacy interest,” 924 F. Supp. 2d at 71, in preventing disclosure of their deceased loved ones’ names, the family members and next of kin here have a substantially greater interest in preventing the disclosure of their loved ones’ medical information. It requires no stretch of the imagination to conclude that releasing such information “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), as its release could cause “additional anguish” to the surviving family, Katz, 862 F. Supp. at 485. Defendants are also correct that releasing potentially embarrassing and stigmatizing information could result in unwanted attention for the individual's surviving family members. (See Richman Decl. ¶ 9); see also Rollins v. U.S. Dep't of State, 70 F. Supp. 3d 546, 554 (D.D.C. 2014) (recognizing that disclosure of name of third-party decedent “could result in unwanted attention for or harassment of the individual's surviving family members”).

Accordingly, this Court agrees with those courts that have found that deceased individuals’ surviving relations and next of kin have nontrivial privacy interests in their loved ones’ autopsy reports and medical information, such as the toxicology reports, medical records, and mental health records at issue here. See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 517–18 (finding survivors of deceased veterans who had been exposed to radiation had more than de minimis privacy interest in their family medical histories and that such records properly were withheld under Exemption 6); Wolk Law Firm, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 527 (finding relatives of individuals who died in aircraft accidents had “strong privacy interests” in “death scene photographs, autopsy reports, and medical case reviews” and that such records properly were withheld under Exemption 6); Wessler, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 259 (finding family members of pretrial detainees who died in custody had privacy interest in their decedents’ medical and autopsy records); Eil v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.3d 392, 400 (1st Cir. 2017) (reversing grant of summary judgment for plaintiff journalist where district court failed to consider “the distinct privacy interests of the relatives of Dr. Volkman's deceased patients in the deceased patients’ death-related records” and directing district court to enter judgment for DEA on remand); Am. Civ. Lib. Union v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 738 F. Supp. 2d 93, 117–18 (D.D.C. 2010) (concluding government properly withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(C) medical records that family members and estate counsel provided to government during course of investigation into death of ICE detainee); Katz, 862 F. Supp. at 485–86; Marzen v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 632 F. Supp. 785, 811–13 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd 825 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding family of newborn infant with Down's syndrome who died because medical treatment was withheld had “overwhelming” privacy interests in medical records pertaining to infant's birth, care, and death and that government properly withheld such records pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C)). NCIS, therefore, has shown that family members and next of kin have nontrivial privacy interests in Vaughn Nos. 1, 6, 11–12, 36–37, 20–22, 26–27, 30–32, 34–35, 40, 45–47, and 49–50 and that it is reasonably foreseeable that those interests may be invaded by the disclosure of the information contained in those records.

*16 This leaves the “mental health information” and “medical information” records comprising summaries of interviews with the deceased servicemembers’ friends, family members, partners, colleagues, commanding officers, and members of law enforcement who knew or came into contact with the deceased servicemembers. For the same reason the Court concluded the deceased servicemembers retain “a measurable privacy interest” in this information, the Court likewise concludes the decedents’ family members, some of whom were interviewed as part of NCIS's death investigations, retain such an interest as well. See, e.g., Am. Civ. Lib. Union Found. S. Cal., ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2024 WL 3370532, at *13 (finding decedents and their next-of-kin have “a privacy interest in controlling dissemination of the details of their or their loved one's personal lives, how they entered [ ] the United States, and interactions with immigration law enforcement”). Defendants, therefore, also have shown that the deceased servicemembers’ family members and next-of-kin have nontrivial privacy interests in Vaughn Nos. 4, 5, 10, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 28, 33, 47, 48, 52, 53, and 56 and that it also is reasonably foreseeable that those interests may be invaded by the disclosure of the information contained in those records.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants have made no showing that the families of the decedents would object to release of the information at issue.” (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 10.) They point, in particular, to the fact that “families of deceased service members participated in an article that Plaintiff Huntsberry wrote in which they openly acknowledged many of the topics that Defendants here continue to withhold on privacy grounds.” (Id.) The Court rejects this argument as specious. Plaintiffs have identified, and the Court is aware of, no authority requiring Defendants to produce evidence that the family members would object to the release of each disputed record. Further, while one court has found relevant gratitude previously expressed to a reporter by family members, see Wessler, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 259, the Court finds it inappropriate to impute the attitudes of some families to all the families who would be affected by the disclosures in this action. See Associated Press, 554 F.3d at 287 (rejecting speculation that a detainee might want to publicize the abuse suffered in detention at Guantanamo because “[t]hat a detainee might want to voluntarily disclose information publicly does not authorize the government to disclose that information”). Had Plaintiffs produced evidence that all the families implicated here had no objection to disclosure of the information sought, the Court may have found their privacy interests to be trivial or even waived. Plaintiffs, however, have not proffered such evidence.

In sum, the Court finds that Defendants also have shown that the deceased servicemembers’ families and next-of-kin have nontrivial privacy interests in their loved ones’ mental health information, medical information, and toxicology results that might be invaded by disclosure—Vaughn Nos. 1, 4–6, 10, 13–15, 23–24, 28, 33, 36–37, 45–46, 48, 50, 52, 53, and 56. This is consistent with Congress’ broad policy “intended to permit family members to assert their own privacy rights against public intrusions long deemed impermissible under the common law and in our cultural traditions.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 167, 124 S.Ct. 1570.

With respect to the records in this broader category, Defendants have asserted interests on behalf of third parties as to eight records: Vaughn Nos. 10, 13, 15, 24, 27, 30, 53, and 56.

The Supreme Court has held that, in Exemption 7(C) cases where a third party's “link to the official inquiry may be the result of mere happenstance,” there is “special reason ... to give protection to this intimate personal data, to which the public does not have a general right of access in the ordinary course.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570. In such cases, where the subject of the records “ ‘is a private citizen,’ ‘the privacy interest ... is at its apex.’ ” Id. (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780, 109 S.Ct. 1468); see also Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 765, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (“[D]isclosure of records regarding private citizens, identifiable by name, is not what the framers of FOIA had in mind.”). Concerns regarding connecting private individuals to criminal investigations include “the potential for physical harm or the disclosure of particularly embarrassing private details shared in the course of certain investigations.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 975; see also Cameranesi, 856 F.3d at 638 (“Disclosures that would subject individuals to possible embarrassment, harassment, or the risk of mistreatment constitute nontrivial intrusions into privacy under Exemption 6.”).

*17 The Ninth Circuit also recognizes that third parties have a privacy interest in being protected from unwanted contact by other third parties, such as media entities. See Lahr, 569 F.3d at 975–76 (“The potential for unwanted contact by third parties, including the plaintiff, media entities, and commercial solicitors, nonetheless remains.”); see also Cameranesi, 856 F.3d at 639 (“We have similarly held that the potential for harassment from third parties gives rise to a cognizable privacy interest.”). With respect to the latter privacy interest, an agency “may carry its burden of establishing a nontrivial privacy interest by showing that the requested disclosure has ‘[t]he potential’ to result in the sorts of harassment described in our cases.” Cameranesi, 856 F.3d at 639 (quoting Lahr, 569 F.3d at 976).

Here, Plaintiffs have withdrawn all requests for the names of third parties and “are not seeking disclosure of any information concerning the decedents’ intimate behavior, sexual histories, or romantic relationships that would implicate the privacy interests of third parties.” (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 13 (citing ECF No. 57-2 (“Huntsberry Decl.”) ¶ 14); see also Defs.’ MSJ at 11.) Defendants maintain that, nevertheless, “the release of many disputed items could reasonably be expected to lead to the identification of the third parties—whether to the public at large or to those in their respective communities, workplaces, or social circles—and to reveal those parties’ private information.” (Defs.’ MSJ at 11.) Such disclosure would “foreseeably harm the individual by resulting in their public identification with a suicide investigation and publicizing personal details of their relationship or involvement with the deceased servicemember.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 10.) Disclosure “could also harm future investigations by making witnesses less inclined to cooperate with law enforcement if they know that investigating agencies will ultimately release information about their private relationships into the public realm.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 56; see also Vaughn No. 53.) Plaintiffs counter that Defendants’ concerns are “overblown,” (see Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 4), and that they have “attempted to mitigate these concerns by not seeking the names of the third parties,” (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 15 (citing Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 15).)

Vaughn Nos. 10, 13, 15, 24, 27, 30, and 56 comprise summaries of interviews with the deceased servicemembers’ friends, family members, former romantic partners, and enlisted members who participated in the servicemembers’ medical treatment. These interviews were conducted during the course of NCIS's investigations into the decedents’ suicides. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 10, 13, 15, 24, 27, 30, 56; see also Richman Decl. ¶ 10.) Vaughn No. 53 comprises screenshots from the cellphone of a civilian third-party witness that the witness supplied during the investigation. (See id., Vaughn No. 53.[3]) During the investigations, these third parties disclosed, for example, that they were involved in romantic or sexual relationships with the decedents (see Vaughn Nos. 10, 56), the third party's role in the mental health treatment the decedents received while they were alive (see Vaughn Nos. 27, 30), their knowledge of the extent of the decedents’ medical or mental health problems (see Vaughn Nos. 13, 15, 24), and their private communications with and about the decedent's mental health problems (see Vaughn No. 53).

*18 Courts in the Ninth Circuit routinely recognize that private citizens who cooperate with governmental investigations have an interest in maintaining the privacy of their identities and the nature of their assistance to the investigation. See, e.g., Lahr, 569 F.3d at 975–76 (reversing district court's order that names of eyewitnesses to mid-air explosion of airline be disclosed where eyewitnesses’ link to the investigation was result of “mere happenstance” (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570)); Forest Serv. Emps. for Env't Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 524 F.3d 1021, 1025–27 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding government employees cooperating as witnesses in disaster investigation had cognizable privacy interest pursuant to Exemption 6 in preventing disclosure of their names in connection with incident and official investigation); see also, e.g., Karam v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 18-cv-454, 2019 WL 7987860 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2019), report and recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 995570 (D. Ariz. Mar. 2, 2020) (recommending court grant summary judgment for defendant as to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) where redacted information included “the names, contact information, and testimony that was provided to the OCR investigator during the OCR's investigation”).

Government employees, on the other hand, “do not waive all privacy interests in information relating to them simply by taking an oath of public office, but by becoming public officials, their privacy interests are somewhat reduced.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 977. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that lower-level employees have stronger privacy interests than more senior officials. See Forest Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d at 1025–26. “[A] government employee's privacy interests may be diminished in cases where information sought under FOIA would likely disclose ‘official misconduct,’ ” id. at 1025, or “when there are doubts about the integrity of [an investigator's] efforts,” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 977. Here, it appears that the individuals interviewed in Vaughn Nos. 10, 27, 30 are currently serving in the Navy. Because Plaintiffs have not argued that the information sought would “likely disclose ‘official misconduct’ ” and because the individuals appear to be lower-level employees, the Court finds that their status as servicemembers does not substantially diminish their privacy interests in the withheld information. Forest Serv. Emps, 524 F.3d at 1025; see also, e.g., Lahr, 569 F.3d at 977 (explaining that FBI agents have “a legitimate interest in keeping private matters that could conceivably subject them to annoyance or harassment”); Spurling v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 425 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17–22 (D.D.C. 2019) (upholding application of Exemption 7(C) to names and identifying information of state and local law enforcement personnel and Kentucky state penitentiary personnel who assisted the FBI in its investigation).

Further, federal courts throughout the country have found it appropriate to withhold information collected about third parties during law enforcement investigations that might subject the individuals to embarrassment, harassment, or stigma. See Schrecker v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 349 F.3d 657, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The mention of an individual's name in a law enforcement file will engender comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.” (cleaned up)); see also Mermerlstein v. U.S. Dep't of Just., FBI, No. 19-cv-312, 2021 WL 3455314, at *11–12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2021), report and recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 11628214 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2021) (recommending summary judgment for government on application of Exemption 7(C) to names and identifying information of third parties who provided information during investigation regarding “their medical histories or treatment results” that are “highly personal and possibl[y] embarrassing”); McDaniels v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 14-cv-7780, 2016 WL 7647671, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2016) (granting summary judgment for defendant on application of Exemption 7(C) to “names and other identifying information of other witnesses who were involved in or were believed to have information regarding the July 8, 2013 assault” because disclosing such information “could subject these inmates to harm, harassment, embarrassment, or unwanted public attention”); Yagman v. Dep't of Just., No. 13-cv-354, 2014 WL 1245305, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2014), aff'd sub nom. 605 F. App'x 666 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding application of Exemption 7(C) to ten pages of emails in which third-party witnesses responded to government's questions, as disclosure of such information “could lead to harassment, harm, or exposure to unwanted and/or derogatory publicity and inferences arising from their connection to the case”); Shannahan v. I.R.S., 637 F. Supp. 2d 902, 921 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (upholding government's application of Exemption 7(C) to documents obtained during course of criminal tax fraud investigation that reference third parties who were not the subject of the criminal or civil investigation but who could be subjected to harassment or intimidation if their identities were revealed); Karantsalis v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 05-cv-22088, 2005 WL 8155866, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2005) (granting summary judgment as to application of Exemption 7(C) to personnel record “replete with intimate details of the subject's personal life”); see also Fed. Lab. Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 496, 114 S.Ct. 1006 (explaining that “information about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct” is not the type of information to which FOIA typically permits access (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773, 109 S.Ct. 1468)).

*19 The Court finds that these third parties have substantial privacy interests in the information they shared about themselves and their relationship to the decedents. Moreover, the Court agrees with Defendants that, even with Plaintiffs’ concessions and the redactions of third parties’ names, it is still reasonably foreseeable that the information disclosed would reveal the third parties’ identities within their communities, exposing them potentially to harassment, embarrassment, or stigma. See, e.g., Property of People, Inc. v. Dep't of Just., 539 F. Supp. 3d 16, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2021) (“Because the documents contain identifying details revealed in interviews, the Court finds that even with the redactions supported by Plaintiffs, release would invade the interest third-party individuals have in remaining unassociated with federal investigations.”); Cameranesi, 856 F.3d at 638 (“Disclosures that would subject individuals to possible embarrassment, harassment, or the risk of mistreatment constitute nontrivial intrusions into privacy under Exemption 6.”). Indeed, one witness's cooperation in the investigation already has exposed her to precisely the harassment and stigma FOIA seeks to spare third parties. Vaughn No. 56 comprises a summary of an interview with the decedent's “potential girlfriend or ex-girlfriend,” in which she related “difficulties” in her “romantic relationship” with the decedent and other “private events that occurred” during that relationship. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 56.) The witness advised the investigator that, following the suicide, some of the decedent's friends had contacted her and blamed her for the death. (See id.)

Plaintiffs complain that they have attempted to mitigate such concerns by seeking the information that specifically pertains to what the interviewees knew of the decedents’ mental health problems. (See Pltfs.’ MSJ at 14 (citing Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 10, 15).) This argument misses the mark. As evidenced by the experience of the decedent's former romantic partner in Vaughn No. 56, the very fact of a third party's knowledge—or lack of knowledge—of specific information about a decedent's mental health struggles may be sufficient to identify that third party within his or her community and expose that individual to harassment, embarrassment, or stigma. For example, the Court can conceive of a situation where a close friend of the decedent would be subjected to harassment for his knowledge of the decedent's suicidal ideations and failure to take steps beyond what he already had done to prevent the suicide. (See, e.g., Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 10.) Similarly, it is reasonably foreseeable that the decedent's parents might be excoriated in the press and shamed by their community because they did not know the extent of their child's mental health struggles. (See, e.g., id., Vaughn No. 13.)

In sum, Defendants have shown that third parties have substantial privacy interests in these records and that it is reasonably foreseeable that disclosure of such information could identify these third parties within their workplace or greater communities and subject them to harassment, stigma, or embarrassment. Similarly, it is also reasonably foreseeable that the potential for such disclosure may dissuade other third parties from cooperating with future investigations.

Once the government identifies a cognizable privacy interest, the requester then must demonstrate that the public interest served by disclosure (1) “ ‘is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information for its own sake,’ ” and (2) “that disclosure is likely to advance that interest.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 974 (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 172, 124 S.Ct. 1570). For disclosure to be warranted, the public interest must outweigh the privacy interest at stake. See Cameranesi, 856 F.3d at 637. “[T]he only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis is the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would shed light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what their government is up to.” Lahr, 569 F.3d at 974 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bibles v. Or. Nat. Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355, 355–56, 117 S.Ct. 795, 136 L.Ed.2d 825 (1997)). If the requester asserts that the reason for the disclosure is to uncover government impropriety or negligence, “the requester must establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure” by “produc[ing] evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174, 124 S.Ct. 1570.

*20 Here, Plaintiffs argue broadly that disclosure of the withheld information “will shed significant light on whether the military could have taken action to prevent these deaths” and “will significantly contribute to the public's understanding of how the military addresses mental health issues.” (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 16–17.) They highlight, in particular, the extensive media coverage of the rising incidence of suicide in the military during peacetime and provide a declaration from Plaintiff Huntsberry, in which he explains in greater detail his interest in the specific records at issue. (See id. at 1–2, 17.)

In Huntsberry's declaration, he elaborates that the public has an interest in the deceased servicemembers’ mental and medical health information, as well as treatment records, because such information “will contribute to the public's understanding of how the military detects those at risk of suicide, what warning signs were exhibited in these cases, and what the military could do to decrease the incidence of suicide.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶¶ 26, 30.) Similarly, he contends that the toxicology results will “contribute to the public's understanding of how alcohol and drug consumption in the military interact with the mental health of service members.” (Id. ¶ 16.) He further notes that the toxicology results would “help inform [his] investigation as to how the military detected those who may be at greater risk of suicide where there may have been preexisting drug abuse or addiction issues.” (Id.) With this greater detail, Plaintiffs maintain they have “made the legal showing required[.]” (Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 5.)

Defendants counter that Plaintiffs have only identified “various general topics of public interest” to which the disputed records “might tangentially relate” but have failed to show “some nexus between the specific requested information ... and the public interest advanced.” (Defs.’ Opp'n at 12 (quoting Lahr, 569 F.3d at 978).) As such, they have failed to demonstrate that the “marginal additional usefulness” of the withheld information “outweigh[s] the privacy interests at stake.” (Id. (quoting Lahr, 569 F.3d at 978).)

The Court agrees with Defendants. As the Court previously acknowledged, “the public has an interest in understanding how the military investigates deaths by suicide.” (Order at 29.) The Court further acknowledges that, as demonstrated by the substantial media coverage by news outlets like The New York Times and NPR, the public has an interest in understanding the measures the military is implementing to curb the incidence of suicides within its ranks. Here, however, Plaintiffs have not identified a public interest more specific than having the information for its own sake, particularly given that the information at issue is linked to known, deceased servicemembers and discloses next-to-nothing about the activities or operations of the agencies. See Lahr, 569 F.3d at 637.

First, Plaintiffs have failed to show the requisite “nexus” between the requested information and the public interest they claim the information will advance. As to much of the medical and mental health information, Plaintiffs claim that the requested information will “show what the military knew about the decedent's medical and/or mental health history and whether it had an opportunity to intervene.” (See, e.g., Huntsberry Decl. ¶¶ 27, 31; see also Pltfs.’ MSJ at 17 (“All of these categories of information will reveal what the military knew about the mental health challenges of the decedents before they died and whether these deaths were in any way preventable.”); Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 8 (noting that the military appears to have provided at least some of the mental health treatment the decedent received before death).)

*21 This argument, however, rests on the premise that the same information the Navy has collected through its death investigations also was available to it before the deaths occurred. Such an assumption ignores that the deceased servicemembers would have enjoyed doctor-patient confidentiality while they were alive. In other words, Plaintiffs impute the knowledge of medical personnel bound by confidentiality to the entire Navy. Plaintiffs have offered neither argument nor evidence that the private medical files at issue would have been available for the inspection of any officers in the decedents’ chain-of-command.[4] See, e.g., Rollins, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 554 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that disclosure of deceased third party's name would serve public interest where plaintiff “offers no evidence or argument that this individual died in mysterious circumstances or that disclosure of his or her identity would shed any light on the Department's performance of its statutory duties”). As such, the information collected during NCIS's death investigations will not disclose what the military broadly knew about the decedents’ mental health problems before the deaths occurred. Moreover, as Defendants’ counsel pointed out at the hearing, millions of Americans receive healthcare from the federal government every year. (See ECF No. 60.) FOIA does not open the door to disclosure of private medical information merely because people receive healthcare from the federal government.

*22 The absence of the requisite nexus is further illustrated by Vaughn No. 13, which summarizes an interview with a decedent's civilian family member, in which the interviewee revealed information about the decedent's mental health treatment that the government has redacted. (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 13.) Huntsberry claims that disclosing the redacted information “would help inform the public about how the military approached high-risk cases and what the military could have done to prevent this death.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 28.) NCIS, however, did not interview the decedent's civilian family member until after the decedent had committed suicide. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 13.) The redacted information, therefore, will not reveal what the military knew before the suicide. The same is true of most of the medical and mental health information at issue and certainly is true of the toxicology results.

Vaughn Nos. 5, 10, 14, 33, and 48 appear to be the only records that otherwise might disclose what the Navy knew before the deaths occurred.[5] Vaughn No. 5, which summarizes a review of the decedent's Official Military Personnel File, includes information the decedent provided prior to active service as part of his medical history provider interview regarding his drug and alcohol history. (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 5.) Vaughn Nos. 10, 14, 33, and 48 respectively summarize interviews with the decedent's friends in the armed forces (Vaughn Nos. 10, 14), with the decedent's commanding officer (Vaughn No. 33), and with an acquaintance of the decedent (Vaughn No. 48). With respect to the interviews, as will be discussed in greater detail below, Plaintiffs have failed to explain how disclosure of the specific information redacted will advance the “only relevant” interest under FOIA—the extent to which disclosure would shed light on the Navy's performance of its statutory duties or would otherwise let the public know what their government is up to. Bibles, 519 U.S. at 355–56, 117 S.Ct. 795.

Second, although Plaintiffs assert that disclosing the deceased servicemembers’ medical and mental health information and toxicology results will contribute to the public's understanding of “the military's actions or inaction,” (see Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 6)—i.e., how the military detects those at risk of suicide, (see Huntsberry Decl. ¶¶ 26, 30)—they fail to explain how this will result. “In the context of addressing whether disclosure of redacted names and identifying information is warranted, the Supreme Court has explained that where disclosure of the documents themselves adequately serve the public interest, a requester must show how ‘the addition of the redacted identifying information’ would ‘shed any light on the Government's conduct.’ ” Associated Press, 554 F.3d at 288 (quoting Ray, 502 U.S. at 178, 112 S.Ct. 541); see also Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 497, 114 S.Ct. 1006 (concluding that disclosure of agency bargaining unit employees’ addresses “would reveal little or nothing about the employing agencies or their activities” in determining that “the relevant public interest supporting disclosure in this case is negligible”); E.G. v. Dep't of Air Force, 302 F. Supp. 3d 230, 238–39 (D.D.C. 2018) (concluding that “the release of a singular proceeding would not substantially serve the public interest” because releasing “SSgt. Broome's records would be insufficient to show a pattern of misconduct by the Air Force in conducting administrative discharge boards”); MacLean, 2007 WL 935604, at *12 (finding no public interest in disclosure where plaintiff sought “to learn about the conduct of two military agencies by looking at six specific investigations in the 12 years between 1992 and 2004” because, “when placed in context, information about six cases ‘does not provide information about the agency's own conduct’ ” (quoting Beck, 997 F.2d at 1493)).

*23 Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that disclosing the intimate medical and mental health information at issue here would “add significantly to the already available information concerning the manner in which [the agency] has performed its statutory duties.” Cameranesi, 856 F.3d at 640 (internal citations omitted); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of Just., 365 F.3d 1108, 1125–26 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (concluding government properly applied Exemption 6 to pardon applications disclosing, inter alia, applicants’ substance abuse, criminal history, and medical history because “these types of personal records are unlikely to shed light on the Department's conduct in the pardoning process”). Defendants already have disclosed more than 1,800 pages of individual servicemember death investigation records that reveal how NCIS conducted its investigations, the manner in which the decedents died, and information regarding some of the surrounding circumstances of these specific deaths. (See Defs.’ MSJ at 2; Vaughn Index; Huntsberry Decl., Exs. 1–21; ECF No. 59-1 (“Supp. Huntsberry Decl.”) ¶ 2, Ex. 1); see also Ray, 502 U.S. at 180, 112 S.Ct. 541 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that, under Exemption 6, the focus “must be solely upon what the requested information reveals, not upon what it might lead to” (emphasis in original)). The redacted information—medical diagnoses, mental health treatment, and toxicology results specific to a handful of individuals—will not contribute to the public's understanding of how the Navy operates or performs its statutory duties. (See Defs.’ Opp'n at 13.)

For example, Plaintiffs seek the decedents’ toxicology results because they will “contribute to the public's understanding of how alcohol and drug consumption in the military interact with the mental health of service members.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 16.) They note that the Department of Defense's Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee recommended in 2022 that the military address “excessive alcohol use and the risks it poses” to reduce the incidence of suicide. (See Pltfs.’ MSJ at 17 n.2 (quoting Preventing Suicide in the U.S. Military: Recommendations from the Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee, SPRIRC (2022), https://media.defense.gov/2023/Feb/24/2003167430/-1/-1/0/SPRIRC-FINAL-REPORT.PDF).) The military's own identification of a “meaningful link between substance abuse and suicide,” Plaintiffs contend, supports their request for disclosure of the toxicology results, which will reveal “whether the decedents’ preexisting substance abuse issues were apparent and whether the military could have intervened.” (Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 6.) But Huntsberry fails to explain “how the contents of a particular servicemember's blood at the time they died—which could also reveal prescribed or emergency medications, as opposed to mere ‘drug and alcohol consumption’—will ‘shed light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what their government is up to.’ ” (Defs.’ Opp'n at 13 (quoting Bibles, 519 U.S. at 356, 117 S.Ct. 795).) As Defendants point out, the toxicology results will reveal whether a controlled or illegal substance was present in a decedent's bloodstream at the time of death; to extrapolate a substance abuse issue from that fact in isolation would require wild speculation. (See id.) Nor would the mere presence of a substance in the bloodstream at the time of death illuminate “whether those preexisting substance abuse issues were apparent before the death.” (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 17.) And above all, Plaintiffs fail to explain (see Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 6), and the Court does not understand, how the presence of a controlled or illegal substance in a decedent's bloodstream enlightens the public as to how NCIS conducts death investigations or as to how the Navy detects and addresses servicemembers at risk of committing suicide.

Similarly, Plaintiffs do not explain how disclosing that a decedent suffered from athlete's foot or was diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder would shed light on how the agency detects servicemembers at risk of suicide. (See generally Pltfs.’ MSJ at 16–19; see, e.g., Vaughn Nos. 32, 34.) They also fail to explain how disclosure of the bare facts of such conditions would reveal whether the military “had a reasonable ability to intervene” before the deaths occurred. (Huntsberry Decl. ¶¶ 27, 31.) As a further example, the relevant passage in Vaughn No. 10 provides, “4. [Witness] stated he was aware of V/MCGAVIN's previous suicidal ideations, citing he was the reporting party [REDACTED]. [Witness] stated he sought guidance from his Corporal on the discovery which eventually led to V/MCGAVIN's hospitalization.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 10.) The government explains that it has redacted “sensitive mental health information and details that the friend related concerning the decedent's suicidal ideations which eventually led to the decedent's hospitalization and mental health treatment.” (Id.) Plaintiffs seek this information because they believe it “will contribute to the public's understanding of how the military detects those at risk of suicide, what warning signs were exhibited in these cases, and what the military could do to decrease the incidence of suicide.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 26.) Here, the Vaughn Index discloses the warning signs—suicidal ideation—and how the military addressed the friend's report of McGavin's suicidal ideations—hospitalization. (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 10.) Disclosing, for example, that the friend witnessed McGavin engage in self-harm or found a draft of her suicide note, does not reveal anything about the agency's conduct.

*24 And while disclosure of such information might be useful for painting a picture of the decedents’ lives and stressors, as Plaintiffs argue (see Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 32), “courts have been skeptical of recognizing a public interest in this ‘derivative’ use of information, which is indirect and speculative.” Long v. Off. Personnel Mgmt., 692 F.3d 185, 194 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 518 (rejecting as derivative use plaintiffs’ argument that releasing names of individuals present at nuclear accident would “allow the public to fully appreciate the human cost of the Palomares clean-up”). In Painting Industry of Hawaii Market Recovery Fund v. U.S. Department of the Air Force, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged a circuit split as to the propriety of “derivative use” arguments in analyzing FOIA exemptions, commenting that, “[i]f ‘derivative’ public benefits are merely those which require some tabulation of data released under FOIA, or perhaps some further research on the part of the requester, we see no reason why the extra effort required of the requester should, in every case, render a proffered public benefit more or less strong.” 26 F.3d 1479, 1485 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting derivative use argument where the “additional step requires direct contact with the employees whose payroll records are being sought” because the public benefit was “inextricably intertwined with the invasions of privacy that those contacts will work”); see also Forest Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d at 1027 (“We have previously expressed skepticism at the notion that such derivative use of information can justify disclosure under Exemption 6.”). While Plaintiffs cannot take the “additional step” of contacting the decedents here, Plaintiffs’ articulated public benefit of enabling the public's “understanding” of the decedents’ particular circumstances remains fatally vague. Understanding the “medical and mental health circumstances,” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 32), of the servicemembers who committed suicide does nothing to further the public's understanding of the operations or activities of the Navy in connection with how it investigates suicides or how it strives to prevent suicides. Moreover, by Plaintiffs’ reasoning, disclosure of any medical or mental health record that happens to be in the hands of law enforcement would serve the public interest because it would allow the public to better understand the “medical and mental health circumstances” of the individuals involved. See also Painting Indus. of Hawaii, 26 F.3d at 1485 (noting Second and Seventh Circuits’ agreement that “virtually any piece of information about a government employee could possibly provide some assistance to an investigative reporter”).

Where, as here, a plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a public interest in disclosure of the requested information, the court “need not linger over the balance; something, even a modest privacy interest, outweighs nothing every time.” Nat'l Ass'n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Even if the Court were to conclude that Plaintiffs had demonstrated a significant public interest in disclosure of these records given the substantial media attention, the Court would find that the public interest has been adequately served by disclosure of the redacted summaries of medical records and that the privacy interests in the redacted information outweigh the public's interest in disclosure. See Ray, 502 U.S. at 178, 112 S.Ct. 541 (holding that “the public interest in knowing whether the State Department has adequately monitored Haiti's compliance with its promise not to prosecute returnees” had been “adequately served by disclosure of the redacted interview summaries and that disclosure of the unredacted documents would therefore constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the interviewees’ privacy”). While Plaintiffs and the public may have a general interest in the disclosure of information pertaining to how NCIS investigates servicemembers’ suicides or how the Navy works to detect those at risk of suicide, the disputed information pertains to known servicemembers, relates to the circumstances surrounding their health and death, and includes information provided by family members, friends, and partners about the decedents. See, e.g., Eil, 878 F.3d at 400 (reversing and remanding with instructions to enter judgment for government where government withheld health and death-related records of deceased individuals whose identities could be readily determined from the public trial transcript); Am. Civ. Lib. Union, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (finding public interest in disclosure did not outweigh privacy interests of surviving family members in records they provided about the decedent); Marzen, 632 F. Supp. at 812–13 (finding plaintiff had failed to substantiate his claim that the medical records of deceased infant would inform the public debate and concluding substantial privacy interests of surviving family members outweighed public interest); see also Ray, 502 U.S. at 175–76, 112 S.Ct. 541 (“Although disclosure of such personal information constitutes only a de minimis invasion of privacy when the identities of the interviewees are unknown, the invasion of privacy becomes significant when the personal information is linked to particular interviewees.”).

Plaintiffs argue that this case is similar to Wessler, where the court found a significant public interest existed and ordered the disclosure of the medical records of federal pretrial detainees who died in the custody of the U.S. Marshal Service. (See Pltfs.’ MSJ at 18–19.) Wessler is distinguishable. In Wessler, the plaintiff sought the medical records of federal pretrial detainees who died in the Marshals’ custody so that “he and his team of doctors” could “evaluate properly the medical care the detainees received at these prisons.” 381 F. Supp. 3d at 260. The court concluded that there was a significant public interest in disclosure because “[t]he public has a right to know the circumstances under which people die while detained in the pretrial custody of USMS.” Id. In particular, the court pointed out that Wessler's reporting strove to uncover whether the Marshals had failed to perform “a core responsibility” of the Marshals Service—“monitor[ing] the care provided to the detainees in these state, local, and private facilities.” Id. at 261. Here, Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that the public has an interest in learning “what the military knew about the mental health challenges of the decedents before they died and whether these deaths were in any way preventable.” (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 17.) To this end, they point out that the military provided most of the medical and mental health care records at issue. (Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 7.) As discussed above, however, most of the information NCIS compiled as part of its death investigations is information the Navy did not know or could not have known while the decedents were living. Further, “the deceased servicemembers were nonincarcerated free individuals whose highly individualized medical and personal information does not bear a self-evident link to the question of whether the Navy and the Marine Corps are carrying out their ‘core responsibilities.’ ” (Defs.’ Opp'n at 14.) Plaintiffs counter that, in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2022, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a Suicide Prevention and Response Independent Review Committee (SPRIRC) to “conduct[ ] a comprehensive review of Department of Defense (DoD) efforts to address and prevent suicide.” (Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 7 (quoting Preventing Suicide in the U.S. Military).) Even if the military is prioritizing reducing the incidence of suicide within its ranks, however, Plaintiffs still have not explained how the specific, intimate details they seek about a handful of individuals will shed light on the agencies’ performance of their statutory duties.

*25 For similar reasons, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is also distinguishable. ––– F. Supp. 3d at –––– – ––––, 2024 WL 3370532, at *13–14. There, the court concluded that the public's interest in disclosure outweighed the decedent's and her family's privacy interests in the decedent's medical and immigration history. Id. Specifically, the court found “Defendants’ knowledge of Medina Leon's medical conditions leading up to her death is relevant to whether the steps ICE took for her care were sufficient, and whether DHS OIG appropriately addressed any concerns related to Defendants’ handling of Medina Leon's health and death.” Id. at 13. Information regarding the decedents’ immigration histories was “likewise relevant to ICE's decision to release the decedents from its custody prior to their deaths, and DHS OIG's investigation into that decision.” Id. The court found this information “would shed light not only on ICE's practices of releasing detainees facing imminent death, but also DHS OIG's evaluation of whether those practices are appropriate.” Id. at *14. As in Wessler, the dispute centered around the disclosure of detainees’ medical records and appeared to implicate a core responsibility of ICE and DHS OIG. Because ICE was responsible for providing appropriate medical care for the deceased detainees, disclosing the records at issue would reveal what ICE knew of the detainees’ medical needs and would allow the public to evaluate whether ICE had failed to provide sufficient care. See id. at *13–14. Again, here, the Navy did not have access to most of the information now in its possession before the deaths occurred, and the servicemembers were not in a position comparable to those of the detainees, who were wholly reliant on their captors for medical care.

In sum, in light of the principles discussed above regarding the privacy interests of the decedents, their families, and third parties, the Court finds that the public interests, minimal or nonexistent as they are, do not outweigh the significant privacy interests here. The redacted medical and mental health information and toxicology results reveal little-to-nothing about the Navy's activities and conduct. Rather, the information discloses the medical and mental health information of specific, known servicemembers who committed suicide. Disclosing the requested information would invade the moderate privacy interests of the deceased servicemembers in their own medical and mental health treatment history and toxicology results; the substantial privacy interests of their surviving family members and next of kin in controlling the dissemination of potentially stigmatizing and embarrassing information about their loved ones’ personal lives; and the substantial privacy interests of third parties whose identities remain discernable and who have substantial interests in not being associated with a law enforcement investigation and in not being contacted by members of the press or the public. Additionally, the Court agrees with Defendants that disclosure of the information at issue could discourage other families and witnesses from cooperating with NCIS's investigations and even may discourage servicemembers from seeking necessary medical treatment for fear their information might be disclosed to well-meaning investigative journalists postmortem.

Finally, to the extent Plaintiffs are suggesting that the Navy has engaged in misconduct by failing to prevent these suicides, (see Huntsberry Decl. ¶¶ 26–27, 30–32), Plaintiffs have failed to offer any evidence to substantiate their vague allusions. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 174, 124 S.Ct. 1570 (explaining that a plaintiff advancing the public interest of uncovering government misconduct must provide “evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that” such allegations of misconduct are true).

In sum, the Court finds that the deceased individuals, their families, and the implicated third parties have nontrivial privacy interests in the “medical information,” “mental health information,” and “toxicology results” records at issue that are not outweighed by the public interests Plaintiffs have identified. Thus, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendants on the application of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to the withheld information.

Defendants have categorized five of the items in the Vaughn Index as pertaining to “intimate/sexual information,” which “includes information about—or conveyed during the course of—a decedent or a third-party witness's intimate romantic or sexual relationship.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 14.) Within these five items, Defendants have asserted privacy interests on behalf of the deceased servicemembers, their families, and third parties. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 10, 12, 15, 20, 56.) The Court already has determined that Defendants properly applied Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to these records based on the privacy interests of the decedents, their families, and third parties in the medical and mental health information contained therein. Moreover, Plaintiffs concede that they are “not seeking information regarding the decedents’ sexual histories, intimate behavior, or relationship histories, which may implicate the privacy interests of third parties.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 14.) In light of this admission and the Court's prior findings, the Court finds that Defendants have shown, at a minimum, that third parties have substantial privacy interests in the withheld information and that no countervailing public interest outweighs it.

*26 Defendants also have categorized six of the items in the Vaughn Index as “arrest/law enforcement information” that “contain[s] stigmatizing or derogatory information pertaining to a decedent's arrest or law enforcement history.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 15.) As to these six items, Defendants have asserted privacy interests on behalf of the deceased servicemembers and their families. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 3, 20, 25, 28, 29, and 33.) The Court already has determined that Defendants properly applied Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to Vaughn Nos. 28 and 33 and, accordingly, confines its analysis to Vaughn Nos. 3, 20, 25, and 29.

Finally, Defendants have categorized thirteen of the items in the Vaughn Index as “substance use information” that “contain[s] information regarding the use of drugs or alcohol by a decedent or third party.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 16.) As to these thirteen items, Defendants have asserted privacy interests on behalf of the deceased servicemembers, their families, and third parties. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 5, 20–24, 26–28, 33, 38–39, 43–44.) The Court already has determined that Defendants properly applied Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to Vaughn Nos. 5, 20–24, 26–28, and 33, and accordingly, confines its analysis to Vaughn Nos. 38–39 and 43–44.

As discussed above, the fact of death diminishes, but does not eliminate, an individual's privacy interests. See Schrecker, 254 F.3d at 166. Living individuals have a measurable privacy interest in their criminal histories and in their contacts with law enforcement, “even if scattered bits of criminal history” are in the public domain. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 767, 771, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (“The privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial.”); Am. Civ. Lib. Union v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (recognizing that Exemption 7(C) extends to “individuals who have been acquitted or whose cases have been dismissed,” “individuals who have been investigated but never publicly charged at all,” and “even to convictions and public pleas”); Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1125–26 (explaining that individuals had privacy interests in pardon applications that required disclosure of criminal history because “[t]hese documents easily fall under the purview of an individual's ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,’ and controlling ‘information concerning his or her person’ ” (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762–63, 109 S.Ct. 1468)); but see Kowack v. U.S. Forest Serv., 766 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that privacy interests fade where the public “already know[s]” the information that has been withheld).

While the Court is unaware of a Ninth Circuit decision expressly holding that deceased individuals have privacy interests in their own criminal records, the Court is mindful that “[t]he mention of an individual's name in a law enforcement file will engender comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.” Schrecker, 349 F.3d at 666. Additionally, at least one court has concluded that “[d]eceased defendants never convicted of a crime retain a reputational interest in keeping information concerning their prosecutions out of the public eye.” Am. Civ. Lib. Union, 750 F.3d at 936. Defendants contend that the decedents retain reputational interests “in not having stigmatizing or embarrassing information publicly released.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 3); see also Campbell, 164 F.3d at 33–34 (explaining that “certain reputation interests” survive death). Whether an individual previously has been arrested also is information of the type “that a person ordinarily would not wish to make known about himself or herself.” See Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 517 (finding decedents retained privacy interest in records that would reflect whether they were exposed to radiation); see also Associated Press, 554 F.3d at 287 (explaining that Guantanamo detainees who were victims of abuse had an “interest in keeping the personal facts of their abuse from the public eye and in avoiding disclosure of their identities in order to prevent embarrassment”).

*27 In light of these guiding principles and the absence of arguments or evidence from Plaintiffs that the law enforcement contacts here are already known to the general public, the Court agrees with Defendants that disclosure of these records would implicate measurable privacy interests the decedents retain in their criminal histories and prior encounters with law enforcement. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 3 (summarizing decedent's arrest history); Vaughn No. 20 (describing decedent's encounter with law enforcement); Vaughn No. 25 (describing police report “with a nexus to the deceased individual”); and Vaughn No. 29 (summarizing interview with junior enlisted member who disclosed that decedent was separating from Navy because of incident involving law enforcement).)

Similarly, courts have recognized that living individuals have cognizable privacy interests in records disclosing their substance abuse or addictions. See, e.g., Eil, 878 F.3d at 396 (reversing judgment for plaintiff and directing court to enter judgment for government on application of Exemption 7(C) to withheld medical records describing, inter alia, illicit drug use, where patients could be readily identified based on trial records); Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1125–26 (explaining that individuals had privacy interests in pardon applications that required disclosure of substance abuse because “[t]hese documents easily fall under the purview of an individual's ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,’ and controlling ‘information concerning his or her person’ ” (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762–63, 109 S.Ct. 1468)); Gov't Accountability Project v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com'n, No. 86-cv-1976, 1993 WL 13033518, at *3 (D.D.C. July 2, 1993) (upholding application of Exemption 7(C) to names and other identifying information from reports generated during government investigation of wrongdoing at nuclear facility involving allegations of “such provocative subjects as sexual harassment and drug abuse”); Frets v. Dep't of Transp., No. 88-cv-404, 1989 WL 222608, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 14, 1989) (applying exemption 6 to bar disclosure of report of FAA special agent investigating allegations of off-duty-time drug use by air traffic controllers where interviewee disclosed use or non-use of illegal drugs).

Here, the records at issue chiefly comprise screenshots of private messages between the decedent and third parties discussing illicit substances (Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 38, 43) and summaries and quotations from those private messages (Id., Vaughn Nos. 39, 44). Vaughn No. 43 additionally includes screenshots of (1) the “ ‘r/LSD’ Reddit thread” that decedent “accessed on a private tab of his internet browser,” (2) “an image saved” on the decedent's cellphone “referencing illicit substances,” and (3) “financial transactions made via the CashApp application” installed on the decedent's phone. (Id., Vaughn No. 43.[6]) Defendants contend that “[d]isclosure of images reproducing the decedent's private communications to a friend regarding illicit substance use would invade the decedent's privacy” because decedents “normally would not expect or desire screenshots from private communications regarding sensitive and/or stigmatizing topics to be disclosed to the public, particularly in a manner that is likely to be sensationalized in the public realm.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 38, 43.) Disclosure of such images is “particularly likely to result in harm here because photographs and screenshots that are released are more likely to be used or reproduced in publications to sensationalize sensitive topics.” (Id.) Similarly, Defendants maintain that “[d]isclosure of direct quotations from the decedent's private communications to a friend regarding illicit substance use would invade the decedent's privacy” because decedents “normally would not expect or desire quotations from private communications regarding sensitive and/or stigmatizing topics to be disclosed to the public after their deaths absent a sufficiently strong countervailing public interest.” (Id., Vaughn No. 39; see also Vaughn No. 44.)

*28 The Supreme Court's has admonished that “the concept of personal privacy under Exemption 7(C) is not some limited or cramped notion of that idea.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 165, 124 S.Ct. 1570. With this edict in mind, the Court, again, agrees with Defendants that, diminished as decedents’ privacy interests are, decedents retain measurable privacy interests in records disclosing stigmatizing and embarrassing matters that they “ordinarily would not wish to make known about himself or herself,” such as their illicit substance use. Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 517; see also Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1125 (finding pardon applications disclosing substance abuse “easily fall under purview” of Exemption 6 given “individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762–63, 109 S.Ct. 1468)); Rural Housing All. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding Exemption 6 applies to protect “marital status, legitimacy of children, identity of fathers of children, medical condition, welfare payments, alcoholic consumption, family fights, reputation, and so on”).

As discussed above, the Supreme Court has recognized surviving family members’ rights to personal privacy with respect to their close relative's death-scene images. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 170–73, 124 S.Ct. 1570. Courts have had few opportunities to consider the outer boundaries of family members’ privacy interests with respect to other types of intimate information concerning their deceased loved ones. In general, courts tend to agree that family members have cognizable privacy interests in their deceased loved ones’ medical records and autopsy reports. See, e.g., Wolk Law Firm, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 527. And at least one court has noted that deceased individuals who were the subject of prosecutions “may also have family members who themselves have a legitimate interest in avoiding the increased scrutiny that could follow from release of the requested docket information.” Am. Civ. Lib. Union, 750 F.3d at 936. The Parties have not identified, and the Court has not located, any authorities addressing whether surviving family members have privacy interests in records disclosing a loved one's use of an illicit substance, however. Regardless, the Court already has rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that Favish should be limited by its facts to “death-scene” images. (See Order, supra, at 28–31.)

Here, Defendants explain that “there is a reasonably foreseeable risk that these items of information would be disseminated or sensationalized in the public realm if released, thus causing unnecessary pain and renewed grief for the decedent's family and survivors.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 9); see also, e.g., Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 3 (disclosure would pain family by portraying loved one in a negative light); Vaughn No. 44 (families have privacy interest in decedent's private messages to friends and family regarding such sensitive and stigmatizing topic as use of illicit substance.) Ms. Richman further notes that it is reasonably foreseeable that “the media will report on or otherwise expose derogatory or stigmatizing information—such as the deceased servicemember's mental health struggles, drug and alcohol history, sexual history, or legal or disciplinary issues—in a way that blames the decedent for their death or results in the family's humiliation in the public eye.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 9); see also, e.g., Vaughn No. 23 (family has privacy interest in not having embarrassing/compromising information released regarding “alcohol related incident” and its consequences involving law enforcement); Vaughn No. 29 (family has interest in preventing dissemination of law enforcement's involvement in circumstances and basis for decedent's separation from military).

The Court agrees with Defendants that the surviving family members and next of kin have significant privacy interests in the records containing “arrest/law enforcement information” and “substance use information.” Release of records concerning such stigmatizing and potentially embarrassing topics as the decedents’ encounters with law enforcement and use of an illicit substance foreseeably could result in both additional anguish and unwanted attention for the individual's surviving family members. See Am. Civ. Lib. Union, 750 F.3d at 936; Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570 (explaining that family members have independent privacy interests in being “shielded by the exemption to secure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility”); Katz, 862 F. Supp. at 485; see also Espino v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 869 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29–30 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding family members of rape victim had “significant” privacy interests in lists of “items recovered from victim” and “other information of a personal and medical nature”).

*29 As relevant here, Defendants only assert the interests of third parties with respect to three of the “substance use information” records—Vaughn Nos. 38, 39, and 43. The Court incorporates by reference its earlier discussion of the privacy interests of third parties whose names appear in law enforcement records. (See Order at 34–36.)

Vaughn Nos. 38 and 43 comprise screenshots of private messages between the decedent and third-party civilian witnesses, (Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 38, 43), and Vaughn No. 39 summarizes a review of the decedent's cellphone records and contains quotations from the private messages. (Id., Vaughn No. 39.) More specifically, Vaughn No. 38 “consist[s] of four full-page screenshots of a private messenger exchange between Seaman Vo and a third-party civilian witness who had known Seaman Vo since childhood,” in which “the witness and Seaman Vo discussed Seaman Vo taking LSD on May 1, 2020.” (Id., Vaughn No. 38.)[7] Vaughn No. 39 describes private conversation the decedent had via Facebook messenger with a third-party civilian in which they “discuss[ed] drinking alcohol and smoking e-cigarettes or cannabidiol oil (CBD oil)” as well as their “desire to take various illicit narcotics[.]” (Id., Vaughn No. 39.) In another conversation, the decedent disclosed to a third party that “he and others had taken [REDACTED]” and that while he “did not start feeling the effects until an hour later,” his “friends were [REDACTED].” (Id.) Vaughn No. 43 consists, among other things, of “screenshots from text messages between Seaman Vo and a third party identified by first name, discussing alcohol and the drinking habits of another third party.” (Id., Vaughn No. 43.[8]) It also includes “screenshots of a secret end-to-end encrypted conversation between Seaman Vo and a civilian third party via Facebook Messenger referencing various personal topics as well as alcohol, e-cigarettes, marijuana, CBD oil, and LSD” which included photographs of “paraphernalia pertaining to these substances.” (Id.)

Defendants explain that the implicated third parties have “strong privacy interests in not having their private communications, collected in the course of a law enforcement investigation, disclosed to the public.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 38, 43; see also Vaughn No. 39.) Disclosure of such images and communications “could harm future investigations by making witnesses less inclined to cooperate with law enforcement if they know that investigating agencies will ultimately release their private communications into the public realm.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 38, 39, 43.) Plaintiffs respond that they have withdrawn all requests for the names of third parties in an attempt to mitigate these concerns. (See Pltfs.’ MSJ at 13 (citing Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 14); see also Defs.’ MSJ at 11.) Defendants maintain that merely redacting the third parties’ names will not adequately protect the third parties’ privacy interests because releasing the disputed items still “could reasonably be expected to lead to the identification of the third parties—whether to the public at large or to those in their respective communities, workplaces, or social circles—and to reveal those parties’ private information.” (Defs.’ MSJ at 11.) Further, disclosure of the records “could foreseeably cause harm to the privacy interests of those individuals by associating them publicly with a suicide investigation; by placing their sensitive personal information or communications into the public realm; and by exposing them anew to harassment, embarrassment, or stigma.” (Id. at 12.)

*30 As discussed above, courts have recognized that private citizens who cooperate with governmental investigations have an interest in maintaining the privacy of their identities and the nature of their assistance to the investigation. (See Order, supra, at 36–37.) This is particularly true where disclosure would “subject individuals to possible embarrassment, harassment, or the risk of mistreatment.” Cameranesi, 856 F.3d at 638. Indeed, where the subject of the records “ ‘is a private citizen,’ ‘the privacy interest ... is at its apex.’ ” Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570 (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780, 109 S.Ct. 1468).

Undoubtedly, records revealing third parties’ knowledge of, participation in, or desire to participate in using illegal or controlled substances implicates substantial privacy concerns. Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1125–26 (explaining that individuals had privacy interests in pardon applications that required disclosure of substance abuse because “[t]hese documents easily fall under the purview of an individual's ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,’ and controlling ‘information concerning his or her person’ ” (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762–63, 109 S.Ct. 1468)); Gov't Accountability Project v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com'n, No. 86-cv-1976, 1993 WL 13033518, at *3 (D.D.C. July 2, 1993) (upholding application of Exemption 7(C) to names and other identifying information from reports generated during government investigation of wrongdoing at nuclear facility involving allegations of “such provocative subjects as sexual harassment and drug abuse”); Frets, 1989 WL 222608, at *5 (applying Exemption 6 to bar disclosure of report of FAA special agent investigating allegations of off-duty time drug use by air traffic controllers where interviewee disclosed use or non-use of illegal drugs). And Vaughn Nos. 39 and 43 discuss the use of controlled or illicit substances by still other third parties, who likewise have substantial interests in not having their drinking habits or substance use disclosed to the public. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 39 (describing decedent's friends’ experience with LSD); Vaughn No. 43 (discussing alcohol and drinking habits of another third party).) Even if the records were released with the names redacted and faces of third parties blurred, it is reasonably foreseeable that these individuals could be identified from the substance or form of their communications with the decedent—e.g., use of a specific platform to communicate, turns of phrase or spelling errors unique to a particular individual. See, e.g., Frets, 1989 WL 222608, at *4 (concluding confidential sources in law enforcement investigation had substantial privacy interest in nondisclosure of their handwritten statements because they “could be easily identified even if the names were redacted” and “[r]eprisals might well follow”). Accordingly, Defendants are correct that disclosure of these records, particularly in connection with a law enforcement investigation, foreseeably would expose these third parties to harassment, embarrassment, or stigma and, potentially, could impact their employment. (See Richman Decl. ¶ 10; Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 38, 39, 43.)

Having found nontrivial privacy interests, the Court proceeds to weigh those interests against the public's interest in disclosure. The Court need not repeat the standard for performing the balancing of interests. (See Order, supra, at 40–41.)

Here, Plaintiffs argue generally that the requested information “will reveal what the military knew about the mental health challenges of the decedents before they died and whether these deaths were in any way preventable.” (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 17.) More specifically, Huntsberry attests that he is “interested in” the arrest and law enforcement information “to the extent that it sheds light on what information the military had regarding the decedent's mental health history.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 22.) “That information, in turn, will inform the public's understanding as to whether the decedent's behavior suggested that he was at risk of suicide.” (Id.) As to the substance use information, he explains that he is “interested in redacted information regarding substance use because it will contribute to the public's understanding of how the use of drugs and alcohol in the military is linked to deaths by suicide.” (Id. ¶ 34.) “This information will inform the public as to how the military may attempt to reduce the incidence of suicide by addressing substance abuse and/or detect those who are at risk due to their related substance abuse issues.” (Id.)

*31 Defendants raise the same arguments in response—i.e., that Plaintiffs have failed to show a nexus between the specific requested information and the public interest advanced and, consequently, have not shown that the “marginal additional usefulness” of the requested information outweighs the privacy interests at stake. (See Order, supra, at 42.) Once again, the Court agrees with Defendants. Plaintiffs have not shown the requisite “nexus” between the requested information and the public interest they claim the information will advance. See Lahr, 569 F.3d at 978. As before, Plaintiffs argue that disclosure of the requested information will reveal “what the military knew.” (See, e.g., Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 22.) And, as before, this argument rests on the premise that the same information the Navy has collected through its death investigations also was available to it before the deaths occurred.[9] However, as the Vaughn Index makes clear, much of the information at issue was collected during the death investigations and, therefore, was not within the Navy's control prior to the deaths. (See generally Vaughn Index.)

For example, Huntsberry explains that he is interested in Vaughn No. 3 “to the extent that it sheds light on what information the military had regarding the decedent's mental health history. That information, in turn, will inform the public's understanding as to whether the decedent's behavior suggested that he was at risk of suicide.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 22.) This statement rings hollow considering the Vaughn Index's explanation that the summary of the decedent's history with law enforcement was compiled as part of a “limited assistance investigation ... initiated to assist the San Diego Police Department's (SDPD) investigation into the circumstances leading to the death of V/HEDGES by providing any information requested.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 3 (emphasis added).) Moreover, as the Vaughn Index notes, the law enforcement history compiled in Vaughn No. 3 largely concerns events that “occurred nine years or more” prior to the death, “including events that occurred when he was a minor.” (Id.) Plaintiffs do not explain, and the Court cannot see, how information that was not in the Navy's possession prior to the deaths at issue could possibly serve the public interests Plaintiffs have identified.

*32 Further, as before, despite Plaintiffs’ contention that disclosing the requested information will “help the public understand what warning signs the decedent exhibited before he died,” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 24), they fail to explain how this will happen. For example, Plaintiffs seek disclosure of Vaughn No. 29, which summarizes an interview with a “third-party junior enlisted member,” who disclosed the rumor he or she had heard regarding the reason why the decedent was separating from the Navy. (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 29.) Huntsberry is “interested in this redacted information because it will inform the public's understanding as to the possible connections between Madeus’ separation from the Navy, his alcohol use, struggles over his sexuality, and his mental health issues.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 24.) “In other words, this information will help the public understand what warning signs the decedent exhibited before he died.” (Id.) The Court disagrees. Disclosure of Vaughn No. 29 will reveal a rumor that circulated about the reason for the decedent's alleged separation from the Navy. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 29.) Plaintiffs do not attempt to explain how an unsubstantiated rumor will allow the public to “read the tea leaves” of the decedent's files to divine past “warning signs” the decedent exhibited. Nor do Plaintiffs explain how disclosure of an unsubstantiated rumor will shed light on the Navy's performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what their government is up to—the only relevant public interest under FOIA. See Bibles, 519 U.S. at 355–56, 117 S.Ct. 795.

As another example, Plaintiffs seek Vaughn No. 38, which discusses the decedent's “taking LSD,” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 38), because it “will contribute to the public's understanding of how the use of drugs and alcohol in the military is linked to deaths by suicide,” (id. ¶ 34). While Plaintiffs argue that “[k]nowing more about this incident” will serve the public's “interest in understanding how the military is or is not addressing substance abuse in connection with suicide deaths,” Plaintiffs do not explain how disclosure of screenshots discussing a single incident in which the decedent used an illicit substance will inform the public's greater understanding of the link between drugs and suicide in the military. (Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 8; see also generally Pltfs.’ MSJ; Huntsberry Decl.) Nor do Plaintiffs explain how these screenshots from a private Facebook messenger exchange between the decedent and a third party reveal anything about the agencies’ conduct. (See generally Pltfs.’ MSJ; Huntsberry Decl.) Moreover, given that the Vaughn Index already summarizes the substance of the messages, it is unclear how the underlying messages will shed any further light on the incident, as Plaintiffs contend, or on the operations of the Navy.

Enabling the public to trawl through a decedent's past to offer their own speculation as to why a decedent committed suicide is not a cognizable public interest under FOIA. See Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 518 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that releasing names of individuals present at nuclear accident would serve public interest by “allow[ing] the public to fully appreciate the human cost of the Palomares clean-up”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to identify a significant public interest in disclosure of the requested “arrest/law enforcement information” and “substance use information.” See, e.g., Rollins, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 554 (finding no interest in public disclosure where plaintiff failed to offer evidence or argument that disclosure of decedent's identity would “shed any light on the Department's performance of its statutory duties”).

The Court further concludes, as before, that even if the Court were to find that Plaintiffs had demonstrated a significant public interest in disclosure, the public's interest in understanding the circumstances surrounding the decedents’ deaths has been adequately served by the disclosures that have been made. See Ray, 502 U.S. at 178, 112 S.Ct. 541. The Court notes, for instance, that the Vaughn Index indicates that, as to at least one record, “released pages immediately preceding the screenshots summarize the investigators’ interview of that witness and provide context” and that the interview summary does not “contain any disputed redactions.” (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 38.)

Finally, the Court would find that the moderate privacy interests of the decedents and the significant privacy interests of their families and of third parties in the highly personal information linked to specific decedents far outweigh any public interest in “understanding” the warning signs these specific decedents exhibited. See, e.g., Am. Civ. Lib. Union, 750 F.3d at 936 (finding privacy interests of potentially deceased individuals who were the subject of prosecutions that ended in dismissals or acquittal, and the privacy interests of their families, were “substantial” and properly withheld under Exemption 7(C)); Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1126 (affirming application of Exemption 6 to pardon applications disclosing criminal history and substance abuse as implicating “far more serious privacy interests than those at stake in Reporters Comm.”); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (“[FOIA's] purpose, however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct.”); Yagman, 2014 WL 1245305, at *8 (upholding application of Exemption 7(C) to ten pages of emails in which third-party witnesses responded to government's questions, as disclosure of such information “could lead to harassment, harm, or exposure to unwanted and/or derogatory publicity and inferences arising from their connection to the case”).

*33 In sum, the Court finds that the deceased individuals, their families, and the implicated third parties have nontrivial privacy interests in the records at issue that are not outweighed by the public interests Plaintiffs have identified. Thus, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendants on the application of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to the withheld information in the “intimate/sexual information,” “arrest/law enforcement information,” and “substance use information” categories.

Defendants have categorized one item in the Vaughn Index as a “performance evaluation” that “consists of information from the decedent's military performance evaluation.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 17.) As to this one item, Defendants have asserted privacy interests on behalf of the deceased servicemember and that person's family. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 9.)

Defendants also have categorized four items in the Vaughn Index as “disciplinary record information” consisting of “information from the decedent's military disciplinary record.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 18.) As to these four items, Defendants again have asserted privacy interests on behalf of the deceased servicemembers and their families. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 16, 20, 22, 33.) The Court already has determined that Vaughn Nos. 22 and 33 properly were withheld pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C), (see Order, supra, at 53), and, accordingly, confines its analysis to Vaughn Nos. 16 and 20.

As the Court already has discussed at length, the fact of death diminishes, but does not eliminate, an individual's privacy interests. See Schrecker, 254 F.3d at 166. Exemption 6 expressly carves out “personnel” files as being exempt from disclosure if their release “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Courts in the Ninth Circuit have recognized that living individuals have nontrivial privacy interests in “personnel matters including performance evaluations[.]” Church of Scientology Int'l v. I.R.S., 845 F. Supp. 714, 724–25 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (upholding application of Exemption 6 to documents disclosing, among other things, employees’ performance evaluations); see also Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A government employee generally has a privacy interest in any file that reports on an investigation that could lead to the employee's discipline or censure.”); Painting Indus. of Haw., 26 F.3d at 1483 (concluding workers on federally-funded construction projects have “a substantial privacy interest in information tying their names and addresses to precise payroll figures”). In Department of the Air Force v. Rose, law students submitted a FOIA request for “case summaries of honor and ethics hearings” that were “maintained in the United States Air Force Academy's Honor and Ethics Code Reading Files.” 425 U.S. at 355, 96 S.Ct. 1592. The Supreme Court held that FOIA required disclosure of the case summaries “with personal references or other identifying information deleted.” Id. at 380, 96 S.Ct. 1592.

Here, Plaintiffs seek the summary of a performance evaluation of decedent Seaman Apprentice Brian Gibbons that discloses his “average score of [REDACTED] out of a possible 5” and remarks “discussing and evaluating the quality of the decedent's performance of his military duties.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 9.) They likewise seek disclosure of a summary of Lance Corporal McGavin's Official Military Personnel File, which contains “derogatory military disciplinary information concerning the deceased individual, and a description of the underlying events that led to said discipline,” (id., Vaughn No. 16), and disclosure of a summary of “sensitive and potentially stigmatizing information concerning Seaman Madeus from his personnel records,” (id., Vaughn No. 20). Defendants contend broadly that “individuals have a personal privacy interest in these categories of information and normally would not desire them to be disseminated to the public for the sake of their own reputation and peace of mind,” and that releasing the disputed items would harm that privacy interest, “which does not terminate upon death.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 9.) More specifically, Defendants argue with respect to Vaughn No. 9 that “release of the average evaluation score and performance remarks on the evaluation would violate a privacy interest of the decedent ... A sailor has a privacy interest in keeping the official evaluation by his superiors of his job performance private.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 9.) “It could cause embarrassment or discomfort to have a critical evaluation of one's job performance released to the world.” (Id.) As to Vaughn Nos. 16 and 20, Defendants maintain that “[r]elease of derogatory military disciplinary information would cause embarrassment, lessened esteem, and violate the expectation of privacy of the individuals whom it concerns.” (Id., Vaughn No. 16; see also Vaughn No. 20 (decedent has privacy interest in “derogatory information about him contained in his personnel records”).)

*34 The Court is unaware of, and the Parties have not identified, any case that has addressed the privacy interests of deceased individuals in their own performance evaluations or disciplinary records. Nevertheless, the Court is mindful of both the Supreme Court's recognition in Rose that living servicemembers had nontrivial privacy interests in summaries of honor and ethics hearings that took place while they were cadets, 425 U.S. at 381, 96 S.Ct. 1592, and of the Supreme Court's admonition in Favish that personal privacy under Exemption 7(C) is “not some limited or cramped notion of that idea,” 541 U.S. at 165, 124 S.Ct. 1570. In particular, disclosure was permissible in Rose only because the plaintiffs’ “request for access to summaries ‘with personal references or other identifying information deleted,’ respected the confidentiality interests embodied in Exemption 6.” Id. at 380, 96 S.Ct. 1592. By contrast, here, no such anonymity is possible, as the information pertaining to the decedents’ performance evaluation and disciplinary history already are publicly linked to the specific decedents named. While the Ninth Circuit has not had occasion to determine whether deceased individuals retain privacy interests in their reputations, see Fiduccia, 185 F.3d at 1047, the D.C. Circuit, which writes frequently on FOIA, has noted that “certain reputation interests” survive death, Campbell, 164 F.3d at 33–34. Because comments evaluating an individual's performance and descriptions of the way an individual was professionally disciplined are matters that individuals—dead or alive—“ordinarily would not wish to make known about himself or herself,” the Court finds that the deceased servicemembers implicated retain nontrivial privacy interests in their performance evaluation and personnel records that are more than de minimis. See Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 517; see also E.G., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 236 (finding staff sergeant in the Air Force had privacy interest in documents pertaining to hearings before the Air Force's Administrative Discharge Board where plaintiff had testified that the staff sergeant sexually assaulted her and upholding Air Force's application of Exemption 6 to such documents); Sanders v. U.S. Dep't of Just., No. 09-cv-1425, 2010 WL 3447271, at *6–7 (D. S.C. Aug. 9, 2010), report and recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3447262 (D. S.C. Aug. 31, 2010), aff'd 408 Fed. App'x 722 (4th Cir. 2011) (recommending court uphold application of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to specific employee's job performance evaluations contained in her personnel file, which included “information such as a final rating on each performance standard, rating official's comments, reviewer's comments, chief executive officer's comments, and the rating official's narrative comments for each job element”); Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1125 (finding pardon applications disclosing applicant's employment history and military record “easily fall under purview of Exemption 6” given “individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762–63, 109 S.Ct. 1468)); Painting Indus. of Haw., 26 F.3d at 1483; Triestman v. U.S. Dep't of Just., Drug Enf't Admin., 878 F. Supp. 667, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (recognizing that government employees have “privacy interests in their employment histories and performance evaluations”); FLRA v. Dep't of Commerce, 962 F.2d 1055, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (explaining that a “mandatory personnel evaluation, favorable or not, is intensely personal” and that “employees have a substantial interest in keeping this information private”).

As above, neither the Court nor the Parties have identified any authorities addressing whether surviving family members have privacy interests in records disclosing a loved one's performance evaluation or military disciplinary history. Here, as before, Defendants generally explain that “there is a reasonably foreseeable risk that these items of information would be disseminated or sensationalized in the public realm if released, thus causing unnecessary pain and renewed grief for the decedent's family and survivors.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 9.) With respect to Vaughn No. 9, Defendants explain, “the decedent's family have an interest in not having this information on public display. It could cause emotional harm or upset surviving family members to have the public at large reading the personal evaluation of their deceased loved one. That personal information is rightly reserved for the family members with love and relation for the deceased, not the public.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 9.) Similarly, Defendants maintain that the deceased's surviving family members have “a privacy interest in ... derogatory information about him contained in his personnel records,” as described in Vaughn No. 20. (Id., Vaughn No. 20.) Release of Vaughn No. 16 “would also cause renewed grief and emotional harm to the decedent's family.” (Id., Vaughn No. 16.) Ms. Richman further notes that it is reasonably foreseeable that “the media will report on or otherwise expose derogatory or stigmatizing information—such as the deceased servicemember's mental health struggles, drug and alcohol history, sexual history, or legal or disciplinary issues—in a way that blames the decedent for their death or results in the family's humiliation in the public eye.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 9.)

Just as the Court found that the family members had privacy interests in records containing law enforcement information and substance use information (see Order, supra, at 60–61), so too, the Court finds that surviving family members and next of kin have nontrivial privacy interests in the performance evaluation and disciplinary records of their deceased loved ones. Releasing records concerning stigmatizing and potentially embarrassing topics, like the decedent's subpar performance review or disciplinary actions taken against the decedent, foreseeably could result in both additional anguish and unwanted attention for the decedents’ surviving family members. See Am. Civ. Lib. Union, 750 F.3d at 936 (“[Deceased defendants never convicted of a crime] may also have family members who themselves have a legitimate interest in avoiding the increased scrutiny that could follow from the release of the requested docket information.”); Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570 (explaining that family members have independent privacy interests in being “shielded by the exemption to secure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility”); Katz, 862 F. Supp. at 485; see also Espino v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 869 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29–30 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding family members of rape victim had “significant” privacy interests in lists of “items recovered from victim” and “other information of a personal and medical nature”).

*35 The Court, again, proceeds to weigh the nontrivial privacy interests it has identified against the public's interest in disclosure. The Court does not repeat the standard for performing the balancing of those interests. (See Order, supra, at 40–41.)

Plaintiffs continue to argue generally that the requested information “will reveal what the military knew about the mental health challenges of the decedents before they died and whether these deaths were in any way preventable.” (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 17.) More specifically, Huntsberry explains that he is “interested in” the performance evaluation “because it will contribute to the public's understanding of how the decedent's service in the military interacted with his mental health issues.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 44.) “In other words, I am curious as to what warning signs the decedent displayed and whether there were ways in which the death was preventable.” (Id.; see also Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 6 (explaining that the performance evaluation will “contribute to the public's understanding of what warning signs the decedent displayed, i.e., whether the military was on notice of his mental health issues and could have intervened”).) Similarly, regarding the disciplinary record information, Huntsberry explains that he is “interested in this redacted information because it will contribute to the public's understanding of how disciplinary actions taken by the military influenced the decedents’ mental health (or vice versa).” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 47; see also Pltfs.’ MSJ at 17.)

Defendants, likewise, raise the same arguments in response—i.e., that Plaintiffs have failed to show a nexus between the specific requested information and the public interest advanced and, consequently, have not shown that the privacy interests are outweighed by the “marginal additional usefulness” that the requested information would serve in revealing “what the government is up to.” (See Defs.’ Opp'n at 12–13.) They maintain that “Plaintiff Huntsberry's desire to investigate the personal foibles and individual mental health struggles of particular servicemembers ... is not a cognizable public interest under FOIA.” (Id.)

As a preliminary matter, Defendants are correct that the reasons Plaintiffs are seeking the withheld information is “irrelevant to our inquiry.” Forest Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d at 1025; see also Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (“[W]hether an invasion of privacy is warranted cannot turn on the purposes for which the request for information is made.”). Instead, because FOIA permits every member of the public equal access to public documents, documents disclosed pursuant to FOIA must be released to the greater public as well. Forest Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d at 1025. The proper focus, accordingly, is upon the “consequences of disclosure” of the information sought to the entire public. Id.; see also Painting Indus. of Haw., 26 F.3d at 1482 (“We must evaluate both the public benefit and the potential invasion of privacy by looking at the nature of the information requested and the uses to which it could be put if released to any member of the public.” (emphasis in original)).

Here, the Court again finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show the requisite “nexus” between the requested information and the public interests they claim the information will advance. See Lahr, 569 F.3d at 978. Unlike the majority of the previous records the Court has considered, there can be no dispute that the requested “performance evaluation” and “disciplinary record” information will reveal “what the military knew” with respect to the concerned decedents. (See Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 17; see also generally Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 9, 16, 20.) Plaintiffs, however, remain unable to connect the specific, requested information to the public interests advanced. For example, Vaughn No. 9 discloses the decedent's “average score” out of “a possible 5” and specific remarks concerning “the quality of the decedent's performance of his military duties.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 9.) Plaintiffs claim that this information will reveal “how the decedent's service in the military interacted with his mental health issues” and any “warning signs” the decedent displayed. (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 44.) They do not, however, explain how this will result. The Court and Defendants are left to speculate as to how knowing that the decedent received an average score of, for example, 3 out of 5 reveals any interaction between the decedent's military service and his mental health or otherwise discloses a “warning sign.” A score out of 5 is simply a score out of 5. Nor do Plaintiffs explain how remarks regarding the “quality” of the decedent's performance will inform the public's understanding of how the decedent's military performance interacted with his mental health. Indeed, the Court can conceive of no meaning that can be wrung from this information absent unchecked speculation. See Ray, 502 U.S. at 180, 112 S.Ct. 541 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that, under Exemption 6, the focus “must be solely upon what the requested information reveals, not upon what it might lead to” (emphasis in original)).

*36 Likewise, unredacting Vaughn No. 16 will reveal “military disciplinary information concerning the deceased individual, and a description of the underlying events that led to said discipline.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 16; see also Vaughn No. 20 (“derogatory” and “potentially stigmatizing” information contained in personnel records).) Plaintiffs claim that this information will contribute to the public's understanding either of the effect of disciplinary actions on the decedent's mental health or how the decedent's mental health resulted in disciplinary action being taken. (See Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 47; see also Pltfs.’ MSJ at 17.) First, as before, Plaintiffs fail to explain how this will result. Disclosing the reason that a servicemember was disciplined and the discipline imposed simply discloses those facts. To infer a causal relationship with the decedent's mental health requires Plaintiffs and the public to speculate. Second, the asserted public interest of “contributing to the public's understanding of” how one incident may have affected one servicemember's mental health remains fatally vague. See, e.g., Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 518 (rejecting as derivative use plaintiffs’ argument that releasing names of individuals present at nuclear accident would “allow the public to fully appreciate the human cost of the Palomares clean-up”). If a public interest could be framed so broadly, the public interest would always outweigh the countervailing privacy interests. See Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 958 F.2d 503, 512 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Compelling disclosure of personal information, that has no relationship to an agency's activities, on so attenuated a basis would inevitably result in the disclosure of virtually all personal information, thereby effectively eviscerating the protections of privacy provided by Exemption 6.”). Third, and most importantly, Plaintiffs fail to explain how the requested information will serve the only relevant public interest—shedding light on the agencies’ conduct or performance of their statutory duties. Although Plaintiffs argue that their requests seek information about “the military's actions or inactions,” as discussed above, the redactions at issue belie this. (See Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 6.) When placed in context, moreover, information about two disciplinary incidents involving two different servicemembers, (Vaughn Nos. 16, 20), does not provide any information about the agencies’ conduct or performance of their statutory duties. See MacLean, 2007 WL 935604, at *12 (concluding plaintiff had not demonstrated public interest in disclosure where plaintiff sought “to learn about the conduct of two military agencies by looking at six specific investigations in the 12 years between 1992 and 2004” because “when placed in context, information about six cases ‘does not provide information about the agency's own conduct.’ ”) (quoting Beck, 997 F.2d at 1493); see also E.G., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 238–39 (concluding that “the release of a singular proceeding would not substantially serve the public interest” because releasing “SSgt. Broome's records would be insufficient to show a pattern of misconduct by the Air Force in conducting administrative discharge boards”); Buckovetz v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, No. 15-cv-838, 2016 WL 8729934, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016) (upholding application of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to documents concerning investigation of a sexual harassment complaint where the government redacted names in the files, substantive, identifying information, and “factual allegations about the harassment, which include describing the conduct and identifying accused co-workers and witnesses”).

In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to show a significant public interest in disclosure of the requested “performance evaluation” and “disciplinary information.” See Beck, 997 F.2d at 1493 (“[B]ecause there is nothing in such information that would in itself shed light on the employer agency's actions, there is no public interest in its release.”). Further, even if the Court were to perform the requisite balancing, the Court would find that Plaintiffs have not shown that the “marginal additional usefulness” of the specific information withheld does not outweigh the privacy interests at stake. Lahr, 569 F.3d at 978. The public's interest in understanding the circumstances surrounding the decedents’ deaths has been adequately served by the disclosures that have been made. See Ray, 502 U.S. at 178, 112 S.Ct. 541. When weighed against the moderate privacy interests of the deceased servicemembers in their reputations and the significant privacy interests of their surviving family members and next-of-kin in avoiding unwanted attention and in controlling dissemination of potentially stigmatizing or embarrassing information about their loved ones, the public's interest in speculating as to the cause and effect between the servicemembers’ mental health and their professional performance comes up short. See Sanders, 2010 WL 3447271, at *6–7 (upholding application of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to files containing information regarding “personnel actions, job performance, reviewer's actions and comments and evaluations” of specific individual); Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1125 (finding pardon applications disclosing applicant's employment history and military record “easily fall under purview of Exemption 6” given “individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762–63, 109 S.Ct. 1468)); Painting Indus. of Haw., 26 F.3d at 1483; Triestman, 878 F. Supp. at 669 (recognizing that government employees have “privacy interests in their employment histories and performance evaluations” and granting summary judgment for government where plaintiff sought information regarding whether thirteen DEA agents had been investigated for perjury or mishandling of evidence); Church of Scientology, 845 F. Supp. at 724–25 (granting summary judgment for government as to application of Exemption 6 to documents disclosing, among other things, employees’ performance evaluations); FLRA, 962 F.2d at 1060 (concluding public interest served by releasing information regarding “the names, duty stations, and locations of all bargaining unit employees who had received outstanding or commendable personnel evaluations” was not overcome by “substantial invasion” of employees’ privacy that would result). Production of the requested information could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy—both of the decedents and their families—that cannot be mitigated because the identities of the decedents already are publicly available. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 380–81, 96 S.Ct. 1592 (finding disclosure of honor and ethics hearings permissible because identifying information could be redacted); Hunt, 972 F.2d at 288 (“Because Hunt's FOIA request sought access to a single file that contained information about one particular agent, disclosure of any material contents of this file, coupled with the public availability of Hunt's FOIA request naming the agent, would make redaction of the file a pointless exercise.”). Moreover, in contrast to the multitude of summaries at issue in Rose, the comparatively small sampling of files here will not shed any light on whether a causal relationship between the disciplining of servicemembers in the Navy and their mental health.

*37 The Court finds that the deceased individuals and their families have nontrivial privacy interests in the “performance evaluation” and “disciplinary information” records at issue, that it is reasonably foreseeable that those interests would be harmed by disclosure, and that those interests are not outweighed by the public interests Plaintiffs have advanced. Thus, in the absence of evidence contradicting the agencies’ justifications for nondisclosure of the agencies’ bad faith, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendants on the application of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to the withheld information in this broader category.

Defendants have categorized three items on the Vaughn Index as “suicide note/journal entries” that “consist of the decedent's suicide note or journal entries.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 19.) As to these three items, Defendants have asserted privacy interests on behalf of the deceased servicemembers, their families, and third parties. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 17–19.)

Defendants have further categorized five items on the Vaughn Index as “images/screenshots” that “consist of images or screenshots of private or sensitive information, including photocopies of a decedent's handwritten journal entries and screenshots of private communications between decedents and third parties.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 20.) “[T]he contents of the images themselves are often summarized in unredacted text on the released pages, but the images themselves are withheld.” (Id.) As to these five items, Defendants assert privacy interests on behalf of the deceased servicemembers, and third parties. (Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 18, 19, 38, 43, 53.) The Court already has determined that the government properly applied Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to Vaughn Nos. 38, 43, and 53 (see Order, supra, at 36–54, 64–68), and accordingly, confines its analysis to Vaughn Nos. 18 and 19.

The Court already has explained at length that the fact of death diminishes, but does not eliminate, an individual's privacy interests. See Schrecker, 254 F.3d at 166. The Court likewise has explained that surviving family members and next-of-kin have their own privacy interests in the death-scene images of loved ones, see Favish, 541 U.S. at 170–73, 124 S.Ct. 1570, and that courts have recognized family members’ privacy interests with respect to other intimate details about their loved ones, see, e.g., Wolk Law Firm, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 527. Similarly, the Court has described third parties’ substantial privacy interests in not having their private information disclosed, particularly in connection with a law enforcement investigation. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570. Because there is a dearth of authority regarding privacy interests in suicide notes and journal entries, the Court will combine its discussion of the relevant privacy interests.

As relevant here, in Sikes v. United States Department of the Navy, a FOIA requestor sought a suicide note that a deceased admiral in the Navy had written to his wife. 896 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2018). The decedent, then Chief of Naval Operations, had written two notes before taking his life—one to his wife, and one to his sailors. Id. The Navy publicly released the note addressed to his sailors but withheld the one addressed to his wife. Id. The Eleventh Circuit found that the same privacy interests identified in Favish “apply here and to an even greater degree.” Id. at 1238. Because the “requested suicide note would intrude not only into the memory of a deceased loved one, but more specifically into the intimate and private relationship between Adm. Boorda and his wife,” the decedent and his wife had “the strongest personal-privacy interest in such matters.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

*38 Similarly, in American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, an advocacy group submitted a FOIA request for documents regarding the deaths of individuals in ICE's custody, including the handwritten notes of one detainee who committed suicide. 738 F. Supp. 2d at 98. Citing Favish, the court found that the decedent's family had substantial privacy interests in “[t]he writings of a detainee in the days leading up to her suicide,” which were “likely to contain personal information” that “sensibly should be withheld for privacy reasons.” Id. at 116–17.

Here, Vaughn No. 17 comprises “a verbatim transcription of the final journal entry of the deceased, the suspected suicide note,” which “contains specific messages addressed to LCpl McGavin's family, to named individuals, and to individual military members (who are referenced solely by rank but would likely be identifiable to individuals with knowledge of LCpl McGavin's personal or work life).” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 17.) Vaughn Nos. 18 and 19, which have been withheld in their entirety, consist of photocopies of the decedent's “private journal pages with varying degrees of legibility, apparently handwritten by Lance Corporal McGavin on and off over a period of a few months.” (Id., Vaughn No. 18; see also Vaughn No. 19.) The journal entries consist of (a) “[p]rivate religious thoughts and prayers;” (b) “[d]iscussions of McGavin's personal struggles and private relationships with named individuals;” (c) “[n]otes and letters pertaining to individuals identified by first name containing personal sentiments and statements of farewell;” (d) “[a] handwritten draft of an apparent memorandum titled as a ‘Rebuttal of Negative Counseling,’ which recounts conversations with McGavin's coworkers and low-level superiors (who could reasonably be expected to be identified by knowledgeable individuals from the contents of the notes) regarding an apparent workplace issue;” and (e) “[a] four-page handwritten log of approximately 13 workdays recounting conversations with, orders from, reporting times of, and Covid test results of McGavin's coworkers and low-level superiors (who could reasonably be expected to be identified by knowledgeable individuals from the contents of the notes).” (Id., see Vaughn Nos. 18, 19.) Immediately before the latter log is a “handwritten note stating that the record is being kept to ‘keep[ ] note of the suspicious actions of my coworkers and chain of command, with hopes to have evidence if any wrongdoing is brought to light.” (Id., Vaughn No. 19.) The Court's in camera review confirms the accuracy of these descriptions. Much of the materials consist of religious sentiments and prayers, final remarks to family and other individuals, and reflections on the decedent's personal struggles, particularly in her romantic and sexual relationships. In light of the Court's review, the Court agrees that no segregable, non-exempt material has been withheld.

Defendants explain that “revealing [the decedent's] suicide note and/or journal entries bares their most intimate thoughts and experiences to the world and thus violates the decedent and the family's reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Id., Vaughn No. 17; see also Vaughn Nos. 18, 19.) “Exposing the interior and private life of the decedent to public scrutiny would also cause additional pain and grief to the family.” (Id., Vaughn Nos. 17, 18, 19.) Further, “the potentially identifiable third-party individuals referenced by name or rank have a privacy interest in not being associated with a law enforcement death investigation, and in individual private remarks either addressed to them or about them.” (Id., Vaughn Nos. 17, 18, 19.) “Even if specific names and titles were redacted, revealing the remarks about living individuals contained in a suicide note would likely subject them to unwarranted pain, embarrassment, or stigma.” (Id., Vaughn Nos. 17, 18, 19.) With respect to Vaughn Nos. 18 and 19, Defendants add that “[d]isclosure is particularly likely to result in harm here because photographs and screenshots that are released are more likely to be used or reproduced in publications to sensationalize sensitive topics.” (Id., Vaughn Nos. 18, 19.) “Decedents and families normally would not expect or desire screenshots from private communications regarding sensitive and/or stigmatizing topics to be disclosed to the public, particularly in a manner that is likely to be sensationalized in the public realm.” (Id., Vaughn Nos. 18, 19.)

*39 The Court has no trouble in concluding that the decedents and their surviving family members have the strongest privacy interests in both the suicide note (Vaughn No. 17) and the journal entries (Vaughn Nos. 18, 19). The “requested suicide note would intrude not only into the memory of a deceased loved one, but more specifically into the intimate and private relationship” between the decedent and her family members. Sikes, 896 F.3d at 1238. The Supreme Court has “recognized the ‘weighty privacy interests’ of family members seeking to preserve their private memories of a deceased loved one and to ‘secure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility.’ ” Id. (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 166–67, 171, 124 S.Ct. 1570). As in Sikes, disclosure of the suicide note would reveal the “deeply personal sentiments” the decedent chose to share with her family and friends in the final days of her life. Id. at 1238. Nor are the privacy interests any weaker for the third parties whom decedent named in the suicide notes and to whom, or about whom, she addressed her final remarks. Indeed, it is self-evident that such third parties have strong privacy interests in not being associated with a law enforcement suicide investigation—let alone the suicide note. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570 (explaining that, where the third party's “link to the official inquiry” is the “result of mere happenstance,” the third party's privacy interest is “at its apex” (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780, 109 S.Ct. 1468)). It is reasonably foreseeable that, even with redactions of names and titles, the third parties referenced in the suicide note would be identifiable within their smaller communities and that disclosure of the remarks the decedent made to them or about them “would likely subject them to unwarranted pain, embarrassment, or stigma.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 17.)

Similarly, the writings of a decedent “in the days leading up to her suicide” are “likely to contain personal information,” Am. Civ. Lib. Union, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 117, like “entries related to possible suicidal ideations” and “notes apologizing to family members,” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 19). The decedent and their families have the “strongest personal-privacy interest” in such matters. Sikes, 896 F.3d at 1238. Third parties also have strong privacy interests in the journal entries describing their relationship with the decedent. Disclosure of these entries reasonably could allow their identification within their smaller communities, subjecting them to “unwarranted pain, embarrassment, or stigma,” (Vaughn Nos. 18, 19), either from the content of the comments or the connection to the suicide investigation. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570.

The Court recognizes that the journal entries in Vaughn Nos. 18 and 19 span “a period of a few months” and consist of more than just words of farewell. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 18, 19.) While the strongest privacy interests inhere in the suicide note and goodbye notes, the other journal entries still reveal the decedent's private thoughts and opinions on a variety of topics, including her religious beliefs, personal struggles, relationships with others, and workplace issues. (See id.) The decedent and her surviving family members retain significant interests in these private reflections, as do the third parties about whom the decedent has written. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 166–67, 171, 124 S.Ct. 1570; see also Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 517 (finding decedents and their families retained privacy interest in records that would reflect whether decedents were exposed to radiation); see also Associated Press, 554 F.3d at 287 (explaining that Guantanamo detainees who were victims of abuse had an “interest in keeping the personal facts of their abuse from the public eye and in avoiding disclosure of their identities in order to prevent embarrassment”); Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1125 (finding pardon applications disclosing applicant's employment history and military record “easily fall under purview of Exemption 6” given “individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762–63, 109 S.Ct. 1468)); Off. of Cap. Collateral Couns., N. Region of Fla. ex rel. Mordenti v. Dep't of Just., 331 F.3d 799, 804 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing district court order requiring disclosure where requested hearing transcript and final decision letter revealed Assistant United States Attorney's “candid disclosure of her private thoughts and feelings concerning her misconduct in [U.S. v.] Sterba [22 F.Supp.2d 1333 (M.D. Fla. 1998)] and its effect on her, her family, and her career”).

Having found substantial privacy interests at stake in Vaughn Nos. 17–19, the Court turns to the public interests in disclosure that Plaintiffs advance.

*40 Attempting to distinguish Sikes, Plaintiffs note that the plaintiff in that case “d[id] not seriously dispute th[e] characterization” of the widow's privacy interest in her husband's suicide note and argue that here, by contrast, Plaintiffs “are interested in the notes to the extent that they reveal a decedent's experience in the military and how that experience may have contributed to the person's death.” (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 11–12.) They further argue that the “expressions of depression and suicidal ideation in notes and journals may reveal any warning signs that were missed, whether the decedent sought out resources that would have put the military on notice of their mental health struggles, and whether there were opportunities to intervene.” (Id. at 17.) Huntsberry explains that he agrees that redacted notes or portions of a note containing only “sentiments directed to the decedent's family, partners, or loved ones” may “properly remain redacted or withheld.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 49; see also Pltfs.’ MSJ at 12.) However, he contends that journal entries and notes revealing “the decedent's mindset before her death” will “shed light on the warning signs this decedent exhibited and whether this death was preventable.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 50.)

Defendants similarly reiterate their arguments that Plaintiffs have failed to show a nexus between the specific requested information and the public interest advanced and, therefore, have not shown that the “marginal additional usefulness” of the requested information outweighs the privacy interests at stake. (Defs.’ Opp'n at 12–13.) They further point out that Plaintiffs articulate the same interests that the plaintiff in Sikes advanced and the Eleventh Circuit rejected. (Id. at 9.) In Sikes, the plaintiff sought the suicide note because he believed it would show “pressures Admiral Boorda faced as a naval officer” and that the decedent “was under significant pressure in light of the military's criminalization of adultery.” 896 F.3d at 1238. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's speculations about job pressure the decedent might have faced “touch[ed] only tangentially upon the only interest that matters for FOIA purposes: contributing to the public's understanding of the operations or activities of the government.” Id. (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 775, 109 S.Ct. 1468) (emphasis in original).

The Court, once again, agrees with Defendants. Plaintiffs speculate that the suicide note and journal entries would reveal the “decedent's experience in the military and how that experience may have contributed to the person's death.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 49.) Following the Court's in camera review, the Court declines to confirm or deny Plaintiffs’ suspicions but notes that even if the Court were to confirm such suspicions, a “glimpse into the general level of pressure that came with” the decedent's military service “would not ‘contribut[e] significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities’ of the Navy,” Sikes, 896 F.3d at 1238 (quoting Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 495, 114 S.Ct. 1006). While it is true that, in Sikes, the Navy previously had disclosed the suicide note addressed to the decedent's sailors that did mention certain job pressures, 896 F.3d at 1239, Plaintiffs fail to explain, and the Court does not see, how disclosure of one relatively low-ranking individual's “personal struggles” and “warning signs” would shed any light on the Navy's or U.S. Marine Corps’ operations or activities. Nor do Plaintiffs attempt to explain how the decedent's “[p]rivate religious thoughts and prayers” or details regarding her “private relationships with named individuals” will contribute to the public's understanding of the operations or activities of those branches. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 18, 19; see also Pltfs.’ MSJ; Pltfs’ Opp'n.)

Further, here, as in Sikes, “[t]here is nothing to indicate” that the suicide note or journal entries were “in any sense a product of the Navy” or of the decedent's “official duties,” 896 F.3d at 1239, particularly in light of the fact that the note and entries were contained in the decedent's personal journals, one of which was “hidden in a bedside table[.]” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 19.) “Indeed, the only reason the Navy even has the note is because” NCIS found the decedent's journals in her assigned barracks room. Sikes, 896 F.3d at 1239; (see also Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 17.)

*41 As above, the Court concludes that enabling the public to comb through the decedent's private reflections and farewell notes in search of “warning signs” is not a cognizable public interest under FOIA. See Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 518 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that releasing names of individuals present at nuclear accident would serve public interest by “allow[ing] the public to fully appreciate the human cost of the Palomares clean-up”). Because Plaintiffs have not identified a public interest more significant than having the information for its own sake, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a significant public interest in disclosure of the suicide notes and journal entries. But even if the Court had found a significant public interest, the Court would find that Plaintiffs have not shown that the substantial privacy interests at stake are outweighed by the “marginal additional usefulness” of these documents in contributing to the public's understanding of the warning signs these specific individuals may have exhibited before their deaths. Although the decedent's suicide note and journal entries are held within the Navy's files, the decedent, her family, and the third parties who appear in these documents, have not forfeited their substantial privacy interests in these entries merely because the decedent was serving in the military at the time of her death. See Sikes, 896 F.3d at 1240; Am. Civ. Lib. Union, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 116–17 (concluding journal entries from days before detainee's suicide were not of “any discernible public interest” that would outweigh the privacy interests of the decedent's family). Indeed, following the Court's in camera review of Vaughn Nos. 18 and 19, the Court is convinced that they should not be disclosed under any circumstance.

In sum, the Court finds that there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of Vaughn Nos. 17–19 would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy interests of the decedent, her surviving family members, and the third parties who appear in those documents that are not outweighed by the minimal public interests Plaintiffs have advanced.

Finally, Defendants have categorized one item on the Vaughn Index as a “web search” that “consists of quotations from the decedent's private internet searches.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 21.) As to this item, Defendants assert privacy interests on behalf of the deceased servicemember and his family. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 2.)

Defendants also have categorized six of the disputed items on the Vaughn Index as “internet use/social media information” that consists of “information about—or compilations of—the deceased servicemember's personal online activity, such as websites visited, social media activity, or account usernames.” (Richman Decl. ¶ 22.[10]) As to these seven items, Defendants assert privacy interests on behalf of the deceased servicemembers, their families, and third parties. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 7–8, 41–42, 51, 54–55.)

As before, in light of the paucity of cases addressing the privacy interests of individuals in their internet search history, social media handles, and social media posts under Exemptions 6 and 7(C), the Court will combine its discussion of the relevant privacy interests.

Here, Vaughn Index No. 2 comprises a list of the “various web searches SN Peralta appears to have conducted on his laptop before his death.” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 2.) Defendants explain that “[d]isclosure of quotations from the decedent's personal web searches reflecting various personal and emotional struggles would be an unwarranted invasion of the decedent's privacy and the family's privacy” because individuals normally would expect that their web searches and web history would remain private. (Id.) They further note that “[t]here is a significant risk that this information would be widely disseminated or sensationalized in the public realm if released, thus causing unnecessary pain and renewed grief for the decedent's family and survivors.” (Id.)

The remaining records chiefly consist of the decedents’ various social media posts (Id., Vaughn No. 7, 54, 55) and social media account identifiers (Id., Vaughn No. 8, 41, 42, 51). Defendants explain that “[d]isclosure of the exact quoted contents” of the decedent's “sensitive and personal social media posts would invade the family's privacy.” (Id., Vaughn No. 7.) They elaborate,

(Id., Vaughn No. 7.) Defendants offer similar explanations to justify withholding the decedents’ social media identifiers, including their usernames and handles. (See id., Vaughn Nos. 8, 41, 42, 51.) With respect to Vaughn Nos. 54 and 55, which contain “direct quotations” from the decedent's “personal Snapchat post and subsequent private communications to a friend,” Defendants explain that their disclosure would invade the decedent's and his family's privacy interests because such individuals “normally would not expect or desire quotations from private communications regarding sensitive and/or stigmatizing topics to be disclosed to the public after their deaths[.]” (Id., Vaughn No. 54; see also Vaughn No. 55.) Third-party witnesses likewise “have strong privacy interests in not having quotations from their private communications, collected in the course of a law enforcement investigation, disclosed to the public.” (Id.) Defendants note that such disclosures could harm future investigations by making witnesses less inclined to cooperate with law enforcement. (Id.; see also Vaughn No. 55.)

Plaintiffs counter that the privacy interests are “less acute” with respect to these records because the information, at one time, was “publicly available.” (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 11.) As such, “[t]here is a diminished privacy interest in these sort of records,” though Plaintiffs do not claim that the privacy interests at stake are de minimis. (Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 3.)

Few courts have had occasion to address whether the government can withhold information related to social media posts and account details pursuant to Exemption 7(C). In Electronic Privacy Information Center v. United States Department of Justice, the government withheld, among other things, the social media account information of third parties who were “unwittingly” involved in Russian nationals’ 2016 election interference efforts and of third parties who were merely mentioned in the Mueller Report. 490 F. Supp. 3d 246, 261–66 (D.D.C. 2020), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 18 F.4th 712 (D.C. Cir. 2021). The court concluded that, “pursuant to Exemption 7(C), the Department has appropriately withheld information relating to the unwitting third parties, the individuals not charged with having committed crimes by the Special Counsel's Office, and the individuals merely mentioned in the Mueller Report.” Id. at 263. On appeal, the plaintiff did not challenge the district court's holding with respect to these third parties. 18 F.4th at 716 n.4.

Relatedly, the Supreme Court has considered whether personal information should be disclosed when that information would be available publicly from other sources. In United States Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the privacy interest of bargaining unit employees in nondisclosure of their home addresses was nontrivial despite the fact that home addresses are often available from other sources, such as telephone directories and voter registration lists. 510 U.S. 487, 500–01, 114 S.Ct. 1006, 127 L.Ed.2d 325 (1994). The Supreme Court explained, “[a]n individual's interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that information may be available to the public in some form.” Id.

*43 Similarly, in Reporters Committee, reporters brought suit under FOIA to compel the Department of Justice to produce the rap sheet of Charles Medico, whose family had known ties to organized crime. 489 U.S. at 757, 109 S.Ct. 1468. The reporters argued that, because the events summarized in a rap sheet had previously been disclosed to the public, Medico's interest in avoiding disclosure of a federal compilation of these events was virtually nonexistent. Id. at 762–63, 109 S.Ct. 1468. The Court soundly rejected the reporters’ “cramped notion of personal privacy,” explaining that there was a distinction “in terms of personal privacy, between scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole.” Id. at 763–64, 109 S.Ct. 1468. “Plainly, there is a vast difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.” Id. at 764, 109 S.Ct. 1468. Accordingly, the Court found that a “strong privacy interest inheres in the nondisclosure of computerized information[.]” Id. at 766, 109 S.Ct. 1468.

Here, the Court finds that the decedents and their families retain privacy interests in the decedents’ private web searches and the URLs of specific pages of websites accessed (see Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 7, 42). Although the websites accessed, obviously, are public, the fact that the decedent searched specific terms or accessed a specific web page is not, and never was, public information. (See, e.g., id., Vaughn No. 42 (noting that decedent accessed Reddit thread on a “ ‘private’ tab of his cellphone's Internet browser” before his death).) As with the medical information, law enforcement information, and substance use information, decedents retain measurable interests in preventing disclosure of potentially stigmatizing and embarrassing matters that they “ordinarily would not wish to make known about himself or herself,” such as illicit drug use. Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 517; see also Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1125 (finding pardon applications disclosing substance abuse “easily fall under purview” of Exemption 6 given “individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 762–63, 109 S.Ct. 1468)). Decedents’ family members similarly retain measurable privacy interests in controlling the disclosure of such intimate details about their loved ones and in avoiding additional anguish and unwanted attention that may flow from such disclosures. See, e.g., Am. Civ. Lib. Union Found. S. Cal., ––– F. Supp. 3d at ––––, 2024 WL 3370532, at *13 (finding next-of-kin have “a privacy interest in controlling dissemination of the details of their or their loved one's personal lives, how they entered [ ] the United States, and interactions with immigration law enforcement”); Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570 (explaining that family members have independent privacy interests in being “shielded by the exemption to secure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility”).

For much the same reasons, the Court finds that measurable privacy interests inhere in the private messages that a decedent exchanged with his former teacher on Snapchat. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 54, 55.) Such messages were not publicly available (see id.), and further, the third party who sent and received messages, as well as the third parties merely mentioned in those messages, have the strongest privacy interests in avoiding disclosure of their private communications with the decedent and in avoiding being associated publicly with a law enforcement investigation. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 263 (recognizing privacy interests of “unwitting” third parties and third parties “merely mentioned” in their private social media information appearing in the Mueller Report); Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570 (explaining that, where the third party's “link to the official inquiry” is the “result of mere happenstance,” the third party's privacy interest is “at its apex” (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780, 109 S.Ct. 1468)); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (“[FOIA's] purpose, however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct.”). It is also reasonably foreseeable that disclosure of such communications could harm future investigations by making witnesses less inclined to cooperate with law enforcement—a possibility Plaintiffs do not dispute. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 54–55; Pltfs’ MSJ.)

*44 While the decedents’ social media posts and social media account information, which were publicly available at one time, present a closer question, the Court finds that the decedents retain nontrivial privacy interests in such information, as do their families. As in Federal Labor Relations Authority and Reporters Committee, the mere fact that it might be possible to locate the social media posts, usernames, and handles online does not eliminate the privacy interests in that information. See Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth., 510 U.S. at 500–01, 114 S.Ct. 1006 (individuals retained privacy interests in their home addresses despite availability of information from other sources); Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 764, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (recognizing strong privacy interest in rap sheet that compiled criminal history from vast network of sources). Plaintiffs here attempt to distinguish Reporters Committee on the ground that the criminal history information at issue there only could be located following a “diligent search” of files held by different entities all over the country. (See Pltfs.’ Opp'n at 3 n.2 (emphasis in original).) Although Plaintiffs are correct that the advent of the internet obviates the need for curious and sufficiently motivated individuals to scour physical records, the overwhelming amount of content available online still requires substantial sifting of information. Indeed, the fact that Plaintiff, an investigative reporter, apparently has been unable to locate the information at issue independently, supports the distinction the Supreme Court observed in Reporters Committee: there is a difference between bits of information scattered across millions of publicly available websites and a single file compiling those bits of information. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 764–66, 109 S.Ct. 1468.

Plaintiffs’ citations to Powell v. United States Department of Justice and Cohodes v. U.S. Department of Justice are equally unavailing. In Powell v. United States Department of Justice, the files sought were over twenty years old and concerned the highly publicized prosecution of suspected communists during the McCarthy era. 584 F. Supp. 1508, 1526 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Discussing Exemptions 6 and 7(C), the Powell court noted that “[t]he issues underlying the prosecution of the Powells and Schuman and the tenor of the times strongly suggest that some individuals may have waived their privacy interests by public involvement or disclosure.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Powell court underscored that “[t]he privacy interests of each of these groups have, however, seriously diminished with the passage of time” and noted that “the contemporaneity of the information is a major consideration.” Id.

In Cohodes v. U.S. Department of Justice, plaintiff sought disclosure of the names and email addresses of individuals who apparently provided information to the government as part of an investigation. No. 20-cv-4015, 2024 WL 2701618, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2024). The government withheld the information pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. In rejecting the government's application of these exemptions, the court explained, “public availability of documents is one factor that lessens a privacy interest.” Id. at *2. Because the company's executives had publicly disclosed their cooperation with law enforcement in the investigation of the plaintiff, the Court concluded that the names and email addresses of the individuals whom the government had interviewed or with whom the government had communicated were not protected under Exemption 7(C). Id. at *2.

Here, unlike the individuals in Powell and Cohodes, the decedents did not voluntarily thrust themselves into the spotlight by publicizing the fact of their cooperation with law enforcement or by otherwise involving themselves publicly in an ongoing investigation. The social media information at issue here is only in the Navy's possession because the decedents committed suicide while in the federal government's employ. Further, although the issue of the rising incidence of suicide in the military is receiving considerable publicity, as Plaintiffs highlighted in their briefing, Plaintiffs have not shown that the specific information disclosed in the social media posts and through the social media account information has received the same level of attention. For example, in Fiduccia, the plaintiffs sought disclosure of all documents pertaining to the FBI's search of Coqui Santaliz's home. 185 F.3d at 1046. While the FBI had never publicly disclosed its search of Santaliz's home, “she had spoken to the press herself about the search of her house.” Id. at 1047. The Ninth Circuit found that the “district court correctly held that these individuals did not lose their statutory interest in privacy by reason of the earlier publicity,” noting that it was “a long time ago” that Santaliz had publicized the information and that she might not now be “indifferent” to disclosure. Id.; see also Lane, 523 F.3d at 1137 (“That the public may be aware of the allegations against Antonich does not lessen his privacy interest, because notions of privacy in the FOIA exemption context encompass information already revealed to the public.”). Similarly, in Office of Capital Collateral Counsel, the FOIA requester sought all records concerning an AUSA's disciplinary proceedings following her publicly documented misconduct in another case. 331 F.3d at 803. The government withheld a transcript and final decision letter that revealed the AUSA's “candid” reflections on her misconduct and its effects on her life. Id. The Eleventh Circuit found that such documents properly were exempt from disclosure because, while her misconduct was public, her “personal reflections” had not been publicized. Id. at 804. So, too, here the fact that the information, at one time, was publicly available on social media does not completely eliminate the privacy interests in the information shared, like “childhood difficulties, personal emotions, and past mental health struggles,” (Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 7), particularly where there is no evidence that such specific information has been widely publicized.

*45 Finally, with respect to the social media usernames and handles, the Court is mindful that, in Transgender Law Center, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the “email domains” had been improperly redacted pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C) but did not order disclosure of the employees’ email addresses in their entirety. See 46 F.4th at 784. Likewise, here, Defendants have redacted the specific social media usernames and handles that would link the decedents to those online profiles but have disclosed the websites through which the decedents created an account. (See, e.g., Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 42.) This limited disclosure appears to strike the proper balance.

In sum, the Court finds that the decedents and their families retain nontrivial privacy interests in the decedents’ social media posts and account information, and more measurable privacy interests in their private communications on those platforms and private web searches. The third parties with whom, and about whom, the decedents communicated have significant privacy interests in preventing the disclosure of their private communications and in not being associated publicly with a law enforcement investigation. Further, it is reasonably foreseeable that the public disclosure of the requested information might result in an unwarranted invasion of these privacy interests, tarnishing the reputations of the decedents, causing renewed and unnecessary grief as well as unwanted attention for their families, and publicly associating third parties with a law enforcement investigation that could result in unwanted attention and harassment of those third parties.

Having found nontrivial privacy interests, the Court proceeds to weigh them against the privacy interests Plaintiffs have advanced. The Court does not repeat the standard for performing the balancing of those interests. (See Order, supra, at 40–41.)

Plaintiffs continue to argue broadly that the decedents’ web searches, social media posts, and communications with third parties “may reveal any warning signs that were missed, whether the decedents sought out resources that would have put the military on notice of their mental health struggles, and whether there were opportunities to intervene.” (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 17.) “All of these categories of information will reveal what the military knew about the mental health challenges of the decedents before they died and whether these deaths were in any way preventable.” (Id.) With respect to the web searches, Huntsberry explains he is “interested in these web searches because they will inform the public's understanding as to how servicemembers experiencing depression (like Isaiah Glenn Peralta) attempt to obtain mental health resources or information.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 21.) “The nature of these efforts to obtain resources will, in turn, shed light on how the military would be able to better detect those at-risk of suicide and intervene before it's too late.” (Id.) As to the social media and internet use records, he explains that he is “interested in these redacted social media posts because they would contribute to the public's understanding of what warning signs the decedents displayed before their deaths and whether intervention by the military was possible.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Defendants, likewise, reiterate their arguments that Plaintiffs have not shown a nexus between the specific requested information and the public interest advanced and, thus, have not shown that any additional utility from disclosure of the information outweighs the relevant privacy interests. (Defs.’ Opp'n at 12–13.)

*46 Once more, the Court agrees with Defendants. First, the Navy collected the records regarding the decedents’ web searches and social media activities during the investigations, so disclosure of the records will not reveal what the Navy knew before the decedents committed suicide. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 2, 7–8, 41–42, 51, 54–55.) Plaintiffs neither contend nor present evidence that the Navy closely monitors all servicemembers’ activity across all social media platforms such that the Navy could fairly be said to have been on notice of the public content at issue. Second, despite repeated pronouncements that disclosure will reveal the warning signs or help the public understand the warning signs the decedents exhibited, Plaintiffs do not explain how any discernable warning signs exhibited by a handful of individuals will contribute to the only relevant public interest—shedding light on the operations and activities of the government. (See Pltfs.’ MSJ at 17; Huntsberry Decl. ¶¶ 21, 41.) For example, Plaintiffs seek disclosure of Vaughn No. 7, the redacted portions of which directly quote the decedent's Facebook posts. (See Vaughn Index, Vaughn No. 7.) Plaintiffs believe that disclosure of the information would “illustrate the mindset of the decedent in the last month of his life.” (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 42.) Even if this is true, Plaintiffs do not explain how revealing one decedent's mindset or exposing “warning signs” in one decedent's public comments contributes to the public's understanding of what the Navy is doing to address the incidence of suicide within its ranks or how the Navy investigates those suicides. Placed in context, even when the social media information is aggregated across the nine decedents identified here, the social media posts and private messages do not provide any “information about the agency's own conduct.” MacLean, 2007 WL 935604, at *12 (concluding plaintiff had not shown public interest in disclosure where plaintiff sought to learn about six specific cases over a twelve-year period because such information, when contextualized, would not provide any information about the military agencies’ conduct); see also E.G., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 238–39 (concluding that “the release of a singular proceeding would not substantially serve the public interest” because releasing “SSgt. Broome's records would be insufficient to show a pattern of misconduct by the Air Force in conducting administrative discharge boards”). Similarly, Plaintiffs posit that disclosing Vaughn No. 2 will reveal how servicemembers attempt to obtain mental health resources or information. (Huntsberry Decl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs, however, fail to explain how disclosure of one servicemember's internet searches, in isolation, sheds any light on how servicemembers generally attempt to obtain information about mental health. (See id.) They also do not explain how such disclosure would contribute to the public's understanding of the agencies’ operations.

No more do Plaintiffs attempt to explain how disclosure of the decedents’ personal social media usernames and handles will shed any light on the Navy's operations or activities. (See generally Pltfs.’ MSJ.) Indeed, the Court can conceive of no use this information would serve except to enable Plaintiffs and the public to locate the accounts at issue and to scour their content. As the Court previously explained, “courts have been skeptical of recognizing a public interest in this ‘derivative’ use of information, which is indirect and speculative.” Long, 692 F.3d at 194; see also Forest Serv. Emps., 524 F.3d at 1027. Enabling the public to pore over a decedent's social media accounts and to offer their own speculation as to warning signs such accounts disclose is not a cognizable public interest under FOIA. See Vietnam Veterans, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 518 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that releasing names of individuals present at nuclear accident would serve public interest by “allow[ing] the public to fully appreciate the human cost of the Palomares clean-up”).

In sum, as with all of the other categories of information Plaintiffs have requested, they have not shown a significant public interest in disclosure of the decedents’ social media account information, private internet messages, or social media posts. Diminished as some of the privacy interests might be, “something, even a modest privacy interest, outweighs nothing every time.” Horner, 879 F.2d at 879. And, even if the Court were to find a significant public interest in the information at issue in light of the media attention this issue has attracted, the Court would find that the privacy interests—particularly the privacy interests of the decedents’ families and of third parties—outweigh the “marginal additional usefulness” of these documents in contributing to the public's understanding of warning signs the decedents exhibited before they committed suicide or of shedding light on what the government knew before the deaths occurred. The Vaughn Index, while withholding the specific sentiments the decedents expressed in their social media posts and private communications and the specific internet search terms they used, summarize the substance of the decedents’ activities. (See, e.g., Vaughn Index, Vaughn Nos. 2, 7–8, 54; see also Huntsberry Decl. ¶¶ 42–43, Exs. 20–21.) Such disclosures adequately serve the public interests Plaintiffs advance. See Ray, 502 U.S. at 178, 112 S.Ct. 541. Moreover, the Navy is only in possession of the requested information because NCIS examined the computers and phones located among the decedent's possessions. For all intents and purposes, the requested “web searches” and “social media/internet use” information is “information about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files ... that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct.” Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773, 109 S.Ct. 1468.

*47 In sum, the Court finds that there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of Vaughn Nos. 2, 7–8, 41–42, 51, 54–55 could result in an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy interests of the decedents, their surviving family members, and the third parties whose communications and identities appear in those records that are not outweighed by the negligible public interests Plaintiffs have advanced. The Court, therefore, GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the application of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to the records in the “web searches” and “internet use/social media” categories.

V. Equitable Relief (Declaratory Judgment)

Finally, Plaintiffs petition the Court to issue a declaratory judgment that Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties and that Defendants improperly applied Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to the redacted and withheld records at issue. (Pltfs.’ MSJ at 22–23.) Additionally, Plaintiffs seek an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and an order directing Defendants to produce the records at issue in the Vaughn Index free of any withholdings. (Id. at 23.) Because the Court concludes that Defendants properly applied Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to the records at issue, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.