Bennett v. Jetro Rest. Depot, LLC
Bennett v. Jetro Rest. Depot, LLC
2024 WL 4471996 (S.D. Fla. 2024)
March 8, 2024

Moore, K. Michael,  United States District Judge

Failure to Preserve
Video
Adverse inference
Bad Faith
Sanctions
Spoliation
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Summary
The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that he tripped and fell on a plastic ribbon left on the floor of the defendant's store. The plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions, claiming that the defendant spoliated surveillance video of the incident. However, the court found that the plaintiff did not meet the threshold requirements for spoliation sanctions and denied the motion.
Additional Decisions
BRADLEY BENNETT, Plaintiff,
v.
JETRO RESTAURANT DEPOT, LLC d/b/a RESTAURANT DEPOT, Defendant
Case No. 0:23-cv-60954-KMM
United States District Court, S.D. Florida
Signed March 08, 2024

Counsel

William Castile Ruggiero, William C. Ruggiero, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.
Gilda Gladys Romano, Niva Maria Harney, Kennedys, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
Moore, K. Michael, United States District Judge

OMNIBUS ORDER

*1 THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Jetro Restaurant Depot, LLC d/b/a Restaurant Depot's (“Defendant”) Motion for Final Summary Judgment with Incorporated Memorandum of Law. (“Def.’s Mot.”) (ECF No. 30). Plaintiff Bradley Bennett (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response in opposition. (“Pl.’s Resp.”) (ECF No. 37). Defendant filed a Reply. (“Def.’s Reply”) (ECF No. 42). The Court has also considered Plaintiff's related Motion for Sanctions and to Strike Defendant's Liability Defenses, or, Alternatively, for Burden-Shifting Presumption and for Standard Jury Instructions 301.11(a) and 301.11(b), (“Pl.’s Mot.”) (ECF No. 38), Defendant's Response, (“Def.’s Resp.”) (ECF No. 43), and Plaintiff's Reply, (“Pl.’s Reply”) (ECF No. 44). The Motions are now ripe for review.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant on March 19, 2023 in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida. (“Compl.”) (ECF No. 1-1). Defendant thereafter removed the case to this Court. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that on October 27, 2022, he was a business invitee at Defendant's store where he tripped and fell on a plastic ribbon that was left on the floor. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached its duty owed to Plaintiff by negligently maintaining its premises. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of this negligence, Plaintiff sustained permanent or continuing injuries that will cause Plaintiff losses into the future. Id. ¶ 11.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of the plastic ribbon on the floor that Plaintiff alleges caused him to fall. See generally Def.’s Mot. Plaintiff separately moves for sanctions based on Defendant's alleged spoliation of surveillance video capturing the incident. See generally Pl.’s Mot. Because the success of Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions bears on the success of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court begins with the former.
II. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
In his Motion, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to sanctions based on Defendant's alleged spoliation of surveillance video capturing Plaintiff's fall. See generally Pl.’s Mot. The relevant facts are as follows.
Four days after the incident, Plaintiff's counsel sent a preservation letter to the store where the incident occurred as well as two of Defendant's corporate offices. Id. at 1–2. Among other things, the letter advised Defendant to preserve surveillance video of “two hours before through one hour after the accident.” Id. at 2. In July of 2023, Plaintiff propounded discovery requests on Defendant, including a request for “[a]ny and all video footage of the premises which shows the Plaintiff and/or captures the incident in question on the date of accident from one hour prior to the time of this accident to one hour subsequent to the time of this accident.” Id. Defendant objected to the request, and Plaintiff filed a motion to compel production of the surveillance video of the incident. (ECF No. 17). The Court granted Plaintiff's motion on December 4, 2023. (ECF No. 26). However, when Plaintiff received the footage on December 11, 2023, he discovered that Defendant only preserved twenty-six seconds of video related to the incident, specifically four seconds before and twenty-two seconds after Plaintiff's fall. Pl.’s Mot. at 2.
*2 Now, Plaintiff moves for sanctions based on Defendant's alleged spoliation of the “critical one hour” of footage prior to Plaintiff's fall. Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant's failure to preserve this footage warrants sanctions because the missing video “would have afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to examine it and possibly determine exactly when the plastic band was left on the floor, and importantly, by whom (likely an employee of Defendant).” Id. at 3. As a remedy, Plaintiff asks the Court to: (1) strike Defendant's liability defenses and allow the case to proceed on the damages aspect only; (2) shift the burden of proof to Defendant for the purposes of both Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and trial; and/or (3) instruct the jury that an adverse inference may be drawn that the missing footage would have been unfavorable to Defendant.[1] Id. at 7–8. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Motion should be denied because it is untimely and because there is no evidence that Defendant acted in bad faith. See generally Def.’s Resp.
A. Timeliness
As an initial matter, the Court agrees that Plaintiff's Motion is untimely. Pursuant to the Court's Scheduling Order entered on June 22, 2023, “[a]ny and all pretrial motions” were to be filed by January 5, 2024. (ECF No. 13). Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on January 18, 2024, nearly two weeks after the deadline. See Pl.’s Mot. Plaintiff provides no explanation for why he waited to raise issues with the video's length for the first time in response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, particularly given that he has had possession of the video since December 11, 2023. Def.’s Resp. at 1–2. Nevertheless, “[d]istrict courts have ‘unquestionable’ authority to control their own dockets.” Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “This authority includes ‘broad discretion in deciding how best to manage the cases before them.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the Court finds that adjudicating this Motion will not delay trial. Rather, the Court finds that adjudicating the Motion now will aid in the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of this Action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Accordingly, the Court will rule on Plaintiff's Motion.
B. Applicable Law
“Spoliation is defined as the destruction of evidence or the significant and meaningful alteration of a document or instrument.” Tesoriero v. Carnival Corp., 965 F.3d 1170, 1184 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Spoliation of evidence, in appropriate circumstances, “may warrant the imposition of sanctions.” Id.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff cites exclusively to Florida law and Florida cases in making his argument. See generally Pl.’s Mot.; Pl.’s Reply. However, “federal law governs the imposition of spoliation sanctions” in federal court. Tesoriero, 965 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 943 (11th Cir. 2005)). “A district court's power to sanction a party for spoliation of evidence derives from two sources: (1) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and (2) the court's inherent power to control the judicial process and litigation.” Sosa v. Carnival Corp., No. 18-20957-CIV, 2018 WL 6335178, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2018).
Where, as here, the alleged spoliation involves electronically stored information (“ESI”), the Court must look to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e).[2] Rule 37(e) “authorizes and specifies measures a court may employ if information that should have been preserved is lost, and specifies the findings necessary to justify these measures.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee notes to 2015 amendment.[3] In doing so, Rule 37(e) “forecloses reliance on inherent authority or state law to determine when certain measures should be used.” Id. As a result, courts have held that Rule 37(e) “provide[s] the exclusive mechanism by which [a court] must analyze spoliation allegations involving ESI.” Romero, 2019 WL 2866498, at *4 (collecting cases). Rule 37(e) states as follows:
*3 (e) Failure to Preserve Electronically Stored Information. If electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the court:
(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or
(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in the litigation may:
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party; or
(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
As this language reflects, four threshold requirements must be established for Rule 37(e) to apply: “(1) the information sought constitutes ESI; (2) the ESI should have been preserved in anticipation of litigation; (3) the ESI is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it; and (4) the ESI cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery.” Title Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. Progress Residential, LLC, No. 16-21882-CV, 2017 WL 5953428, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2017). Further, even if Rule 37(e)’s threshold criteria are satisfied, a court may only award sanctions under subsection (e)(1) if it finds “prejudice” to another party, or under subsection (e)(2) if it finds that the spoliating party acted with the “intent to deprive” the opposing side of the ESI in question. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e); see also Watkins v. Fox, No. 8:21-CV-2022-SDM-CPT, 2023 WL 5804498, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2023).
C. Analysis
Here, Plaintiff requests the following sanctions: (1) an order striking Defendant's liability defenses, (2) a burden-shifting rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of Defendant for the purposes of both Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and trial, and (3) an adverse inference instruction. Pl.’s Mot. at 7–8. To the extent such sanctions are available under Rule 37(e), they clearly fall within the scope of subsection (e)(2).[4] Accordingly, for Plaintiff to be entitled to the relief requested the Court must find that Defendant acted with the “intent to deprive” Plaintiff of the video footage in question. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2). The Eleventh Circuit has held that this standard “is the equivalent of bad faith in other spoliation contexts” and generally means destruction of evidence “for the purpose of hiding adverse evidence.” Skanska USA Civ. Se. Inc., 75 F.4th at 1312 (citations and emphasis omitted); see also Watkins, 2023 WL 5804498, at *6 (“[A] movant seeking to prove an ‘intent to deprive’ must show more than negligence or even gross negligence by the alleged spoliating party.”).
*4 Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to the sanctions he requests. Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff meets the threshold requirements to invoke Rule 37(e), there is simply no evidence in the record that Defendant acted with bad faith or the intent to deprive Plaintiff of the missing video footage. In fact, it appears that Plaintiff himself is unsure as to why Defendant failed to preserve the footage at issue. See, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. at 2 (“For reasons we can only wonder, Defendant decided unilaterally not to preserve the video ....”); id. at 6 (“We can only imagine why Defendant decided not to keep that portion of the video ....”). Nor does Plaintiff allege how Defendant might have lost or destroyed the relevant video surveillance footage. See Patrick v. Forster & Howell, Inc., No. 5:22CV20-MW/MJF, 2023 WL 5227112, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 5, 2023). At most, Plaintiff might be able to show that Defendant was negligent in losing or destroying the relevant video surveillance footage. See id. But negligence, or even gross negligence, is not enough to support Plaintiff's spoliation argument. See Stovall v. Brykan Legends, LLC, No. 17-2412-JWL, 2019 WL 480559, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 7, 2019) (“Although defendant's failure to take steps to preserve the ESI may be negligent, even grossly negligent, nothing in the record suggests defendant intentionally lost the video.”).
Further, this case does not involve a situation where “the unpreserved evidence clearly would have resolved a crucial issue in the case.” ML Healthcare Servs., LLC v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 881 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff claims that the missing video “could well have shown an employee working with a pallet, who caused the plastic strap to be left behind on the floor. Or it could have shown the plastic band remaining on the floor for twenty minutes, thirty minutes, or even an hour or two. Or, the video could have shown an employee, or multiple employees, in the area with the opportunity to observe the plastic band on the floor prior to Plaintiffs fall.” Pl.’s Mot. at 7. However, Plaintiff provides no reason to believe that the missing footage would have actually shown these things. Instead, Plaintiff relies on nothing more than speculation and conjecture as to what the unpreserved video might have shown. See Romero, 2019 WL 2866498, at *7. “Failure to preserve such speculative evidence does not raise the specter of bad faith in the same way that a failure to preserve evidence of a specific, crucial event in a case might.” ML Healthcare Servs., LLC, 881 F.3d at 1309. Because there is no evidence that Defendant acted with bad faith or the intent to deprive Plaintiff of the missing video footage, Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he requests.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 38) is DENIED.
III. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact [such] that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “For factual issues to be considered genuine, they must have a real basis in the record.” Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Speculation cannot create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment. Cordoba v. Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005).
The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). In assessing whether the moving party has met this burden, a court must view the movant's evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1181 (11th Cir. 2001).
Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992). But if the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial, and summary judgment is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
B. Discussion
*5 Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no record evidence showing that Defendant had either actual or constructive notice of the plastic ribbon on the floor that Plaintiff alleges caused him to fall. See Def.’s Mot. at 4. Plaintiff responds that the evidence shows a genuine dispute of material fact as whether Defendant had both actual and constructive notice. See generally Pl.’s Resp.
“To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant had a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from particular injuries; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the defendant's breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm.” Palavicini v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 787 F. App'x 1007, 1010 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1067 (11th Cir. 2008)). With respect to the duty element, “[a] possessor of premises to which the public is invited has a legal duty to ascertain that the premises are reasonably safe for invitees.” Id. (quoting Skipper v. Barnes Supermarket, 573 So. 2d 411, 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)). This duty to business invitees equates to two legal duties: “(1) to use reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition, which includes a duty to use reasonable care to learn of the existence of any dangerous conditions on the premises, and (2) to give the invitee warning of concealed perils which are or should be known to the landowner, but are unknown to the invitee and could not be discovered by him through the exercise of due care.” Id. (citing Skipper, 573 So. 2d at 413).
Under Florida law, which governs this diversity case,[5] a plaintiff bringing a negligence claim based upon a transitory foreign substance on the floor of a business must prove that the business had “actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and should have taken action to remedy it.” Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1).
A business has actual knowledge of a dangerous condition when its employees or one of its agents “knows of or creates the dangerous condition.” Barbour v. Brinker Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 953, 957 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Constructive knowledge can be established by circumstantial evidence, by either showing that (1) “[t]he dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the business establishment should have known of the condition,” or (2) “[t]he condition occurred with regularity and was therefore foreseeable.” Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1).
1. Actual Notice
Defendant claims that the record is devoid of any evidence showing that it actually knew about the plastic ribbon prior to Plaintiff's fall or created the condition. Def.’s Mot. at 5. Plaintiff responds that Defendant had actual notice because “the evidence is that Defendant's employees created the hazard, as they are the ones who utilize these plastic bands to tie merchandise.” Pl.’s Resp. at 10. Specifically, Plaintiff points to his deposition testimony where he stated that he tripped on a plastic strap used to go around a pallet, and that he saw workers around other parts of the store that day who were undoing pallets and moving things around. Id. at 3. Plaintiff argues that because a plastic pallet strap is something utilized by Defendant's employees, rather than by customers, “the logical inference is that one of Defendant's employee created the hazard.” Id. at 3–4.
*6 Plaintiff's argument is unavailing. There is simply no evidence in the record to support Plaintiff's claim that the dangerous condition was created by one of Defendant's employees. Plaintiff admittedly does not know how the plastic ribbon got on the floor. See (ECF No. 31) at 4. Plaintiff testified that he did not see anyone put the ribbon on the floor. Id. While he believed that it may have come from workers unloading pallets, Plaintiff testified that he did not see anyone working on a pallet in the area where he fell. Id. “Although all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, inferences based upon speculation are not reasonable.” Kernel Recs. Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up); Glasscox v. City of Argo, 903 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Conclusory allegations and speculation are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant had actual notice of the dangerous condition.
2. Constructive Notice
Turning to constructive notice, Plaintiff appears to concede that, without the surveillance video at issue above, there is no evidence that the ribbon was on the floor for a sufficient period of time to put Defendant on constructive notice. See Pl.’s Resp. at 10–11. It is also undisputed that Plaintiff did not see the ribbon on the floor when he was in the same area approximately five to seven minutes before the incident. See (ECF No. 39) at 2. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed show that the ribbon was on the floor for sufficient time to put Defendant on constructive notice.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that constructive notice can still be imputed to Defendant because the condition “occurred with such a regularity that the danger was foreseeable.” Pl.’s Resp. at 10. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that walk logs and store sweep records produced by Defendant demonstrate “a pattern of these plastic bands, strings, and wraps being left on the floor constantly, and being recorded with each of the Defendant's floor inspections.” Id. at 12. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that these records show that “there are only three times per day that the premises are to be walked/inspected, with four hour gaps between each walk.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff asserts that on the day of the incident “more than two and a half hours had elapsed” between the last inspection and when he fell. Id.
Plaintiff's evidence falls well short of establishing constructive notice under Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1)(b). First, the walk logs and store sweep records Plaintiff cites to only provide information for a single day and often involve different areas of the store unrelated to where he fell. See Felder v. Sam's E., Inc., No. 22-CV-60962, 2023 WL 3600041, at *6 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2023) (“Plaintiff here provides no evidence showing that the type of spill was foreseeable in the location where Plaintiff slipped on water on the floor in this case.”). Second, Plaintiff does not cite to any authority to support the notion that a general maintenance policy constitutes awareness that a dangerous condition occurred with such regularity as to be foreseeable. See Avila Andrade v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 22-23488-CV, 2023 WL 6846670, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2023). Finally, “the fact there was no inspection for a given length of time in itself” is insufficient to establish constructive notice. Espinoza v. Target Corp., 843 F. App'x 168, 172 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. King, 592 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)); see also Borroto v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 219CV356FTM38NPM, 2020 WL 6591193, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2020) (“[I]f no inspection occurred for over an hour, that is not enough to show constructive notice on its own.”). As such, the Court finds that there is no evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer constructive notice based on foreseeability of a regularly occurring condition.
*7 Accordingly, as Plaintiff can point to no record evidence that would support an inference that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED.
IV. CONCLUSION
UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motions, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 38) is DENIED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 8th day of March, 2024.

Footnotes

Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court instruct the jury pursuant to Florida Standard Jury Instructions 301.11(a) and 301.11(b).
See, e.g., Romero v. Regions Fin. Corp./Regions Bank, No. 18-22126-CV, 2019 WL 2866498, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2019) (“Rule 37 provides the exclusive avenue to sanction a party based on spoliation allegations related to ESI, which would include the surveillance video at issue here.”); Birren v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 1:20-CV-22783, 2021 WL 9216928, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2021) (“The contested CCTV is electronically stored information (‘ESI’) and thus governed by Rule 37(e).”); Sosa, 2018 WL 6335178, at *11–15 (finding that CCTV surveillance footage is ESI governed by Rule 37(e)).
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that although the advisory committee notes are not binding upon the courts, they are afforded “great weight in interpreting Rule 37(e).” Alabama Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., No. 20-11141, 2022 WL 433457, at *13 n.19 (11th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
First, adverse inference jury instructions are expressly referenced in subsection (e)(2)(B). Second, a burden-shifting rebuttable presumption is equivalent to “presum[ing] that the lost information was unfavorable to the party” under subsection (e)(2)(A). Third, to the extent that Rule 37(e) authorizes the striking of a party's pleadings or defenses, such a sanction would only be available under subsection (e)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment (“An example of an inappropriate (e)(1) measure might be an order striking pleadings related to, or precluding a party from offering any evidence in support of, the central or only claim or defense in the case.”). Additionally, because Plaintiff only seeks sanctions that fall within the scope of subsection (e)(2), the Court need not address whether he would be entitled to sanctions under subsection (e)(1).
A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the state in which the case arose. See Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1132–33 (11th Cir. 2010).