Burns v. Shama Express, LLC
Burns v. Shama Express, LLC
2023 WL 11965154 (W.D. Pa. 2023)
July 24, 2023

Eddy, Cynthia R.,  United States Magistrate Judge

Failure to Produce
30(b)(6) corporate designee
Proportionality
Protective Order
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Summary
The Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel the Corporate Designee Depositions of Amazon Logistics, Inc. after the company objected to the scope and temporal nature of the Plaintiff's notices of video deposition. The Court granted the Motion in part and denied it in part, ordering Amazon to comply with some of the requests but also limiting the scope of others. The Court also denied the Plaintiff's request to file documents under seal.
EMILY M. BURNS, et al. Plaintiff,
v.
SHAMA EXPRESS, LLC; et al. Defendants
2:22-cv-00113
United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed July 24, 2023
Eddy, Cynthia R., United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM ORDER

*1 Before the Court is a Motion to Compel the Corporate Designee Depositions of Amazon Logistics, Inc. (“Amazon”), (here after, the “Motion”) (ECF No. 164), filed by Plaintiff to which Amazon responded, (ECF No. 167), and Plaintiff replied (ECF No. 169). For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
A. Factual Background
On March 8, 2023,[1] Plaintiff asserts she served seven (7) notices of video deposition (collectively, “NOVDs”) under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. Pro.). (ECF No. 164, page 4). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that her requests include:
  • “Amazon Relay” NOVD- the operation of the Amazon Relay Program, and use of it by carriers such as Shama Express, LLC;
  • “Trip” NOVD- all aspects of the trip at issue that is the subject of this action;
  • “Policy & Procedure” NOVD- the policies and procedures referencing and/or relating to, inter alia, the means and/or methods to be employed by carries, such as Shama Express, LLV, for retrieval, transport, and/or delivery of cargo, operation, performance, and safety practice of carriers during such trips, and participation in, application of, or compliance with Amazon's Relay or Middle Mile Asset;
  • “Middle Mile” NOVD- the operation of Amazon's Middle Mile team and/or program;
  • “Specific Document” NOVD- certain documents produced previously by Amazon in this litigation, identified by description and bates number;
  • “Counsel Letter” NOVD- information contained in or represented by its counsel February 11, 2023, letter;
  • “Spreadsheet” NOVD- explain and interpret the sate and/or entries contained in Bates 334 to Bates 344, a previously produced spreadsheet by Amazon.
(ECF No. 164, pages 4-5).[2]
On June 8, 2023, counsel for Plaintiff and Amazon met and conferred by telephone. (ECF Nos. 164, page 5; 167, page 5). Plaintiff asserts that on that date Amazon objected to the general temporal scope of the “Amazon Relay” and “Middle Mile” NOVDs as well as the scope of carriers identified within the “Policy & Procedure” NOVD. (ECF No. 164, page 5). Amazon's Response in Opposition, (ECF No. 167, page 5), avers raising several objections to the scope and temporal nature of the NOVDs.
On June 9, 2023, Plaintiff sent Amazon's counsel a summary of the parties’ conference, (ECF No. 167, page 5), to which Plaintiff asserted she agreed “to narrow the temporal scope of the NOVDs to the year of the incident (2020) and three [3] years prior and to limit the “Policy & Procedure” NOVD to only Shama, with reservations to later seek additional testimony,” (ECF No. 164, page 5).
Further, Plaintiff contends that on June 16, 2023, Amazon sought to “ ‘clarify’ its position on the notices raising numerous, previously unstated objections as to definitions and scope of matters identified in the notices and sought additional, improper restriction or obligations on Plaintiff's ability to conduct the noticed corporate designee depositions.” (ECF No. 164, page 5). In relation thereto, Amazon's Response in Opposition asserts its disagreement with Plaintiff's “dogmatic assertion.” (ECF No. 167, page 5).
*2 On June 22, 2023, Plaintiff engaged this Court to which it directed formal submissions. (ECF Nos. 164, page 6; 167, pages 5-6). Plaintiff filed this Motion on July 3, 2023. (ECF No. 164). Amazon filed its Response in Opposition on July 10, 2023, which, among other things, specifically objects to three (3) NOVDs. (ECF No. 167). After, this Court entered its Memorandum Order, (ECF No. 168), addressing Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal, (ECF No. 161), to which it denied with prejudice to refile with further delineation and explanation as articulated therein. Recognizing the Court's Order, (ECF No. 168), and in reply to Amazon's Response in Opposition, Plaintiff requested that this Motion be considered without two (2) of her exhibits, (ECF No. 169). In that regard, however, the Court notes that Plaintiff's request has no bearing on its review because both asserted exhibits (i.e., “L” and “O”) relate to unopposed NOVDs. See (ECF No. 164, pages 9 and 11).
B. Legal Standard
Rule 26 and decisions relating thereto rest in the sound discretion of the district court. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26. See Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987) (“The conduct of discovery is a matter for the discretion of the district court and its decisions will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of this discretion.”); See also Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir.1983) (“It is well established that the scope and conduct of discovery are within the sound discretion of the trial court, [ ] and that after final judgment of the district court or final agency order, our review is confined to determining if that discretion has been abused [ ].”). Accordingly, the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which further discovery responses may be compelled, are matters committed to the court's judgment and discretion. Robinson v. Folino, 2016 WL 4678340, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2016) (citation omitted).
Specifically, discovery parameters under Rule 26(b)(1) are limited to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(b)(1). However, relevant matters are tempered by principles of proportionality. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gemma, No. 2:16-CV-483, 2022 WL 1810701, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2022). By extension, “[t]he reasonable particularity requirement in Rule 30(b)(6)[3]... merely requires that the requesting party describe topics with enough specificity to enable the responding party to designate or prepare one or more deponents.” Nippo Corp./Intern. Bridge Corp. v. AMEC Earth & Environ., Inc., No. 09-cv-0956, 2009 WL 4798150, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2009) (citing Cabot Corp. v. Yamulla Enter., Inc., 194 F.R.D. 499, 500 (M.D. Pa. 2000)). Correspondingly, Rule 30(d)(3)(B) prescribes the court discretional authority to limit a deposition's scope and manner as provided under Rule 26(c). Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 30(d)(3)(B); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(c).
Under Rule 26(c), “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, [of relevance]: forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(D). See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 24 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (“All such orders are intended to offer litigants a measure of privacy, while balancing against this privacy interest the public's right to obtain information concerning judicial proceedings.”) “Good cause” means “that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure. The injury must be shown with specificity.” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d 662, 671 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994)). Consequently, “broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing.” Id. Courts may consider several non-exhaustive factors to evaluate “good cause:”
*3 1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests;
2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an improper purpose;
3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party embarrassment;
4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information important to public health and safety;
5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote fairness and efficiency;
6) whether a party benefiting from the order of confidentiality is a public entity or official; and
7) whether the case involves issues important to the public.
Glenmede Tr. Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787-91.)
C. Discussion
As an initial matter, Amazon's Response in Opposition specifically addresses its issues with Plaintiff's general inquiry of scope regarding three (3) of Plaintiff's NOVDs: namely, “Amazon Relay,” “Policy & Procedure,” and “Middle Mile.” (ECF No. 167, page 7). Because Amazon otherwise does not object to Plaintiff's remaining four (4) notices, i.e., “Trip” “Specific Document,” “Counsel Letter,” and “Spreadsheet,” the court needs to neither review nor consider such. (ECF No. 167, page 7).
According to Plaintiff, she “seeks to depose Amazon's corporate designee(s) as to matters directly related to her claim and Amazon's defense in this case, e.g., whether Akbari and Ali Shah were the latter's ‘agent, servant, and/or employee;’ Amazon's relationship to them and Shama; Amazon's tracking of their performance, operation, and safety, and the standards or requirements to which Amazon held them while delivering loads for it.” (ECF No. 164, page 6). In conjunction, Amazon's respective assertions are succinctly addressed below.
“Amazon Relay” NOVD
Plaintiff's Motion asserts she requests an Amazon designee to testify as to the “operation of Amazon Relay Program and its use by carriers, such as Shama Express, LLC.” (ECF No. 164, page 7). Amazon's Response in Opposition avers that she “seeks testimony not just as to Shama, but to every one of the thousands of third-party motor carries with which Amazon contracts for a four 4 year period.” (ECF No. 167, page 7).
Plaintiff's Motion asserts she requests what Amazon knew about Shama and its drivers’ safety and performance, including what it expected or required of them during trips, and what standards it held. (ECF No. 164, page 7). Amazon's Response in Opposition asserts that, in this regard, a meet and confer has yet to occur. Despite this, it contends that Plaintiff fails to define “policy” or “procedure” and requires testimony as to four (4) years’ worth of information. (ECF No. 167, page 7).
Plaintiff's Motion asserts she requests a designee to testify about Amazon's Middle Mile Team and/or program, which, according to Amazon's website, “manages complexity and scale in making routing decision across the company's expansive transportation network.” (ECF No. 164, page 9). Amazon's Response in Opposition contends that Plaintiff's NOVD contains no temporal limitation, and that her counsel refuses to delineate or agree to one. (ECF No. 167, page 7).
*4 The Court finds as follows:
After review of the filings, (a) protective order(s) is not necessary because Amazon alleges generalities of harm, i.e., “endure incredible prejudice, annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, and expense in discovery,” and thus do not support a good cause showing. Therefore, Amazon's request to quash “Amazon Relay,” “Policy & Procedure,” and “Middle Mile” NOVDs is denied. Notably, however, Amazon's Response in Opposition directs the Court's attention to Plaintiff's representation that it is “a straightforward motor vehicle case.” ((ECF No. 167, page 3) citing (ECF No. 116, page 6)). The Court accordingly exercises it authority of discretion and appropriately imposes the following, in relevant part:
Plaintiff is required to tailor and limit the scope of all temporal applicable requests, but which may not exceed more than two (2) years before the accident. And, particularly, the scope of the “Amazon Relay” NOVD is confined to address Shama Express, LLC. Furthermore, Plaintiff is required to cure, where necessary, the instant defective NOVDs: see e.g., (ECF Nos. 167, page 5 n.4 and page 7). Additionally, Plaintiff must clarify and/or define her meaning of “policy” and “procedure.” In redundance, compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as Rule 30(b)(6), is requisite.
Tangentially, Amazon avers that Plaintiff served seven (7) different NOVDs in an apparent attempt to seek, without stipulation or leave of Court, seven (7) times greater testimony than permitted by Rule 30(d)(1). (ECF No. 167, page 10). In support, Amazon alleges that Plaintiff refuses to limit this single designee deposition to seven (7) hours on one day. ((ECF No. 167, page 5) referencing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 30(d)(1)). Regarding this contention, the Court shall permit two (2) days of no longer than five (5) hours per day. And Amazon of course has discretion to select (a) corporate designee(s) to accordingly address the NOVDs.
Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion is granted in part (regarding compelling (a) corporate designee(s) to testify as to the matters and topics identified in the NOVDs) and denied in part to comply with further delineation and explanation as articulated herein.
AND NOW, this 24 day of July 2023,
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion be granted in part and denied in part.

Footnotes

Amazon, in disagreement, contends April 5, 2023, as the date it was served the seven (7) NOVDs. (ECF No. 167, page 4).
To clarify, the NOVDs’ titles remain in accordance with the parties’ references.
Rule 30(b)(6) provides:
Notice or Subpoena Directed to an Organization. In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, [among others], and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testify. [ ]. The persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization.
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 30(b)(6).