*1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the United States of America's (the “Government”) Application for Judicial Assistance filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (the “Application”), ECF No. [1]. In the Application, the Government informs the Court that it brings this action pursuant to a request made by the First Instance Court in Civil Matters No. 75 in Buenos Aires, Argentina (the “Argentinian Court”), relating to a civil inheritance proceeding currently pending before it. See id.; ECF No. [1-5] at 2. The Argentinian Court captions the civil proceeding in question as Susana Estela del Valle Santillan v. Vanesa Karina Nager Rubinowski, Foreign Reference Number 1417/2023 (the “Inheritance Proceeding”). See id. The Honorable K. Michael Moore referred this matter to me “to take all necessary and proper action as required by law and/or for a Report and Recommendation with respect to the Application for Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782.” ECF No. [3]. Having reviewed the Application, the record, and the relevant law, the Government's Application is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 26, 2024, the Argentinian Court transmitted its request for judicial assistance to the Offices of Foreign Litigation and International Judicial Assistance in the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice “pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 12140.” ECF No. [1-5] at 2.

The Argentinian Court initiated its request “to obtain financial records from Alex Brown — a Division of Raymond James” (“Alex James”) — that it intends to use during the Inheritance Proceeding currently pending before it. Id. at 1-2; see ECF No. [1-3] at 4-5. Specifically, the Argentinian Court seeks (1) statements from Alex Brown, “containing monthly account movements, from January 1, 2020 to present” in the Account[1] “held by Mr. Oscar Enriquez Nager and Mrs. Vanesa Karina Nager Rubinowski;” (2) information regarding “any and all transfers made from” the Account[2] “during 2017, 2020 and 2021, specifying amount, number and dates of such transfers, and duly indicating account identification information, Bank, and holder of such accounts to which such funds were transferred;” (3) a report indicating “whether joint account holder, Mrs. Vanessa Karina Nager Rubinowski, transferred any assets, during 2020, from such joint account to her own personal account and furnish a statement of such transfer;” (4) a report indicating “whether joint account holder, Mrs. Vanessa Karina Nager Rubinowski opened an account with the institution and, if applicable, provide information and opening date thereof;” (5) a report showing “any and all wire transfers of funds made in 2017 from” the Account,[3] “indicating the account to which such transfers were made ... and [the] account holder's particulars;” (6) a report indicating “whether joint account holder, Mrs. Vanesa Karina Nager Rubinowski, transferred any assets, during 2020 and 2021, from” the Account[4] “to her own personal account ... and furnish a description of such account and the relevant statements in connection with such transfers;” (7) information concerning the Raymond James Bank Deposit Program and the Account,[5] such as “amount deposited, interest, and payment dates from July 31, 2020 to present;” and (8) information revealing “the current status of” the Account held by Mrs. Vanesa Karina Nager Rubinowski “and Mr. Oscar Enrique Nager and furnish the relevant statements thereof.” ECF No. [1-3] at 5; see generally [1-4].

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

*2 “Section 1782 is the product of congressional efforts, over the span of nearly 150 years, to provide federal-court assistance in gathering evidence for use in foreign tribunals.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004). The “history of Section 1782 reveals Congress’ wish to strengthen the power of district courts to respond to requests for international assistance.” Application of Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc., 747 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2014) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted).

“A district court has the authority to grant an application for judicial assistance if the following statutory requirements in § 1782(a) are met: (1) the request must be made ‘by a foreign or international tribunal,’ or by ‘any interested person’; (2) the request must seek evidence, whether it be the ‘testimony or statement’ of a person or the production of ‘a document or other thing’; (3) the evidence must be ‘for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal’; and (4) the person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the district of the district court ruling on the application for assistance.” In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted) (quoting § 1782(a)). “If these requirements are met, then § 1782 ‘authorizes, but does not require, a federal district court to provide assistance.’ ” Id. at 1332 (quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 255); see also United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A] district court's compliance with a § 1782 request is not mandatory.”).

“Once the prima facie [statutory] requirements are satisfied, the Supreme Court in Intel noted these factors to be considered in exercising the discretion granted under § 1782(a): (1) whether ‘the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding,’ because ‘the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant’; (2) ‘the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance’; (3) ‘whether the § 1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States’; and (4) whether the request is otherwise ‘unduly intrusive or burdensome.’ ” In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334 (quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 264–65). None of these factors is required or automatically dispositive — they simply “bear consideration in ruling on a § 1782(a) request.” See Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. In fact, even if a court concludes an application contains “unduly intrusive or burdensome requests,” it may still exercise its discretion to grant the application because those specific requests “may be rejected or trimmed.” Id. at 265.

Finally, though the Supreme Court has not specifically listed it as a factor in the analysis, sometimes courts look at how granting or denying a § 1782 application would impact international comity concerns. That's because “the animating purpose of § 1782 is comity: Permitting federal courts to assist foreign and international governmental bodies promotes respect for foreign governments and encourages reciprocal assistance.” ZF Auto. US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619, 632 (2022); see also In re Pimenta, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (noting “the twin aims of the statute: providing an efficient means of assistance to participants in international litigation and encouraging foreign countries to provide reciprocal assistance to our courts”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Applicant Has Met the Four Requirements of § 1782

*3 As noted above, the four factors set out in the statute govern the first step in the § 1782 analysis. See In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1331-32. Here, the Government has met each of them.

First, the Argentinian Court — an “international tribunal[ ]” — is making a request for judicial assistance through the Government. In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1331 (quoting § 1782(a)); see ECF No. [1-5] at 2. Second, the Argentinian Court's request “seek[s] evidence,” namely the production of “a document or other thing.” In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1331-32 (quoting § 1782(a)); see ECF No. [1-3] at 5. Third, the evidence the Argentinian Court seeks is “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” See § 1782(a); In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1332; ECF No. [1-5] at 5. Finally, the Argentinian Court seeks evidence from Alex Brown, whose “subpoena processing center is located in Miami, Florida[,]” ECF No. [1-5] at 5 (footnote call number omitted); in other words, the entity from which the Argentinian Court seeks the evidence “resides or is found” in this District, § 1782(a); see Matter of ex parte Petition for Jud. Assistance Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, No. 20-CV-8444, 2020 WL 6129607, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2020).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Argentinian Court — applying for judicial assistance through the Government — has satisfied the four statutory factors under § 1782.

B. The Intel Factors Weigh In Favor of Granting the Application

Once the statutory requirements are satisfied, the discretionary factors the Supreme Court set out in Intel govern the second step in the § 1782 analysis. See 542 U.S. at 264–65; In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334. Here, each of the four Intel factors weighs in favor of granting the Application.

First, Alex Brown — the entity from which the discovery is sought — is not a participant in the Inheritance Proceeding and appears to be outside the Argentinian Court's jurisdictional reach. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 264; In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334; ECF No. [1-5] at 6-7.

Second, the fact that the Argentinian Court initiated the instant request for judicial assistance weighs in favor of disclosing the evidence sought. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 264; Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334; ECF No. [1-5] at 7; see also In re Request for Int'l Jud. Assistance from the Norrkoping Dist. Ct., Sweden, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1063 (D. Colo. 2015) (“Moreover, as the entity who made the request, the Swedish court is itself seeking U.S. federal-court judicial assistance. (quotation omitted)).

Third, as noted by the Government, “because the requester is the Argentin[ian] Court, there is sufficient assurance that the request for judicial assistance is not an attempt to circumvent Argentin[ian] discovery rules or to thwart policies of Argentina.” ECF No. [1-5] at 7 (citation omitted); Intel, 542 U.S. at 265; In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334; see also In re Request for Jud. Assistance from the Dist. Ct. in Svitavy, Czech Republic, 748 F. Supp. 2d 522, 529 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“[T]he fact that the request was initiated by the Svitavy Court itself, rather than a private litigant, provides sufficient assurance that the request does not attempt to circumvent Czech discovery rules or Czech policy.” (citation omitted)).

*4 Finally, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Argentinian Court's request is unduly intrusive or burdensome. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 265; In re Clerici, 481 F.3d at 1334. The Application seeks information about one specifically identified bank account — the Account. See ECF No. [1] at 1–2. The information Applicant seeks — the Account's balance, the movement of money to and from the Account, and the people involved in that movement of money, see ECF No. [1-3] at 4-5 — is not particularly difficult to gather. Those sorts of details are common to every bank account and procuring them would not likely require Alex Brown to do much more than access the standard records associated with the account number the Argentinian Court provided. That is something a bank does every day in the normal course of business.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that all four Intel factors weigh in favor of granting the Application.

C. Granting the Application Would Further the Policy Underlying § 1782

As a final consideration, the Court evaluates whether granting the Application would further the policy underlying § 1782, which is to encourage international comity. See ZF Auto., 596 U.S. at 632; In re Pimenta, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 1289. Allowing the Argentinian Court to marshal the power of our judicial system to assist it in gathering evidence for use in the Inheritance Proceeding aligns with “Congress’ wish to strengthen the power of district courts to respond to requests for international assistance.” See Consorcio Ecuatoriano, 747 F.3d at 1269 (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). And it would certainly “encourage[e] foreign countries to provide reciprocal assistance to our courts.” See In re Pimenta, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 1289. As a result, the Court finds that granting the Application would further the international comity concerns that underlie § 1782.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the Argentinian Court, applying through the Government, has satisfied the four statutory factors under § 1782, all four Intel factors weigh in favor of granting the Application, and granting the application would further the international comity policy underlying § 1782, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, on September 17, 2024.