I. INTRODUCTION

*1 Plaintiffs CNY Fair Housing, Inc.; The Fair Housing Partnership of Greater Pittsburgh, Inc.; Housing Research & Advocacy Center, Inc., d/b/a Fair Housing Center for Rights & Research, Inc.; Housing Opportunities Made Equal of Buffalo, Inc.; Housing Opportunities Made Equal of Greater Cincinnati, Inc.; Phyllis Bartoszewski; Deanna Town; and Joyce Wilcox, as administrator and representative of the estate of Lois Harter, bring this action, asserting claims under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (“FHA”), New York Human Rights Law, and Ohio Civil Rights Law. (Dkt. No. 1). Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ appeal from United States Magistrate Judge Miroslav Lovric's November 13, 2023 text order (the “Order”), (Dkt. No. 157), denying Plaintiffs’ September 28, 2023 and October 16, 2023 motions to compel (the “Motions to Compel”). (Dkt. No. 162). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ appeal is granted and the Order is reversed.

II. BACKGROUND[2]

This appeal stems from a dispute over the appropriate scope of discovery in this case and whether Defendants must produce information about eight properties (the “Contested Properties”)[3] located in Ohio and Pennsylvania. (See generally Dkt. No. 162). Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Clover Management, Inc. is responsible for FHA violations at the Contested Properties and the Contested Properties are therefore “not just relevant, but central to Plaintiffs’ [FHA] claims.” (Dkt. No. 143, at 3). Defendants assert that the Contested Properties, which are owned by entities named in the Complaint but since dismissed, are managed by non-party Clover Management West, Inc. and therefore not relevant. (Dkt. No. 165-3, at 7).

*2 Plaintiffs filed an initial motion to compel discovery regarding the Contested Properties on April 21, 2023. (Dkt. No. 97). Defendants opposed the motion, largely on the basis of relevancy. (See Dkt. No. 105, at 6–9). Magistrate Judge Lovric held a hearing on May 16, 2023, (Text Minute Entry, May 16, 2023), and issued a text order denying the motion without prejudice “for the reasons set forth at the Hearings and also the reasons set forth in Response 105,” (Dkt. No. 112).

On September 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the first Motion to Compel at issue here, requesting an order “compelling Defendants to reproduce documents without redactions made exclusively on the grounds of relevancy.” (Dkt. No. 135, at 1). Plaintiffs stated that “Defendants have produced documents with redactions covering certain information that Defendants have unilaterally deemed is irrelevant to the case,” including “all information related to the eight Contested Properties.” (Id. at 1, 3). Plaintiffs argued that “[r]elevance is not a basis for redacting information from a responsive document,” (id. (citing Christine Asia Co. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 52, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2018))), and that under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a party seeking to redact information from otherwise responsive documents must establish good cause,’ ” (id. at 4 (quoting Trireme Energy Holdings, Inc. v. Innogy Renewables US LLC, No. 20-cv-5015, 2022 WL 621957, at *3, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39589, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2022))).

Plaintiffs filed the second Motion to Compel at issue here on October 16, 2023, seeking an order compelling Defendants to supplement their responses to all requests and interrogatories to cover the Contested Properties. (Dkt. No. 143, at 2 n.2, 18). Plaintiffs stated that “Defendants agreed to provide the requested discovery for all properties with the exception of eight ‘Contested Properties’ ” because, “[a]ccording to Defendants, no named Defendant owns or manages the Contested Properties,” but that “evidence adduced through discovery has shown that Defendant Clover Management, Inc. is likely liable for FHA violations at the Contested Properties.” (Id. at 2–3). Plaintiffs noted that they “have raised multiple possible bases for [Clover Management, Inc.’s] liability for conduct at [the Contested Properties].” (Id. at 10).

On October 23, 2023, Magistrate Judge Lovric held a hearing on the September 28 Motion. (Text Minute Entry, October 23, 2023). Plaintiffs confirmed that the September 28 Motion seeks only redacted information in documents that have already been produced, (Dkt. No. 154, at 37:23–38:25), specifically redacted information concerning Clover Management, Inc.’s potential liability for conduct at the Contested Properties, (id. at 50:12–51:4). Magistrate Judge Lovric reserved decision on the September 28 Motion to decide it with the October 16 Motion. (Id. at 59:17–23). He stated that at the next hearing he was “most interested in having both parties laser focus on ... how do[ ] plaintiffs, or defendants the opposite, find that what plaintiffs are seeking is relevant to this litigation.” (Id. at 60:2–8).

On October 31, 2023, and November 13, 2023, Magistrate Judge Lovric held hearings on both Motions to Compel. (Text Minute Entry, October 31, 2023; Text Minute Entry, November 13, 2023). At the October 31 hearing, Magistrate Judge Lovric expressed concern with the relevancy of the discovery sought and the potential cost and burden of production, (Dkt. No. 153, at 82:2–83:17), and instructed the parties to confer, (id. at 117:4–120:16). At the November 13 hearing, Magistrate Judge Lovric informed the parties that he would be denying both Motions, explaining: “A great deal of my reasoning for this ... is relevancy[.] ... I have a very difficult path of seeing the relevancy of this expanded discovery as to the claims that are currently pending and as to the Complaint that is the operative pleading here. The eight disputed properties are not only disputed in terms of the parties and how you view them, but the eight disputed properties were in the early stages of this proceeding dismissed by way of the defendants that were the owners of those properties.” (Dkt. No. 158, at 12:8–19).

*3 Magistrate Judge Lovric subsequently issued the Order, which reads, in relevant part: “(1) the Court finds persuasive and adopts Defendants arguments and analysis in Defendants Responses at Dkt. Nos. [105, 141, 144] and also finds persuasive and adopts Defendants analysis and arguments as presented at Hearings held on 4/24/2023, 5/16/2023, 10/23/2023, and 10/31/2023; (2) the Court relies upon the reasoning and analysis as set forth by the Court at Hearings held on 4/24/2023, 5/16/2023, 10/23/2023, and 10/31/2023; (3) therefore for all those reasons, Plaintiffs Motions to Compel at Dkt. Nos. [135, 143] are DENIED.” (Dkt. No. 157).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court's review of a non-dispositive discovery order is limited to determining whether the order is “clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). “A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Malowsky v. Schmidt, No. 15-cv-666, 2017 WL 5496068, at *2, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229306, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2017). “An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Id.; see also In re Hulley Enters. Ltd., 400 F. Supp. 3d 62, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); E.E.O.C. v. First Wireless Grp., Inc., 225 F.R.D. 404, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). “Under this highly deferential standard, magistrate judges are ‘afforded broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes, and reversal is appropriate only if that discretion is abused.’ ” Storms v. United States, No. 13-cv-811, 2014 WL 3547016, at *4, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96665, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs assert that Magistrate Judge Lovric denied the Motions to Compel on the basis of relevancy, “without engaging at all with (1) Plaintiffs’ explanation in their September 28 Motion that information on the eight Contested Properties is relevant to the claims at issue and, in any event, a party cannot redact information absent good cause, or with (2) Plaintiffs’ explanation in their October 16 Motion that, even if Defendants’ assertion regarding the corporate structure of the Clover companies are true ... that would not be determinative of the Defendant Clover Management, Inc.’s potential responsibility for discriminatory acts at the properties described in the Complaint.” (Dkt. No. 162, at 4). Defendants respond that “the extensive history underlying the November 13 Order evidences that Magistrate Judge Lovric's denial of Plaintiffs’ September 28 and October 16 Motions was not an abuse of discretion” and that Magistrate Judge Lovric “fully considered” Plaintiffs’ arguments.” (Dkt. No. 165-3, at 4).

Under Rule 26(b)(1), “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. “Information is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Relevance is a matter of degree, and the standard is applied more liberally in discovery than it is at trial.” New Falls Corp. v. Soni, No. 16-cv-6805, 2020 WL 2836787, at *1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94747, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2020) (quoting Vaigasi v. Solow Mgmt. Corp., No. 11-cv-5088, 2016 WL 616386, at *11, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18460, at *35 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016)); see also Refco Grp. Ltd., LLC v. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., No. 13-cv-1654, 2014 WL 5420225, at *7, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155009, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2014) (“[I]t is well established that relevance for the purpose of discovery is broader in scope than relevance for the purpose of the trial itself.” (quoting Arch Assocs., Inc. v. HuAmerica Int'l, Inc., No. 93-cv-2168, 1994 WL 30487 at *1, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 746, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1994))). “Proportionality focuses on the marginal utility of the discovery sought.” Vaigasi, 2016 WL 616386, at *14, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18460, at *42 (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). “Proportionality and relevance are ‘conjoined’ concepts; the greater the relevance of the information in issue, the less likely its discovery will be found to be disproportionate.” Id. (citing Hon. Elizabeth D. Laporte & Jonathan M. Redgrave, A Practical Guide to Achieving Proportionality under New Federal Rule of Procedure 26, 9 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 19, 53 (Fall 2015)).

*4 “In reviewing a motion to compel, the district court must determine whether the moving party has established the relevance of the information sought and its proportionality in relation to the needs of the case.” Offor v. Mercy Med. Ctr., No. 21-cv-2115, 2023 WL 2579040, at *4, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 6687, at *11 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 2023) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 87 (2023). The party filing the motion “bears the initial burden [of showing] the relevance of the information it seeks.” Huseby, LLC v. Bailey, No. 20-cv-167, 2021 WL 3206776, at *6, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141504, at *19 (D. Conn. July 29, 2021). If this burden is met, the “party resisting discovery [then] bears the burden of showing why discovery should be denied.” Cole v. Towers Perrin Forster & Crosby, 256 F.R.D. 79, 80 (D. Conn. 2009); see also N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc. v. MultiPlan, Inc., 325 F.R.D. 36, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Once the requesting party has made a prima facie showing of relevance, ‘it is up to the responding party to justify curtailing discovery.’ ” (quoting Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Great American Ins. Co. of New York, 284 F.R.D. 132, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2012))).

The short Order cites to the analysis and arguments in numerous documents and hearings, without specifying a rationale, making it difficult to determine the precise basis of Magistrate Judge Lovric's decision to deny the Motions to Compel. As best as the Court can discern, Magistrate Judge Lovric determined that the information Plaintiffs seek is not relevant to their FHA claims—not that such information is not proportional to the needs of the case. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 154, at 65:9–11 (Magistrate Judge Lovric stating at the October 23 hearing that he is “looking to have both sides tell [him] how [the information Plaintiffs seek] is relevant to where [the parties] are right now”); Dkt. No. 153, at 82:2–83:17 (Magistrate Judge Lovric expressing some concern at the October 31 hearing about the potential cost and burden of production but focusing discussion on the relevancy of the discovery sought); Dkt. No. 158, at 12:8–19 (Magistrate Judge Lovric explaining at the November 13 hearing that a “great deal of [his] reasoning for” denying the Motions to Compel “is relevancy”)). Having carefully reviewed the Order, the underlying motion papers, the various hearing transcripts, and other filings in this case, the Court is left with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Malowsky, 2017 WL 5496068, at *2, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229306, at *5.

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs name Clover Management, Inc. as a Defendant, along with a number of other entities, including the owners of the Contested Properties. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 1). Plaintiffs also allege FHA violations at numerous properties, including the Contested Properties. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 25, 100 (alleging that a tester who visited Lorain Pointe Senior Apartments was told “that she could not have a reserved parking space” and “that the property charged an additional $25.00 per month for first-floor units”)). And Plaintiffs allege that Clover Management, Inc. manages “all of the senior properties at issue in this matter.” (Id. ¶ 24). While the owners have since been dismissed, (Dkt. Nos. 17, 31), Clover Management, Inc. remains a Defendant, and Plaintiffs have raised multiple possible bases[4] for finding Clover Management, Inc. liable for conduct at the Contested Properties, (Dkt. No. 143, at 10). As a result, the record before the Court establishes that the information Plaintiffs seek is highly relevant; the record does not support Magistrate Judge Lovric's finding to the contrary. Defendants’ assertion that the Contested Properties are managed by non-party Clover Management West, Inc. simply raises a factual dispute to be resolved at trial.

*5 Moreover, the record includes evidence connecting Clover Management, Inc. to conduct at the Contested Properties, including a sworn statement made by Richard Greenspan, Executive Vice President of Clover Management, Inc., that “Clover Management, Inc. provides property management services at the properties described in the Complaint,” (Dkt. No. 22-1, ¶ 3); references to “Clover Management, Inc.” in lease agreements for properties purportedly managed by Clover Management West, Inc., (Dkt. No. 135-4; Dkt. No. 105-4, ¶¶ 8, 11); deposition testimony from District Managers overseeing Contested Properties that suggests they had never heard of Clover Management West, Inc., (Dkt. No. 135-5, at 22:4–12, 29:8–14; Dkt. No. 135-6, at 30:4–7, 31:16–32:14); and a written policy captioned “Reasonable Accommodation and Reasonable Modification Request Policy” that references Clover Management, Inc. and appears to have been distributed to employees at properties purportedly managed by Clover Management West, Inc., (Dkt. No. 143-14, at 2, 4; Dkt. No. 135-4; Dkt. No. 105-4, ¶¶ 8, 11). The Court is therefore satisfied that “the discovery [Plaintiffs seek] is more than merely a fishing expedition.” Evans v. Calise, No. 92-cv-8430, 1994 WL 185696, at *1, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6187, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1994).

Defendants could have sought to “justify curtailing discovery” into the Contested Properties on the basis of proportionality, N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 325 F.R.D. at 48, which is an important factor in defining the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1), see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment (“The parties and the court have a collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving all discovery disputes.”). But Defendants have not made such a showing. And, in any event, Magistrate Judge Lovric's decision turned on relevancy, not proportionality. Having found that the information Plaintiffs seek is highly relevant and that the record does not support Magistrate Judge Lovric's finding to the contrary, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have met the “heavy burden” of showing that the Order is clearly erroneous. Khatabi v. Bonura, No. 10-cv-1168, 2017 WL 10621191, at *3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61921, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2017).

With respect to the September 28 Motion, which seeks only redacted information in documents that have already been produced, the Court also concludes that the Order is contrary to law because Magistrate Judge Lovric failed to apply the good cause standard required by Rule 26(c).

“The weight of authority in this Circuit goes against allowing a party to redact information from admittedly responsive and relevant documents ‘based on that party's unilateral determinations of relevancy.’ ” Christine Asia Co., 327 F.R.D. at 54 (quoting Cyris Jewels v. Casner, No. 12-cv-1895, 2016 WL 2962203, at *4, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66405, *12–13 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2016) (collecting cases)); see also Howell v. City of New York, No. 06-cv-6347, 2007 WL 2815738, at *2, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71063, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2007) (“The defendants have not sought to withhold from discovery, on grounds of irrelevance, the document in which the redacted information appears. It is not the practice of this court to permit parties to selectively excise from otherwise discoverable documents those portions that they deem not to be relevant.”). “Redactions are normally impermissible unless based on a legal privilege,” Coventry Cap. US LLC v. EEA Life Settlements Inc., No. 17-cv-7417, 2020 WL 7383940, at *9, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 236645, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2020) (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Book Dog Books, LLC, 298 F.R.D. 184, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)), and especially impermissible “where ... a confidentiality stipulation and order ... is in place,” Durling v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., No. 16-cv-3592, 2018 WL 557915, at *9, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11584, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2018).

*6 Courts may under Rule 26(c) “permit redactions on ‘a finding of “good cause” based on a need “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.’ ”” Trireme Energy Holdings, Inc, 2022 WL 621957, at *3, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39589, at *6 (quoting Howell, 2007 WL 2815738, at *2, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71063, at *6 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1))). But to establish good cause, “courts require a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Republic of Turkey v. Christie's, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 3d 385, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).

Consequently, even if the Court were to accept Defendants’ relevancy argument, which it does not, redactions in documents that have already been produced would only be permissible on a finding of good cause. It does not appear that Magistrate Judge Lovric made a finding of good cause, however, or even that Defendants made a particular and specific demonstration of fact that might support such a finding. Indeed, argument on the September 28 Motion at the October 23 hearing appears to have focused almost exclusively on relevancy. (See generally Dkt. No. 154). Furthermore, the parties entered into a Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order, which provides for confidentiality protections in this case and allows the parties to designate as “Confidential” or “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” certain categories of discovery material. (Dkt. No. 78, ¶¶ 2–3). There has been no finding that the Protective Order is insufficient to assuage Defendants’ confidentiality concerns in this instance.

Finally, the Court is not convinced by Defendants’ additional argument that Plaintiffs failed to file and serve a notice of appeal in accordance with Local Rule 72.1(b). (Dkt. No. 165-3, at 5). Local Rule 72.1(b) reads, in relevant part: “Any party may file an appeal from a Magistrate Judge's decision of a non-dispositive matter to the District Judge by filing with the Clerk and serving upon all parties their appeal to the decision.... The party must file and serve its notice of appeal and appellant's brief within fourteen (14) days after being served with the Magistrate Judge's order and must specifically designate the order or part of the order from which the party seeks relief and the basis for the appeal.” Plaintiffs submitted their appeal within the requisite time period, along with a brief explaining the bases for their appeal.

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ appeal, (Dkt. No. 162), is GRANTED, and Magistrate Judge Lovric's Order, (Dkt. No. 157), denying Plaintiffs’ Motions to Compel, (Dkt. Nos. 135, 143), is REVERSED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motions to Compel, (Dkt. Nos. 135, 143), are REMANDED for further consideration consistent with this Decision and Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.

IT IS SO ORDERED.