U.S. ex rel. Griffis v. EOD Tech., Inc.
U.S. ex rel. Griffis v. EOD Tech., Inc.
2024 WL 4921518 (E.D. Tenn. 2024)
May 10, 2024

Poplin, Debra C.,  United States Magistrate Judge

Protective Order
30(b)(6) corporate designee
Proportionality
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Summary
The court addressed a dispute between a relator and a defendant regarding the production of ESI related to various contracts and task orders. The court found that the relator was entitled to question the defendant's corporate representative about relevant areas where the document production was lacking, but also ordered the parties to meet and confer to narrow the scope of some of the topics. The court also noted that the defendant's corporate designee is not required to have a photographic memory, but can refer to documents and summaries during the deposition to refresh their recollection.
Additional Decisions
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. PATRICK GRIFFIS, and PATRICK GRIFFIS, individually, Plaintiffs,
v.
EOD TECHNOLOGY, INC. (N/K/A JANUS GLOBAL OPERATIONS LLC), Defendant
No. 3:10-CV-204-TRM-DCP
United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Northern Division
Filed May 10, 2024
Poplin, Debra C., United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

*1 This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Rules of this Court, and Standing Order 13-02.
Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Protective Order [Doc. 241]. Relator filed a response in opposition [Doc. 245], and Defendant filed a reply [Doc. 247]. The motion is ripe for adjudication. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(a). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion [Doc. 241].
I. BACKGROUND
On April 9, 2024, Relator served his Rule 30(b)(6) notice on Defendant containing 84 topics [Doc. 242-1]. Later, on April 16, 2024, Relator served his Request for Admissions (“RFA) [Doc. 242-2]. On April 17, 2024, Defendant served written responses and objections to Relator's Rule 30(b)(6) notice [Doc. 242-3]. It now seeks a protective order “striking or significantly narrowing 53 topics in the notice (i.e., Topics 1, 3–29, 31, 32, 34–39, 41–44, 46, 51–53, 66, 75– 82) (“Disputed Topics”)” and striking RFA Nos. 1–14 [Doc. 242 pp. 2, 4, 5].
Defendant provides five grounds for its request: (1) “[it] would face an undue, impractical burden to prepare for many of the Disputed Topics because [its] former ... employees who were personally involved in the matters at issue ... were themselves unable to recall many of the specific details that Relator now seeks from [Defendant's] corporate designee[,]” (2) most of the Disputed Topics are impractically overbroad[,]” (3) “many of the Disputed Topics would require [Defendant's] representative to prepare for a ‘memory contest’ regarding specific dates, payment amounts, billing amounts, and other similar information across more than one million pages of produced material[,]” (4) a number of Disputed Topics seek information about ‘OCNs’ or ‘other country nationals[,]’ ” which target information in Relator's proposed Third Amended Complaint, and this issue also “infects Relator's RFA Nos. 2–14[,]” and (5) several topics and RFA No. 1 relate to the authenticity of documents, which “would be unduly burdensome for [Defendant] to attempt to prepare a corporate designee on each of those documents” [Doc. 242 pp. 2–5].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The deposition of a corporate representative is governed by Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testify. A subpoena must advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make this designation. The persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6); Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-505, 2021 WL 1685955, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 3, 2021). This rule “imposes burdens on both the discovering party and the designating party.” QBE Ins. Corp. v. Jorda Enters., Inc., 277 F.R.D. 676, 688 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
*2 The party seeking a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition “must describe the matters to be explored in the deposition with ‘reasonable particularity’ sufficient to enable the responding corporation or business entity to produce a representative witness who can testify to the entity's knowledge on the topics so identified.” Alvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 517CV00023, 2018 WL 826379, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2018) (citation omitted). “The test for reasonable particularity is whether the request places the party upon ‘reasonable notice of what is called for and what is not.’ ” Id. at *7 (quoting St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Comm. Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 514 (N.D. Iowa 2000)).
With respect to the responding organization, “it is obligated to produce a witness or witnesses knowledgeable about the subjects described in the notice and to prepare the witness or witnesses to testify not simply to their own knowledge, but the knowledge of the corporation.” Schnatter v. 247 Grp., LLC, 343 F.R.D. 325, 331 (W.D. Ky. 2022) (citation omitted). “Absolute perfection is not required of a 30(b)(6) witness[,]” and “[t]he mere fact that a designee could not answer every question on a certain topic does not necessarily mean that the corporation failed to comply with its obligation.” QBE Ins. Corp., 277 F.R.D. at 691 (citation omitted).
Rule 30(b)(6) depositions are subject to Rule 26(c). Smith v. Guidant Glob. Inc., No. 19-CV-12318, 2020 WL 6793330, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 19, 2020). Rule 26(c) governs protective orders, which provides, “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including ... forbidding the disclosure or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A). “To show good cause, a movant for a protective order must articulate specific facts showing ‘clearly defined and serious injury’ resulting from the discovery sought and cannot rely on mere conclusory statements.” Nix v. Sword, 11 F. App'x 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Avirgan v. Hull, 118 F.R.D. 252, 254 (D.D.C. 1987)). The party requesting the protective order has the burden of establishing good cause. Id. “[A] showing of irrelevancy of proposed discovery can satisfy the good cause requirement of Rule 26(c).” Large on behalf of Large v. Blazer, No. 3:20-CV-1012, 2022 WL 99986, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 10, 2022).
III. ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, Defendant objects to Topics 6–7, 11–13, 16–17, 19, 34–36, and 39– 44 and RFA Nos. 2–14 on the basis that they seek information beyond the scope of Relator's Second Amended Complaint and instead target information subject to Relator's proposed Third Amended Complaint [Doc. 242 pp. 19–20]. On May 6, 2024, however, the Court granted Relator leave to file his Third Amended Complaint [Doc. 249], which he filed the same day [Doc. 251]. The Court therefore denies Defendant's request to strike these topics on this basis.
A. Topics 5–7, 19, 39, 41–44, and 52
Defendant states that it “will reasonably prepare its corporate designee(s) to testify about information currently available to [it],” but that its “ability to provide accurate and complete testimony on the [t]opics is necessarily limited due to the passage of time, and the fact that all of the individuals with first-hand knowledge of the matters at issue in the [t]opics are no longer employees of or associated with Defendant” [Doc. 242 pp. 8-9]. According to Defendant, “[i]t is simply unreasonable and unrealistic to expect that [it] will be able to provide answers to questions about the contemporaneous knowledge, intent, representations, and materials relied upon by [Defendant's] former employees when they themselves could not recall such information” [Id. at 10 (citation omitted)]. Defendant further argues that “to the extent that [it] has any ‘knowledge’ of the relevant matters separate and apart from the recollections of its former employees, such information is contained in the documents that [it] already produced to Relator” [Id. at 11].
*3 Relator responds that Defendant “cannot discharge its [Rule] 30(b)(6) obligations by resting on the answers of the individual employees, current or former, during their personal depositions” [Doc. 245 p. 3 (citation omitted)]. Relator argues that “[i]f anything, the inability of individual witnesses to recall certain factual details emphasizes [his] need for a [Rule] 30(b)(6) deposition to address the disputed topics” [Id. at 5 (citation omitted)]. He further submits that “Defendant cannot rest on the documents in place of making available a well-prepared corporate designee to testify to each of the topics noticed” [Id.]. And while the relevant employees may no longer be employed by Defendant, Relator states that “a corporation has life beyond that of mortals” [Id. at 7 (citation omitted)]. Relator submits that Defendant “can also interview the people close to the underlying facts” [Id. at 8]. Several of the fact witnesses could not recall information, but Relator states that Defendant “fails to note that many of these individuals did not do anything to prepare” [Id.]. Even so, Relator states that “most witnesses displayed general recall about the issues, and memories improved as documents were introduced” [Id.]. Relator asserts that requiring him to “rely solely on fact witness testimony would prejudice [him]” [Id.]. He states that Defendant has access to its former employees, pointing to its witness list, and that it provided similar information to its expert witness [Id. at 10].
Defendant replies that “[m]erely because some of the 20 former ... employes compelled to appear by subpoena agreed to limited representation by counsel at those depositions, does not mean that [Defendant] can force those individuals to assist a corporate designee to prepare to testify” [Doc. 247 p. 2]. Even if they agree to assist, Defendant argues, this does not mean that it can prepare a witness on the “former employees’ contemporaneous knowledge and intent, because the former employees themselves do not recall such information” [Id. at 3 (citations omitted)]. Defendant argues that it is not required to “interview every former employee with every available document in preparation of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition” [Id.]. It submits that “Relator seeks to require [Defendant] to uncover answers to overbroad and vaguely worded topics covering a wide range of [Defendant's] operations between 2004 and 2012” and that “[s]uch stale information, assuming it even exists, cannot plausibly be characterized as ‘reasonably available’ under any plain reading of the phase” [Id. at 4 (footnote omitted)].
The parties' dispute boils down to what is “reasonably available” to Defendant as contemplated by Rule 30(b)(6). “[The] designee has a duty to reasonably obtain information from corporate documents, current or prior corporate employees, or any other sources reasonably available to the corporation.” Schall v. Suzuki Motor of Am., Inc., No. 4:14CV-00074, 2017 WL 4050319, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 13, 2017) (citation omitted). “If the entity receiving the deposition notice does not possess knowledge of the matters listed in the deposition notice, ‘then its obligations under Rule 30(b)(6) obviously cease, since the rule requires testimony only as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization.” Bigsby v. Barclays Cap. Real Est., Inc., 329 F.R.D. 78, 81 (S.D. N.Y. 2019) (quoting Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 70, 76 (D. Neb. 1995) (citation omitted)).
At this time, the Court finds Defendant's concerns too speculative to enter a protective order prohibiting Relator from inquiring about these topics. Ellis v. Corizon, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00304, 2018 WL 1865158, at *5 (D. Idaho Apr. 18, 2018) (“While [the defendant] may plead lack of institutional memory or knowledge as to a specific topic or topics, ... it may do so only after it reviews ‘all matters known or reasonably available to it.’ ” (quoting United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 362 (M.D. N.C. 1996), aff'd, 166 F.R.D. 367 (M.D. N.C. 1996)).
Defendant has pointed to the depositions of Lisa Jacobson, David Mayfield, Donald Patton, and Matthew Hulsey asserting that they could not recall certain information. Even so, these witnesses are not under an obligation to prepare like a Rule 30(b)(6) witness is obligated to so do. Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Pixcir Microelectronics Co., No. 2:10-CV-00014, 2013 WL 4101811, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2013) (“Several courts have recognized that preparing a Rule 30(b)(6) designee may be an onerous task.”). Defendant states that, to the extent it has any knowledge about these topics, separate from its employees' knowledge, the information is in documents that have been produced to Relator. But producing documents is not a substitute for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Occidential Chem. Corp. v. 21st Century Fox Am., Inc., No. CV1811273, 2022 WL 2671198, at *6 (D.N.J. July 11, 2022) (collecting cases).
*4 The Court notes that given the age of this case, there may be situations where Relator's line of questioning relates to matters that are no longer reasonably available to Defendant. At the deposition, however, Defendant can explain the efforts it used to obtain such information. Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prod., LLC, No. 09-C-0916, 2011 WL 3880787, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 1, 2011) (“The projects relevant here occurred approximately twenty years ago. [The corporate designee's] deposition responses indicate she made a good faith effort to obtain answers but could not in the face of time and memory constraints.”). But at this juncture, the Court finds it premature to prohibit Relator from asking about these topics.[1]
B. Topics 3 and 4 and RFA No. 1
These topics and the discovery request, Defendant argues, “would require [it] to review and evaluate[,] in an impractical and unduly burdensome way[,] thousands of documents for potential evidentiary objections” [Doc. 242 p. 12]. According to Defendant, “Topic 3 would require [Defendant's] designee to testify regarding which of the 1,998 documents listed on Attachment 1 to Relator's [Rule] 30(b)(6) [n]otice ... ‘lack of trustworthiness as a business record under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 803(6), or otherwise” [Id. (citation omitted)]. Topic 4 presents a similar request but includes 1.9 million pages and “documents produced by third parties” [Id.]. RFA No. 1 asks about 2,263 documents [Id.]. Defendant asserts that these “are facially overbroad and unduly burdensome” [Id.]. Further, Defendant states that “each of these topics is premature . . . because Relator has not identified which of these documents he may use at trial” [Id.]. Defendant submits that “[t]he proper time to address any remaining evidentiary objections over these documents is when the parties exchange trial exhibit lists, and only to the extent those lists include such documents” [Id. (citation omitted)].
Relator responds that Defendant posed trustworthiness objections to the documents, which “can be dealt with much more efficiently now rather than on a document-by-document and witness-by-witness basis at trial” [Doc. 245 p. 14]. “[He] agrees that the legal issues concerning admissibility can be decided later” [Id. at 14–15]. But Relator argues, “to the extent there are factual contentions underlying [Defendant's] claim that its documents lack trustworthiness, [it] should answer Relator's RFA No. 1 and produce a witness to speak to any contentions before the close of discovery” [Id. (citation omitted)].
The Court finds that Topics 3 and 4 and RFA No. 1 are facially overbroad. As Defendant represents, Topic 3 implicates 1,998 documents and Topic 4 implicates 129,635 documents [Doc. 247 p. 5]. See Town of Smyrna, Tenn. v. Mun. Gas Auth. of Georgia, No. 3:11-0642, 2015 WL 13718033, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 17, 2015) (“The Court agrees that a topic requiring a Rule 30(b)(6) witness to potentially testify about the admissibility of 100,000 documents is completely unreasonable, overbroad, and burdensome.”). Likewise, RFA No. 1 relates to 2,263 documents [Doc. 247 p. 5]. In light of the volume of documents, “[t]he Court does not believe it necessary at this point to order Defendant[ ] to spend the time and resources necessary to authenticate thousands of pages of documents.” Hampton v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., No. 3:04CV346, 2006 WL 3020895, at *5 (D. Conn. Oct. 23, 2006); Kumar v. Copper Mountain, Inc., No. 07-CV-02597, 2009 WL 1244174, at *1 (D. Colo. May 5, 2009) (“Instead of debating whether the Defendant must stipulate to the entire universe of discovery documents, the Court believes it would be more efficient and relevant to limit [the p]laintiff's inquiry to those documents identified as exhibits.”). The most efficient use of the parties' time is to meet and confer regarding the authenticity of any exhibits that each party intends to rely on [See Doc. 150 ¶¶ 3(g), 4(e)]; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (explaining that the rules “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”).
*5 The Court therefore grants Defendant's request to strike Topics 3 and 4 and RFA No. 1.
C. Topics 8, 9, and 46
According to Defendant, Topic 8 seeks “ ‘communications between the Government and [Defendant] concerning the Contract proposals:’ Topic 9 is ‘all contract documents submitted by [Defendant] to the Government for the Contracts;’ and Topic 46 is ‘[Defendant's] representations, use and billings to the Government of Ex-patriot and LN security personnel to perform services for the United States Army Corps of Engineers on TO 26’ ” [Doc. 242 p. 13 (citation omitted)]. Claiming that these topics are not described with reasonable particularity, Defendant argues “they seek testimony on virtually every written correspondence and oral conversation between [Defendant] and the Government, as well as all ‘contract documents’ (an undefined term) that [Defendant] provided to the Government in connection with thirty-three different Contracts and Task Orders” [Id.]. In addition, Defendant argues that “Topic 46 also improperly combines at least three distinct topics regarding all ‘representations, use, and billings’ to the Government during the 13-month period (December 29, 2009[,] through February 5, 2011) in which [Defendant] performed under Task Order 26” [Id. at 13–14].
Relator states that he has “agreed to limit the scope of the topics” and only requests that Defendant “provide a witness prepared to testify to communications which occurred during the question-and-answer (“Q&A”) process prior to [the] contract award and any post-award communications which [Defendant] contends exonerate it” [Doc. 245 p. 15]. This narrow inquiry, Relator argues is “directly relevant to [his] fraud allegations” [Id.]. Relator attaches a Q&A, stating that Defendant “told the Government that it would use employed, not subcontracted, labor” and that Defendant is “familiar with its own response during the Q&A process” [Id. at 16; see also Doc. 245-17].
While Relator agreed to narrow the scope of these topics, Defendant states that they “still impose an impractical burden” because “[n]one of the people who worked on the 33 contracts and task order proposals at issue are still employed by [Defendant]; former employees who were involved are not likely to recall specific ‘Q&A’ exchanges with the Government from nearly two decades ago” [Doc. 247 p. 6].
The Court finds Relator's offer to narrow these topics is appropriate. In addition, at this point, Defendant's claims of burden are speculative. See supra pp. 6–7. Defendant has an obligation to discuss the topics with current and former employees and to gather information that is reasonably available. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6); see Schall, 2017 WL 4050319, at *5 (noting that the corporate designee must discuss the topics with current and former employees). Again, considering the age of the case, there may be situations where Relator's line of questioning relates to matters that are no longer reasonably available to Defendant. But at this time, its objections are premature.
D. Topics 10, 12–27, 29, 31, 32, 34, and 53
According to Defendant, these topics “seek testimony regarding specific dates of award, costs incurred, and ‘dollar amounts’ and ‘justification’ for amounts paid and/or billed by [Defendant] and its subcontractors on thirty-three different Contracts and Task Orders” [Doc. 242 p. 14 (citation omitted)]. Defendant characterizes some of them as follows:
*6 Topics 10 (“date of awards”); 14, 20 (“costs actually incurred ... by dollar amount”); 16 (“costs actually incurred by EODT to provide fringe benefits ... on a per head per month basis”) 18 (“Cost element breakdown of all costs”); 22 (“amount of money EODT paid ... and the justification for the payments made”); 53 (“The basis for and details of all EODT payments...”).
[Id.].
Defendant claims that “these [t]opics should be stricken because [they are] unreasonably duplicative or cumulative of discovery that [Defendant] has already produced to Relator” [Id.]. In a footnote, Defendant adds that “Topic 35 should be partially stricken to the extent it seeks testimony regarding ‘the dollar amount [Defendant] paid for such benefits’ ” and that “Topic 51 likewise should be partially stricken to the extent it seeks testimony regarding ‘the total amount paid by [Defendant] to Emad Raheem and/or Al Hurea under each of the Contracts’ ” [Id. at n.15].
Relator states that these topics “primarily deal with [Defendant's] and its subcontractors’ actual incurred and indirect costs under the contracts” [Doc. 245 p. 16]. He, however, “has already addressed the ‘date of awards’ and the amounts paid on each contract via stipulation” [Id.]. But Relator claims that he “is entitled to, but has not obtained, information clarifying what costs were actually incurred by [Defendant]” [Id.]. Relator states that “[Defendant] and its expert frustratingly refuse to state what its actual costs were and the basis therefor” [Id.]. While Defendant claims that it does not need to produce a witness to testify about these topics because it has produced documents, Relator asserts this position is incorrect [Id. at 17]. He argues that “[o]f further significance, [Defendant's] statement about having produced general categories of financial documents fails to reveal substantive gaps in [Defendant's] production” [Id.]. As an example, Relator states:
[Defendant] did not produce complete timesheets, invoices, or payroll reports for payments made or costs coded in the general ledger for its local national (“LN”) and third-country national (“TCN”) independent contractors and subcontracts under the Rusafa Contract. Similarly, [Defendant] has not produced timesheets, payroll reports, or labor contracts with Al Hurea personnel from 2005–2007 on Task Orders 5 and 6 despite [Defendant] having paid these workers directly. Thus, it remains imperative that Relator be able to question [Defendant's] corporate representative about actual costs incurred and benefits provided using those documents that bear upon these issues.
[Id.]. He asserts that he “should not be compelled [to] go through 1.7 million pages of documents to come up with the accounting that [Defendant] has in its Delteck accounting system, general ledger, and other accounting reco[ ]rds and which has already been calculated by [Defendant's] expert” [Id. at 17–18]. According to Relator, he “is entitled under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to have [a Defendant] witness go through its accounting documents and provide Relator with [its] official position on and interpretation of those highly relevant documents” [Id. at 18].
Defendant replies that its corporate designee is not required “to have a photographic memory of financial information contained in previously produced documents” [Doc. 247 p. 6]. While Relator asserts that its expert has this information, Defendant argues that its expert had months to review and issue an opinion on such financial data [Id. at 6–7].
*7 As an initial matter, in light of Relator's representation that he already addressed “date of awards” and the “amounts paid on each contract” by stipulation, the Court finds Relator has no need to address these specific areas with the Rule 30(b)(6) witness. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (explaining that the court must limit discovery when it is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative”).
Turning to the remaining areas, “[the] [a]pplicable ‘rules of discovery require a court to consider whether a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition would be cumulative, duplicative, unreasonably burdensome, and disproportional to the needs of the case.’ ” Adkisson, 2020 WL 8254453, at *5 (quoting Edwards v. Scripps Media, Inc., 331 F.R.D. 116, 121 (E.D. Mich. 2019)). And here, Relator has identified areas, that Defendant has not rebutted, where its document production was lacking such that he needs to “be able to question [Defendant's] corporate representative about the actual costs incurred and benefits provided using those documents that bear upon these issues” [Doc. 245 p. 17]. And further, merely because Defendant provided relevant information during discovery does not mean Relator cannot ask it about these topics. DDK Hotels, LLC v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., No. 19CV226, 2022 WL 2702378, at *10 (E.D. N.Y. Feb. 11, 2022) (“[S]imply because plaintiffs have provided relevant information covered by these topics in their interrogatory responses is not a basis for refusing defendants the opportunity to explore these topics further through a Rule 30(b)(6) witness.”). Indeed, “producing documents and responding to written discovery is not a substitute for providing a thoroughly educated Rule 30(b)(6) deponent.” Occidential Chem. Corp. v. 21st Century Fox Am., Inc., No. CV1811273, 2022 WL 2671198, at *6 (D.N.J. July 11, 2022) (collecting cases) (quoting Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Vegas Constr. Co., 251 F.R.D. 534, 541 (D. Nev. 2008)).[2]
Defendant contends that its corporate designee is not required to have a photographic memory. The Court agrees. Clear Cast Grp., Inc. v. Ritrama, Inc., No. 1:09CV0169, 2011 WL 13334451, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2011) (“It is true that a deposition is not a memory contest.”) (citations omitted)). To the extent Defendant's corporate designee may not be able to recollect financial documents, he/she is not prevented from bringing them to the deposition to refresh his/her recollection. DDK Hotels, LLC, 2022 WL 2702378, at *11 (“In cases where the breadth of deposition topics exceeds the boundaries of what it is reasonable to expect an individual to be able to recollect, courts have held that it is appropriate to allow the deponent to refer to a testimonial summary, documents, or notes during the deposition.” (collecting cases)); Starline Windows Inc. v. Quanex Bldg. Prod. Corp., No. 15-CV-1282-L, 2016 WL 4485564, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2016) (“Moreover, a prepared Rule 30(b)(6) witness is entitled to bring documents and summaries to the deposition to aid in testifying, rendering “memorization” unnecessary.”).
*8 The Court therefore precludes Relator from addressing the date of awards and the amounts paid on each contract given that the parties have entered a stipulation on these areas. The Court declines to preclude Relator from addressing the other topics.
E. Topic 11
According to Defendant, this topic seeks, “Contract amendments or modifications related to any security, demining, general labor, translation, or life support function performed by or to be performed by LNs, TNCs, or OCNs” [Doc. 242 p. 15]. Claiming that this topic “gives no indication of, and places no limitation on, what particular aspect(s) of the ‘[c]ontract amendments or modifications that [its] corporate representative must prepare to address in [his/her] testimony,’ ” Defendant asserts it is not reasonably particular [Id.]. In addition, Defendant claims that it has “already produced modifications and amendments to formal contracts, to the extent they still exist, to both Relator and the Government” [Id.]. Therefore, Defendant states, “Topic 11 is unreasonably duplicative and/or cumulative of discovery that [Defendant] has already produced in this action” [Id.].
Relator sates that Topic 11 “concern[s] a discrete subject matter—‘security, demining, general labor, translation, or life support function performed by or to be performed by LNs, TCNs, and OCNs’ ” [Doc. 245 p. 18]. In addition, Relator states that he “further narrows this request to apply only to Task Orders 5, 6, 18, 26, and the Rusafa Contract” [Id.]. He argues that “the fact that [Defendant] produced some Contract amendments and modifications does not extinguish its obligation to prepare a witness under Rule 30(b)(6)” [Id.]. According to Relator, he needs information on this topic for two reasons: (1) “[Defendant's] fact witnesses have testified that [Defendant] would ‘go back to the Government’ if it deviated from its contract proposals[,]’ ” and (2) “Relator alleges that [Defendant] used Contract modifications and amendments as a means of realizing higher margins on its fraudulent schemes” [Id. at 18–19 (footnote omitted)].
Defendant responds that while Relator asserts that the topic is limited to “discrete subject matter[,]” the term “general labor—in addition to the other four labor types listed in Topic 11—is about as broad as one could describe ‘labor’ ” [Doc. 247 p. 7 (citation and emphasis omitted)].
The Court declines to strike Topic 11 as Relator sets forth his reasons for needing Defendant's position on this matter, and Defendant has not rebutted this assertion. And Relator has narrowed this topic. But there does appear to be some misunderstanding as to what “general labor” or other labor means. The Court therefore orders the parties to meet and confer to determine appropriate parameters on “general labor” or the other categories of labor.
F. Topic 28
According to Defendant, this topic seeks information about “the contents of [Defendant's] general ledger and final cost workbooks for the Contracts” [Doc. 242 p. 16]. Defendant argues that “this [t]opic fails to describe the testimony sought with reasonable particularity because, as written, [it] purports to require [Defendant's] corporate representative to be prepared to address tens-of-thousands of individual financial entries for thirty-three different Contracts and Task Orders that were performed over the course of nearly a decade” [Id.]. Defendant states that the “burden of preparing a corporate designee to provide the requested testimony outweighs any usefulness to Relator because the ‘contents’ of [Defendant's] general ledger and financial cost workbooks speak for themselves, and no corporate witness can add to the information contained in these documents” [Id.].
*9 Relator states that he needs Defendant “to prepare a witness on this topic so [he] can ask about projected and actual costs incurred for [the] at-issue labor categories and subcontracts under Task Orders 5, 6, 18, and 26[,] and the Rusafa Contract[,]” and he “agrees to narrow Topic 28 accordingly” [Doc. 245 p. 19]. Relator asserts that “[e]xpenses incurred for specific labor categories and subcontractors have been at issue since [he] filed his First Amended Complaint” and that “[Defendant] undoubtedly intends to present testimony at trial regarding what its general ledger and final cost workbooks indicate and whether they reflect costs actually incurred and amounts billed to the Government for relevant labor services” [Id.].
Defendant asserts that “[e]ven with the proposed narrowing, this [t]opic remains impractically overbroad because it would require a designee to be prepared to address thousands of individual financial entries for five different Contracts and Task Orders performed over multiple years” [Doc. 247 p. 8].
The Court does not find this topic overly broad in light of Relator's offer to narrow this request to the projected and actual costs incurred for the at-issue labor categories and subcontracts under Task Orders 5, 6, 18, and 26, and the Rusafa Contract. While the number of documents may be great, Relator only seeks information about a specific set of costs. The Court therefore declines to strike this topic.
G. Topics 36–38, 51, and 52
According to Defendant, “Topics 36–38 each improperly combine four distinct topics concerning thirty-three different Contracts and Task Orders into a single Topic, meaning that each of these Topics effectively contain 132 different subparts” [Doc. 242 p. 16]. Defendant states “[t]hat these [t]opics were drafted so broadly as to encompass ‘a wide range of items[,]’ ” which “demonstrates that they lack the requisite specificity of a proper Rule 30(b)(6) topic” [Id. at 17 (citation omitted)]. Further, Defendant states that the topics are overbroad because “they use the phrase ‘including but not limited to’ ” [Id. (citation omitted)]. Moreover, Defendant argues, that “[t]hese [t]opics are also overbroad and ambiguous to the extent that they seek testimony regarding, inter alia, ‘representations made by [Defendant] to the Government,’ ‘negotiations between [Defendant] and its subcontractors on the Contracts,’ and ‘[Defendant's] evaluation of subcontractor burdened rates proposed under each [C]ontract’ ” [Id. (citation omitted)]. Defendant requests that the Court strike these topics “or require Relator to significantly narrow and better define the scope of these [t]opics” [Id. at 18].
Relator responds that these topics “concern [Defendant's] relationship and negotiations with its LN, TCN, and OCN, labor force and providers, Emad Raheem, and Al Hurea” [Doc. 245 p. 19]. Defendant's reference to subparts, Relator argues, “does not render these topics impermissible, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not cap the number of topics a party may include in a deposition notice” [Id. at 19–20 (citation omitted)]. Relator states that the subparts provide the details he seeks. He agrees, however, to strike the phrase, “including but not limited to” from these topics [Id. at 20]. But he “maintains that [Defendant] is otherwise obligated to prepare witnesses to address these relevant topics, even if doing so will be time consuming or onerous” [Id.].
Defendant replies that “[t]opics 36–38 each effectively contain 132 different subparts, and [t]opics 51 and 52 combine at least five and nine distinct topics into a single [T]opic, respectively” [Doc. 247 p. 8]. It argues that “courts will limit Rule 30(b)(6) notices, when ... ‘the breadth of subject and number of topics render[ ] a responding party's efforts to designate a knowledgeable person unworkable’ ” [Id.].
*10 Initially, it is noted that Relator agrees to strike the phrase “including but not limited to” from these topics, and the Court finds this to be appropriate. Green v. Platinum Restaurants Mid-Am., LLC, No. 3:14-CV-439, 2017 WL 11682937, at *19 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 24, 2017) (“Although the federal courts are not entirely uniform in their view on this language, the better rule in the opinion of this Court is to strike such language as being overbroad since it imposes virtually no limitation on the questioning party. Indeed, the very purpose of such language is to remove otherwise reasonable limitations from an inquiry.”). The Court therefore strikes the phrase “including but not limited to” from all of the topics in which it appears in Relator's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice.
“[C]ourts have limited discovery where the breadth of subjects and number of topics identified in a 30(b)(6) deposition notice renders a responding party's efforts to designate a knowledgeable person unworkable.” Luken v. Christensen Grp. Inc., No. C16-5214, 2018 WL 1994121, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 27, 2018) (citing Apple Inc., v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 2012 WL 1511901, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012)). Defendant states that Relator has inquired about a “wide range of items” [Doc. 247 p. 8].[3] But in reading each of these topics, the subparts simply provide the detail that Relator is seeking regarding each respective topic. The Court does not find that these topics lack specificity—instead, without these “subparts,” they would likely be considered vague. The Court therefore declines to strike these topics based on Defendant's arguments.
H. Topic 66
According to Defendant, this topic “covers ‘safety, performance, and payment issues that arose with respect to Askars[’] guards and security supervisors performing services under the Contracts’ ” [Doc. 242 p. 18 (citation omitted)]. Defendant argues that “this [t]opic fails to describe the testimony sought with reasonable particularity because the phrase ‘safety, performance, and payment issues’ is vague and ambiguous, and because the [t]opic is unlimited in time and scope and broadly applies to thirty-three different Contracts and Task Orders that [Defendant] performed over nearly a decade’ ” [Id. (citation omitted)]. Defendant further states “[i]t is unclear how ‘safety, performance, and payment issues’ are relevant to any claim or defense in this action” [Id.]. Defendant requests that the Court strike this topic or “require Relator to significantly narrow and better define the scope of [it] so that [Defendant] can reasonably prepare a witness to testify” [Id.].
Relator responds that he “has agreed to limit the scope of this topic to Task Orders 5, 6, and the Rusafa Contract[,]” and therefore, “[Defendant's] concerns that Topic 66 ‘broadly applies to thirty-three different Contracts and Task Orders' are overstated’ ” [Doc. 245 p. 20]. Relator argues the topic is relevant as follows:
[Defendant] knows that Askars guards had a strike during the performance of at least two of the contracts after Askars failed to pay them. [Defendant] investigated the strike and payment concerns, and its then-CFO, Lisa Jacobson (who [Defendant's] counsel represents), was appalled by the non-payment issue and contended that it created safety concerns on the United States military base. It is Relator's position that these issues, and Ms. Jacobson's response, arose because Askars was a subcontractor, and the Askars' guards did not have a direct employee relationship with or benefits from [Defendant].
*11 [Id. at 21 (footnote omitted)].
Defendant replies that while Relator agreed to limit this topic, his agreement “is not enough, especially when there are no allegations in the [Second Amended Complaint] regarding any ‘safety, performance, and payment issues’ with Askars on Task Orders 5 and 6” [Doc. 247 p. 9 (citation omitted)]. In addition, Defendant argues that although Relator states that “the evidence referenced work stoppages on Askars on ‘at least two of the contracts[,]’ the only source Relator cites is deposition testimony that refers only to the Rusafa contract” [Id. (citation and emphasis omitted)]. Defendant acknowledges that Relator makes certain allegations concerning the Rusafa contract and Askars, but it argues this topic “should nevertheless be stricken because ‘safety, performance, and payment issues that arose with respect to Askars’ do not make it more or less probable that [Defendant] submitted a false claim for payment to the Government in connection with the Rusafa contract” [Id.].
The Court agrees with Defendant that this topic seeks some irrelevant information. Relator states that the topic is relevant because the “Askars' guards did not have a direct employee relationship with or benefits from [Defendant]” [Doc. 245 p. 21]. The Third Amended Complaint alleges, “The Government's mission-specific goals were thwarted by Acuity's fraudulent misrepresentations to the JCC-IA for the Rusafa Contract as exampled in part by the Ugandan security guards going on strike because their actual employer, Askars, was not paying them on a timely basis” [Doc. 251 ¶ 153]. But the topic seeks “[s]afety, performance, and payment issues that arose with respect to Askars['] guards and security supervisors performing services under the Contracts” [Doc. 242-11 p. 15]. Relator does not sufficiently explain why safety and performance issues are relevant to the issues in this case.
The Court therefore grants Defendant's request in part. Relator may inquire about any payment issues with respect to the Askars’ guards on the Rusafa contract but may not inquire about any safety and performance issues.
I. Topics 75–82
According to Defendant, these topics “seek extensive testimony on [Defendant's] financial information and documents, including historic financial information and documents that have no relevance to the claims, defenses or asserted damages in this case” [Doc. 242 p. 18 (citation omitted)]. Defendant states that its current financial information and net worth is relevant when a plaintiff seeks punitive damages but not its historical financial condition [Id. at 18–19]. In addition, Defendant argues that it has already produced “its most recent federal tax returns and audited financial statements showing its current financial condition and net worth” [Id. at 19]. Defendant further submits that “the testimony sought by Topics 75–82 are duplicative or cumulative of prior discovery, and to the extent they seek more, the [t]opics seek information that is not relevant to any party's claims or defenses” [Id. (citation omitted)]. Defendant argues that the burden of preparing a witness outweighs any benefit given that “federal tax returns speak for themselves” [Id.].
*12 Relator responds that Defendant's “current financial position is relevant to [his] punitive damages claims” and because Defendant claims an inability to pay a judgment due to “its current financial status” [Doc. 245 p. 21]. He states that a Rule 30(b)(6) witness “would be able to discuss and clarify [Defendant's] position and financial records” [Id.]. Relator claims that Defendant has not produced its most recent tax returns, so he must question a witness [Id.]. He asserts that Defendant should be able to designate an accountant or chief financial officer on this topic [Id. at 21–22].
Defendant acknowledges in its reply “that Relator may be entitled to limited information about [its] current financial status,” but it argues that the vast majority of these topics seek information that has no relevancy to the claims and defenses in this case” [Doc. 247 p. 9]. Defendant states that it has produced the “most recent available federal tax return, which corresponds to tax year 2022, and informed Relator's counsel that [its] 2023 audited financial statements and tax returns are not yet available (but [Defendant] will produce them when they become available)” [Id. at 10]. Because Relator has the 2022 tax returns and will receive the 2023 tax returns when available, Defendant argues that no testimony is needed because the records “speak for themselves” [Id.]. Defendant states that “the Court should permit [it] to respond to [these topics] through the designation of documents previously produced (and that will be produced) by [Defendant] rather than requiring [it] to prepare a [Rule] 30(b)(6) corporate representatives on such [t]opics” [Id.].
To the extent the topics seek any information regarding Defendant's historic net worth and financial condition (i.e., prior to 2022), the Court finds them irrelevant. Corizon Health, Inc. v. CorrecTek, Inc., No. 5:17-CV-35, 2017 WL 7693390, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 12, 2017) (agreeing with the defendants' argument that limiting the plaintiff's discovery requests to the defendants' current financial information is relevant for the purposes of the punitive damages claim). But as the Court has explained above, document production is generally not a substitute for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Occidential Chem. Corp., 2022 WL 2671198, at *6 (collecting cases). The Court strikes theses topic to the extent they seek Defendant's historic net worth or financial condition but declines to strike them in full.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion for Protective Order [Doc. 241].
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

Notably, the cases that Defendant primarily relies on addressed whether the corporate deponent was prepared for the deposition. See FDIC v. 26 Flamingo, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-01936, 2013 WL 3975006, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 1, 2013); Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc., 2011 WL 3880787, at *2.
Defendant relies on Adkisson, 2020 WL 8254453, at *5 (stating that the court struck the Rule 30(b)(6) topic for testimony on financial documents that had been produced in discovery [Doc. 247 p. 6]. In Adkisson, however, the plaintiffs did not directly address the defendant's request to provide written responses to certain topics. Id. at *4. And the court further found that a corporate witness could not add any testimony to the public financial filings. Id. at *6. Here, Relator has identified areas where he seeks to inquire further, meaning that the Rule 30(b)(6) will not be unduly cumulative or duplicative. Cf. Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., No. 06-1217, 2008 WL 294547, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 1, 2008) (“The discovery requested by plaintiffs in their Rule 30(b)(6) notice is unreasonably cumulative. It can also be obtained by a review of the documents previously produced by [the defendant], a source less burdensome and/or less expensive.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)).
Defendant cites DDK Hotels, LLC, 2022 WL 2702378, at *12, but in that case, the plaintiff objected to the topics, stating that they sought a “wide range of items.” The court ordered the defendants to revise the topic because there were no time frames specified or subject matter limitations, and the description did “not seem to encompass the question that defendants [sought] to explore[.]” Id. The Court finds the circumstances in that case inapposite from this case.