K.W.1 v. Cnty. of Riverside
K.W.1 v. Cnty. of Riverside
2024 WL 5274617 (C.D. Cal. 2024)
October 10, 2024

Kewalramani, Shashi H.,  United States Magistrate Judge

Failure to Produce
Possession Custody Control
Privacy
Proportionality
Redaction
Manner of Production
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Summary
The plaintiffs sought access to juvenile case files in a federal court case, despite state law protections. The court had to balance the relevance of the requested documents with the privacy interests of a non-party minor and determine if there were adequate safeguards in place to prevent unauthorized disclosure. The plaintiffs argued that the court had the power to order disclosure and that a protective order could protect privacy interests. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not shown a compelling reason for access and that there were inadequate safeguards. Ultimately, the court had to determine which documents were necessary and had substantial relevance to the plaintiffs' claims.
K.W.1, et al.
v.
County of Riverside, et al
Case No. 5:21-cv-01216-JWH-SHK
United States District Court, C.D. California
Filed October 10, 2024
Kewalramani, Shashi H., United States Magistrate Judge

Proceedings (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL [ECF NO. 62]

*1 On March 15, 2024, Plaintiffs K.W.1 and K.W.2 (“Plaintiffs”) moved the Court (“Motion” or “Mot.”) to compel Defendant County of Riverside (the “County” or “Defendant”), to provide juvenile case file materials to Plaintiffs in response to Plaintiffs' request for production (“RFP”) sets one, two, and three. Electronic Case Filing Number (“ECF No.”) 62, Mot. at 7-9. Plaintiffs' Motion is supported by the declaration of their counsel, Stephen D. Daner (“Daner” or “Counsel Daner”) (“Daner Declaration” or “Daner Decl.”), and exhibits (“Exs.”) attached thereto. ECF No. 62-1, Danner Decl. On April 5, 2024, County opposed Plaintiffs' Motion (“Opposition” or “Opp'n”). ECF No. 63, Opp'n. County's Opposition is supported by the declaration of its counsel, Christopher P. Romero (“Romero” or “Counsel Romero”) (“Romero Declaration” or “Romero Decl.”), and exhibits attached thereto. ECF No. 63-1, Romero Decl. On April 16, 2024, Plaintiffs replied to the County's Opposition (“Reply”). ECF No. 68, Reply. The Motion stands fully briefed and ready for decision. After considering the parties' arguments, for the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
On July 21, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint (“Complaint” or Compl.”) against County, and County's Department of Public Social Services Children's Services Division (“DPSS”) social workers M. Sonia Correa, Daniel Elihu, Kaila Paul, Juan Cevallos, Kristen Preston, and Does 1 through 20 inclusive (collectively “Social Worker Defendants” and, together with County, “Defendants”) alleging the following four causes of action: (1) “failure to protect from harm/state created danger” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983[1]; (2) Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“Monell”) related claims for “failure to protect from harm/state created danger”; (3) “breaches of mandatory duties”; and (4) “negligence” arising from alleged sexual abuse against Plaintiffs and Defendants' failure to provide adequate safeguards and warnings about the abuser, David Jakubowski (“Jakubowski” or “D.J.”). ECF No. 1, Compl. at 17-26.
On May 24, 2023, the parties filed a Stipulation for a Protective Order, ECF No. 53, which the Court issued on May 26, 2023 (“Stipulated Protective Order”), ECF No. 54.
Counsel Daner served Plaintiffs' RFP Sets 1-3 on County and, on or about June 6, 2022, Counsel Daner received County's responses to RFP set 1. ECF No. 62-1, Daner Decl. ¶¶ 1-2, Ex. A. On or about February 2, 2024, Counsel Daner received County's Supplemental Response to RFP set 2. Id. at ¶ 2, Ex. B. On or about March 14, 2024, Counsel Daner received County's Response to RFP set 3. Id. at ¶ 2, Ex. C. Counsel for both parties “engaged in numerous and lengthy meet and confer efforts” but were unable to reach an agreement on the discovery issues presented in the instant Motion. Id. at ¶ 3. However, County reportedly “does not dispute that the Juvenile Case File Materials and SafeMeasures are relevant to the issues in this case.” Id.
*2 On December 20, 2023, the parties stipulated to the continuance of the trial and all related dates, ECF No. 58, and, on December 21, 2023, the Court modified the schedule accordingly, ECF No. 59 (“Scheduling Order”). As is relevant here, the discovery cut-off was modified from March 29, 2024, to September 25, 2024, and the trial was postponed from August 5, 2024, to February 3, 2025. EFC No. 55, Scheduling Order at 2.
On February 16, 2024, the parties requested an informal discovery conference. ECF No. 60. On March 6, 2024, the Court held an informal discovery conference with respect to the production of discovery involving juvenile files and ordered briefing on the same. ECF No. 61, Minutes of Discovery Conference. On March 15, 2024, Plaintiffs submitted their instant Motion, ECF No. 62, which County opposed on April 5, 2024, ECF No. 63, and Plaintiffs filed a Response in support of on April 16, 2024, ECF No. 68.
B. Disputed Discovery
Plaintiffs move to compel responses, and County objects, to the following nine RFPs—three requests from set one [RFP Nos. 12-14], and six requests from sets two and three [RFP Nos. 16-21].
1. Set One
In set one, RFP numbers 12-14, Plaintiffs seek the “SafeMeasures Case History” for: D.J. [RFP No. 12]; K.W.1 [RFP No. 13]; and K.W.2 [RFP No. 14]. ECF No. 62-1, Danner Decl., Ex. A.
In the Responses to set one, RFP numbers 12-14, County asserts the following:
Objection. Responding party objects to this request on the following grounds: (1) Vague and ambiguous; (2) overly broad; (3) seeks proprietary information coming from an independent, third party vendor; (4) possibly seeks information constituting confidential employment information and thus may invade the privacy rights of a person who is not a party to this litigation; (5) the information may be duplicative of the juvenile records already released to Plaintiff[s] by the Juvenile Court in response to Welfare and Institutions Code [(“WIC”) section] 827 Petition(s); (6) disclosure, absent an appropriate order from the juvenile court, may constitute a violation of WIC Section 827, et. seq.; and (7) may include information constituting attorney work product or protected from disclosure by attorney-client privilege.
Id.
2. Sets Two and Three
In sets two and three, RFP numbers 16-21, Plaintiffs seek:
entire, unredacted, JUVENILE CASE FILE(S). (For purposes of this request, “JUVENILE CASE FILE(S)” is defined pursuant to Cal. R. of Court, Rule 5.552(a), and means:
(1) All DOCUMENTS filed in a juvenile court case;
(2) Reports to the court by probation officers, social workers of child welfare services programs, and [court appointed special advocates (“CASA”)] volunteers;
(3) DOCUMENTS made available to probation officers, social workers of child welfare services programs, and CASA volunteers in preparation of reports to the court;
(4) DOCUMENTS relating to a child concerning whom a petition has been filed in juvenile court that are maintained in the office files of probation officers, social workers of child welfare services programs, and CASA volunteers;
(5) Transcripts, records, or reports relating to matters prepared or released by the court, probation department, or child welfare services program; and
(6) DOCUMENTS, video or audio tapes, photographs, and exhibits admitted into evidence at juvenile court hearings.)
Id. at Exs. B, C. Plaintiffs seek this information for: K.W.1 [RFP No. 16]; K.W.2 [RFP No. 17]; K.W.3 [RFP No. 18]; A.W.1 [RFP No. 19]; A.W.2 [RFP No. 20]; and D.J. [RFP No. 21].[2] Id.
*3 In the Supplemental Response to set two, RFP numbers 16-20, County asserts the following:
Objection. Responding party objects to this request on the following grounds: (1) overly broad; (2) seeks documents protected from disclosure by [WIC] § 827; (3) violates right to privacy of persons who are not a party to this litigation. Juvenile case file records are only available through an 827 petition and juvenile court order authorizing and ordering the release. There is, at present, no order authorizing the release of the “entire, unredacted” juvenile case file.
Id. at Ex. B.
In the Response to set three, RFP number 21, County asserts the following:
Objection. Responding party objects to this request on the following grounds: (1) vague, and ambiguous; (2) overly broad; (3) seeks documents protected from disclosure by [WIC] § 827; (4) violates right to privacy of persons who are not a party to this litigation; and (5) responsive documents are equally accessible to Plaintiff[s]. Juvenile case file records are only available through an 827 petition and juvenile court order authorizing and ordering the release. There is, at present, no order authorizing the release of the “entire, unredacted” juvenile case file.
Id. at Ex. C.
C. Parties' Arguments
1. Plaintiffs' Motion
Plaintiffs argue, in sum, that County should be compelled to respond to the RFPs because:
1) “This Court has the power to order disclosure of juvenile case file materials, notwithstanding State law”;
2) “The balance weighs in favor of disclosure”;
a. “The magnitude of an[y] encroachment on privacy rights is minimal” because:
b. “Plaintiffs K.W.1 and K.W.2 do not object to the release of their juvenile case files”;
c. “David Jakubowski—a sexual predator—has diminished privacy rights”;
d. “A protective order and Plaintiffs' counsel's duties will protect Plaintiffs' and any other third party's privacy interests”; and
e. “Plaintiffs, themselves, may review and obtain the unredacted juvenile records – without a court order”;
3) “The juvenile case file materials are highly relevant, and necessary to prosecute Plaintiffs' claims”;
4) “Juvenile case file and related documents are not readily available from other sources”;
5) “The public has a special interest in civil rights litigation”;
6) There is an “interest in judicial fact-finding and serious[ ] ... litigation”; and
7) “State law cannot act as a shield to protect a government official from liability for civil rights violations.”
ECF No. 62, Mot. at 2-3.
2. County's Opposition
County responds, in sum, that:
1) “Plaintiff[s'] request for ‘juvenile case files’ as defined by California rules of court is inherently over broad”;
2) “Plaintiffs' requests violate WIC 827 to which the County is bound, and seeks to invalidate the privacy and due process rights of non-party minors”;
3) The RFCs “also possibly implicate a slew of other statutory privileges concerning the release of information” and “[s]ince Plaintiff[s] ha[ve] not identified a specific category of information sought from the juvenile case files, it is impossible to address each statutory privilege” and, thus, “the federal court would need to conduct its own in-camera review of the entire ‘juvenile case file’ (as maintained by County DPSS) to determine what information should be released and whether redactions should be made pursuant to objections” and “[t]his process should be undertaken by the juvenile court, as the court presiding over California juvenile proceedings and the court regularly conducting this type of in-camera review of the juvenile case file.”
*4 4) Plaintiffs' request for “the entire juvenile case file materials invades the privacy and due process rights of non-party minors.”
5) Plaintiffs' request for “the entire juvenile case file for [D.J.], a non-party[,] ... is non-specific, but it is necessary for Plaintiff[s] to make a particularized request so that the Court can analyze which specific records in the juvenile case file are requested and whether they should be produced”;
6) “The potential for harm in a disclosure of [D.J.'s] records is great” because “[D.J.] is not a party to the instant case, and his interest in the production of his entire non-redacted juvenile case is not represented”;
7) “[T]here are inadequate safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure of [D.J.'s] unredacted juvenile case file. A protective order would not prevent unauthorized disclosure, because [D.J.] would not be a party to any protective order”;
8) “Plaintiff[s] ha[ve] not articulated a need for access to [D.J.'s] entire juvenile case file[ ]” and “[t]here is no need to request the entire juvenile case file, where Plaintiff[s] already appear[ ] to be in possession of the vast majority of the file”;
9) “[T]here is no express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access of an unredacted juvenile case file” and “[c]ase law suggests consideration should absolutely be given to the WIC 827 process, whether in the State Juvenile Court, or in Federal court”;
10) “The majority of Plaintiff[s'] [M]otion uses the [Maldonado v. Sec'y of Calif. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., No. 2:06CV02696-MCE/GGH, 2007 WL 4249811 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2007) (“Maldonado”)] analysis for the argument in favor of disclosure of the juvenile case files” but the “[C]ourt should not even get to the Maldonado analysis for the reasons stated above” and “the Maldonado analysis is nearly impossible because Plaintiff[s] do[ ] not specify what records are desired other than the ‘entire juvenile case file’ ”; and
11) “As to Plaintiff[s'] request for SafeMeasures case and referral histories, the data available through that database necessarily implicates WIC 827 because the data consists of juvenile case specific information[,]” which “clearly falls within the California Rules of Court, Rule 5.552(a)'s definition of ‘juvenile case file’ that are confidential, requiring a petition through the WIC 827 process.” Further, Plaintiffs “do not articulate why they are needed or what information they hope to gain” and “the juvenile court would have broad expertise with the type of information being entered into the SafeMeasures database and is therefore in the best position to determine whether SafeMeasures data should be released to the parties.”
ECF No. 63, Opp'n at 7-17.
3. Plaintiffs' Reply
Plaintiffs reply, in sum, that:
1) “This Court has the power to order disclosure of juvenile case file materials, notwithstanding state law”;
2) “This Court should order disclosure of the juvenile case file materials”;
3) “The Maldonado balancing test weighs in favor of disclosure”;
4) “Disclosure of the entire juvenile case file is appropriate”;
5) “A protective order will protect Plaintiffs' and any other third party's privacy interests”;
*5 6) “Defendant's informational privacy test is misguided”;
7) “Defendant failed to show that an in camera review is necessary”; and
8) “Plaintiffs' requests are reasonably particularized.”
ECF No. 68, Reply at 2.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. General Discovery Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(b)(2) governs the scope of permissible discovery and provides:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
Relevancy, for purposes of discovery, “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Nguyen v. Lotus by Johnny Dung Inc., No. 8:17-cv-01317-JVS-JDE, 2019 WL 3064479, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Generally, the purpose of discovery is to remove surprise from trial preparation so the parties can obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute.” Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 378 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he question of relevancy should be construed ‘liberally and with common sense’ and discovery should be allowed unless the information sought has no conceivable bearing on the case.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D. Cal. 1992)).
Because discovery must be both relevant and proportional, the right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Nguyen, 2019 WL 3064479, at *1. Discovery may be denied where: “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
“The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1). The party opposing discovery then has the burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining or supporting its objections.” Bryant v. Ochoa, No. 07-cv-200 JM (PCL), 2009 WL 1390794 at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009). “The party opposing discovery is ‘required to carry a heavy burden of showing’ why discovery should be denied.” Reece v. Basi, No. 2:11-cv-2712 TLN AC P, 2014 WL 2565986, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2014), aff'd, 704 F. App'x 685 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir.1975)).
*6 “Pursuant to ... Rule ... 34(a), a party may request documents ‘in the responding party's possession, custody, or control.’ ” Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 570 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)). Rule 34(b) requires the requesting party to “describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(A). “The test for reasonable particularity is whether the request places a party upon reasonable notice of what is called for and what is not.” Mailhoit, 285 F.R.D. at 570 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “All-encompassing demands that do not allow a reasonable person to ascertain which documents are required do not meet the particularity standard of Rule 34(b)(1)(A).” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“The district court enjoys broad discretion when resolving discovery disputes, which should be exercised by determining the relevance of discovery requests, assessing oppressiveness, and weighing these factors in deciding whether discovery should be compelled.” United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Corp., No. CV 10-3165 GHK (SS), 2015 WL 12731923, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
B. Requests for Production
“A party may request the production of any document within the scope of Rule 26(b).” Meyer v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 21-cv-341-RSH-BLM, 2024 WL 505193, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2024) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)). “For each item or category, the response must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state an objection to the request, including the reasons.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B). The responding party is responsible for all items in their “possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). “[A]ctual possession of the requested document is not required.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Instead, “[a] party may be ordered to produce a document in the possession of a non-party entity if that party has a legal right to obtain the document or has control over the entity who is in possession of the document.” Id. (citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Applicability of State Privacy Protections to Requested Information.
A key issue between the parties is whether the documents Plaintiffs seek may be disclosed to Plaintiffs despite the confidentiality and privacy protections accorded to juvenile case records under WIC Section 827. See, e.g., ECF No. 63, Opp'n at 7 (County arguing that “Plaintiff[s'] [r]equests [v]iolate WIC 827 to which the County is bound, and seeks to invade the privacy and due process rights of non-party minors.” (emphasis removed)); see also ECF No. 68, Reply at 4 (Plaintiffs arguing that “Federal courts are not constrained by [WIC] § 827 or Cal. R. of Court, Rule 5.552, and have authority to order the disclosure of Juvenile Case Files, notwithstanding state law.” (citations omitted)).
“Juvenile case files include ‘[d]ocuments relating to a child concerning whom a petition has been filed in juvenile court that are maintained in the office files of probation officers, social workers of child welfare services programs, and CASA volunteers.’ ” A.C. v. Cortez, 34 F.4th 783, 785 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cal. R. Ct. 5.552(a)(4)) (bracketed material from original removed)). The types of documents in a juvenile case file “vary dramatically” and “generally contain ‘reports to the court by probation officers, social workers ... , and CASA volunteers’ and ‘[t]ranscripts, records, or reports relating to matters prepared or released by the ... child welfare services program.’ ” Id. at 785, 787 (quoting Cal. R. Ct. 5.552(a)(3), (5)) (brackets in original). “In its early stages, a social worker's child-abuse file might contain only relatively innocuous biographical data and academic records.” Id. at 787. “Eventually, however, it would not be unusual for such a file to contain intimate details that families would not share with strangers, including medical diagnoses, reports of abuse, substance-abuse treatment records, and the like.” Id.
*7 The Ninth Circuit “recognizes an ‘individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’ ” Id. (quoting Endy v. Cnty. of L.A., 975 F.3d 757, 768 (9th Cir. 2020)); see also Burmayan v. Garfield Beach CVS, LLC, CV 23-01788-FMO (ARGx), 2023 WL 9318994, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2023) (“ ‘Federal constitutional law recognizes a right to informational privacy stemming from the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’ ” (quoting A.C., 34 F.4th at 787) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). “In California, a court order is required to access juvenile case files, except for a list of statutorily excepted categories of people, such as the subject minor and attorneys litigating a juvenile or criminal proceeding involving the minor.” A.C., 34 F.4th at 785 (citing WIC § 827); see also Shibley v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. 5:19-cv-00065-JGB (SPx), 2022 WL 21802409, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2022) (“Generally, juvenile case files are confidential and ‘may only be inspected by certain enumerated individuals or those who successfully petition a dependency court for access to the file.’ ” (citations omitted)); Horn v. Hornbeak, 2010 WL 1027508, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2010) (WIC Section 827 “evidences the general policy of favoring confidentiality of juvenile records, intended to protect the privacy rights of the child at issue.”).
“Generally, a juvenile court has broad and exclusive authority to determine whether and to what extent to grant access to confidential juvenile records pursuant to [WIC] section 827.” In re Elijah S., 125 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 1541 (2005) (citations omitted). However, “federal courts are not bound by state laws prohibiting disclosure of juvenile case files.” Shibley, 2022 WL 21802409, at *4 (citations omitted); see also Gonzalez v. Spencer, 336 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“the district court could have ordered disclosure notwithstanding state law”), abrogated on other grounds in Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012); J.T. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., No. 23-cv-06524-LJC, 2024 WL 3834200, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2024) (observing “Gonzalez's recognition that federal courts have authority to order disclosure [of juvenile records] notwithstanding state law.” (citing Gonzalez, 336 F.3d at 835; A.C., 34 F.4th at 786–87; Nunes v. Arata, Swingle, Van Egmond & Goodwin (PLC), 983 F.3d 1108, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2020)); Doe No. 59 v. Santa Rosa City Sch., No. 3:16-cv-01256-WHO, 2017 WL 11837754, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017) (“federal common law on privilege, not state law, controls cases that are in federal court with federal question jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)); Horn, 2010 WL 1027508, at *4 (“In the context of a motion to compel in a section 1983 action, ... [WIC] section 827 would not prevent disclosure ‘and informs the ultimate determination of the federal privilege.’ ” (quoting Maldonado, 2007 WL 4249811, at *5)).
Nevertheless, although WIC § 827 “could not purport to bind the federal courts[,]” “comity require[s] that the state law be respected if at all possible given the needs of th[e] case.” Maldonado, 2007 WL 4249811, at *5; see also Fox v. Cnty. of Tulare, No. 1:11-cv-00520-AWI-SMS, 2013 WL 12086297, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2013) (“comity requires that this law be respected if at all possible”). Thus, a federal court must “weigh[ ] the needs of the case versus the state interest in keeping the juvenile information confidential.” Maldonado, 2007 WL 4249811, at *5.
“The court in Horn laid out a test for determining whether to authorize inspection of juvenile case files[.]” Shibley, 2022 WL 21802409, at *4 (citing Horn, 2010 WL 1027508, at *5). Specifically:
“[T]he court must balance the interests of the child and other parties to the juvenile court proceedings, the interests of the petitioner, and the interests of the public. If the court grants the petition, the court must find that the need for discovery outweighs the policy considerations favoring confidentiality of juvenile case files. The confidentiality of juvenile case files is intended to protect the privacy rights of the child. The court may permit disclosure of juvenile case files only insofar as is necessary, and only if petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the records requested are necessary and have substantial relevance to the legitimate need of the petitioner.”
*8 Id. at 4-5 (quoting Horn, 2010 WL 1027508, at *5) (emphasis added).
Here, the records Plaintiffs seek relate to juvenile case records. Thus, the confidentiality and privacy protections accorded to juvenile case records under WIC Section 827 are applicable to the records Plaintiffs seek. However, even though a juvenile court generally has “exclusive authority to determine whether and to what extent to grant access to confidential juvenile records pursuant to [WIC] section 827[,]” In re Elijah S., 125 Cal. App. 4th at 1541, this Court is “not bound by state laws prohibiting disclosure of juvenile case files[,]” Shibley, 2022 WL 21802409, at *4 (citations omitted). Thus, state laws, including WIC Section 827, do not prohibit this Court from ordering the disclosure of the documents Plaintiffs seek in this civil rights action. Shibley, 2022 WL 21802409, at *4; Gonzalez, 336 F.3d at 835; J.T., 2024 WL 3834200, at *7; Doe No. 59, 2017 WL 11837754, at *2; Horn, 2010 WL 1027508, at *4; Maldonado, 2007 WL 4249811, at *5.
Although not bound by state laws prohibiting disclosure of the documents Plaintiffs seek in their Motion, the Court is nevertheless still bound by the federal rules, including Rule 26, which requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate that the documents they seek are relevant to this case. For the reasons discussed next, however, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the relevancy of the documents they seek.
B. Plaintiffs Have Not Demonstrated That All Documents Sought Are Relevant.
1. Plaintiffs' Relevance Arguments
Plaintiffs argue first, generally, that “[t]he Juvenile Case File materials are highly relevant, and necessary to prosecute Plaintiffs' claims.” ECF No. 62, Mot. at 14. Plaintiffs add that:
Plaintiffs' lawsuit targets, in part, the Defendants (1) failure to protect Plaintiffs from harm and/or created a danger to Plaintiffs, (2) breached their mandatory statutory duties, and (3) were negligent. The Juvenile Case Files, SafeMeasures, and related documents are relevant and proportional to Plaintiffs' claims and the issues in the case.
Id. (citations omitted).
With respect to the SafeMeasures case and referral histories sought in set three, Plaintiffs argue, in toto, that:
SafeMeasures is a full-agency data solution to social service case management. Near real-time analyses offer current reports on every client served.
SafeMeasures helps monitor practice and outcomes, and allows a social worker to drill down to critical information on every client and case.
The SafeMeasures “Referral” and/or “Case History” pages, in part, help the social worker prepare for case conferences and write the court reports. In fact, when a social worker is just assigned a case, they use the “history” pages to learn what has taken place in the case.
Further, the burden to obtain the requested history pages is de minimis. Indeed, SafeMeasures is an electronic database, and the requested pages are accessible by simply clicking the “H”/“history” button/link.
As a result, the SafeMeasures Case History Reports bear on the issues in the case.
*9 Id. at 15-16 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original).
With respect to the juvenile case files sought in sets two and three, Plaintiffs argue that they are “expansive, and contain[ ] significant documents and information relating to a particular child and the underlying proceedings and events[,]” including, “but not limited to”: “(1) Contact notes, (2) Referrals, (3) Service Components, (4) Case Plans, (5) Placement, (6) Mental Health Services, (7) Child Family Team Meetings, (8) Staff Contacts, (9) Collateral Individuals, and (10) Social Worker and Supervisor Assignments.” Id. at 15 (citing Cal. R. of Court, Rule 5.552(a); ECF No. 62-1, Daner Decl. at ¶ 12; ECF No. 62-1, Ex. L). Plaintiffs add that “[t]hese documents bear on, and/or [are] significantly relevant to the issues in this case.” Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that “the need to access the Juvenile Case Files is high, because an attorney has a duty to represent their client, and adequate representation requires reviewing the Juvenile Case Files.” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiffs add that in a different case, “the County of Los Angeles confirmed that ‘the Juvenile Case File is highly relevant to th[at] ... action, and there is a legitimate need for the parties to access and use the same in presenting their case to th[e] Court.’ ” Id. (citing ECF No. 62-1, Daner Decl. at ¶ 7; ECF No. 62-1, Ex. G). Finally, Plaintiffs assert that “it is undisputed that the Juvenile Case File materials bear on the issues in the case.” Id. (citing ECF No. 62-1, Decl. Daner at ¶ 3).
2. County's Relevance Response
County responds that “[w]hen it comes to determining whether a particular person has made a showing the juvenile case file records are necessary and relevant, it is respectfully the California juvenile court standing in the best position to make such a determination.” ECF No. 63, Opp'n at 10 (citations omitted). County adds that “Plaintiff[s] ha[ve] not specifically identified all of the additional records [they] seek[ ] and why,” and “[t]here is simply no reason the entire unredacted juvenile case file should be produced without a particularized showing as to why.” Id. at 13, 15. County asserts that “Plaintiff[s] should be required to make a particularized showing of what records they want, followed by objections by interested parties, and a review of the records by the Court to ultimately decide what records should be produced and for what reason.” Id. at 15. County also asserts that “Plaintiff[s] request[ ] the Referral and Case History pages, but do not articulate why they are needed or what information they hope to gain” and “Defendant does not even know why Plaintiff[s] [are] requesting those documents.” Id. at 16.
3. Plaintiffs' Relevance Reply
Plaintiffs reply first that contrary to County's argument, “ ‘[t]he juvenile court is not in a superior position in deciding what information and records are critical to the parties’ ability to comply with federal procedures required by this Court, or to litigate a civil rights § 1983 matter.’ ” ECF No. 68, Reply at 4 (quoting Bradley v. County of Sonoma, No. 19-cv-07464-KAW, 2020 WL 13972462, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2020)). Plaintiffs reply next that “[t]he complete Juvenile Case File is significantly relevant to a Section 1983 lawsuit[ ]” and that “Plaintiffs will be adversely affected if the juvenile case files are not disclosed.” Id. at 5 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs reiterate that other courts have “order[ed] disclosure of the entire juvenile case file.” Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added).
4. Analysis
*10 As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with County's argument that the California juvenile court is in the best position to determine the relevancy and necessity of the documents Plaintiffs seek here because, as another court in the Ninth Circuit has found, “[t]he juvenile court is not in a superior position in deciding what information and records are critical to the parties' ability to comply with federal procedures required by th[e] Court, or to litigate a civil rights § 1983 matter.” Bradley, 2020 WL 13972462, at *4. Consequently, the Court analyzes the relevancy of the documents Plaintiffs seek next.
In this case, although some of the records Plaintiffs seek may be relevant to Plaintiffs' case, Plaintiffs have not met their “burden of establishing that [their] request[s] satisf[y] the relevancy requirements of Rule 26(b)(1)[,]” Bryant, 2009 WL 1390794 at *1, nor have Plaintiffs demonstrated “ ‘by a preponderance of the evidence that the records requested are necessary and have substantial relevance to the legitimate need of [Plaintiffs,]’ ” Shibley, 2022 WL 21802409, at *4-5 (quoting Horn, 2010 WL 1027508, at *5) (emphasis added). The Court discusses Plaintiffs' requests in turn next.
a. Set One
In set one, RFP numbers 12-14, Plaintiffs seek the “SafeMeasures Case History” for: D.J. [RFP No. 12]; K.W.1 [RFP No. 13]; and K.W.2 [RFP No. 14]. ECF No. 62-1, Danner Decl., Ex. A. Plaintiffs, however, do not explain why they need the SafeMeasures case and referral histories sought in set one, besides: (1) providing a brief description of what the SafeMeasures database is; (2) describing how information is accessed in the SafeMeasures database; and (3) asserting that the information contained in the SafeMeasures database is “relevant” and “bear[s] on the issues in the case.” ECF No. 62, Mot. at 15-16.
However, asserting generally that something is relevant, or that it bears on the issues in the case, is not enough to satisfy Rule 26(b)'s relevancy requirements because even though Plaintiffs' burden in requesting discovery is low, Plaintiffs must still meet a threshold of relevance that is beyond speculation by describing with a reasonable degree of specificity how the information they seek is important to this case. See Johnson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. C 08–02272 VRW, 2009 WL 839044, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (finding that “[a]lthough the burden on parties requesting discovery is low, they must meet a threshold of relevance that is beyond speculation; litigants seeking to compel discovery must describe with a reasonable degree of specificity the information they hope to obtain and its importance to their case.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Shibley, 2022 WL 21802409, at *3 (partially denying a motion to compel, in relevant part, because the “[p]laintiffs' statement that the records are ‘highly relevant’ is not enough to satisfy Rule 26(b)'s relevancy requirements.” (citing Johnson, 2009 WL 839044, at *2)).
Consequently, because Plaintiffs did not articulate why the SafeMeasures case and referral histories sought in set one are important to their case with any specificity, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing that the SafeMeasures case and referral histories sought in set one are relevant to this case. As such, Plaintiffs' MTC, insofar as Plaintiffs seek the SafeMeasures case and referral histories in set one, is DENIED.
b. Sets Two and Three
In sets two and three, RFP numbers 16-21, Plaintiffs seek the “entire, unredacted, JUVENILE CASE FILE(S)” as “defined pursuant to Cal. R. of Court, Rule 5.552(a),” for: K.W.1 [RFP No. 16]; K.W.2 [RFP No. 17]; K.W.3 [RFP No. 18]; A.W.1 [RFP No. 19]; A.W.2 [RFP No. 20]; and D.J. [RFP No. 21]. ECF No. 62-1, Danner Decl., Exs. B, C.
*11 Plaintiffs, however, do not explain why they need the entire, unredacted juvenile case files. Instead, Plaintiffs describe what “Plaintiffs' lawsuit targets[,]” and argue only that: (1) their “need to access the Juvenile Case Files is high, because an attorney has a duty to represent their client, and adequate representation requires reviewing the Juvenile Case Files”; (2) another county confirmed that juvenile case files were relevant to that action; and (3) “it is undisputed that the Juvenile Case File materials bear on the issues in the case.” ECF No. 62, Mot. at 14-15 (citing ECF No. 62-1, Daner Decl. at ¶¶ 3, 7; ECF No. 62-1, Ex. G; A.C., 34 F.4th at 788; A.C. v. Cortez, 398 F.Supp.3d 748, 754 (S.D. Cal. 2019)). In their Reply, Plaintiffs reiterate that “[t]he complete Juvenile Case File is significantly relevant to [this] Section 1983 lawsuit[ ]” and that “Plaintiffs will be adversely affected if the juvenile case files are not disclosed.” ECF No. 68, Reply at 4-5 (citing Bradley, 2020 WL 13972462, at *4; Meyer, 2024 WL 505193, at *4; Doe No. 59, 2017 WL 11837754, at *2). Plaintiffs' arguments are not persuasive for the following reasons.
First, describing briefly what “Plaintiffs' lawsuit targets” does not explain how the records Plaintiffs seek are relevant to this litigation. ECF No. 62, Mot. at 14. Thus, Plaintiffs' brief summary of what this lawsuit targets does not establish relevance beyond speculation by articulating with a reasonable degree of specificity how the records Plaintiffs seek in this case are relevant to this litigation. Johnson, 2009 WL 839044, at *2.
Second, Plaintiffs' argument that the records sought are relevant because an attorney has a duty to represent their client is not persuasive because every attorney owes a duty to their client. Thus, the mere fact that attorneys are dutybound to their clients—a fact that is ubiquitous to all cases where parties are represented by counsel—also does not establish relevance beyond speculation by articulating with a reasonable degree of specificity how the records Plaintiffs seek in this case are relevant to this litigation. Id. Further, Plaintiffs' assertion that adequate representation requires reviewing the juvenile case files is also insufficient to establish relevance beyond speculation because Plaintiffs do not explain why the specific juvenile case files they seek, in their unredacted entirety, are needed to adequately represent their claims before this Court. See Shibley, 2022 WL 21802409, at *3 (“Plaintiffs' statement that the records are ‘highly relevant’ is not enough to satisfy Rule 26(b)'s relevancy requirements.” (citing Johnson, 2009 WL 839044, at *2)).
Moreover, as Plaintiffs concede, the juvenile case files are “expansive, and contain[ ] significant documents[,]” including, “but not limited to ... Collateral Individuals[.]” ECF No. 62, Mot. at 15 (citing Cal. R. of Court, Rule 5.552(a); ECF No. 62-1, Daner Decl. at ¶ 12; ECF No. 62-1, Ex. L). Thus, the Court struggles to see how simply owing a general duty to one's clients, or an assertion that adequate representation requires reviewing the juvenile case files, establishes that everything in the expansive juvenile case files, which could “contain intimate details that families would not share with strangers, including medical diagnoses, reports of abuse, substance-abuse treatment records, and the like[,]” A.C., 34 F.4th at 785, are relevant to this specific litigation.
Third, Plaintiffs' reliance on another case where the County of Los Angeles purportedly concluded that a juvenile case file was relevant in that case, is not persuasive to establishing the relevancy of the juvenile case files here because the parties and facts alleged in the case Plaintiffs cite are different than the parties and facts alleged in this case. For example, Plaintiffs here seek the “entire, unredacted, JUVENILE CASE FILE(S)” of multiple individuals, ECF No. 62-1, Exs. B, C, whereas, in the case Plaintiffs cite, the county defendant there sought to have information redacted from any juvenile case files it might be compelled to produce. See ECF No. 62-1, Ex. G at 9 (the County of Los Angeles arguing in the motion for a proposed protective order that Plaintiffs cite, that any juvenile case files that were ordered to be produced, would be produced only “after redacting identifying information pursuant to” Superior Court of Los Angeles County Local Rule 7.2; California Rule of Court 5.552; and the California Government, Penal, Civil, Vehicle, and Welfare and Institutions Codes). Further, the record Plaintiffs cite was a motion for a protective order and not an order from a court. Thus, Plaintiffs' argument rests on a motion (not an order) filed in a different case, where a different county defendant agreed that a redacted version of a juvenile case file was relevant under the separate facts of that case. Although relevancy, for purposes of discovery, is “construed broadly[,]” Nguyen, 2019 WL 3064479, at *1, Plaintiffs' citation to the above discussed motion does not satisfy Plaintiffs' burden of proving that the multiple, complete, unredacted, expansive juvenile case files sought in sets two and three are relevant to this litigation. Shibley, 2022 WL 21802409, at *3; Johnson, 2009 WL 839044, at *2.
*12 Fourth, Plaintiffs' argument that “it is undisputed that the Juvenile Case File materials bear on the issues in the case[,]” ECF No. 62, Mot. at 15 (citing ECF No. 62-1 Daner Decl. at ¶ 3), is not persuasive because the County appears to dispute the relevance of the juvenile case files, see, e.g., ECF No. 63, Opp'n at 15 (the County arguing that “[t]here is simply no reason the entire unredacted juvenile case file should be produced without a particularized showing as to why.” (citations omitted)); see also ECF No. 63, Opp'n at 10 (the County arguing that a determination whether “the juvenile case file records are necessary and relevant” is needed and should be performed by the California juvenile court).
Finally, the cases Plaintiffs cite in their Reply establish only that juvenile case files can be relevant to litigation generally, but not that “[t]he complete Juvenile Case File is significantly relevant to [this] Section 1983 lawsuit[ ]” or that “Plaintiffs will be adversely affected if the juvenile case files are not disclosed[,]” as Plaintiffs argue here. ECF No. 68, Reply at 5 (citing Bradley, 2020 WL 13972462, at *4; Meyer, 2024 WL 505193, at *4; Doe No. 59, 2017 WL 11837754, at *2) (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, not all the cases Plaintiffs cite authorized the production of complete, unredacted case files, as Plaintiffs seek here. See, e.g., Bradley, 2020 WL 13972462, at *5 (the Court ordered that “to the extent that the privacy interests of any third parties are at risk, the parties shall stipulate to a protective order, wherein the production of the juvenile case files contain appropriate redactions that protect those interests
As such, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the complete, unredacted juvenile case files sought in sets two and three are relevant to this litigation. Consequently, Plaintiffs' MTC, insofar as Plaintiffs seek the complete, unredacted juvenile case files in sets two and three, is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs' Motion [ECF No. 62] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

The Court normalizes the capitalization and punctuation of all quoted material herein unless otherwise noted.
K.W.3, A.W.1, and A.W.2 are minor children who lived in the same home as K.W.1, K.W.2, and D.J., and were also allegedly sexually assaulted by D.J. ECF No. 1, Compl. at 7, 11-12.