Gomez-Echeverria v. Purpose Point Harvesting, LLC
Gomez-Echeverria v. Purpose Point Harvesting, LLC
2024 WL 5284048 (W.D. Mich. 2024)
December 4, 2024
Beckering, Jane M., United States District Judge
Summary
The court considered several motions, including a motion to exclude evidence of damages not timely disclosed, a motion to allow certain Plaintiffs to testify via Zoom, and a motion to exclude testimony from non-plaintiff Purpose Point workers. The court granted the motion to exclude evidence of damages not timely disclosed, conditionally granted the motion to allow Plaintiffs to testify via Zoom, and granted the motion to exclude testimony from non-plaintiff Purpose Point workers.
LUIS GOMEZ-ECHEVERRIA, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
PURPOSE POINT HARVESTING, LLC, et al., Defendants
v.
PURPOSE POINT HARVESTING, LLC, et al., Defendants
Case No. 1:22-cv-314
United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division, SOUTHERN DIVISION
Filed December 04, 2024
Beckering, Jane M., United States District Judge
OPINION AND ORDER
*1 Pending before the Court are the following motions: Plaintiffs’ “Motion in Limine to Preclude Defendants from Presenting Claimed Damage Amounts Not Disclosed Until September 16, 2024” (ECF No. 217-1);[1] Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Allow Testimony by Zoom” (ECF No. 207-1); and Plaintiffs’ “Omnibus Motion in Limine” (ECF No. 210). Having considered the parties’ submissions, including Defendants’ responses (ECF Nos. 214, 213, & 215), the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary to resolve the issues presented. See W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(d). For the following reasons, the Court: (1) grants the motion to exclude evidence of claimed damages (ECF No. 217-1) to the extent those claimed damages are connected with Defendants’ difficulties hiring additional workers; (2) conditionally grants the motion to allow Plaintiffs residing in Guatemala to testify at trial by Zoom (ECF No. 207-1); and (3) grants the omnibus motion in limine to the extent described herein.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The parties to this action are Plaintiffs Luis Gomez-Echeverria (“Luis), Hervil Gomez-Echeverria (“Hervil), Darwin Joel Fuentes Perez (“Darwin”), Artemio Coronado Esteban (“Artemio”), and Leonel Lopez Y Lopez (“Leonel”).[2] This case arises from Plaintiffs’ employment with Defendant Purpose Point Harvesting, LLC (“Purpose Point”) as temporary agricultural workers. Purpose Point is a Michigan farm labor contracting company owned and operated at different times by Defendants Emilto Moreno Gomez (“Emilto”) and Lucille Jean Moreno (“Lucille”).
The Court reviewed and summarized the factual record in detail in its August 2, 2024 Opinion and Order denying six motions, including cross-motions for summary judgment (Op. & Order, ECF No. 193 at PageID.5220–23). In short, Plaintiffs are Guatemalan agricultural workers who were recruited to work at Purpose Point through the H-2A temporary agricultural worker visa program (JSF[3] ¶¶ 55, 62, 67). Purpose Point provides seasonal farm workers to a number of farms throughout Michigan to plant, maintain, and harvest crops (id. ¶ 3). Plaintiffs, in their remaining claims, contend that Defendants mistreated them in contravention of federal and state labor, human trafficking, and contract laws—principally by allegedly charging Plaintiffs extractive recruitment fees, confiscating their passports, controlling their bank accounts, and underpaying them for their work (id. ¶¶ 4–6, 12–14; Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 56 ¶¶ 14–127). Defendants, in their remaining counterclaim, allege that Plaintiffs Luis and Hervil breached their employment contracts by violating the stated terms and conditions of those contracts including, principally, by abandoning their work prior to the end of the term of employment and by “deliberately restricting production or engaging in a work stoppage or slow down” (Second Am. Counterclaims, ECF No. 61 ¶¶ 23, 25, & 205).
B. Procedural Posture
*2 Plaintiffs initiated this action well over two years ago on March 31, 2022 with the filing of a Complaint (ECF No. 1). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8), which was renewed (ECF No. 15) after the Court gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend the Complaint. The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 21). Defendants then filed an Answer (ECF No. 24). Defendants also filed a Counterclaim on February 16, 2023 (ECF No. 25). Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the Counterclaim (ECF No. 32), which was renewed (ECF No. 64) after the Court gave Defendants an opportunity to amend the Counterclaim. The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended Counterclaim in a January 12, 2024 Opinion and Order (ECF No. 96).
On May 4, 2023, a Case Management Order (ECF No. 44) was issued in this case, and the parties were given until December 29, 2023 to complete discovery. On October 23, 2023, the parties filed a joint motion to stay discovery until January 1, 2023 and to delay all deadlines in this case by 77 days (ECF No. 88). The parties’ motion indicated that they had engaged in “extensive written discovery” and that after this exchange of documents, counsel for the parties believed settlement was possible (id.). The Court granted the motion (ECF No. 89) but warned that additional requests to extend the deadlines would not be favored (id. at PageID.1150). Pursuant to the parties’ request, the Court added 77 days to the remaining deadlines, making a Rule 23 certification motion due by January 11, 2024; discovery complete on March 15, 2024; and dispositive and decertification motions due by May 3, 2024. As set forth in the Minutes of a settlement conference with the Magistrate Judge, on December 11, 2023, the parties were unable to reach a settlement (ECF No. 91). Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on January 11, 2024 (ECF No. 92).
On February 19, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to extend discovery based on challenges obtaining depositions of Guatemala citizens (ECF No. 109), which the Court denied in a February 21, 2024 Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No. 112). Also on February 21, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state-law claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction (ECF No. 115). The next day, on February 22, 2024, Defendants filed an additional motion to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens (ECF No. 116). The Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state-law claims, and Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in a May 28, 2024 Opinion and Order (ECF No. 178).
On March 4, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds (ECF No. 121). On March 19, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37 and 41 (ECF No. 145). On May 3, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on Purpose Point's Second Amended Counterclaim (ECF No. 168). Also on May 3, 2024, Defendants filed three separate motions for summary judgment: (1) on Luis's claims and Purpose Point's counterclaim against Luis (ECF No. 172); (2) on Hervil's claims and Purpose Point's counterclaim against Hervil (ECF No. 174); and (3) on Darwin, Artemio, and Leonel's claims and Purpose Point's counterclaims against them (ECF No. 176).
On August 2, 2024, the Court issued an Opinion and Order concluding that “the record evidence does not support an entry of summary judgment on any of the remaining claims or counterclaims” (ECF No. 193, PageID.5254–55).
On August 21, 2024, a Trial Case Management Order was issued in this case (ECF No. 196). The final pretrial conference in this matter is set for April 22, 2025 and this case is scheduled for trial beginning on May 28, 2025. The following claims and counterclaims—alleged in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 56) and Defendants’ Second Amended Counterclaim (ECF No. 61)—remain in this action:
I. Violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (Against All Defendants);II. Violation of the Michigan Human Trafficking Victims Compensation Act (MHTVCA), Mich. Comp. Laws. § 752.981 et seq. (Against All Defendants);III. Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (Against All Defendants);IV. Violation of the Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act (WOWA), Mich. Comp. Laws. § 408.411 et seq. (Against All Defendants); andV. Breach of Contract (Against All Defendants)
II. Breach of Contract (Alleged by Purpose Point Against Luis and Hervil)
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion Standards
“Motions in limine are ‘designed to narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.’ ” Joseph v. Joseph, No. 19-3350, 2022 WL 3536273, at *19 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2022) (quoting Louzon v. Ford Motor Co., 718 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2013)). The resolution of a motion in limine lies “entirely within the discretion of the district court.” United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Luce, 713 F.2d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd 469 U.S. 38 (1984)). See also Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley L. Sch., 689 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 2012) (a district court's ruling on a motion in limine is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
Given the nature and timing of motions in limine, a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine is “no more than a preliminary, or advisory, opinion” that the parties may consider when formulating their trial strategies. Yannott, supra. A trial court's ruling is “subject to change when the case unfolds.” Luce, 469 U.S. at 41. See also Taglieri v. Monasky, 767 F. App'x 597, 601–02 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[T]rial courts frequently change their evidentiary rulings when they learn of new facts or law.”). “Indeed, even if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.” Luce, 469 U.S. at 41–42.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A) requires a party to disclose, in its initial disclosures, “(iii) a computation of each category of damages” and to make available documents or other evidentiary material on which such computations are based. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). Rule 26(e) requires a party to supplement Rule 26(a) disclosures “in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). Pursuant to Rule 37(c), “[i]f a party fails to provide information...as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information...to supply evidence...at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 states that “[f]or good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a). As the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 43(a) caution that “[t]ransmission cannot be justified merely by showing that it is inconvenient for the witness to attend the trial.” Advisory Committee Notes on 1996 Amendment to Rule 43(a).
*4 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), the court must “decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 104(a). Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402; Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 178 (1997). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. But the court may still “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “ ‘Unfair prejudice’ ... means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180 (citation omitted). A testifying witness must have “personal knowledge” of the matter to which they are testifying. Fed. R. Evid. 602.
B. Discussion
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine Regarding Defendants’ Claimed Damages
a. The Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from claiming the amount of damages Defendants disclosed after the close of discovery in Defendants’ third supplemented Rule 26 initial disclosures (ECF Nos. 217-1 & 217-2). In the supplemented disclosures, Defendants disclose $2,849 in “damages due to loss of a worker during harvesting season” and $223,055 in “damages due to Purpose Point being unable to hire additional workers” (id.).
Plaintiffs argue that “[a]ll of the losses alleged in [the supplemented disclosures] occurred before Defendants filed their amended counterclaim and should have been known at least at that time. Yet Defendants did not supplement their 26(a) disclosures until one and a half years later and well after the close of discovery” (ECF No. 217 at PageID.5725). Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that they “were not able to obtain any breakdown of Defendants’ damage claims” at all until May 31, 2024, when Defendants attached a declaration by Defendant Lucille to their response to Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (id. at PageID.5726 (referencing ECF No. 181 at PageID.4308)). Plaintiffs observe that the numbers calculated in the declaration and those stated in the supplemented disclosures do not exactly match, so they do not know “the basis for any amounts claimed as damages” in the disclosures (id. at PageID.5727).
Defendants make two arguments in response. First, Defendants argue that “although Purpose Point did not provide its damages in detail, it provided sufficient information regarding its damages and the sources of those damages to place plaintiffs on notice of those damages” (ECF No. 214 at PageID.5674). In support of this argument, Defendants observe that “Plaintiffs never filed a motion to compel regarding those damages nor did they attempt to clarify Purpose Point's damages at any point during discovery” (id.). Second, Defendants argue that, even if the Court concludes Defendants did fail to provide information required by Rule 26, their failure was harmless and thus the Court should not exclude the evidence (id. at PageID.5674).
Defendants’ argument has merit only as to damages Defendants claim in connection with loss of Plaintiff Hervil and Luis's labor. As to damages Defendants claim in connection with Purpose Point being purportedly unable to hire additional workers, Plaintiffs’ argument has merit.
b. Analysis
To understand the categories of damages claimed in Defendants’ supplemented disclosures, the May 31, 2024 declaration of Defendant Lucille proves illuminating. Defendant Lucille attests that the damage caused by Plaintiff Hervil and Plaintiff Luis's alleged breaches of contracts totals approximately $305,910 (ECF No. 181 at PageID.4308–14 ¶¶ 18, 37). Broadly speaking, these damages fall into one of two categories. The first category comprises damages connected with loss of labor during the growing seasons in which Plaintiffs Hervil and Luis allegedly breached their employment contracts by abandoning their employment and/or slowing down production. The second category comprises damages connected with Defendants’ inability to hire additional workers in subsequent growing seasons due to the decisions of individuals working at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City not to approve visas sought by prospective Purpose Point workers.[4]
*5 Damages Connected with Loss of Labor. With regard to the first category, the Court denies the motion in limine. Defendants, in their counterclaim for breach of contract, alleged that they “suffered damages in excess of $75,000” as the “direct and proximate result” of Plaintiffs’ alleged breach of their employment contracts (ECF No. 61 ¶ 206). Prior to the close of discovery, on February 15, 2024, Defendant Lucille sat for a deposition during which she discussed the calculations underlying the damages alleged in the counterclaims. She stated that “we're still working on the exact total, but it would be $75,000—more than $75,00 and above is what the figure is at this point” (Def. Lucille Dep., ECF No. 214-1 at PageID.5681). Explaining that figure, she stated:
[S]ome of them abandoned the work, we would never have brought them on them years that they would have abandoned their work. So we have all that loss of counting on them to work the full season and they didn't complete the season. And then, as they were here, they slowed down production, and that affected not just one or two other people but a crew to several crews at a time because of not working like they—as complete—you know, as thoroughly and sufficiently. So there's a lot of figures into it that we're still, you, know, finalizing, but that would be where—where the base of it would be from.
(Id. at PageID.5681–82). Based on the deposition transcript, Defendant Lucille defined the category of claimed damages as lost profits from loss of labor due to abandonment and work stoppages. She estimated the amount of damages in this category. Her testimony, by reasonable inferences, also suggested how the claimed damages would be computed. Moreover, Defendant Lucille's deposition was taken one month prior to the close of discovery, affording Plaintiffs the opportunity to seek more computational information if they had wished to do so. Accordingly, to the extent Defendants intend to claim loss of labor due to Plaintiffs’ abandonment of employment and work stoppages as damages, the Court concludes that Defendants timely disclosed sufficient information about these claimed damages. Moreover, even assuming Defendants did not timely disclose sufficient information, the failure to disclose was harmless because Plaintiffs had the ability to cure the failure to disclose.
Damages Connected with Inability to Hire Additional Workers. With regard to the second category of damages, Purpose Point's inability to hire additional workers in subsequent seasons, the Court grants the motion in limine. In stark contrast to Defendants’ representations that Purpose Point “repeatedly” disclosed its damages prior to the close of discovery (see ECF No. 214 at PageID.5673), Defendants have not directed the Court to any deposition, disclosure, or other documentation from before the close of discovery that mentions the U.S. Embassy's rejections of anticipated workers or any other basis for claiming this category of damages. Defendants point to allegations, in their counterclaims, that Defendant Purpose Point suffered damages in excess of $350,000 (ECF No. 214 at PageID.5675 (apparently referencing Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 61 ¶¶ 170, 189)). These allegations contain no explanation for the amount claimed and, moreover, were pleaded as the damages for counterclaims that no longer remain in this action. Accordingly, to the extent that Defendants are suing Plaintiffs for damages resulting from the U.S. Embassy's rejections of anticipated workers, this category of damages was not timely disclosed.[5]
*6 Moreover, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that the failure to disclose was harmless. To determine whether the failure was either “substantially justified or harmless,” the Sixth Circuit considers the following factors:
(1) the surprise to the party against whom the evidence would be offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure the surprise; (3) the extent to which allowing the evidence would disrupt the trial; (4) the importance of the evidence; and (5) the nondisclosing party's explanation for its failure to disclose the evidence.
Howe v. City of Akron, 801 F.3d 718, 748 (6th Cir. 2015).
Considering these factors, the Court first concludes that the evidence of the damage caused by Defendants’ difficulties hiring additional workers, apparently due to the decisions of individuals working at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, is a surprise to Plaintiffs. All of the information relevant to this computation was in Defendants’ possession. Cf. Howe, 801 F.3d at 748 (concluding evidence of damages was not a surprise to a party when that party had all the information underlying the calculations in their possession). Moreover, Defendant Lucille did not allude to this category of damages during her deposition, such that Plaintiffs’ counsel would have known to pursue further questions about it.
Second, though discovery has closed, Plaintiffs have some ability to cure the surprise through cross-examination of Defendant Lucille at trial to highlight the late disclosure and challenge the credibility of the information. However, given the character of this alleged damage category, cross-examination alone may not fully elucidate how Defendants calculate these damages or attribute them to Hervil and Luis beyond Defendant Lucille's bald assertions. Had this alleged category of damage been revealed before the close of discovery, Plaintiffs could have sought discovery of the alleged underpinning evidence and conducted their own investigation.
Even so, third, allowing the evidence would not disrupt trial, as many months remain for the parties to prepare.
Fourth, regarding the importance of the evidence, this evidence is not essential to demonstrate Plaintiffs’ liability on the counterclaim because the Court intends to allow evidence of damages due to loss of Hervil and Luis's labor to be admitted. However, to the extent that Defendants could prove that Plaintiffs’ alleged breach of contract caused Defendants to be unable to hire additional workers for subsequent seasons, the evidence of those damages would be essential to make Defendants fully whole.
The first four Howe factors are thus in equipoise. The Court turns to the fifth factor, Defendants’ explanation for their failure to timely disclose the evidence. Defendants’ explanation is that Plaintiffs’ “lack of diligence in pursuing the information” led to the failure to disclose (ECF No. 214 at PageID.5676). Defendants speculate that “Plaintiffs may have strategically chosen to refrain from requesting such information to strengthen their motion for summary judgment” (id. at PageID.5676). Defendants’ explanation is unconvincing. Based on the record before the Court, it appears that Plaintiffs did not know Defendants would claim damages resulting from decisions of individuals working at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City until they received Defendant Lucille's declaration on May 31, 2024. Thus, Plaintiffs could not have known to request further information about these damages. Accordingly, the fifth factor tips in favor of Plaintiffs. The Court thus concludes that the motion in limine is properly granted as to the second category of damages, which Defendants claim in connection with their inability to hire additional workers.
2. Plaintiffs’ Rule 43(a) Motion Regarding Zoom Testimony
*7 In Plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) (ECF No. 207-1), Plaintiffs request an Order permitting Plaintiffs Darwin, Artemio, and Leonel to testify by Zoom if they are not able to obtain permission to enter the country for trial. Plaintiffs explain that these individuals are currently in Guatemala (ECF No. 207 at PageID.5476). Plaintiffs “want to travel to Grand Rapids to testify live at the trial ... but it is not certain that they can obtain permission to enter the United States” (id.). Plaintiffs attach an affidavit by an immigration attorney, who attests that he is assisting the Guatemala-based Plaintiffs with obtaining the proper visas to lawfully enter the United States for trial, but “it has been [his] experience that it can take up to a year or more to obtain a non immigrant visa or parole admission from countries like Guatemala in this situation and often they are never approved” (ECF No. 207-2).
In response, Defendants point to the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 43(a), which state that the rule is intended to promote testimony when a witness cannot attend trial for “unexpected reasons, such as accident or illness,” not when it is “inconvenient for the witness to attend trial” (Defs.’ Br., ECF No. 213 at PageID.5663). Defendants observe that the original Plaintiffs in this action joined Darwin, Artemio, and Leonel when they filed the Second Amended Complaint on June 20, 2023 (id. at PageID.5664 (referencing ECF No. 56)). Accordingly, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs here do not have good cause to testify remotely because they “knew, or should have known, that joining the Guatemala Plaintiffs in this lawsuit would likely necessitate their physical presence in Michigan for trial” (ECF No. 213 at PageID.5664). Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs are attempting to circumvent the April 9, 2024 Order of the Magistrate Judge (id. (referencing ECF No. 162 (directing Plaintiffs’ depositions to be taken remotely and stating “Plaintiffs will, however, be required to testify in person at trial”))). Defendants also argue that “Plaintiffs chose Michigan as their forum to bring this action” and that the potential denial of a visa is not an “unexpected” event (id. at PageID.5665).
Plaintiffs’ argument has merit.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants mistreated them in Michigan. The Guatemala-based Plaintiffs, by the very nature of their vocation as temporary agricultural workers, were subsequently unable to remain in the United States. They now reside in a country from which travel to the United States is difficult. Defendants ask this Court to conclude that Plaintiffs’ visa status somehow insulates Defendants from Plaintiffs’ claims (see Defs.’ Br., ECF No. 213 at PageID.5665 (“Should the Guatemala Plaintiffs be truly unable to attend trial, they should be dismissed rather than permitted to litigate from a faraway forum without setting foot in Michigan”). But Plaintiffs’ visa status, over which they have little control, need not prevent Plaintiffs from bringing their claims in their chosen forum, where the alleged harm occurred. If one or more Plaintiffs are unable to obtain the requisite visas to travel to Grand Rapids for travel, this lack of a visa would render in-person testimony not merely inconvenient, but rather, impossible. Such a development would constitute “good cause in compelling circumstances” warranting testimony by those Plaintiffs “by contemporaneous transmission from a different location.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a). The April 9, 2024 Order of the Magistrate Judge, issued in the context of a discovery dispute and without the benefit of the instant briefing on the issue of Plaintiffs’ visas for trial, does not counsel a different conclusion.
Plaintiffs shall continue to make good-faith efforts to obtain the requisite visas to testify in-person at trial. However, to the extent that such efforts prove unsuccessful, Plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to Rule 43(a) is conditionally and provisionally granted. Any video testimony shall be subject to “appropriate safeguards” that the parties shall undertake to develop, subject to the Court's approval or revision.
3. Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine Regarding Certain Testimony and Prior Drinking Allegations
*8 In their third pending motion (ECF No. 210), Plaintiffs seek exclusion of two types of evidence, which the Court considers in turn.
Testimony by Non-Plaintiff Purpose Point Workers. Defendants listed dozens of individuals in their first supplemented Rule 26 initial disclosures as individuals likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts (ECF No. 210-2). Plaintiffs identify these individuals as former and current Purpose Point employees (ECF No. 210-1 at PageID.5489). Plaintiffs move the Court to preclude testimony from “any current and former employees of [Purpose Point] who have no connection to this case,” such as the individuals listed in lines A–YYY of Defendants’ disclosures (id.).
Plaintiffs anticipate that the primary purpose of these witnesses’ testimony will be to establish that Defendants did not mistreat the non-plaintiff witnesses (id. at PageID.5491). Plaintiffs argue that such testimony has no probative value because the “issues in this case are whether Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights” (id. at PageID.5490) (emphasis in original). Moreover, to the extent that the testimony may be “minimally relevant,” Plaintiffs argue that its relevance will be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury (ECF No. 210-1 at PageID.5492–93). Plaintiffs further anticipate that some of Defendants’ prospective witnesses will testify that Plaintiffs or their family threatened Purpose Point workers and encouraged them to join this action (id. at PageID.5493). Plaintiffs argue that such testimony will be “completely irrelevant to any issue in the case and in any event substantially more prejudicial than probative” (id. at PageID.5494).
Defendants contend that such testimony is relevant because, as Plaintiffs worked alongside non-Plaintiff workers at Purpose Point, “the non-Plaintiff H-2A Purpose Point workers will be able to testify as to their experience at Purpose Point and whether the Plaintiffs’ allegations have any merit” (ECF No. 215 at PageID.5690). Defendants argue that, in light of the testimony, “the jury will be able to discern whether the Plaintiff's allegations are credible” (id.). Regarding the testimony about alleged threats made by Plaintiffs’ family toward non-Plaintiff workers, Defendants argue that this testimony will shed light on whether Plaintiffs are “creating a narrative in an attempt to obtain a monetary judgment from Defendants,” rather than bringing valid claims (ECF No. 215 at PageID.5691). Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs seek to “potentially qualify for a T or U visa which would allow Plaintiffs to legally remain in the U.S.” (id.). Defendants believe the testimony at issue will be “highly relevant” to Plaintiffs’ credibility—but also argue that “it is unlikely that a jury will determine credibility solely based on” the evidence, and thus the testimony will not be unfairly prejudicial (id.).
Plaintiffs’ argument has merit.
The Court has denied Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in this case (ECF No. 178). Thus, only Plaintiffs’ rights and alleged mistreatment are at issue. Accordingly, to the extent that Defendants seek to introduce testimony from non-Plaintiff Purpose Point workers that goes beyond their personal knowledge of Plaintiffs’ experiences with Defendants, that testimony is properly excluded as irrelevant under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 401 & 602. Moreover, even to the extent that such testimony is minimally probative, testimony from non-Plaintiff Purpose Point workers about their experiences with Positive Point is likely to mislead the jury to conflate those witnesses’ experiences—which are not at issue—with Plaintiffs’ experiences. As Plaintiffs aptly note, “litigating what did or did not happen to other employees will create peripheral trials and distract the jury from the real issues, which are what happened to the Plaintiffs” (ECF No. 210-1 at PageID.5493). Accordingly, the testimony is also properly excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
*9 Similarly, Plaintiffs’ motive for filing the lawsuit is not at issue. Plaintiffs may file lawsuits that ultimately prove meritorious for a variety of reasons, including—indeed, often—with the hope of winning a monetary judgment. Plaintiffs’ (or their family members’) conduct toward individuals who are not parties to this action is not at issue. Plaintiffs’ ability to prevail in this action depends not on their motivation for bringing the lawsuit but rather on what Defendants did or did not do during Plaintiffs’ term of employment at Purpose Point. Therefore, testimony about alleged threats made by Plaintiffs or their family is irrelevant. In the alternative, even if testimony about these issues were minimally relevant, any probative value is substantially outweighed by the testimony's potential for prejudicing Plaintiffs and confusing the jury.
For these reasons, the Court will grant the motion in limine as to testimony from the individuals listed in lines A–YYY of Defendants’ first supplemented Rule 26 initial disclosures (ECF No. 210-2) to the extent that these individuals lack personal knowledge of any events at issue in this case.
Prior Drinking Allegations. Defendants Emilto and Lucille both sat for depositions in which they suggested that Plaintiff Luis drank alcohol while working (ECF No. 210-1 at PageID.4595 (quoting deposition transcripts)). Plaintiffs argue that this testimony should be excluded because it is “based on hearsay and speculation” (id. at PageID.5496). Plaintiffs also argue that even if that were not the case, “any limited probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the jury would view Luis's drinking allegations as evidence of character or propensity for drinking” (ECF No. 210-1 at PageID.5497).
Defendants respond that testimony that Plaintiff Luis drank alcohol during work hours is relevant to both Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ counterclaim. With regard to Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendants argue that the evidence is relevant to “whether [Plaintiff Luis] was in fact coerced into forced labor” by showing that he “felt comfortable enough to shirk his duties and drink on the job” (ECF No. 215 at PageID.5692). With regard to Defendants’ counterclaim, Defendants argue that the evidence is relevant to “whether [Plaintiff Luis] caused Purpose Point damages by his conduct” (id.). Defendants argue that “little to no unfair prejudice would result” from this evidence because there is not evidence “that [Plaintiff] Luis was so inebriated that he could no longer perform work” (id.). Defendants do not respond to Plaintiffs’ argument that any evidence of Plaintiff Luis drinking at work is based on hearsay.
Plaintiffs’ argument has merit.
Based on the record currently before the Court, there is no evidence that any of Defendants’ witnesses have personal knowledge of Plaintiff Luis drinking alcohol while at work. Rather, Defendants claim that an unnamed “farm owner” observed Plaintiff Luis drinking in the field (ECF No. 215 at PageID.5688). To the extent that Defendants intend to call a witness to testify that this unnamed farm owner told the witness that Plaintiff Luis was drinking in the field—in an effort to prove that Plaintiff Luis was, in fact, drinking in the field—that testimony is inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion in limine as to testimony about Plaintiff Luis drinking alcohol at work to the extent that such testimony would be inadmissible hearsay. As to whether testimony about Plaintiff Luis’ allegedly drinking alcohol at work is admissible at all, even from a witness with personal knowledge, that question is not before the Court in Plaintiffs’ present motion. Accordingly, the Court will defer ruling on that question until such time as it may be squarely before the Court.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ “Motion in Limine to Preclude Defendants From Presenting Claimed Damage Amounts Not Disclosed Until September 16, 2024” (ECF No. 217-1) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as described herein.
*10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Allow Testimony by Zoom” (ECF No. 207-1) is GRANTED subject to the conditions described herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ “Omnibus Motion in Limine” (ECF No. 210) is GRANTED as described herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ “Motion in Limine to Preclude Defendants From Presenting Claimed Damage Amounts Not Disclosed Until September 16, 2024” (ECF No. 205-1) is DISMISSED as moot.
Footnotes
Plaintiffs previously filed a version of the motion (ECF No. 205-1) missing an attachment referenced in—and integral to—the briefing. In response to an Order issued by the Court (ECF No. 216), Plaintiffs filed a new version of the motion (ECF No. 217-1) with the attachment. The motion itself is identical to the prior version. In light of the corrected attachment, the Court's Order afforded Defendants an opportunity to supplement their response (ECF No. 216). Defendants submitted a filing (ECF No. 217) indicating that they rely on their previously-filed response (ECF No. 214). The motion is now properly before the Court. The Court will dismiss the prior version of the motion (ECF No. 205-1) as moot.
As some of the parties have the same last name, the Court refers to all parties by their first names.
The parties’ Joint Statement of Facts (ECF No. 171) was filed in support of their cross-motions for summary judgment.
Defendant Lucille attests that, due to Plaintiff Hervil's abandonment of his employment in 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City rejected Purpose Point's application for twenty-three H-2A workers for the 2019 season (ECF No. 181 at PageID.4310 ¶ 11). To this rejection, Defendant Lucille attributes $77,348 in lost expenses and $94,948 in unrealized potential profit (id. ¶¶ 12 & 15). Defendant Lucille also attests that, due to Plaintiff Luis’ abandonment of his employment in 2019, the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City rejected Purpose Point's application for thirteen H-2A workers for the 2020 season (id. at PageID.4313 ¶ 31). To this rejection, Defendant Lucille attributes $35,745 in lost expenses and $15,013 in unrealized potential profit (id. ¶¶ 32–33).
Though Defendants do not direct the Court to this document in their briefing of the instant motion, the Court has identified an additional place in the record where Defendants at least arguably notified Plaintiffs of claimed damages related to an inability to hire additional workers. In their first set of written interrogatories, Plaintiffs asked Defendants to “[e]xplain, in detail, the calculation of Defendants’ damages alleged in their Counterclaims” (ECF No. 169-1 at PageID.3286 ¶ 15). Defendants responded that they were only able to request 5 workers, instead of 60, for the 2023 season because of “the costs associated with having to defend” against Plaintiffs’ lawsuit (id.). To the extent that this rationale underpins Defendants’ claimed damages, any evidence of the cost of defending against the lawsuit is not relevant Defendants’ breach of contract claim and is, therefore, properly excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 401.