S.D. Fla. L. R. 7.3(a). There has been no argument made in this case that Defendant has failed to comply with this Local Rule. In fact, at the hearing, it was represented that the parties had complied with this Local Rule.

Under Florida law, “the billing records of opposing counsel are relevant to the issue of reasonableness of time expended in a claim for attorney's fees, and their discovery falls within the discretion of the trial court when the fees are contested.” Paton v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 190 So. 3d 1047, 1052 (Fla. 2016). Additionally, the Paton court stated, “[t]he hours expended by the attorneys for the insurance company will demonstrate the complexity of the case along with the time expended, and may belie a claim that the number of hours spent by the plaintiff was unreasonable, or that the plaintiff is not entitled to a full lodestar computation, including a multiplying factor.” Id.

Two Southern District of Florida cases cite to Paton—Atlantic Healthcare, LLC v. Argonaut Ins. Co., No. 19-14420-CV, 2021 WL 2333112 (S.D. Fla. June 7, 2021) (J. Maynard), and Procaps S.A. v. Patheon Inc., No. 12-24356-CIV, 2017 WL 3536917 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2017) (J. Goodman). Claimants rely on both of those cases in their papers.

In Procaps S.A., the court noted that “the method the Court often uses to assess whether a case was overstaffed—comparing the billing records of the law firm representing the party seeking fees with the billing records of opposing counsel—is unavailable here because Procaps failed to submit its counsel's billing records.” 2017 WL 3536917, at *31.

In Atlantic Healthcare, LLC, the court first noted that the defendant had failed to comply with Local Rule 7.3 and had failed to submit an affidavit containing the requisite information. 2021 WL 2333112, at * 2. The court additionally found that defense counsel's time sheets were “relevant to determining whether the time spent by Plaintiffs’ counsel was reasonable and in evaluating the complexity of the case.” Id. Citing Paton, the court explained that, “Plaintiffs are seeking a multiplier so the complexity of the case, including the novelty or difficulty of the issues presented, is a factor to be considered. See, e.g., Fla. Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Thus, Defendant's time sheets, billing records, and their fee agreements are relevant and must be disclosed.” Id.

*3 Eleventh Circuit cases from the time period before Paton was decided reached a different conclusion. See Johnson v. Univ. Coll. of Univ. of Alabama in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 1983), holding modified by Gaines v. Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 775 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1985) (“This Court has questioned the relevance of the number of hours spent by defense counsel to a determination of the reasonable fee for plaintiffs’ attorneys.”). The cases generally hold that such disclosure is relevant only in “special” circumstances. Gaines v. Dougherty County Bd. of Educ., 775 F.2d 1565, 1571 n. 12 (11th Cir.1985) (plaintiff's own records were inadequate to assess time worked); Henson v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 770 F.2d 1566, 1574–75 (11th Cir.1985) (disclosure appropriate in decade-long litigation). “The Local Rules do not require an objecting party to turn over billing records, and the Eleventh Circuit does not consider one side's billing records to be particularly relevant in determining appropriate fees for the other side.” Vergara v. Davis Bancorp, Inc., No. 10-21746-CIV, 2011 WL 666169, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2011) (Goodman, J.).

The Court has reviewed all of the applicable law. As an initial matter, there is a dispute between the parties as to whether this Court should be relying on pre-Paton Eleventh Circuit law or the Florida Supreme Court's Paton decision, in conjunction with the Southern District of Florida cases which cite Paton, in determining this discovery dispute. This particular issue has not been sufficiently briefed by the parties. However, the Court does not need to decide this issue because, regardless of whether or not Florida law applies to this discovery dispute (as argued by Claimants) or federal discovery law applies (as argued by Defendant), the Court finds that Paton simply provides courts with discretion to determine whether the billing records of opposing counsel are relevant to the issue of reasonableness of time expended in a claim for attorneys’ fees. Paton does not mandate the production of opposing counsel's billing records. Thus, even under Paton, the primary case upon which Claimants rely in seeking the billing records from defense counsel, the Court finds that Defendant has met his burden to establish that the Subpoena should be quashed and/or a protective order should be issued. There are several reasons for this ruling.

First, Southern District of Florida Local Rule 7.3, which is applicable to fee disputes, does not exist in state court. Local Rule 7.3 sets forth very specific procedures in this federal district that materially negate the need for discovery into an opposing counsel's billing records. And, Local Rule 7.3 wisely does not mandate the production of the billing records of opposing counsel in a fee dispute. Moreover, the parties in this case have complied with the requirements of Local Rule 7.3, which is an important factor that this Court has relied upon in quashing the Subpoena.

Second, the Southern District of Florida cases which cite Paton are easily distinguishable from the case at hand. Primarily, neither of those cases involved determination of a fee award after a jury trial. This is an important distinction because a judge overseeing a jury trial is intimately familiar with the case and is thus more readily able to determine the complexity of the case and whether a case was over-staffed, over-litigated, or over-tried. In this case, I presided over the jury trial, and I am very familiar with the complexity of the case, the staffing of the case, and the excellent work done by the attorneys for all the parties. Further, the facts of the cases cited by Claimants were less complex than those underlying the case at hand. Finally, those cases did not have such very specific entitlement findings as have already been made by the Court here. With this depth of knowledge, the billing records of Defendant's counsel would in no way assist me in determining a reasonable attorneys’ fee award in this case.

*4 Third, the burden of responding to the subpoena by Defendant's counsel would clearly outweigh any potential benefit created by the subpoenaed documents. A subpoena on a law firm is very invasive, and the burden on Defendant would outweigh any possible marginal relevance of the documents sought. This is especially true here where there is a pending appeal, and Defendant would have to carefully redact all of the invoices for attorney-client and work-product privileged information. This is not a simple task in a case that has spanned several years and has been heavily litigated.

Fourth, “[i]t is long settled in this circuit that when a court is determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, the court, as a matter of law, is itself an ‘expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses.’ ” Laney v. BBB Logistics, Inc., 844 F. App'x 203, 210 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988)). Thus, the Court can use its own knowledge and experience to determine the amount of fees in this case. In making this determination of a reasonable fee award in this specific case, the Court really sees no value in inspecting opposing counsel's billing records.

Fifth, under Eleventh Circuit law, there are no special circumstances here that make the production of Defendant's counsel's billing records appropriate. Gaines v. Dougherty Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 775 F.2d 1565, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e have also held that in special circumstances it is an abuse of discretion for a judge to refuse to allow discovery of the hours spent by defense counsel.”).

Sixth, the reasonable attorneys’ fees issue has been somewhat of a moving target in this case, and the Court sees no need to further unnecessarily complicate the attorneys’ fees litigation. Requiring production of Defendant's attorneys’ time records would undoubtedly lead to further discovery motion practice, delays, and complications. The attorneys’ fees litigation should not take on a life of its own. See generally, Lambert and Arendall, You Spent How Much? Who Really Cares? Discovery and Evidentiary Value of an Opponent's Billing Records, 91-JUN FLBJ 10 (June 2017).

In sum, under the specific facts of this case, the Court shall exercise its discretion to grant Defendant's Motion to Quash. The Court will not require Defendant's law firm to produce the voluminous subpoenaed billing records. The Court has watched the excellent attorneys in this case during pretrial, trial, and post-trial proceedings, and I am very familiar with this complex case and all of its issues and disputes. The Court is confident that the billing records sought would not help it in determining the reasonableness of the fees sought by Claimants.

In light of the foregoing, Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena and/or for Protective Order [DE 411] is GRANTED.

ORDERED and ADJUDGED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, this 9th day of January 2025.