*1 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's motion to compel production of documents from third-parties Marty Rall and Rall & Ortiz, LLC (hereinafter “Rall”) (Dkt. No. 21). Having thoroughly considered the briefing and relevant record, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion for the reasons described herein.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a separate tort lawsuit filed in Snohomish County Superior Court, case number 20-2-04109-31 (hereinafter the “Underlying Lawsuit”). (Dkt. No. 21 at 2.) The Underlying Lawsuit arose out of a two-vehicle accident that occurred on August 25, 2017 (hereinafter the “Accident”). (Id.) Plaintiff was a passenger in one of the vehicles; her husband, Celso Wang (hereinafter the “Husband”), was the driver. (Id.) Plaintiff sustained injuries and thus pursued litigation against her Husband and the driver of the other vehicle. (Id.) At the time, Plaintiff was insured through a policy issued by Defendant, which included coverage for an underinsured motorist. (Dkt. Nos. 1-2 at 3, 13 at 2.) In turn, Defendant retained Rall to represent the Husband in the Underlying Lawsuit. (Dkt. No. 21 at 2.) That Underlying Lawsuit ultimately resulted in a settlement. (Id.) Then, on February 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed the present action in state court for various extracontractual claims. (Id.; see also Dkt. No. 1-2 at 17–25.) Defendant removed to this Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Parties are now in the midst of discovery.

This particular discovery dispute arises out of Defendant's subpoena duces tecum to Rall. (Dkt. No. 21 at 1.) In it, Defendant seeks all relevant and non-privileged materials within Rall's possession or control related to Plaintiff and/or her Husband for any claims regarding the Accident. (See id.; see also Dkt. No. 22-2) (subpoena at issue). Defendant served its subpoena on August 8, 2024. (Dkt. No. 21 at 1.) Since then, Rall has only provided Defendant with a copy of Plaintiff's medical records, and nothing more. (See id. at 3.) Defendant has even granted Rall several extensions to comply with the subpoena or provide an explanation as to why compliance is not possible—all to no avail. (See id. at 2–4.) Even after retaining counsel for this limited scope discovery dispute, Rall still has not provided a fulsome response to the subpoena. (See id. at 3–4.) Defendant thus brings its motion to compel. (See generally id.)

II. DISCUSSION

As the Court so often states, it strongly disfavors discovery motions and prefers that parties resolve such disputes on their own. See, e.g., Larson Motors Inc. v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2023 WL 346623, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2023); PCF Ins. Serv. Of the West, LLC v. Fritts, 2024 WL 3966735, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2024).

Nevertheless, the Court recognizes the importance of discovery to the litigation process. Indeed, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly favor full discovery.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994). As such, they entitle a party to discover non-privileged information that is (1) relevant to any party's claims or defenses and (2) proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). This, of course, includes discovery by subpoena. Id. 45(3). Relevant information need not be admissible, but it must be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. 26(b)(1); see Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005). A party responding to the discovery request may then, amongst other options, submit objections to the request. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1)(B), (d)(3). Proper objections include irrelevance, see id. at 26(b)(1), unreasonable amount of time to comply, invasion of privilege, or undue burden, see id. at 45(d)(3)(A). A party who fails to timely object thereby waives any objection to the subpoena, absent “unusual circumstances and for good cause.” Uzzell v. Teletech Holdings, Inc., 2007 WL 4358315, slip op. at 1–2 (W.D. Wash. 2007).

*2 If a party inappropriately withholds or fails to answer a discovery request, the requesting party may move for an order compelling discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1977). The movant must demonstrate that “the information it seeks is relevant and that the responding party's objections lack merit.” Hancock v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 321 F.R.D. 383, 390 (W.D. Wash. 2017). The Court then has broad discretion to decide whether to compel discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).

Rall does not object to the subpoena based on relevance, privilege, undue burden, or the like. In fact, it seems that Rall never submitted any objections. (See Dkt. No. 21 at 3–4.) Instead, Rall's justification for noncompliance is that it has not received the Husband's express consent to disclose the file related to his case. (Id.) Indeed, Rall argues that Washington Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”) 1.15A and 1.15B preclude it from releasing the Husband's file without his express consent. (Id. at 1.) But those rules only govern an attorney's duties to safeguard client property—items such as trusts, real estate, and deeds or wills related thereto. See generally Washington RPC 1.15A (“Safeguarding Property”) and 1.15B (“Required Trust Account Records”). That is, those rules govern an attorney's duties to protect items that generally give rise to or represent the ultimate culmination of an attorney's representation. They do not apply to items that primarily serve as a record of the attorney's representation, such as the client file at issue here. And, even if they did, the specific authority to which Rall cites is only a “best practice,” not a bright-line rule. (See Dkt. No. 23 at 1) (citing Appendix A, “Best Practices for Client File Retention”).

Of course, the Court appreciates that, out of an abundance of caution, it is preferable to have the client's express consent before producing information about their case. Nevertheless, mere lack of consent, without more, is not a proper objection to a subpoena that is otherwise reasonable and seeks relevant, non-privileged information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and 45(d)(3) (laying out various grounds for objection); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (in the context of privilege objections, the court ruled that “boilerplate objections or blanket refusals...to a Rule 34 request for production of documents are insufficient to assert a privilege”). And it is certainly not a valid justification for the lack of any response. See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(g) (failure to respond to a subpoena, or at least provide an adequate excuse for failure to respond, may result in a contempt order from the district court). In short, Rall's “objection” (to the extent it may be considered one) lacks merit.

Finally, both parties otherwise appear to agree that Defendant's request for production is reasonable and seeks relevant information. Rall even admitted as much. (Dkt. No. 23 at 2) (“Rall is not otherwise opposed to [Defendant's] motion”). As such, there does not even seem to be a true discovery dispute here.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant's motion to compel (Dkt. No. 21).[1]

*3 DATED this 21st day of January 2025.

John C. Coughenour UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE