See Gastelum Decl. [91], Exs. 5, 7, 9-10; Gastelum Decl. [92], Ex. 5; Arabyan, Ex. F. In the April 29, 2024 order, the court overruled defendant's boilerplate objections. See docket no. 64, n.2.

Nevertheless, defendant County not only failed to withdraw the boilerplate objections in its supplemental responses to Estate RFP, Set One and Matus RFP, it reasserted them. See Gastelum Decl. [91], Ex. 9-10; Arabyan, Ex. F. And then in its July 19, 2024 responses to Estate RFP, Set Three, defendant again responded with the same overruled boilerplate objections. See JS [90], Ex. 5.

*5 The court reiterates that it overrules defendant's objections as mere boilerplate to the extent they are not specifically addressed in each particular discovery response or in the joint stipulations. See Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The party resisting discovery must show specifically how ... each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive.”) (citation omitted); Holt v. Nicholas, 2014 WL 250340, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2014) (“[g]eneric, boilerplate objections to discovery are not sufficient”) (citations omitted).

D. Privilege Issues

Central to most, if not all, of plaintiffs' issues are defendants' privilege assertions. Other than certain documents pertaining to “cellmate Hernandez” (document nos. 3-13) and “reports” regarding Gray v. County of Riverside, no. 05:13-cv-444 (document nos. 26-48), defendants asserted the following identical privileges for the remaining 434 documents in their second amended privilege log: attorney-client communication, attorney work product, federal official information, federal deliberative process, and federal privacy.[7] See Estrada-Villela [93], Ex. 1. As discussed above and previously, “boilerplate objections ... are insufficient to assert a privilege.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoot Winc, LLC v. RSM McGladrey Fin. Process Outsourcing, LLC, 2009 WL 3857425, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009) (“boilerplate assertions in a privilege log are insufficient to invoke an evidentiary privilege”); Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 302 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (boilerplate objections “are improper and therefore no claim of privilege at all”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

The court previously ordered defendant to collect responsive documents “and either produce them or, as to any defendant believes are genuinely privileged, include them in a proper privilege log in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Docket no. 64 at 10. Defendants have since expanded the number of documents on the log, but have still failed to produce a proper, rules-compliant log. Defendants must identify which privileges are actually applicable to each document. Moreover, some of the privileges asserted by defendants may not be applicable at all (including for the “cellmate Hernandez” and Gray v. County of Riverside, No. 05:13-cv-444 documents), as follows.

1. Attorney-Client and Work Product Privilege

Defendants assert almost all of the documents on the privilege log are protected by attorney-client or work product privilege, but have not met the burden of establishing the privileges apply. “'The attorney-client privilege protects confidential disclosures made by a client to an attorney in order to obtain legal advice, ... as well as an attorney's advice in response to such disclosures.” U.S. v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 607 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The purpose of the privilege is “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1981). “ ‘[A] party asserting the attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing the [existence of an attorney-client] relationship and the privileged nature of the communication.’ ” U.S. v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 607)). Confidential communications between a client and an attorney are protected from disclosure:

Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1071 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Because it impedes the full and free discovery of the truth, the attorney-client privilege is strictly construed” (id.), and “applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose.” U.S. v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000). Communications are not privileged unless they included legal advice or were made for the purpose of assisting counsel in rendering legal advice. See In re Copper Market Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding privilege applied where communications “were made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services”).

The work product doctrine is a qualified privilege that protects documents prepared by a party or its representative in anticipation of litigation. U.S. v. Sanmina Corp., 968 F.3d 1107, 1119 (9th Cir. 2020). At its core, the doctrine protects an attorney's mental processes and prevents “ ‘exploitation of a party's efforts in preparing for litigation.’ ” Id. (citation omitted); see Miller, 141 F.R.D. at 303 (documents prepared by a police department's internal affairs section in the regular course of business are not considered protected work product).

Defendants assert attorney-client and work product privilege for almost every document on the second amended privilege log. See Estrada-Villela Decl. [93], Ex. 1. But the second amended privilege log lacks the specificity necessary to make a clear showing that these privileges apply.[8] The second amended privilege log fails to identify the positions of its author and recipients. Nor does the second amended privilege log identify all of the recipients of the documents. Instead, it improperly lists the name of only one recipient followed by “et al.” The failure to identify all of the recipients, their positions, and the author's position, at a minimum, renders it impossible to determine whether either the attorney client or work product privileges may apply. Moreover, defendants must also keep in mind that the mere fact an attorney is included on a communication does not render it privileged. See U.S. v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996) (“That a person is a lawyer does not, ipso facto, make all communications with that person privileged.”). Thus, defendants must also state the purpose or subject of the document with enough specificity to demonstrate the attorney-client or work product privilege applies.

2. Official Information Privilege

*7 “Federal common law recognizes a qualified privilege for official information.” Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1990). “Government personnel files are considered official information.” Id. In order to determine whether the official information privilege applies, courts apply a balancing test, weighing the potential benefits of disclosure against the potential disadvantages. Id. at 1033-34. Some district courts have applied “a balancing approach that is moderately pre-weighted in favor of disclosure” in civil rights cases against law enforcement agencies. Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 661 (N.D. Cal. 1987).

The party invoking the official information privilege must at the outset make a “substantial threshold showing” by way of a declaration or affidavit from a responsible official with personal knowledge of the matters attested. Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The declaration must include “(1) an affirmation that the agency generated or collected the material in issue and has in fact maintained its confidentiality (if the agency has shared some or all of the material with other governmental agencies it must disclose their identity and describe the circumstances surrounding the disclosure, including steps taken to assure preservation of the confidentiality of the material), (2) a statement that the official has personally reviewed the material in question, (3) a specific identification of the governmental or privacy interests that would be threatened by disclosure of the material to plaintiff and/or his lawyer, (4) a description of how disclosure subject to a carefully crafted protective order would create a substantial risk of harm to significant governmental or privacy interests, (5) and a projection of how much harm would be done to the threatened interests if the disclosure were made.” Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 670; see Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of California, 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1975).

Defendants submitted the Yelenich declaration as the official information declaration in support of the first amended privilege log. As an initial matter, the Yelenich declaration, dated May 21, 2024, does not apply to the additional 420 documents added to the second amended privilege log. Yelenich states she reviewed the documents identified in the amended privilege log, but the amended privilege log she reviewed contained only 48 documents. See Yelenich Decl. ¶ 10; Gastelum Decl. [91], Ex. 11. There is no indication that Yelenich reviewed any of the 420 documents added to the second amended privilege log after May 21, 2024.

Moreover, the Yelenich declaration is insufficient to support the privilege claims. Yelenich, without identifying specific documents, states the documents are protected by the official information privilege, federal executive-deliberative process privilege, law enforcement privilege, right to privacy, privilege of critical self-analysis, and various California state privileges. Yelenich Decl. ¶¶ 12-13. Yelenich declares that disclosure of the documents in the privilege log would harm defendants' interest because: (1) it would chill future candor in analysis or evaluation (id. ¶ 15); (2) it would inhibit the ability to frankly engage in self-critical analysis (id. ¶ 16); (3) many of documents are unrelated to the underlying incident (id. ¶ 17); (4) it could reveal investigative methods and endanger the ability of future investigations to identify wrongdoing (id. ¶ 18); and (5) “internal correspondence and investigative records often involve ongoing investigations which may invoke the Law Enforcement Investigative Privilege” (id. ¶ 19). First, a “general assertion that a police department's internal investigatory system would be harmed by disclosure of the documents is insufficient to meet the threshold test for invoking the official information privilege. A general claim of harm to the public interest is insufficient to overcome the burden placed on the party seeking to shield material from disclosure. The party resisting discovery must specifically describe how disclosure of the requested documents in that particular case would be harmful.” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 614 (cleaned up and citations omitted); see, e.g., Centeno v. City of Fresno, 2016 WL 7491634, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2016) (declaration that disclosure would likely chill future candor in analysis or evaluation “does not overcome the moderately weighed presumption in favor of disclosure”). Second, that the declarant determined the documents were irrelevant is not a factor to consider. Finally, general statements that these types of documents may invoke the law enforcement investigatory privilege (discussed below) fail to establish how a specific document indeed implicates that privilege.

*8 Accordingly, the Yelenich Declaration is insufficient to make a threshold showing of official information privilege.

3. Deliberative Process Privilege

The deliberative process privilege protects the “decision making processes of government agencies” and covers documents “reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150, 95 S. Ct. 1504, 44 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1975) (citations omitted). The purpose of the privilege is to “promote frank and independent discussion among those responsible for making governmental decisions, and also to protect against premature disclosure of proposed agency policies or decisions.” F.T.C. v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal citation omitted). In order for the deliberative process privilege to apply to a document, the document must have been generated before the adoption of the policy or decision and must be deliberative in nature (i.e., containing opinions, recommendations or advice about agency policies). Id. It is not an absolute privilege and the documents may be discovered if the need for the documents outweighs the governmental interest in keeping them confidential. Scalia v. Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 336 F.R.D. 603, 610 (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Defendants have not explained how the deliberative process privilege protects any of the withheld documents in the privilege log. The withheld documents appear to be communications and reports about in-custody deaths, training materials produced in another matter, department policy manuals, crime statistics, and personnel files, and not pre-decision documents regarding the formulation of agency policy or decision. Indeed, the deliberative process privilege is “inappropriate for use in civil rights cases against police departments.” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 612. It offers no protection to most of the kinds of information police departments routinely generate, including internal affairs investigations. Id. Thus, unless defendants demonstrate, through a declaration at a minimum, that withheld communications “directly contribute[d] to the formulation of important public policy,” the deliberative process privilege is inapplicable. Id.; see Taylor v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 2024 WL 3915194, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2024) (agencies seeking to invoke the deliberative process privilege can do so through a declaration explaining what the documents are and how they relate to the decisions).

4. Law Enforcement Investigative and Critical Self-Analysis Privileges

Defendants do not list the law enforcement and critical self-analysis privileges on their privilege log, but the Yelenich declaration cites both as bases for withholding the documents. See Yelenich Decl. ¶¶ 12-13, 19. The law enforcement investigative privilege (also known as the law enforcement privilege and law enforcement investigatory privilege) is “based on the harm to law enforcement efforts that might arise from public disclosure of investigatory files.” Lien v. City of San Diego, 2022 WL 134896, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2022); see Scalia, 336 F.R.D. at 617. It is a qualified privilege protecting the confidentiality of investigative files in order to prevent harm to law enforcement efforts which might arise from their public disclosure. See U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, 2023 WL 6370887, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2023). The critical self-analysis privilege (also known as the self-critical analysis privilege) “has been used in some federal courts to shield from discovery internal safety reviews in which companies evaluate the causes of accidents in which they are involved.” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 611. Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit “have yet to recognize or reject a ‘law enforcement privilege.’ ” Shah v. Dep't of Justice, 714 F. App'x 657, 658 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, “several courts within this circuit have acknowledged and applied it.” Lien, 2022 WL 134896, at *2. These courts have found that the party asserting the law enforcement investigative privilege must lodge a formal claim of privilege by the head of the department with control over the requested information, the assertion of the privilege must be based on personal consideration by that official, and the information for which the privilege is claimed must be specified with an explanation as to why it falls within the scope of the privilege. U.S. ex rel. Burroughs v. DeNardi Corp., 167 F.R.D. 680, 687 (S.D. Cal. 1996); see also Hereford v. City of Hemet, 2023 WL 6813740, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2023).

*9 To the extent the law enforcement investigative privilege exists, defendants have not met the burden to establish it applies to the withheld documents. The Yelenich declaration simply asserts that: departmental internal correspondence “sometimes” contain information gathered and developed during investigations of complaints (Yelenich Decl. ¶ 4); internal correspondence and investigative records “often” involve ongoing investigations which may invoke the Law Enforcement Investigate Privilege” (id. ¶ 19); and in connection with in-custody death matters such as the instance case, “internal correspondence would necessarily include civil, criminal, and administrative investigations” (id.). The Yelenich declaration does not make a showing about any document specifically or why the law enforcement privilege would apply to it. Instead, it simply contains generalities that these types of documents may contain investigative materials. Thus, the Yelenich declaration is insufficient to establish the law enforcement applies to any document in any privilege log. Similarly, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have recognized the self-critical analysis privilege. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 611. And district courts recognizing it have held the privilege “should not be applied to police personnel files and records of internal affairs investigations in civil suits against police officers.” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 611-12 (citing Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 664-66); see also Branch v. Umphenour, 2014 WL 3891813, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7. 2014) (declining to apply the privilege because it is not recognized in the Ninth Circuit); Quiroz v. Horel, 2014 WL 572381, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014) (same).

Because neither the law enforcement investigative privilege nor the self-critical analysis privilege is recognized by the Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit, and because defendants have made no showing that either applies here, defendants may not cite them as bases for withholding any documents. Nor may the official information declarant rely on such privileges in his or her declaration.

5. Privacy

“Privacy and privilege are distinct concepts. Information may be private but not necessarily privileged.” Gutierrez v. Mora, 2019 WL 8953125, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2019). There is no common law privacy privilege, but “[f]ederal courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery requests.” Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 616 (citation omitted); Keith H. v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.R.D. 652, 657 (C.D. Cal. 2005). When objections to discovery are raised on privacy grounds, courts must weigh the privacy interests against the need for the information. See Altamirano-Santiago v. Better Produce, Inc., 2020 WL 2303086, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 617.

Other than imply that their family members' privacy interests would be implicated by the release of individual defendants' personnel files, defendants fail to explain whose right to privacy is implicated by the documents on the privilege log and how. Defendants simply state a vague “third party” interest. See Estrada-Villela Decl. [93], Ex. 1. This is plainly insufficient.

Regarding personnel files, “ ‘[c]urrent case law suggests the privacy interests police officers have in their personnel files do not outweigh plaintiff's interests in civil rights cases.’ ” Lua v. McNett, 2024 WL 1349649, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2024) (quoting Dowell v. Griffin, 275 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D. Cal. 2011)). Moreover, any privacy concerns may be eliminated or dramatically reduced by a protective order. Hipschman v. Cnty. of San Diego,_ F. Supp. 3d_ , 2024 WL 3206909, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jun. 26, 2024); Dowell, 275 F.R.D. at 617.

Defendants do not adequately explain why the protective order already in place is insufficient to protect their privacy interests, or those of a third party. Indeed, defendants' primary argument does not appear to be the right to privacy but rather that plaintiffs' requests are irrelevant, overbroad, and not narrowly tailored. See, e.g., JS [90] at 30-33. Without here deciding whether plaintiffs' particular requests for personnel records are irrelevant, overbroad, or not narrowly tailored, the court finds that plaintiffs' need for information outweighs defendants' and the unnamed third parties' right to privacy. Accordingly, defendants' privacy objection is overruled, and defendants must produce appropriately requested information from personnel files, subject to the protective order in place.

*10 In light of the above privilege rulings, the court orders defendants to provide plaintiffs a further amended privilege log. The privilege log must include all documents defendants have withheld based on privilege, must contain all the information required by the protective order, and may assert only the privileges that are actually applicable to each document in question. To the extent defendants continue to assert the official information or deliberative process privileges, they may do so only if they have a legitimate basis for each such assertion, and they must submit declarations that address the specific documents at issue. If any disputes remain as to whether particular documents qualify for privilege protection, the parties must meet and confer in a good faith effort to attempt to resolve such disputes. Although the court is giving defendants another opportunity to properly assert their privilege objections, future failure to do so will result in the court simply overruling the objections and ordering production of the withheld documents.

E. The Court Denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel [90] Without Prejudice Because Defendants Have Agreed to Make a Supplemental Production in Response to the Estate RFP, Set Three Requests

Estate RFP, Set Three contains five sets of the same requests directed at each of the newly added individual defendants. A representative set of the RFPs at issue is as follows:

1. Defendants Have Agreed to Make a Supplemental Production in Response to Estate RFP, Set Three Requests Related to Personnel and Disciplinary Files

In addition to the privilege and privacy assertions, defendants argue Estate RFP, Set Three Nos. 3, 4, and 14 (and the substantially identical requests) are overbroad and unduly burdensome because they seek information unrelated to the underlying matter and over too long a time frame. See, e.g., JS [90] at 30-34. Specifically, defendants note plaintiffs defined conduct as: “(1) aggressive behavior; (2) violence and/or attempted violence; (3) excessive force and/or attempted excessive force; (4) shooting and/or improper use of firearms; (5) acts indicating inaccuracy or dishonesty; (6) failure to follow department policy and/or the law; (7) improper stops/investigations, including lack of probable cause; (8) improper arrest or detainment; (9) fabrication, misrepresentation, suppression and/or embellishment of facts in reports; (10) fabrication, misrepresentation, suppression and/or embellishment of evidence; (11) false testimony; (12) morally lax character and willingness to lie; and/or (13) fabrication and/or false claims of probable cause,” and contend that this would include matters utterly unrelated to this matter such as improper stops or excessive force. JS [90] at 30-31.

Notwithstanding their objections, defendants now agree to produce records from the last 10 years showing administrative or criminal investigation or discipline against the five defendants for misconduct involving: (a) failure to timely conduct or log inmate safety checks; (b) failure to regularly conduct or log inmate contraband checks; (c) failure to timely or adequately provide medical aid to an unconscious inmate; and/or (d) dishonesty. See, e.g., id. at 33-34. To the extent plaintiffs seek additional documents responsive to these requests, the parties must further meet and confer.

2. Defendants Have Agreed to Make a Supplemental Production in Response to Estate RFP, Set Three Requests Related to Training

*11 Estate RFP, Set Three Nos. 17-19 relate to training materials received by the individual defendants. Plaintiffs contend defendants only produced each individual defendant's training logs. JS [90] at 34; see Arabyan Decl., Ex. D at 19. Defendant argues the requests are overbroad in time and scope. JS [90] at 35-36. Nonetheless, defendants now agree to produce training materials for the last 10 years related to safety checks, contraband checks, and timely/adequately providing medical aid to an unconscious inmate. See, e.g., id. at 36. To the extent plaintiffs are seeking additional documents responsive to their requests for training materials and believe they exist, the parties must further meet and confer.

Accordingly, the court denies plaintiffs' motion [90] without prejudice.

F. Plaintiffs' Motion [91] Regarding Estate RFP, Set One Nos. 15-16, 38, 47, 52 Is Denied Without Prejudice

In the April 29, 2024 order, the court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding Estate RFP, Set One Nos. 15-16 since they did not do so prior to filing the March 26, 2024 motion to compel (docket no. 53). See docket no. 64. At the time, the court did not compel defendants to produce responsive documents but noted the requests were plainly relevant and a protective order was in place. As for Estate RFP, Set One Nos. 38, 47, and 52, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to compel. Id. Nevertheless, defendant County neither supplemented its responses to these requests nor produced any responsive documents. See Gastelum Decl. [91], Ex. 9. Instead, defendant waited until after plaintiffs provided their portion of JS [91], and just two days before the motion was to be filed, to serve plaintiffs with its second supplemental responses to Estate RFP, Set One. See Arabyan Decl., Ex. F.

Despite defendant County's earlier inaction, it has now responded that it has no responsive documents, apart from those that may be on the privilege log. See id.; JS [91] at 28-29. Defendant is not required to produce documents that do not exist, and although plaintiffs previously argue the testimony of County's 30(b)(6) witness and policies set forth in the RCSD Correctional Manual show that responsive documents exist (docket no. 53), plaintiffs no longer assert that argument and do not point to anything suggesting that contrary to defendants' representation, responsive documents do exist and are being withheld. The requests are therefore denied without prejudice, apart from any responsive documents on the privilege log for which defendant cannot properly support its privilege assertion as discussed above.

G. Plaintiffs' Motion [91] Regarding Matus RFP Nos. 1-20, 25-32 Is Granted

Matus RFP Nos. 1-20 and 25-32 seek correspondence relating to decedent's death, in-custody deaths, inmate overdoses, and the prevalence of fentanyl at the County jails. See Gastelum [91], Ex. 6. In the April 29, 2024 order, the court already addressed the disputes about these requests and ordered defendants to conduct another search. Docket no. 64. The court stated that if the search resulted in privileged records, defendants may exclude those documents only after including them in a rules-compliant privilege log. See id. Defendants assert they have produced all non-privileged responsive documents and identified 350+ privileged documents responsive to the Matus RFP. See JS [91] at 38-43.

At the time plaintiffs drafted their portion of the JS [91], defendants had not yet provided them the second amended privilege log. Defendants now claim they complied with their discovery obligations and the April 29, 2024 court order when they served plaintiffs with the second amended privilege log on August 20, 2024, just one day prior to the motions being filed. Despite serving a second amended privilege log, defendants failed to fully comply with the court's April 29, 2024 order. As discussed above, defendants' second amended privilege log is deficient and improperly raises boilerplate and seemingly inapplicable privilege objections. Because defendants have already had the opportunity to submit a compliant privilege log with properly asserted privilege objections and failed to do so, the court would be well justified in finding any privileges have been waived. Nevertheless, the court again orders defendant to provide a further amended privilege log as specified above. The court again cautions, however, that another failure to produce responsive documents or serve a privilege log compliant with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and protective order will result in the court simply overruling the objections and ordering production of the withheld documents. To the extent plaintiffs dispute any privilege assertion made on a proper log, the parties must meet and confer.

H. The Court Again Grants Plaintiffs' Motion [91] as to Estate RFP, Set One Nos. 51, 54-55

*12 Plaintiffs previously moved to compel defendants' responses to Estate RFP, Set One Nos. 51 and 54-55. Estate RFP, Set One Nos. 51 and 54-55 seek documents relating to the coroner's reviews and in-custody death reviews of inmate deaths, except that RFP No. 54 is limited to overdose deaths. See Gastelum Decl. [91], Ex. 4. In its April 29, 2024 order, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to compel responses to these requests. Docket no. 64. Yet for some reason defendants continue to argue the requests are overbroad. The time for such argument is past, since the court has already ruled. Defendant must promptly comply with the court's April 29 order.

To the extent defendants have already asserted privilege objections to some of the documents (see JS [91] at 35-36), the court has explained that the second amended privilege log is deficient, it asserts improper boilerplate objections, and the Yelenich declaration is insufficient. Defendants also suggest that the court conduct an in camera review to resolve any disputes (see id. at 36). But since the court finds defendants have not met their threshold burden to demonstrate any privilege protection may be warranted for any of the responsive documents, consideration of in camera review is premature.

I. The Court Denies Plaintiffs' Motion [92] Without Prejudice

Plaintiffs also previously moved to compel defendants' responses to G.M. RFP Nos. 7-45, 47-52, 54-56, 59-69, and 71-76, all of which seek similar documents. See docket no 53. G.M. RFP Nos. 7-45, 47-52, 54-56, 59-69, and 71-76 each request a specific deceased inmate's “coroner's packet.” See Gastelum Decl. [92], Ex. 4. In opposition to the March 26, 2024 motion to compel, defendants argued that not all of the requests were relevant and the only basis for relevancy was plaintiffs' Monell claim, which it intended to move to bifurcate and stay. See docket no. 53. In the April 29, 2024 order, the court stated it would not refrain from ordering Monell discovery, found that neither party provided information sufficient for the court to evaluate the relevance of the 65 requests from the G.M. RFP, and noted it was unclear that the parties met and conferred in good faith before bringing the dispute before the court. See docket no. 64. The court therefore denied the motion and ordered the parties to meet and confer. See id.

The parties appear not to have conferred in good faith since plaintiffs once again move to compel responses to the same requests and defendants continue to argue the requests are an improper fishing expedition, overbroad, not relevant to the proportional needs of plaintiffs' case, and seek some privileged documents. JS [92] at 24-25. And despite the court previously finding that neither party provided sufficient information for the court to evaluate the relevance of the 65 requests, the parties still have not developed their arguments.

Although defendants continue to argue the requests are overbroad and ask plaintiffs to offer proof of relevance for each request, defendants appear to concede that at least some of the RFPs (without specifying which ones) are indeed relevant to plaintiff's Monell and supervisorial liability claims. See JS [92] at 24. The court orders defendants to produce documents they concede are responsive and relevant to plaintiff's claims.

The court again orders the parties to meet and confer in good faith about the remaining disputed requests. If the parties are unable to resolve their disputes, they must develop their arguments about each document (or category of documents) in dispute so the court has information sufficient to evaluate the relevance of the disputed requests to plaintiffs' Monell claim.

J. Plaintiffs? Request for Sanctions Is Granted in Part

*13 For each motion, plaintiffs request sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

37. Rule 37(a)(5) provides that the moving party on a discovery motion is entitled to an award of its reasonable expenses incurred in bringing or opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, if it prevails or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, except no payment should be ordered if: (1) the motion was filed before the moving party made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute; (2) the losing party's position was substantially justified; or (3) other circumstances make award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Rule 37(a)(5) also provides the court may apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion where a discovery motion is granted in part and denied in part. Rule 37(a)(5)(C).

Here, plaintiffs did not entirely prevail on their motions, in part because defendants made a supplemental production and served a second amended privilege log just two days and one day, respectively, before the motion was filed. Defendants also appear to agree to a supplemental production in response to Estate RFP, Set Three for the first time in JS [90]. Because defendants did not meet and conferred in good faith and waited until after plaintiffs submitted their portions of the joint stipulations to provide supplemental responses, serve a second non-compliant amended privilege log, and agree to a supplemental production, the court finds sanctions are warranted.

Plaintiffs request $8,562.50 in fees for Motion [90], $30,037.50 in fees for Motion [91], and $6,012.50 in fees for Motion [92]. See Gastelum Decl. [90] ¶ 13; Gastelum Decl. [91] ¶ 25; Gastelum Decl. [92] ¶ 11. The court finds the billable rates and the hours spent on the motions, including the apportionment of hours and tasks between the more expensive lead counsel and less expensive associate counsel, to be reasonable. But the court also finds an apparent arithmetic error in the fees sought on Motion [91], since the hours spent at the rates specified only add up to $20,375. See Gastelum Decl. [91] ¶¶ 25-33.

On to Motion [90], the court has denied the motion, but only because defendants agreed to make a supplemental production after plaintiffs were forced to do the work of preparing the motion. Further, defendants improperly asserted numerous privilege claims, as discussed above. Accordingly, the court orders sanctions in the form of half the fees sought by plaintiffs, or $4,281.25.

As to Motion [91], the court has granted it in part and denied it in part. But the same improper privilege assertions exist as with Motion [90], and it is particularly troubling that defendants have reasserted arguments as to certain requests that the court rejected in the earlier motion. Thus, the court also awards plaintiffs half the sanctions they seek on Motion [91], or $10,187.50.

The court has largely denied Motion [92], and does not sanction defendants on this motion.

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES defendants' ex parte application (docket no. 97), DENIES IN PART AND GRANTS IN PART plaintiffs' motions to compel (docket nos. 90, 91, 92) as set forth above, and orders defendant County to pay sanctions in the total amount of $14,468.75 to plaintiffs.