Sanders v. Moneygram Int'l, Inc.
Sanders v. Moneygram Int'l, Inc.
2024 WL 5430194 (N.D. Tex. 2024)
June 27, 2024
Toliver, Renee H., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The plaintiff filed a motion to compel the defendant to produce certain ESI, including social media posts and employee files. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to produce relevant documents and provide a privilege log for any withheld documents. The defendant was also ordered to verify their interrogatory responses and respond to the plaintiff's requests for admissions.
CATHERINE SANDERS, PLAINTIFF,
v.
MONEYGRAM INTERNATIONAL, INC., DEFENDANT
v.
MONEYGRAM INTERNATIONAL, INC., DEFENDANT
CASE NO. 3:23-CV-808-M (BK)
United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division
Filed June 27, 2024
Toliver, Renee H., United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER
*1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the district judge's referral order, Doc. 18, Plaintiff 's Motion to Compel Defendant's Discovery Responses, Doc. 17, and her amended Motion to Compel Defendant's Discovery Responses, Doc. 33, are before the Court for determination.[1] For the reasons stated here, Plaintiff's first motion, Doc. 17, is DENIED AS MOOT, and her amended motion, Doc. 33, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, for the reasons stated here.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initially sued Defendant, her former employer, in Texas state court in March 2023, alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the Texas Labor Code. Doc. 1-5 at 2-13. Defendant removed the case to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction. Doc. 1, passim. Plaintiff's state court petition remains the operative pleading.
Plaintiff avers that she is an African-American woman who suffers from a stomach illness caused by an H. pylori infection, resulting in burning abdominal pain, severe abdominal cramps, nausea, loss of appetite, weight loss, difficulty swallowing, bloody or black vomit, and bloody or black tarry stool. Doc. 1-5 at 4. Beginning in August 2018, Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Senior Global Due Diligence Analyst III.[2] Doc. 1-5 at 4. Upon hire, Plaintiff told a human resources representative, Andres Cruz, about her condition. Doc. 1-5 at 4. During her employment, Plaintiff took about 12 pills per day to stabilize her condition. Doc. 1-5 at 4.
In January 2020, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital and underwent emergency surgery, as her condition had worsened. Doc. 1-5 at 4. After informing her supervisor, Christine Gonzalez, that she could not work that day, Plaintiff received accommodations, such as being allowed to work from home on days when her condition worsened. Doc. 1-5 at 4.
According to Plaintiff, about eight months later, Gonzalez began treating Plaintiff less favorably than similarly situated employees who did not have a disability but took FMLA leave, such as Crystal Harris. Doc. 1-5 at 4-5. In November 2020, Plaintiff was diagnosed with anxiety and acute stress disorder, both of which she contends were caused by the worsening of her H. pylori illness and her supervisor's treatment of her. Doc. 1-5 at 5. That same month, Plaintiff was approved for her first FMLA leave of absence to continue through February 10, 2021. Doc. 1-5 at 5. Because her condition did not improve, she was granted a second leave of absence from March 9, 2021, through May 31, 2021. Doc. 1-5 at 5. However, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment before her second leave period expired. Doc. 1-5 at 5.
*2 In the course of discovery, a number of disputes arose and the instant motion to compel followed.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
Unless otherwise limited by the Court,
[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). More simply, under Rule 26(b)(1), discoverable matter must be both relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Yang Kun Chung, 321 F.R.D. 250, 279 (N.D. Tex. 2017). “To be relevant under Rule 26(b)(1), a document or information need not, by itself, prove or disprove a claim or defense or have strong probative force or value.” Id. at 280. Relevance is interpreted broadly to include “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352 (1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)). The party opposing discovery bears the burden of showing why the discovery sought is not relevant or is otherwise objectionable. Mir v. L-3 Commc'ns Integrated Sys., L.P., 319 F.R.D. 220, 224 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
The party resisting discovery must show specifically why each disputed request for production is not relevant or is otherwise objectionable as overly broad or burdensome. See McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990). “General or boilerplate objections are invalid, and objections to discovery must be made with specificity, and the responding party has the obligation to explain and support its objections.” Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 578 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (Horan, J.) (cleaned up). A party asserting “unsupported or boilerplate objections does not preserve or accomplish anything other than waiver and subjecting the responding party to sanctions.” Id. at 581. And any grounds not stated in a timely objection are waived. Id. at 582.
If a party fails to respond to a proper request for discovery, or if an evasive or incomplete response is made, the party requesting the discovery may file a motion to compel production of documents after having made a good-faith effort to resolve the dispute by conferring first with the other party. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). For purposes of Rule 37(a), “an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4).
Further, the Court has the discretion to modify a discovery request deemed overly broad. Cf. Mintex, Inc. v. Pro. A cct. Mgmt., L LC , No. 3:23-CV-301-B-BK, 2024 WL 1481057, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2024) (Toliver, J.) (modifying discovery requests in partially granting a motion to compel); Source Network Sales & Mktg., LLC v. Jiangsu Mega Motor Co., No. 3:16-CV-1202-B-BK, 2017 WL 7596913, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2017) (Toliver, J.) (same).
III. ANALYSIS
1. No. 4
*3 Plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 4 asks if Defendant has ever been sued or had an EEOC Charge filed by any other person alleging FMLA retaliation. Doc. 21 at 5. Defendant objected based on, inter alia, overbreadth, in that the interrogatory was not limited to a relevant time frame or to individuals who are or could be similarly situated to Plaintiff. Doc. 21 at 5. Limiting its answer to the period of Plaintiff's employment with MPSI and to employees in Plaintiff's same job position or duties with the same supervisor, Defendant responded “none.” Doc. 21 at 5.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly limited its response because the information sought is directly relevant to show Defendant's propensity to retaliate against employees who assert FMLA rights, as well as intent, motive, pretext, Defendant's enforcement of its antiretaliation policy, and a host of other issues. Doc. 20 at 24. Defendant counters that the interrogatory is improper because it seeks information about all of its employees over an unlimited period of time, and Plaintiff is only entitled to information about similarly situated employees. Doc. 23 at 9-10.
“Courts generally allow discovery of other claims and lawsuits against an employer that are sufficiently similar to the plaintiff[']s claims.” Choate v. Potter, No. 3-06-CV-2146-L, 2008 WL 906784, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2008) (Kaplan, J.) (collecting cases). For example, sufficient similarity exists when the claims or lawsuits involve (1) the same department or office where the plaintiff worked, (2) the decisionmakers alleged to have engaged in the unlawful conduct (e.g., FMLA discrimination/retaliation) against the plaintiff, and (3) the same type of unlawful conduct, and (4) is limited to a period of the preceding five years. See, e.g., Le v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 4:24-CV-00031-O, 2024 WL 832374, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2024) (Ray, J.) (ordering the defendant to respond as to “all age and race, but not gender, discrimination complaints and lawsuits, for the past five years only involving its offices and facilities in Texas.”), aff'd, 2024 WL 832389 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2024) (O'Connor, J.); Choate, 2008 WL 906784, at *2 (ordering the defendant to respond “only for lawsuits, grievances, EEO decisions, and arbitration decisions involving the use of temporary contract workers in the Southwest Area office for the past five years”); Smith v. DeTar Hosp. LLC, No. CIV.A. V-10-83, 2011 WL 6217497, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2011) (collecting cases).
Based on this matrix, the Court finds it appropriate to limit the scope of Interrogatory No. 4. Thus, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED IN PART as to this interrogatory. Defendant is ORDERED to provide responsive information regarding lawsuits or EEOC Charges filed against it alleging FMLA retaliation for the five-year period preceding and up to Plaintiff's termination, by another member of the same department or office where Plaintiff worked, and/or involving that same decisionmakers identified in Plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim.
2. No. 15
Interrogatory No. 15 requests that Defendant “[i]dentify by name and location the job posting sites Defendant regularly uses to advertise job vacancies.” Doc. 21 at 7. Defendant responded:
Defendant objects to this Interrogatory because it is overbroad and seeks irrelevant information, in that it is not limited to any relevant time period, type of job position, or department. Any jobs posted by Defendant are wholly irrelevant in that Plaintiff was never employed by Defendant.
On information and belief, at the time of Plaintiff's termination from employment and for Plaintiff's same position, Plaintiff's former employer regularly used an internal team for positions such as that previously occupied by Plaintiff.
*4 Doc. 21 at 7.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's response is, inter alia, “incomplete, nonresponsive, and evasive.” Doc. 20 at 25. The Court need not determine the merits of Plaintiff's arguments, however, as Defendant's supporting brief in response to the motion sub judice does not address Plaintiff's arguments as to Interrogatory No. 15, thus, Defendant's objections are waived. See Orchestrate HR, Inc. v. Trombetta, 178 F.Supp.3d 476, 507 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (“[A] party who has objected to a discovery request must, in response to a motion to compel, urge and argue in support of his objection to a request, and, if he does not, he waives the objection.”). As such, Plaintiff's motion is granted with respect to this interrogatory.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[e]ach interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(3). In the instance of a corporate party, an officer or agent must be designated to provide the responses based on all the information available to the corporation, and that agent or officer making the sworn responses must also sign them. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(1)(B), (b)(5).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not verified its interrogatory responses and requests that the Court order it to do so. Doc. 20 at 28. Defendant does not dispute the lack of verification. Doc. 23 at 16 n.8. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is granted to this extent.
1. Nos. 2, 17-18, 26-29, 32, 34, 40-42
RFP Nos. 2, 17-18, 26-29, 32, 34, and 40-42 seek a variety of documents. Doc. 21 at 9, 13-21. However, after initially objecting to the requests on various bases and producing only some responsive documents, Defendant now represents in its brief in response to the motion sub judice that it has no additional documents to produce with respect to each of these requests. Doc. 23 at 10-12.
The Court cannot compel Defendant to produce more than the responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control. See Alvarado v. Air Sys. Components LP, No. 3:19-CV-2057-N, 2021 WL 4907033, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2021) (Godbey, J.) (noting that “[t]he Court cannot make Defendants produce materials they do not possess,” but specifying that they “must pull together a verified answer by reviewing all sources of responsive information reasonably available to them.”) (quoting Areizaga v. ADW Corp., 314 F.R.D. 428, 437 (N.D. Tex. 2016)); Dittmar v. Kroger Texas, L.P., No. 3:14-CV-3501-G-BN, 2015 WL 11019135, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 9, 2015) (Horan, J.) (“Plaintiff's asserted belief that Defendant has not produced all responsive documents is not enough ... to warrant an order compelling any further production.”). As such, the motion to compel is moot with respect to these production requests. The Court, then, need not address any other arguments raised by the parties. Nevertheless, because Defendant's modified responses to these requests only appear in its brief in response to the motion sub judice, Defendant is ORDERED to serve an amended responses to the requests for production setting forth that it has no additional responsive documents within its possession, custody, or control, as it has represented here.
*5 That said, the Court notes that the parties have a continuing duty to supplement their discovery responses if they learn the information previously disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and the new information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e).
2. No. 13
Plaintiff's RFP No. 13 seeks “[a]ll written and recorded diaries, calendars, journals, emails, notebooks, or similar Documents evidencing Plaintiff's impressions and feelings about how Plaintiff was treated during Plaintiff's employment at Moneygram.” Doc. 21 at 12. Defendant objected on various bases, including that “the requested information would be in Plaintiff's possession, custody, or control, not Defendant's.” Doc. 21 at 12.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not stated whether it is withholding any responsive documents and Defendant's objections are not proper. Doc. 20 at 12. Defendant counters that these documents, if they exist, are in Plaintiff's possession or available to her through a social media search. Doc. 23 at 11. Further, this request does not seek documents that could be in its possession because it has “no record of [Plaintiff] ever making a complaint during her employment that she was being mistreated.” Doc. 23 at 11-12.
Both parties' positions have some merit. On one hand, Defendant cannot object on the basis that the requested materials are available elsewhere. See, e.g., Horton v. Texas Fed'n for Child. Pac, Inc., No. 3:22-CV-2736-D, 2024 WL 68572, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2024) (Fitzwater, J.) (overruling a party's objection that the subject discovery request sought “public information that is equally accessible” by requesting party). On the other hand, it is unclear what Plaintiff means by documents “evidencing [her] impressions and feelings about how [she] was treated during [her] employment at Moneygram.” To the extent Defendant has non-privileged, responsive materials related to the reason for the termination of Plaintiff's employment and her various requests for leave in its possession, custody, or control, it must produce them. Plaintiff's motion is thus granted with respect to this request.
3. No. 14
Plaintiff's RFP No. 14 states:
Please produce a copy of any document associated with employee reports made against the following individuals before or after Plaintiff's termination:
a. Andres Cruz
b. Christine Gonzalez
c. Crystal Harris
Doc. 21 at 12. Defendant objected on various bases, including overbreadth as to subject matter, and responded that “Despite a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, Defendant is not presently aware of any employee reports made against the listed individuals for any type of FMLA-or disability-related discrimination or retaliation.” Doc. 21 at 12.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly limited its response to “reports of FMLA-or disability-related discrimination or retaliation.” Doc. 20 at 12. Defendant counters that “seeking documents regarding any form of discrimination or retaliation (not just of the type [Plaintiff] claims to have suffered)” is improper. Doc. 23 at 9.
With respect to the subject matter limitation, Defendant's position has merit. Plaintiff's motion is denied as to this request.
4. No. 15
Plaintiff's RFP No. 15 states:
Produce a complete copy of any copies of any and all internal complaints, charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Texas Commission on Human Rights, the Texas Workforce Commission, Civil Rights Division, and the U.S. Department of Labor, or written memorandum or letter of complaint by any current or former employee, alleging that you discriminated and/or retaliated against them while they were on FMLA leave.
*6 Doc. 21 at 12-13. Defendant objected to, among other things, the unlimited time frame of the request and responded, “Despite a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, Defendant responds that during the period of Plaintiff's employment with MPSI, Defendant is not aware of any such responsive documents.” Doc. 21 at 13.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly limited its response to the time period of Plaintiff's employment, which began in 2018. Doc. 20 at 13. Defendant counters that such a temporal limitation is proper. Doc. 23 at 9-10.
As to the period at issue, the Court has explained supra that the relevant period is five years before the termination of Plaintiff's employment, which extends beyond the period for which Defendant responded. See Le, 2024 WL 832374, at *2; Choate, 2008 WL 906784, at *2. For that reason, Plaintiff's motion is thus granted with respect to this request.
5. No. 30
Plaintiff's RFP No. 30 seeks “a complete copy of any and all petitions, complaints, judgements or other documents filed in any lawsuits in which you are, or have been, named a party in any capacity relating to discrimination and FMLA retaliation.” Doc. 21 at 17. Defendant objected on multiple grounds, including that this request is overbroad in that it “fails to identify any relevant time frame.” Doc. 21 at 17. Limiting its response to the period of Plaintiff's employment with MPSI, Defendant stated that it is unaware of any responsive documents.
To the extent Defendant has not produced the requested documents in accordance with the scope of discovery outlined in the Court's analysis of Interrogatory No. 4 supra, it must do so. In the event that no responsive documents during the five years preceding the termination of Plaintiff's employment are within Defendant's possession, custody, or control, it must amend its response accordingly.
6. No. 31
Plaintiff's RFP No. 31 states:
Produce a complete copy of any and all employee files for the following individuals:
a. Andres Cruz;
b. Christine Gonzalez; andc. Crystal Harris
Doc. 21 at 17. Defendant responded:
Defendant objects to this Request to the extent that it assumes Plaintiff or any of these individuals were employed by Defendant. Defendant further objects to this Request because it seeks the confidential, private and/or proprietary information of employees of MPSI. Defendant further objects to this Request because it seeks irrelevant information that is not proportional to the needs of the case, in that Plaintiff is not entitled to the complete personnel files of other employees, particularly those who are not similarly-situated to Plaintiff. Defendant further objects to this Request because the term “employee files” is vague and ambiguous.
Doc. 21 at 17.
Plaintiff argues that the personnel files are discoverable because they are relevant to various considerations here, such as whether the termination of Plaintiff's employment was pretextual as well as Defendant's motive and intent. Doc. 20 at 17. Further, Harris is a potential comparator, and any concerns about the nature of the files can be mitigated by a confidentiality order. Doc. 20 at 17. Defendant counters that Plaintiff is not entitled to all documents in these employees' files over an unlimited period of time. Doc. 23 at 9.
As to Cruz and Gonzalez, plaintiffs alleging that they have been discriminated or retaliated against generally may not discover their supervisors' complete personnel files. Smith, 2011 WL 6217497, at *4 (ordering production of such files only as to “(1) the reasons for [the plaintiff's] termination; (2) any complaints of sexual harassment or retaliation made by [the plaintiff] or any other employee; (3) any discipline they have received in response to complaints of sexual harassment or retaliation made by [the plaintiff] or any other employee, and (4) any complaints or discipline they have received for failure to properly investigate and/or respond to complaints of sexual harassment or retaliation made by [the plaintiff] or any other employee.”); Beasley v. First Am. Real Est. Info. Servs., Inc., No. 3-04-CV-1059-B, 2005 WL 1017818, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2005) (Kaplan, J.) (“To the extent any of the personnel files include information relating to the reasons for plaintiff's termination or other complaints of race discrimination or retaliation, they are clearly relevant and must be produced.”).
*7 Both parties' positions have some merit. As to the second, third, and fourth categories of documents described in Smith and documents related to “other complaints” described in Beasley, this request may be moot in light of Defendant's responses to RFP Nos. 14, 15, and 30, which disclaim the existence of complaints and lawsuits against these individuals related to the type of discrimination and/or retaliation that Plaintiff has alleged during the relevant period. But Defendant must produce the personnel files of the Cruz and Gonzalez as to documents related to the reason for the termination of Plaintiff's employment and her various requests for leave.
Turning to Harris, to the extent she is a comparator, the Court may order production of her personnel file if the information contained therein may be relevant to show that Defendant's reasons for terminating Plaintiff were pretextual. See Jepsen v. Florida Bd. Of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1384-85 (5th Cir. 1980). Again, plaintiffs in discrimination cases do not have an unlimited ability to rummage through their employers' personnel files. See Kean v. Jack Henry & Assocs., Inc., 577 F. App'x 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2015); Beasley, 2005 WL 1017818, at *4. In the event that Harris' personnel file includes documents relating to her own requests for FMLA leave, such documents must be produced. Plaintiff's motion is thus granted in part as to this request.
7. No. 48
Plaintiff's RFP No. 48 states:
Produce all documents posted on any social media site (including but not limited to chat rooms, blogs, instant-messaging services, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc.) by any of your agents or attorneys that describe or concern Plaintiff's claims against Defendant that is in your possession or custody.
Doc. 21 at 23. Defendant responded:
Defendant objects to this Request as vastly overbroad, unduly burdensome, and harassing in that it would require Defendant to search every single one of its employees' (likely) multiple social media accounts for responsive information. Such request is not proportional to the needs of the case. Defendant further objects to this Request to the extent that it seeks to require Defendant to search through social media for posts regarding Plaintiff's claims, which may result in Defendant observing information and/or photos considered by Defendant's employees as personal and/or private.
Doc. 21 at 23.
Plaintiff argues that she is not asking Defendant to search “every single one of its employees' (likely) multiple social media accounts for responsive information.” Doc. 20 at 21. Instead, she seeks only such documents within Defendant's possession or custody. Doc. 20 at 21. Defendant counters that these documents, if they exist, are in Plaintiff's possession or are available to her through a social media search. Doc. 23 at 11. Further, this request does not seek documents that could be in Defendant's possession because it has “no record of [Plaintiff] ever making a complaint during her employment that she was being mistreated.” Doc. 23 at 11-12.
Both parties' positions have some merit. The Court is disinclined to give such broad access, but Defendant cannot object based on the requested materials being available from another source. See Horton, 2024 WL 68572, at *5-6. Instead, the Court will confine Defendant's production to the any documents posted on the social media accounts of the individuals identified in RFP No. 31 that describe or concern Plaintiff's claims against Defendant. Plaintiff's motion is thus granted in part with respect to this request.
The Court considers together Plaintiff's motion as it relates to the need for a protective order and Defendant's failure to provide a privilege log despite marking numerous documents “confidential.” Plaintiff asks the Court to compel Defendant to remove the “confidential” designations and circulate a draft protective order to Plaintiff's counsel. Doc. 20 at 9. Plaintiff argues that Defendant should remove improper privilege and protection objections, provide any non-privileged or protected information, and produce a privilege log compliant with Rule 26(b)(5)(A). Doc. 20 at 28. Defendant responds that it redacted confidential, private and proprietary information and labeled such documents as “confidential” in the absence of a protective order. Doc. 23 at 6 n.3. Defendant does not address its failure to provide a privilege log. Doc. 23, passim.
*8 A party must produce “a privilege log or equivalent document for any documents, communications, or other materials withheld from production on the grounds of attorney-client privilege, work product, or other privilege, immunity, or protection.” Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 486 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)). Accordingly, Defendant must produce a log of any such materials withheld from production on these bases and Plaintiff's motion is granted to that extent. Thereafter, Plaintiff may challenge the appropriateness of Defendant's designations.
As relevant here, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 provides for requests for admission, which allow the parties to narrow the issues for trial “by identifying and eliminating those matters on which the parties agree.” Am. Auto. Ass'n v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke, 930 F.2d 1117, 1121 (5th Cir. 1991). When answering a request for admission a party must either admit the request, deny it, “or state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(4). Further, “[a] denial must fairly respond to the substance of the matter; and when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter, the answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest.” Id. In other words, “Rule 36 does not require a party to give wholly unqualified responses to requests for admission,” provided that the responses “fairly meet the substance of the requests.” Thomason v. Met. Life. Ins. Co., No. 3:14-CV-0086-P-BF, 2015 WL 1914527, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2015) (Stickney, J.); see also U.S. ex rel. Dyer v. Raytheon Co., No. 08-10341-DPW, 2013 WL 5348571, at *5 (D. Mass. Sept. 23, 2013) (finding a proper response where the respondent “qualifie[d] the admission to address certain assumptions implicit in the language of the request.”).
1. No. 2
Plaintiff's RFA No. 2 states, “Admit or Deny that Plaintiff was entitled to FMLA leave because of her disability.” Doc. 21 at 24. Defendant responded:
Defendant objects to this Request because it fails to identify any particular time frame or serious medical condition (or other FMLA-qualifying condition) at issue and thus is vague, ambiguous, and lacks foundation. Because the Request is not properly limited, Defendant must respond as follows: deny.
Doc. 21 at 24.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's vagueness and ambiguity objections are improper because “[t]here is no dispute that [she] sought, submitted applications for, and was ultimately approved for FMLA [leave].” Doc. 20 at 26. She adds, “This is memorialized in Defendant's document production, and Defendant asserted in its EEOC Position Statement that it had approved FMLA leave application for Plaintiff on various occasions during her tenure.” Doc. 20 at 26-27. Defendant counters that this request fails to identify a “relevant time period, serious medical condition, disability at issue, or particular application for leave.” Doc. 23 at 15. Moreover, the request calls for a legal conclusion, and “at the time of [Plaintiff's] separation from employment, she was not entitled to FMLA leave.” Doc. 23 at 15.
As analyzed below, the Court need only address Defendant's objection to Plaintiff's use of the term “disability.” At the outset, Defendant's legal-conclusion argument was not raised in its response to the request and thus is waived. See Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 582. But Plaintiff's use of “disability” is, in fact, vague and ambiguous because her operative pleading refers to multiple medical conditions that were present or arose during her employment. See Doc. 1-5 at 4 (referring to an H. pylori infection), 5 (also referring to anxiety and acute stress disorder). Without a more specific request from Plaintiff, the Court cannot compel Defendant to respond. Plaintiff's motion is thus denied with respect to this request.
2. No. 3
*9 Plaintiff's RFA No. 3 states, “Admit or Deny that Plaintiff submitted her application for FMLA leave.” Doc. 21 at 24. Defendant's response is identical to its response to RFA No. 2. Doc. 21 at 24.
Unlike with RFA No. 2, however, Defendant failed to properly respond to this request. Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff submitted multiple applications for leave but argues that her failure to specify which application she is referring to here limits it to a blanket denial of the request. Doc. 23 at 15. The Court disagrees and finds that Defendant did not qualify its denial in a way that comports with Rule 36(a)(4). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is granted with respect to this request, and Defendant must amend its response to address each of Plaintiff's applications for leave.
3. No. 8
Plaintiff's RFA No. 8 states, “Admit or Deny that Plaintiff's supervisor was aware of Plaintiff's disability.” Doc. 21 at 25. Defendant responded:
Defendant objects to this Request because it is vague and ambiguous, and fails to identify any particular time frame or disability at issue. Defendant further objects to the extent that defining the term “disability” calls for a legal conclusion. Because the Request is not properly limited, Defendant must respond as follows: deny.
Doc. 21 at 25.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's objections are improper boilerplate and thus have been waived. Doc. 20 at 28. Defendant counters that this request fails to identify a “relevant time period, serious medical condition, disability at issue, or particular application for leave.” Doc. 23 at 15. Moreover, “whether [Plaintiff] has or had a “disability” within the ambit of the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Texas Labor Code requires a legal conclusion which [it] is not required to make.” Doc. 23 at 15.
As an initial matter, Defendant's objections are not improper boilerplate. That said, Defendant's legal-conclusion objection is improper because Rule 36(a)(1)(A) expressly permits requests that relate to “the application of law to fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(1)(A); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(5) (“A party must not object solely on the ground that the request presents a genuine issue for trial.”); In re Carney, 258 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that litigants can request admissions as to a broad range of matters, including ultimate facts, as well as applications of law to fact). Still, for the same reasons given with respect to Plaintiff's use of “disability” in RFA No. 2, her use of that term is vague and ambiguous here as well. Without more specificity, the Court cannot compel Defendant to respond. Plaintiff's motion is thus denied with respect to this request.
4. No. 15
Plaintiff's RFA No. 15 states, “Admit or Deny that Defendant's FMLA leave policy did not authorize the termination of Plaintiff while she was on FMLA leave.” Doc. 21 at 26. Defendant responded:
Defendant objects to this Request to the extent that it assumes Plaintiff was employed by Defendant. Defendant further objects to this Request because it is compound. Thus, Defendant responds as follows: deny, as to all parts.
Doc. 21 at 26.
Plaintiff argues that this request is not compound and Defendant's contention that it was not Plaintiff's employer does not relieve it of its obligation to respond. Doc. 20 at 28. Defendant counters that this request fails to identify a “relevant time period, serious medical condition, disability at issue, or particular application for leave.” Doc. 23 at 15. Moreover, “at the time of [Plaintiff's] separation from employment, she was not entitled to FMLA leave.” Doc. 23 at 15.
*10 Plaintiff's position has merit. Defendant's objection that the request assumes it was Plaintiff's employer is effectively another improper legal-conclusion objection. Turning to its objection that the request is compound and thus forces it to completely deny the request, the Court disagrees. Defendant may qualify its response to reflect its position that Plaintiff was not entitled to FMLA leave when her employment was terminated, but it must respond to this request as to what its policy allows. Plaintiff's motion is thus granted with respect to this request.
Rule 37 provides that if a motion to compel is granted, or if the requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the court must require the party whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees incurred in making the motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A). The court must not order this payment, however, if (1) the movant filed the motion before attempting, in good faith, to obtain the discovery without court intervention; (2) the opposing party's nondisclosure, objection, or response was substantially justified; or (3) other circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust. Id. Further, if a motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, the court “may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(C).
As reflected herein, neither party's position was unanimously meritorious. Some of Defendant's objections were justified. Still, other objections were unjustified and other responses were incomplete, largely necessitating the filing of the instant motion. Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover a portion of its reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(C).
Accordingly, Defendant is ORDERED to reimburse Plaintiff for 50 percent of her reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in prosecuting the instant motion. To that end, the parties are DIRECTED to confer in an effort to reach agreement regarding the amount of attorney' fees and costs. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement within 21 days of the date of this order, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file documentation of the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of her motion to compel. Defendant may file a response to the same no later than 14 days following Plaintiff's submission. Both submissions may be filed under seal.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff 's Motion to Compel Defendant's Discovery Responses, Doc. 17, is DENIED AS MOOT, and her amended Motion to Compel Defendant's Discovery Responses, Doc. 33, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Defendant is ORDERED to produce the required information, documents, and amended responses, as set forth herein, by July 12, 2024.
SO ORDERED on June 27, 2024.
Footnotes
On March 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed her first motion to compel, Doc. 17. On April 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 to “correct[ ] the errors contained in [Doc.] 17 and provide[ ] up-to-date information related to the Parties' conferences concerning the discovery at issue,” thereby “mak[ing] it unnecessary for the Court to rule on [Doc.] 17.” Both Doc. 19 and Doc. 20, however, were briefs—not a motion and a brief as required by this Court's local rules. See N.D. TEX. L. CIV. R. 7.1. Pursuant to the Court's subsequent directive, Plaintiff filed Doc. 33 to cure this defect.
Defendant asserts that it was not Plaintiff's employer, and that she instead worked for MoneyGram Payment Systems, Inc. (“MPSI”). Doc. 22 at 1.
Plaintiff has represented that a ruling on the motion as to Interrogatory Nos. 2, 10, 14, 17, and 18 is no longer necessary. Doc. 25 at 9. Her motion denied as moot with respect to those interrogatories.