*1 The plaintiff has filed a motion for contempt and sanctions. It wants an award of attorney's fees under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A) and a finding of civil contempt and fines under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2). The defendant's response to the plaintiff's motion was due on January 21, 2025, owing to the federal holiday on the 20th [Dkt. #29], but the defendant didn't bother to file a response. That's par for the course in this case, where neither the defendant nor his attorney have taken much interest in these proceedings. They have not produced any documents, have not responded to any interrogatories, or answered any requests for admissions, all of which were served way back in August of last year. [Dkt. #28-1] Defendant's counsel has missed a hearing [Dkt. #25], been late to another [Dkt. #24], and hasn't responded to a series of emails and/or phone calls from plaintiff's counsel regarding all that long overdue discovery. [Dkt. #28-1]. As such, the court would love to simply grant the plaintiff's motion in full.

But, in order to be awarded attorney's fees under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A), a party must have brought a motion to compel discovery. Fees would then be appropriate “[i]f the motion is granted or disclosure or discovery is provided after filing.” Neither prerequisite is satisfied here. At the last status hearing on December 18, 2024, the plaintiff indicated that it chose not to file a motion to compel “[i]n light of the pendency of the [plaintiff's] summary judgment motion ....” [Dkt. # 26]. The plaintiff informed the court that if it decided to request relief, it would do so no later than January 2, 2025. [Dkt. # 26]. But, rather than file a motion to compel, the plaintiff skipped ahead to a request for fees and sanctions. It's understandable, given the complete lack of participation in discovery on the part of defendants and their lawyer, but it's not how this works. Similarly, a motion for contempt under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) requires the failure to comply with a court Order to provide or permit discovery. Here, as the plaintiff never filed a motion to compel, the court, while chastising defendants and their counsel, issued no such Order and indicating that, “it appears that there is nothing left to be done in this case by this Court” in terms of discovery [Dkt. #24] and that “[i]n light of the pendency of the summary judgment motion, there was no request today by the plaintiff,” i.e., no motion to compel. [Dkt. #26]. The plaintiff seems to realize the necessity of the defendant disobeying an “unambiguous command,” Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Neises Constr. Corp., 62 F.4th 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2023), and points to the language “[v]iolation of these prohibitions may result in sanctions.” [Dkt. #28, at 6]. But, that language is clearly directed at “[p]ersons granted remote access to proceedings” and the general prohibition against photographing, recording, and rebroadcasting of court proceedings.” [Dkt. ##24, 26]. Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion [Dkt. #28] is denied, and the balance of the briefing schedule [Dkt. #29] is stricken.

*2 However, the court does not relish the necessary result here, and a hearing on this matter is set for 1/28/25 at 3:00 p.m. Defendant, Maulik Shah, and defense counsel, Adham Alaily, are ordered to appear by video. They shall provide all of the outstanding discovery responses that have been due since last September, and should be prepared to explain their complete disregard of their discovery obligations thus far in this case, including not only the failure to respond to discovery for months, but the failures to respond to plaintiff's counsel's emails and phone calls regarding discovery and obligations under Local Rule 37.2. That is not a request but an “unambiguous command.” Should the defendant fail to provide all overdue discovery by the time of the hearing, especially in view of the conduct of client and counsel, the court will issue a recommendation to Judge Daniel that he simply eschew the expenditure of judicial resources involved in ruling on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and enter a default judgment against the defendant as a sanction. That, incidentally, is the proverbial “warning shot.” McInnis v. Duncan, 697 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2012); Halas v. Consumer Servs., 16 F.3d 161, 165 (7th Cir. 1994). But, perhaps Mr. Shah and Mr. Alaily have a valid explanation for their compete disregard of their obligations in this case.