*1 This matter is before the court following a remand from the Appellate Court in part, with direction to vacate the trial court's findings that the plaintiff in error, Attorney Norman Pattis, violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), and 5.1 (c) in part, as well as the court's disciplinary order, and to conduct a new hearing on sanctions before a different judge. See Lafferty v. Jones, 225 Conn. App. 552, 611, 316 A.3d 742 (2024).

The following facts and procedural history, as set forth by the trial court, Bellis, J., and the Appellate Court, are as follows. “On December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza entered Sandy Hook Elementary School (Sandy Hook), and thereafter shot and killed twenty first-grade children and six adults, in addition to wounding two other victims who survived the attack. In the underlying consolidated actions, the plaintiffs, consisting of a first responder, who was not a victim of the Sandy Hook shooting but was depicted in the media following the shooting, and the immediate family members of five of the children, one educator, the principal of Sandy Hook, and a school psychologist who were killed in the shooting, brought these separate actions ....

“In the complaints, the plaintiffs alleged that [defendant Alex Emric Jones] hosts a nationally syndicated radio program and owns and operates multiple Internet websites that hold themselves out as news and journalism platforms. The plaintiffs further alleged that [Jones] began publishing content related to the Sandy Hook shooting on his radio and Internet platforms and circulated videos on his YouTube channel. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that, between December 19, 2012, and June 26, 2017, [Jones] used his Internet and radio platforms to spread the message that the Sandy Hook shooting was a staged event to the millions of his weekly listeners and subscribers. The complaints each consisted of five counts, including causes of action sounding in invasion of privacy by false light, defamation and defamation per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq....

“[O]n February 22, 2019, the [trial] court, [Bellis, J.,] granted [a] motion for protective order filed by [Jones, Free Speech Systems, LLC, Infowars, LLC, Infowars Health, LLC, and Prison Planet TV, LLC, collectively] the Jones defendants, which allowed, inter alia, the plaintiffs’ medical and/or mental health records to be designated as confidential. The court order limited the use of such confidential information. On June 16, 2021, the court granted, without objection, the plaintiffs’ motion to modify the protective order to create a Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only designation. Finally, on June 15, 2022, the court granted by consent a final modification to the order of protection, adding sensitive information of parties or witnesses, which is ordinarily kept confidential as a category of information which could be designated as confidential. All ... versions of the protective order required that (a)ll persons having access to Confidential Information to maintain it in a safe and secure manner.” (Citation omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 225 Conn. App. 558-61.

*2 The trial court, Bellis, J., and Appellate Court set forth the following additional facts and procedural history that are relevant to this court's determination of sanctions. “Utilizing a database management firm to ensure that discovery materials were protected and secure, the plaintiffs, beginning in October of 2021, began a rolling [discovery] production. This rolling production was released every two weeks and continued through June of 2022. Every document that was released was reviewed by one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys. All discovery materials were provided to the Jones defendants electronically via link, which could be downloaded. The offices of the plaintiffs’ counsel, as well as their vendor, had measures in place to keep the materials secure. Medical records, deposition transcripts, and employment, financial, and professional records were among the records of the plaintiffs that were designated [pursuant to the protective order] as Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only. The plaintiffs produced over 390,000 pages of discovery materials, approximately 4000 of which were the plaintiffs’ medical records.

“The concerns of the court with protecting the plaintiffs’ medical and confidential information were made painfully clear to [Pattis] early in the discovery process, when [on July 1, 2021] he filed a motion to depose Hillary Clinton, improperly using information designated as Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only. Most unusually, [Pattis] filed the motion containing the Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only information as [a] deposition was taking place. In fact, the motion to depose Clinton was filed during the very first of the plaintiffs’ depositions. In ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions filed in response [on July 6, 2021], the court, on August 5, 2021, entered in part the following order: Given the cavalier actions and [wilful] misconduct of [Free Speech Systems, LLC, Infowars, LLC, Infowars Health, LLC, and Prison Planet TV, LLC, which were defendants in the underlying consolidated actions] in filing protected deposition information during the actual deposition, this court has grave concerns that their actions, in the future, will have a chilling effect on the testimony of witnesses who would be rightfully concerned that their confidential information, including their psychiatric and medical histories, would be made available to the public. The court will address sanctions at a future hearing. Beginning in June of 2021, both the court and the plaintiffs clearly expressed their concerns with respect to protecting the plaintiffs’ mental health and other medical and confidential information.

“In late February of 2022, [Pattis] contacted ... [Federico Andino] Reynal, a Texas attorney, regarding Reynal's potential representation of Jones and related defendants in five cases pending in Texas. The expectation was that Reynal would also be working on the three consolidated Connecticut cases, and that the two would collaborate on the Texas and Connecticut cases. In March of 2022, approximately six weeks prior to the then trial date in Texas, Reynal filed an appearance in the Texas Sandy Hook defamation lawsuit brought by Scarlett Lewis and Neil Heslin (Texas case). Reynal was the tenth lawyer for the Jones defendants in the Texas case, initially appearing as cocounsel with Jacquelyn Blott. Blott gave Reynal the files for all five of the Jones defendants’ pending Texas cases.

“Reynal continued to communicate with [Pattis], and he requested the text messages produced by the Jones defendants in Connecticut as well as the Jones defendants’ Connecticut deposition transcripts. Neither Reynal nor his office ever requested from [Pattis], or from anyone else, the ... plaintiffs’ medical, tax, employment or financial records. Reynal's focus was on preparing for the upcoming Texas trial, which did not require him to review the ... plaintiffs’ records.

“On April 13 [and] 14, 2022, emails were exchanged between [Pattis], Texas attorney ... [Kyung S.] Lee, and [prior counsel for the Jones defendants in the underlying consolidated actions, Jay] Wolman, regarding [Marc] Randazza emails. On April 17, 2022, on the eve of trial in the Texas case, Lee filed a petition for bankruptcy on behalf of [Infowars, LLC, Infowars Health, LLC, and Prison Planet TV, LLC] in the [United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas] (the InfoW bankruptcy case). The plaintiffs’ counsel in the Texas and Connecticut Sandy Hook cases filed motions to dismiss the InfoW bankruptcy case, as did the [United States] Trustee. On April 18, 2022, adversary proceedings were filed in the [United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut] ... and the three consolidated Connecticut cases were removed to Bankruptcy Court.

*3 “On May 2, 2022, Lee emailed Wolman and Randazza, reporting on the status of the InfoW bankruptcy case, reporting that Reynal and [Shelby] Jordan had provided him with the discovery in the Texas case, and stating that, when he had asked [Pattis] and [his associate Cameron] Atkinson about the Connecticut discovery, Atkinson recommended that Lee contact Wolman and Randazza directly, as the transfer [of the Connecticut discovery] from Wolman and Randazza to [Pattis] and Atkinson was corrupted. Lee asked Wolman to provide him with all the Connecticut discovery by and for each side, in light of the changing number of lawyers representing the Jones defendants and the status of discovery in both Texas and Connecticut. Lee gave no thought as to what the Connecticut discovery would include and, although he asked for everything, he had no need for the ... plaintiffs’ mental health or other medical records.

“Half an hour later, Wolman responded to Lee by email, stating that, on March 28, 2022, he had given Atkinson a new [hard] drive with several hundred gigabytes, which Atkinson confirmed worked. Wolman suggested that Atkinson's office FedEx the hard drive to Lee and noted that Lee would need to get the ... plaintiffs’ recent compliance from [Pattis’] team. Six minutes later, Wolman emailed Lee again, copying the same five individuals, including [Pattis] and Atkinson, warning that, in light of th[e] court's protective order, Lee might not be authorized to access the ... plaintiffs’ confidential documents.

“Lee responded to Wolman five minutes later, copying the same five individuals, including [Pattis] and Atkinson, thanking Wolman and confirming that he would look into the confidentiality situation in the Connecticut litigation. A few minutes later, Lee emailed [Adam] Rodriguez, asking him to locate the confidentiality order, and asking [Pattis] and Atkinson if they knew what Wolman was referring to. Shortly thereafter, Lee responded to Wolman's email, confirming that he would follow through with Atkinson and [Pattis]. Later that morning, Rodriguez emailed Lee, (copying Atkinson, [Pattis], [Marc] Schwartz, [Robert J.] Shannon, [Raymond] Battaglia, and Jordan), attaching the Connecticut protective orders and highlighting the Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only language.

“Neither [Pattis] nor anyone from his firm advised of the existence of the protective order, asked Lee to sign a confidentiality order, or responded to Wolman's warning or Lee's inquiry about the protective order. Similarly, neither [Pattis] nor anyone from his firm informed Lee that they were sending him the ... plaintiffs’ mental health records, medical records, or other such sensitive information. Instead, shortly after this May 2, 2022 email exchange, Lee received at his Houston [Texas] office a white external hard drive in a bubble wrap envelope, along with an undated cover letter from Atkinson to Lee, enclosing the hard drive—the same hard drive that [Pattis] and Atkinson had obtained from Randazza and Wolman. Neither the envelope nor the hard drive was designated or marked in any way as confidential or protected by court order, despite the fact that the hard drive contained the ... plaintiffs’ Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only medical records and discovery. The cover letter was similarly silent. Lee was unsuccessful in his efforts to download the hard drive.

“On May 6, 2022, the plaintiffs’ counsel in both the Texas and Connecticut cases notified Lee of their intention to withdraw their claims against [Infowars, LLC, Infowars Health, LLC, and Prison Planet TV, LLC]. On May 31, 2022, [Pattis] moved to withdraw his and Atkinson's appearances in the Connecticut cases, representing that they had been discharged. On June 1, 2022, the Connecticut cases were remanded back to state court. On June 6, 2022, the [United States] Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the InfoW bankruptcy [case] by agreement of the parties, including the [United States] Trustee.

*4 “Sometime between June 1 [and] 15, 2022, at the end of a meeting in [Free Speech Systems, LLC's] conference room in Austin [Texas], Lee handed the hard drive, unmarked, unaltered, and with no envelope, to Reynal. It did not occur to Lee to inform Reynal that the hard drive contained the ... plaintiffs’ Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only information, and Reynal was not asked to sign any confidentiality agreement. Reynal, concerned with what the Jones defendants had produced in Texas compared to what they had produced in Connecticut, subsequently transferred it to his own internal hard drive system. Despite the fact that the hard drive still contained the ... plaintiffs’ Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only documents, absolutely no care was taken to safeguard the information or to document the details of the transfer of the hard drive. Lee testified that someone from either Reynal[’s] or [Pattis’] law firm asked him to transfer the hard drive to Reynal, and Reynal testified that he either asked for the hard drive or Lee volunteered it. On June 15, 2022, Atkinson emailed Lee, asking Lee to make the [hard drive] available to Reynal. Lee responded by saying that he had already given it to Reynal. A day or two later, at the request of [Pattis’] office, Reynal had the hard drive shipped back to [Pattis]. Thus, the ... plaintiffs’ sensitive information, which should have been safeguarded and which was also protected by the court order, was carelessly passed around from one unauthorized person to another, without regard for the protective order, and with no effort to safeguard the ... plaintiffs’ sensitive, confidential documents. The confidential, court-protected medical and other records of the ... plaintiffs were improperly and unsafely transmitted at the direction of [Pattis] to Lee, and then improperly and unsafely transferred by Lee to Reynal, with [Pattis’] approval.

“On July 6, 2022, [Pattis] filed an application for Reynal to appear pro hac vice in the Connecticut cases. The application was granted on July 20, 2022, with certain restrictions and the requirement that Reynal file an appearance by July 30, 2022. On July 26, 2022, the court granted [Pattis’] oral motion to withdraw Reynal's pro hac admission, before Reynal filed his appearance.

“In the meantime, on July 22, 2022, Reynal's assistant, at his request, emailed Mark Bankston, lead counsel [for the plaintiffs] in the Texas case, with a link to a gofile.me archive containing supplemental production. However, the link that was sent mistakenly provided access to other materials, including Jones’ previously undisclosed text messages, as well as the ... plaintiffs’ Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only medical records and discovery. The directory consisted of an unusually large number of highly disorganized folders and files. Bankston, having concluded that the materials contained the ... plaintiffs’ confidential documents, as well as [Pattis’] work product, stopped his review and emailed Reynal, alerting Reynal that the documents appeared to include records of the ... plaintiffs and confidential and work product documents.

“The following morning, Reynal responded to Bankston by email, telling him to disregard the link, indicating that a mistake had been made. Reynal instructed his assistant to deactivate the link but did not address with Bankston the documents that Bankston's office had already downloaded.

“On July 24, 2022, Bankston called ... [Christopher] Mattei [the plaintiffs’ attorney] ... alerting him of Reynal's potential disclosure of the ... plaintiffs’ confidential documents. Bankston informed Mattei that, under [rule 193.3 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure], the inadvertent production rule, Bankston was prohibited from examining the records until the ten day clawback period in the rule had expired. Bankston reassured Mattei that he had sequestered the records and would delete them once he came across them. On July 28, 2022, Mattei emailed Reynal, stating that Reynal remained bound by the court's protective order, despite Reynal's not having filed an appearance; [Pattis] was copied on this email.

“On July 29, 2022, [Free Speech Systems, LLC] filed for bankruptcy in the [United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas] on the eve of the Connecticut trial, which was scheduled to commence jury selection on August 2, 2022. On August 2, 2022, [the defendants] removed the remnants of the Connecticut] cases to the [United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut].

“The ten day clawback period ended on August 1, [2022] and on August 2, [2022] the privilege having been waived, Bankston and his staff reviewed the materials, confirmed that the ... plaintiffs’ confidential documents had been transmitted to them, and deleted them. On August 3, 2022, during his cross-examination of Jones in the Texas case, and to Reynal's surprise, Bankston used several text messages from Jones’ phone contained in the documents inadvertently produced by Reynal. Reynal subsequently reviewed the ... protective order for the first time. That same day, Mattei emailed Reynal regarding Reynal's disclosure to Bankston and his staff, requesting that Reynal provide him with an itemized list of the documents, the date he received them, the identity of anyone who had access to them, and confirmation of their destruction. An hour after that email, [Pattis] texted Mattei, stating, Chris. Give me a call. I learned moments ago that my office may have violated protective order. Norm.

*5 “After trial ended for the day in Texas, Bankston telephoned Mattei, confirming that he had deleted the ... plaintiffs’ confidential documents. That evening, Reynal emailed Mattei, copying [Pattis], indicating that he was deeply troubled by the inadvertent disclosure. Five minutes later, Mattei responded, copying [Pattis] on the email and reiterating the steps he wanted taken. [Pattis] then texted Mattei, stating, Hey. So Texas counsel mistakenly turned over stuff to Texas. Do you recall [one Zimmerman] ever having downloaded [Jones’] text messages?

“On August 4, [2022] Reynal filed an emergency motion for protective order in Texas regarding the inadvertent production. That morning, Mattei emailed [Pattis], pointing out that Reynal was never counsel of record in the Connecticut cases and as such was barred from accessing the ... plaintiffs’ confidential information and requesting further details from [Pattis]. [Pattis] emailed Mattei back an hour later, conceding that Reynal was not counsel of record in this case but positing that Reynal was working on the defense of this case and related cases and therefore authorized to access the records. [Pattis] explained that they gave Reynal and Lee a copy of their file, that Lee turned his over to Reynal and that [Pattis] had asked Reynal to return the file to [Pattis]. [Pattis] stated, I directed an associate to send our files to the two attorneys who requested them to defend [Jones]. I did not direct the associate to withhold the [plaintiffs’ confidential] information. If that is an error, responsibility for it falls on my shoulders. A few minutes later, [Pattis] forwarded to Mattei an email from Reynal to [Pattis], expressing Reynal's embarrassment and reporting that Bankston represented to the Texas court that he had destroyed the ... plaintiffs’ records. Mattei then informed Reynal by email that, according to [Pattis], the materials that Reynal had been given by Lee were the confidential materials that [Pattis] had given to Lee, and he requested a sworn affidavit from Reynal. Mattei also emailed [Pattis], requesting sworn affidavits from Reynal and Lee. Reynal emailed Mattei, stating that he was returning all the files to [Pattis], that he had not shared the materials with anyone outside his firm, and that, as he was awaiting the verdict in the Texas case, he could not prepare the requested affidavit.

“On August 8, [2022] Mattei emailed Reynal, and then both [Pattis] and [Pattis’] attorney, reiterating his request for a detailed affidavit. Reynal responded by email the following day, indicating that he was now represented by counsel, and Mattei immediately emailed Reynal's counsel, repeating his request for an affidavit.” (Footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 225 Conn. App. 579-90.

Based on the facts outlined above, the trial court, Bellis, J., concluded that “[Pattis’] improper dissemination of the records, in conjunction with his failure to maintain the records in a safe and secure manner, led to the ... plaintiffs’ most private information being improperly released to Lee, Reynal, and then Bankston, none of whom were counsel of record in any of the ... Connecticut cases.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 590. Accordingly, on January 5, 2023, the trial court, Bellis, J., issued a memorandum of decision finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Pattis had violated rules 1.1, 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), 5.1 (b), 5.1 (c), and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. As discipline, the court suspended Pattis from the practice of law for a period of six months.

*6 Pattis appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly determined that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and that the trial court's disciplinary order suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months was arbitrary and disproportionate. The Appellate Court remanded the matter in part, with direction to vacate the trial court's findings that Pattis violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), and 5.1 (c) in part, as well as the court's disciplinary order, and to conduct a new hearing on sanctions before a different judge. The Appellate Court rejected Pattis’ claims that the court improperly determined that he violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 5.1 (b), 5.1 (c) in part, and 8.4 (4).

This court, Wilson, J., conducted a new hearing on sanctions on October 24, 2024. On December 3, 2024, Pattis submitted a post-hearing brief in which he argues that he should not be formally disciplined, or, at most, he should be reprimanded. (Docket Entry No. 1084.00.) On December 4, 2024, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel submitted a post-hearing brief arguing that Pattis should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of thirty days. (Docket Entry No. 1085.00.)

“Disciplinary proceedings are for the purpose of preserving the courts from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.... The proceedings to disbar [or suspend] an attorney is neither a civil action nor a criminal proceeding, but is a proceeding sui generis, the object of which is not the punishment of the offender, but the protection of the court.... Once the complaint is made, the court controls the situation and procedure, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may seem to it to require.... [T]he power of the courts is left unfettered to act as situations, as they may arise, may seem to require, for efficient discipline of misconduct and the purging of the bar from the taint of unfit membership. Such statutes as ours are not restrictive of the inherent powers which reside in courts to inquire into the conduct of their own officers, and to discipline them for misconduct.... In [disciplinary] proceedings ... therefore, the attorney's relations to the tribunal and the character and purpose of the inquiry are such that unless it clearly appears that his rights have in some substantial way been denied him, the action of the court will not be set aside upon review.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki, 150 Conn. App. 472, 478-79, 91 A.3d 932, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 931, 102 A.3d 83 (2014).

“[I]n a matter involving attorney discipline, no sanction may be imposed unless a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct has been established by clear and convincing evidence.... [C]lear and convincing proof denotes a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution.... [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sowell v. DiCara, 161 Conn. App. 102, 123-24, 127 A.3d 356, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 909, 128 A.3d 953 (2015).

In the present case, the trial court found, and the Appellate Court affirmed, that Pattis violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 5.1 (b), 5.1 (c) in part, and 8.4 (4) by clear and convincing evidence. See Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 225 Conn. App. 594-610.

*7 “Rule 1.1, titled Competence, provides: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. The commentary to rule 1.1 (1) expounds on the requirement that competent representation necessitates reasonably necessary legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation, and (2) discusses an attorney's ability to retain or contract with other lawyers, as well as an attorney maintaining competence. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, commentary.

“In examining the applicability of rule 1.1, the [trial] court stated that, [i]n order to competently represent a client involved in civil litigation, an attorney must be able to responsibly engage in the discovery process, which routinely requires an attorney to safely maintain and securely transmit confidential materials such as medical records, personal identifying information such as Social Security numbers, and account numbers for financial institutions. This obligation to safeguard such sensitive information extends not only to a client's discovery materials but to discovery materials produced by other parties. Additionally, when the court has issued a protective order in a case, a competent attorney must be familiar with its terms....

“At a basic level, attorneys must competently and appropriately handle the discovery of sensitive materials in civil cases. Otherwise, our civil system, in which discovery of sensitive information is customary and routine, would simply collapse. Litigants would understandably be unwilling to turn over the sensitive, confidential or protected information that would be needed to fully and fairly litigate a civil case without the assurance that the attorneys, as officers of the court, would safeguard their information. The [trial] court proceeded to determine that Pattis, by clear and convincing evidence ... in the course of his representation of the Jones defendants, failed to act competently in the handling of the ... plaintiffs’ confidential records in violation of rule 1.1, exposing [Pattis’] clients to possible sanctions and resulting in harm to the plaintiffs, whose confidential records were distributed without their consent.” (Footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 225 Conn. App. 594-95.

The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court correctly applied rule 1.1, stating that it “agree[d] with the [trial] court that, to provide competent representation to a client in accordance with rule 1.1, an attorney must responsibly engage in discovery and safeguard sensitive discovery materials, whether provided by the client or produced by an opposing party. Indeed, notwithstanding that the court pursued disciplinary action against Pattis, Pattis’ conduct ran the risk of subjecting the defendants he represented to sanctions.” Id., 596.

“Rule 5.1 is titled Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers. Subsection (b) of rule 5.1 provides: A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.0 (i) defines reasonable or reasonably, when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer, [to denote] the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.

“Subsection (c) of rule 5.1 provides: A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if: (1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) The lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action. Under the rules, the term knows denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.0 (g).

*8 “The commentary to rule 5.1 provides in relevant part that [s]ubsection (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4. Subsection (c) (2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension.

“ ‘Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of subsection (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of subsection (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation.” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 225 Conn. App. 604-606.

In examining the applicability of rule 5.1 (b) and (c), “the [trial] court stated that Atkinson, an associate at [Pattis’] firm and a member of his team, transferred the [plaintiffs’] confidential documents to Lee at the direction of [Pattis]. [Pattis] admitted in his August 4, 2022 email to Mattei that he directed an associate to send their files to the two attorneys who requested them and that he did not instruct the associate to withhold the ... plaintiffs’ confidential information. The court [found] by clear and convincing evidence that [Pattis] violated rules 5.1 (b) and 5.1 (c) by directing his associate to transfer the plaintiffs’ protected records to Lee and [to] Reynal, both unauthorized recipients, without proper safeguards and without properly notifying Lee and Reynal that the plaintiffs’ sensitive and protected information was being transferred.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 606.

The Appellate Court “construe[d] the [findings of the trial] court to have determined implicitly on the record before it that, in light of the improper and unsafe transmission of the plaintiffs’ confidential records by Atkinson to Lee at Pattis’ direction, (1) Pattis did not make reasonable efforts to ensure that Atkinson conformed to the Rules of Professional Conduct for purposes of rule 5.1 (b), and (2) Atkinson violated the rules for purposes of rule 5.1 (c).” Id., 607. Accordingly, the court “reject[e]d Pattis’ contention that the [trial] court improperly applied rule 5.1 (b) and (c) vis-a-vis his exercise of supervisory authority over Atkinson.”[1] Id.

“Rule 8.4, titled Misconduct, provides in relevant part: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... (4) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice .... The commentary to rule 8.4 provides in relevant part that, [a]lthough a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 225 Conn. App. 609.

In examining the applicability of rule 8.4 (4), “the [trial] court determined by clear and convincing evidence that [Pattis’] abject failure to safeguard the plaintiffs’ sensitive records, as well as [Pattis’] inexcusable disregard and violation of the clear and unambiguous terms of the protective order, which limited access to the plaintiffs’ Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only documents to counsel of record in the Connecticut state court actions, and which limited the use of said records to the preparation and trial of this case, all cases consolidated with this case, and in any appeal taken from any order or judgment herein violated rule 8.4 [(4)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

*9 The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court correctly applied rule 8.4 (4), stating that “Pattis’ misconduct in permitting the disclosure to unauthorized individuals of the plaintiffs’ personal and sensitive information unilaterally imposed a significant cost on the plaintiffs in their attempt to obtain justice in this matter. In short, Pattis’ mishandling of the plaintiffs’ confidential records falls within the expansive range of misconduct encompassed by rule 8.4 (4).” Id., 610.

“A court disciplining an attorney does so not to punish the attorney, but rather to safeguard the administration of justice and to protect the public from the misconduct or unfitness of those who are members of the legal profession.... Inherent in this process is a large degree of judicial discretion.... [Accordingly, a] court is free to determine in each case, as may seem best in light of the entire record before it, whether a sanction is appropriate and, if so, what that sanction should be.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Disciplinary Counsel v. Cannatelli, 203 Conn. App. 236, 245-46, 248 A.3d 83, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 950, 251 A.3d 617 (2021).

Connecticut courts have utilized the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyers Sanctions as a guide for assessing appropriate discipline. See Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 55-56, 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073, 124 S. Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2004). “The Standards provide that, after a finding of misconduct, a court should consider: (1) the nature of the duty violated; (2) the attorney's mental state; (3) the potential or actual injury stemming from the attorney's misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.... The Standards list the following as aggravating factors: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of law; [and] (j) indifference to making restitution....

“The Standards list the following as mitigating factors: (a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; (f) inexperience in the practice of law; (g) character or reputation; (h) physical or mental disability or impairment; (i) delay in disciplinary proceedings; (j) interim rehabilitation; (k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (l) remorse; [and] (m) remoteness of prior offenses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

As it has been determined that there was misconduct on the part of Pattis—specifically, that Pattis violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 5.1 (b), 5.1 (c) in part, and 8.4 (4)—the court must now assess the appropriate discipline.[2]

*10 The duties implicated, to the plaintiffs and the legal system, are important ones. The respondent had an obligation to safeguard the plaintiffs’ highly sensitive medical and financial information obtained during discovery. The court agrees with Disciplinary Counsel that the respondent's breach of this duty should be observed in the context of the litigation; here, the plaintiffs were seeking redress against the defendants for personal attacks in a hotly contested case. Given the highly litigious nature of this case, Pattis should have been on heightened alert and duty that the information which was the subject of the protective order had to be handled with the utmost care. As previously noted, and aptly stated by the trial court, “[a]t a basic level, attorneys must competently and appropriately handle the discovery of sensitive materials in civil cases. Otherwise, our civil system, in which discovery of sensitive information is customary and routine, would simply collapse. Litigants would understandably be unwilling to turn over the sensitive, confidential or protected information that would be needed to fully and fairly litigate a civil case without the assurance that the attorneys, as officers of the court, would safeguard their information.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, supra, 225 Conn. App. 595.

Pattis’ mental state at the time of the transfer of documents, based on the Appellate Court's ruling, has been determined to be negligent. There is clear and convincing evidence that Pattis was aware of his obligations under the clear and unambiguous terms of the protective order issued by the court. Yet, through his failure to act prudently, “the plaintiffs’ [highly] sensitive and [confidential] information, which should have been safeguarded and which was also protected by the court order, was carelessly passed around from one unauthorized person to another, without regard for the protective order, and with no effort [by Pattis] to safeguard the ... plaintiffs’ sensitive, confidential documents. The confidential, court-protected medical and other records of the ... plaintiffs were improperly and unsafely transmitted at the direction of [Pattis] to Lee, and then improperly and unsafely transferred by Lee to Reynal, with [Pattis’] approval.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 585-86.

With respect to actual or potential injury stemming from Pattis’ misconduct, there was a period of about two weeks where information was coming in, and the plaintiffs could only assume the worse. As soon as he was advised of the disclosure, plaintiffs’ counsel took immediate steps to determine the extent of the disclosure to stop the bleeding of release of the plaintiffs’ confidential information.

The plaintiffs’ sensitive, protected records were passed around to Lee, then to Reynal, then to Bankston, without their consent. In addition to the actual harm the plaintiffs suffered by the unauthorized dissemination of the medical and other records, the potential harm is stunning, as suggested by Disciplinary Counsel. As it was, the unauthorized disclosure to Bankston was revealed on the record in a public trial in Texas that was livestreamed and easily could have been made part of the record in the Texas case, or otherwise disseminated because the materials were not identifiable as confidential, sensitive, or protected. See id., 588. Moreover, the transfer of documents to Lee was made without providing him any information regarding the scope of the disclosure and that the information was “Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only Information”. Lee could have very easily filed the discovery in court or delivered it directly to the defendants. Without fully understanding what the hard drive contained, Lee transferred all of the information to defendant's attorney Reynal. “It did not occur to Lee to inform Reynal that the hard drive contained the ... plaintiffs’ Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only information, and Reynal was not asked to sign any confidentiality agreement. Reynal, concerned with what the Jones defendants had produced in Texas compared to what they had produced in Connecticut, subsequently transferred it to his own internal hard drive system. Despite the fact that the hard drive still contained the ... plaintiffs’ Highly Confidential-Attorneys Eyes Only documents, absolutely no care was taken to safeguard the information or to document the details of the transfer of the hard drive. Lee testified that someone from either Reynal[’s] or [Pattis’] law firm asked him to transfer the hard drive to Reynal, and Reynal testified that he either asked for the hard drive or Lee volunteered it. On June 15, 2022, Atkinson emailed Lee, asking Lee to make the [hard drive] available to Reynal. Lee responded by saying that he had already given it to Reynal. A day or two later, at the request of [Pattis’] office, Reynal had the hard drive shipped back to [Pattis].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 585. “Ultimately, [Pattis’] improper dissemination of the records, in conjunction with his failure to maintain the records in a safe and secure manner, led to the ... plaintiffs’ most private information being improperly released to Lee, Reynal, and then Bankston, none of whom were counsel of record in any of the ... Connecticut cases.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 590. There was clearly actual and potential harm stemming from Pattis’ misconduct.

*11 There are aggravating factors which the court must consider. Although Pattis has no disciplinary history, he was the subject of a grievance arising out of the present litigation where, after a public hearing, the reviewing committee concluded that Pattis’ conduct did not rise to the level of an ethical violation; however, it was critical of Pattis’ level of diligence in connection with an affidavit filed with the court, concluding that the respondent was “sloppy with regard to the execution of the affidavit and that he exercised bad judgment.” Danbury Judicial District Grievance Panel v. Norman A. Pattis, #19-0367. The next aggravating factor is vulnerability of the victims. The court finds this to be the most compelling aggravating factor based on the nature of the civil action. The plaintiffs personal, sensitive information was disseminated without their consent in a case where the claim was that they were victimized already by the Jones defendants. This court also considers as an aggravating factor Pattis’ substantial experience in the practice of law. He has been a member of the Connecticut bar for over thirty years, having been admitted in 1993. Simply put, given his experience, there is no acceptable excuse for his misconduct. Pattis is a well-known attorney who handles high profile cases on a regular basis. He was required to appreciate the consequences of his actions when he made the decision to release the plaintiffs’ discovery. Although Pattis’ mental state was determined by the Appellate Court to be negligent, his negligence was not inadvertent and was inexcusable given the clear and unambiguous protective order which was known to him, and which he failed to follow.

There are mitigating factors which the court considers. The respondent has no prior public disciplinary record, and there is an absence of a dishonest or selfish motive. The court attributes some minimal credit for the respondent's initial disclosure to plaintiffs’ counsel, however, that disclosure fell far short. The court also considers Pattis’ remorsefulness. When he testified before this court, he acknowledged he violated Code provisions and would have “looked before he lept”.

As aptly stated by the court, Bellis, J., “[w]e cannot expect our system of justice or our attorneys to be perfect, but we can expect fundamental fairness and decency. There was no fairness or decency in the treatment of the plaintiffs’ most sensitive and personal information, and no excuse for the respondent's misconduct.” Lafferty v. Jones, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket Nos. X06-UWY-CV-18-6046436-S, X06-UWY-CV-18-6046437-S, X06-UWY-CV-18-6046438-S (January 5, 2023, Bellis, J.), aff'd in part, reversed in part and remanded, 225 Conn. App. 552, 611, 316 A.3d 742 (2024). Here, there was simply no excuse for Pattis’ misconduct.

The trial court's, Bellis, J., findings that Pattis violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), and 5.1 (c) in part, as well as the court's disciplinary order suspending Pattis from the practice of law for a period of six months, dated January 5, 2023, are hereby vacated. Accordingly, based on Pattis’ violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 5.1 (b), 5.1 (c) in part, and 8.4 (4), and for the reasons set forth above, the court hereby orders that the respondent is suspended from the practice of law in the State of Connecticut for a period of two weeks. Said two-week suspension shall be served consecutively within six (6) months from the date of this order. Attorney Pattis is directed to advise the court of which two weeks within the six-month period the suspension will be served.