I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Allergan, Inc.; Allergan Pharmaceuticals Ireland Unlimited Company; Allergan USA, Inc.; and Allergan Sales, LLC (collectively, “Allergan”) brought this suit against Defendant Revance Therapeutics, Inc. (“Revance”) alleging misappropriation of trade secrets under the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”) (18 U.S.C. § 1836) and the Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”) (Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1701, et seq.) related to Allergan’s botulinum neurotoxin injectable products and dermal fillers, including its “flagship products,” collectively known as Botox. Docket No. 1 (Complaint). Revance has denied the substantive allegations and asserted affirmative defenses. Docket No. 151.

This matter is now before the Court upon Revance’s “Motion for Contempt Sanctions Regarding Plaintiffs’ Failure to Comply with September 16, 2024 Order.” Docket No. 267.[1] Revance has also filed supporting documents. Docket Nos. 267-1 through 267-6. Allergan has filed a Response in Opposition and supporting documents. Docket Nos. 286; 286-1 through 286- 17. Revance has filed a Reply and additional supporting documents. Docket Nos. 291; 291-1; 291-2. For the reasons set forth below, Revance’s Motion (Docket No. 267) is GRANTED IN PART.

II. BACKGROUND

This case has been beset with discovery disputes, so much so that the Parties requested and the Court granted the appointment of a Special Master to handle them. Docket Nos. 271, 275. Multiple motions to compel have been filed, replete with accusations of failure to meet and confer, failure to produce required discovery, and failure generally to meet the obligations set forth by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One of these motions was a Motion to Compel in which Revance asserted that Allergan had failed to produce documents and information related to three categories:

(1) the measures [Allergan] allegedly took to protect the purported trade secrets at issue (Request Nos. 5, 23 and Interrogatory No. 3); (2) [Allergan’s] current and former employees whom [Allergan contends] are central to [Allergan’s] claims (Request Nos. 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and Interrogatory No. 12); and (3) the competitive threat to [Allergan’s] monopoly caused by the entry of Revance’s competing product, a central theme of Revance’s Affirmative Defenses (Request Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 and 54).

Docket No. 158-1 (Supporting Memorandum), p. 5.

The Court granted Revance’s Motion in part. Docket No. 204. The Court found that while Revance had failed to participate in crafting a joint dispute statement as required and it seemed that the Motion was “premature in the sense that the Parties appear not to have exhausted their efforts,” it was necessary to resolve the dispute “to provide structure to the process in order to keep the case moving forward.” Id. at 2-3. The Court understood at that point that the Parties could, and hopefully would, continue to negotiate on a number of matters, including their ESI protocol and search terms. See id. at 9-10.[2] Additionally, the Court acknowledged that Allergan appeared to have already produced quite a bit of responsive material. See, e.g., id. at 6-7.

Nevertheless, as to certain requests, the Court ordered Allergan “to the extent it ha[d] not already done so,” to “conduct a reasonable search for [responsive materials] and produce them to Revance.” See, e.g., id. at 8. The Court set September 30, 2024, as the deadline for Allergan to comply. Id. at 23.

Revance filed the instant Motion on November 6, 2024, asserting that Allergan “simply ignored the Court’s deadline” and, as to the documents Allergan did produce, improperly limited the scope of its search and production. Docket No. 267. Allergan responds that it has conducted a reasonable search and produced documents as ordered, and continues to supplement its productions as mandated by Rule 26. Docket No. 286. Additionally, Allergan argues that Revance failed to meet and confer regarding the substance of its Motion as required by the Local Rules. Id.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Compliance with Local Rule 7.01

Allergan maintains that Revance filed the instant Motion in violation of the Local Rules because it did not meet and confer with Allergan in advance as required. Docket No. 286, p. 13. Specifically, Allergan states:

The parties had scheduled an in-person conference in Chicago on November 7, 2024, to discuss certain discovery disputes. One dispute, per Revance’s own meeting agenda, was Allergan’s purported “non-compliance with the Court’s [O]rder.” Ex. L. Allergan prepared to discuss its compliance in detail, hoping to understand what remained in dispute. But Revance moved for sanctions the night before, ignoring its agenda and Allergan’s intent to clarify any misunderstandings in person and avoid wasting the Court’s time on issues that could be resolved through cooperation. ECF 267. Just as it did with the underlying motion to compel, Revance did not comply with the Court’s meet-and-confer requirements. See ECF 189 at 4; L.R. 7.01(a)(1).

Id.

Revance replies that “[t]he parties exhaustively discussed Allergan’s noncompliance over the course of weeks . . . [and] Revance told Allergan that its planned course fell short and would result in Revance seeking relief from the Court.” Docket No. 291, p. 8, citing Docket No. 276-5, p. 4. Revance argues that “[n]othing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or this Court’s Local Rules require[s] parties to engage in yet another meet and conferral concerning a party’s violation of a court order.” Id. Revance asserts that its Motion “is not a discovery motion—it is a motion for sanctions, which happens to concern a discovery issue.” Id.

The Local Rules of this District require that counsel meet and confer in an attempt to resolve disputes before filing most motions:

In cases in which all parties are represented by counsel, all motions, except motions under Rule 12, 56, 59, or 60, but including discovery motions, must state that counsel for the moving party has conferred with all other counsel, and whether or not the relief requested in the motion is opposed. In those instances where counsel for the moving party is unable to confer with all other counsel, the motion must describe all attempts made to confer with counsel and the results of such attempts.

LR 7.01(a)(1).

First, there is no doubt that the Parties have discussed at length the discovery requests and responses that underly Revance’s Motion to Compel and the instant Motion, both before and after the Court’s September 16 Order. Second, although the topic of the Motion is Allergan’s alleged lack of compliance with a discovery order, it is clearly a motion for sanctions. See Docket No. 267. While Revance’s Motion is not brought under one of the enumerated exceptions to LR 7.01, the Court is not aware of any instance (nor has Allergan identified any) of a party being required to meet and confer with its opponent before bringing a motion for sanctions against that opponent. It is presumably understood that even after a thorough and comprehensive meet-and-confer process, the chance that a party will agree that it should be sanctioned is zero. The Court therefore finds that it was reasonable for Revance to file its Motion for sanctions without first attempting to resolve the issue with Allergan, and will proceed to consider the Motion on its merits.

B. Attorneys’ Fees and Other Sanctions Under the Federal Rules

Rule 37 gives courts the authority to impose sanctions when parties fail to cooperate with a court order, including discovery orders and other orders under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a). Failure to obey a discovery order may lead to sanctions including an order:

(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims;

(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence;

(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;

(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;

(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;

(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or

(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).

While the sanctions ordered “may include any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)- (vi) . . . the court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3) (emphasis added).

C. Revance’s Motion for Sanctions

Revance maintains that Allergan failed to comply with the Court’s Order by (1) not meeting the Court’s September 30, 2024, deadline; and (2) improperly limiting the scope of its search and production. Docket No. 267. Revance requests that the Court order that Allergan must:

(1) produce “any nonprivileged documents” within its possession, custody, or control subject to the Order; (2) certify that no further responsive documents exist; and (3) detail the specific steps it took to comply with the Order, including all custodians searched and search terms used (if any) to ensure compliance. Furthermore, the Court should award Revance its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred due to Allergan’s recalcitrance in complying with the Order.

Id. at 19. 1.

Compliance with the Court’s Deadline

(a) Production of Documents by the Deadline

As evidence for its assertion that “[b]y Allergan’s own admission, it failed to comply with the Court-ordered September 30, 2024 production deadline,” Revance states that “[o]n October 31, 2024, responding to a letter from Revance . . . Allergan wrote that its ‘review and production of documents located using the agreed ESI search terms is ongoing, and we will continue to produce documents on [an unspecified] rolling basis.’” Docket No. 267, p. 12 (emphasis and alteration in original), quoting Docket No. 267-6, p. 4. Revance also takes issue with Allergan’s promise “to ‘supplement its production’ with some unspecified documents at an unspecified future date.” Id. at 12-13. Revance maintains that “before the deadline, Allergan disclosed certain ESI search parameters it ‘underst[ood] to be directed at documents that would be responsive to these requests,’” asserting that “[i]t thus appears Allergan has also failed to produce documents resulting from even this narrowed, patently insufficient search.” Id. at 13. Finally, Revance contends that “[t]o date, Allergan has not verified its supplemental responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 12.” Id. at 14.

Allergan asserts that “[b]y the Court’s September 30 deadline, Allergan produced all remaining responsive documents that it located after reasonably diligent searches.” Docket No. 286, p. 12 (footnote omitted); p. 17, citing Docket No. 286-1 (Declaration of Rosanne E. Brewitz), p. 1-3; Docket No. 286-2 (Declaration of Julia Silverberg), p. 2; Docket No. 286-3 (Declaration of Meredith C. Hazinski), p. 2-3; Docket No. 286-5 (Declaration of Andrea P. Roberts), p. 2. Allergan argues that the Court’s Order did not require perfection in searching for and producing documents, only that Allergan conduct a reasonable search and produce all responsive documents located. Id.

Allergan has submitted multiple Declarations, including the Declaration of an attorney (Ms. Roberts) detailing Allergan’s production of documents responsive to each of the enumerated requests at issue in this Motion by the Court’s September 30 deadline. For example, with regard to RFP No. 5, Ms. Roberts declares:

By September 30, 2024, Allergan produced the personnel files of the 100 individuals listed in Appendix 1 to my Declaration. Allergan produced most of the personnel file documents by August 20, 2024, and many were produced before that date. A handful of such documents that had not already been produced were included in Allergan’s September 30, 2024, production, at the Bates range ALGN-MDTENN_1983122 – ALGN-MDTENN_1983166.

The personnel files Allergan produced include employee confidentiality agreements dated between 2010 and the present, but not for the years 2011, 2021, 2022, and 2024. Allergan therefore collected 2011, 2021, 2022, and 2024 employee confidentiality agreements and produced the 2011, 2022, and 2024 agreements by September 30, 2024. The 2021 employee confidentiality agreement was inadvertently not included in the September 30 production, which error was discovered in connection with the present motion, and immediately corrected through a production on November 27, 2024. Exemplary Bates numbers of the produced employee confidentiality agreements for the years 2010 to the present are listed in the attached Appendix 2 (Allergan produced multiple agreements for many years that are not reflected in Appendix 2).

Docket No. 286-5, p. 2 (numbering omitted).

The Declaration of Ms. Roberts, an attorney, substantiates Allergan’s arguments that it produced responsive documents by the September 30 deadline. The fact that additional documents were found at a later time and subsequently produced is not, without more, evidence of a violation; instead, it appears to demonstrate compliance with the Rule 26 mandate of continuing supplementation.[3] Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A).

Allergan maintains that it is searching elsewhere for documents using the Parties’ search terms. Docket No. 286, p. 10-11. Revance appears to argue that Allergan has failed to meet the deadline by using ESI search terms that “were wholly inadequate to meet the full scope of the Court’s Order because they simply tracked the limitations on the scope of the search that led to Revance’s Motion to Compel in the first place, limitations the Court’s Order had already overruled.” Docket No. 267, p. 10. The Court declines to wade into the morass of disputes over which search terms should be used to discover ESI, as the Court understands that the Parties are still working out their ESI issues under the guidance of the Special Master, who is issuing orders on this topic. Docket No. 286, p. 16, n.5, p. 26; Docket No. 267, p. 2; see Docket Nos. 320, 321, 322.

(b) Certification of Production

Revance contends that “Allergan steadfastly refuses to certify it has produced all documents the Court ordered produced.” Docket No. 267, p. 11 (emphasis in original). Revance argues that Allergan’s statement that it has produced all documents responsive to these requests “located after a reasonable inquiry and diligen[t] search” is both “cryptic” and inadequate, because “producing some responsive documents is very different from producing all responsive documents.” Id. at 16, (emphasis in original) quoting Docket No. 267-6, p. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Allergan responds that making a reasonable search for and producing any nonprivileged responsive documents that are within its possession, custody, or control is sufficient to comply with the Court’s Order, as “[r]easonableness is at all times paramount in navigating discovery” and the Court did not require more than reasonable efforts. Docket No. 286, p. 1.

This facet of the dispute is particularly related to the lack of trust and cooperation between the Parties that has led to this case becoming mired in discovery disputes to the extent that a Special Master had to be appointed just to deal with them. Docket No. 275. A statement that a reasonable search has been conducted and all nonprivileged responsive documents that were located have been produced should be sufficient, but Revance appears to believe that Allergan is using this statement to cover the fact that it has deliberately failed to produce all responsive documents. Similarly, Allergan ideally would be willing to state that “all” documents have been produced, but no doubt fears that the discovery of even one additional document after the fact will cause Revance to accuse Allergan of lying. While the Court doubts (but continues to hope) that it will be effective, in an effort to encourage the Parties to focus on the substance of their lawsuit, the Court will order Allergan to file, no later than April 11, 2025, a notice stating that it has conducted reasonable searches for all the documents it was ordered to produce in the Court’s September 16 Order (Docket No. 204) and has produced all of the nonprivileged documents that were located as a result of those searches to Revance.

(c) Verification of Interrogatory Responses

Revance asserts that Allergan failed to include the mandatory verification of its supplemental responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 12 by the September 30 deadline. Docket No. 267, p. 10-11. In response, Allergan argues that “Revance does not cite any authority or any portion of the Order requiring concurrent verifications . . . .” Docket No. 286, p. 25. In Reply, Revance states that the Interrogatory Responses remain unverified. Docket No. 291, p. 7.

Rule 33 requires that answers and objections to interrogatories be signed by the person answering or the attorney objecting. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(5). While it is true that Revance has not pointed to any authority requiring that this be done concurrently with the interrogatory responses (nor has the Court located any, likely because few parties would engage in litigation over this issue), there is no doubt that it must be done at some point. To the extent that Allergan has not verified its supplemental responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 12, it must do so no later than April 11, 2025.

2. Compliance with the Order’s Scope of Search and Production

Revance contends that “Allergan unilaterally imposed limitations on the scope of the Order and therefore refuses to comply with it.” Docket No. 267, p. 14. Revance identifies the following instances of Allergan “substitut[ing] its own judgment for the court’s in deciding it need not comply in full with the Order.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

(a) RFP No. 32

RFP No. 32 seeks “[a]ll documents concerning the departure from Allergan of any former Allergan employee listed in Appendix I.” Docket No. 267, p. 6. Revance argues that the Court “expressly rejected Allergan’s proposal to limit its production on this subject to only those documents within the former employees’ personnel files. See ECF No. 204 at 13. But Allergan limited its production to only those documents within the personnel files of the former Allergan employees.” Id. at 14-15 (emphasis in original). Revance asserts:

Obviously, this limitation excludes a variety of documents the Court already ruled were relevant. For example, it omits communications about a reduction in force, communications about an employee’s voluntary or involuntary termination, communications about transitioning work to other employees, departure reminders to departing employees, as well as other categories of documents.

Id. at 15.

Allergan disagrees with Revance’s characterization of the Order, arguing that “[t]he Order acknowledges Allergan’s efforts to locate these files in personnel files and takes no issue with that process.” Docket No. 286, p. 19. Nevertheless, Allergan maintains that it “produced documents that fall into these categories [that Revance contends have been excluded] using Revance’s proposed ESI searches, such as, for example, its Term 8.” Id., citing Docket No. 286- 5, p. 1; Docket No. 286-8; Docket No. 286-15; Docket No. 286-16. Allergan asserts that it “conducted a reasonable search for documents responsive to RFP No. 32 and produced those documents it located, i.e., those maintained in personnel files.” Docket No. 286, p. 20, citing Docket No. 286-1, p. 1; Docket No. 286-3, p. 2-3.

Revance replies that “Allergan did not produce ‘any nonprivileged documents.’ It admits it only searched for and produced ‘personnel files.’” Docket No. 291, p. 5. Revance also argues that while Allergan “claims one of the ESI search terms will capture responsive ESI . . . Allergan agreed to run that term against only six individuals, not the 115 former employees it contends are relevant to the case.” Id. at 6.

The Court’s Order directs Allergan to produce “any nonprivileged documents that are responsive to RFP No. 32 [that] are within Allergan’s possession, custody, or control.” Docket No. 204, p. 13-14. The Court did not say that these documents could not come from personnel files; indeed, that would seem to be the most likely place to find documents concerning the departure of former employees, so it is not surprising that most of the responsive documents have been located there. The Court understands Allergan to assert that aside from the centralized location of the personnel files, it has searched for responsive documents elsewhere using ESI search terms. This is really the only efficient and cost-effective way to search large volumes of data, and is perfectly acceptable to the Court. The Court further understands that the Parties are still hashing out the particulars of ESI searching with the assistance of the Special Master. That being the case, the Court finds that Revance has not established that Allergan failed to comply with the Court as to RFP No. 32.

(b) RFP Nos. 45-51 and 54

Revance asserts that “[t]he Order expressly rejected Allergan’s proposed limitations because adjudication of Revance’s affirmative defenses should be based on facts.” Docket No. 267, p. 15 (emphasis in original), citing Docket No. 204, p. 19-20. But, Revance argues:

Allergan persists, limiting its production to “business-planning documents, including long-range planning (LRP) presentations, business reviews, growth analyses, and target populations that it was able to locate after a reasonably diligent search.” Ex. A at 2. This made-up limitation, directly contrary to the Court’s Order, makes sure communications by Allergan’s personnel regarding Revance and its products don’t come to light. Allergan’s limitation omits emails, chats, or other documents discussing Revance (documents clearly within the scope of the Court’s Order) in favor of a limited set of canned, sanitized presentations.

Id.

Additionally, Revance argues that “Allergan’s attempt to avoid compliance with the Order extends to temporal scope,” as Allergan has only been running searches “as of January 1, 2018,” rather than “January 1, 2015” as ordered. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis in original).

Allergan responds that it complied with the Court’s Order to produce additional documents responsive to RFP Nos. 45-49 “to the extent that any . . . are within Allergan’s possession, custody, or control.” Docket No. 286, p. 21, quoting Docket No. 204, p. 21-22 (internal quotation marks omitted). Allergan contends that it “applied search terms to custodians identified by Revance” and “had a good-faith belief that it located and produced everything responsive to these RFPs even before the Order.” Id. at 22. Since then, Allergan maintains that it “identified additional responsive documents, some with earlier dates than those previously produced, but through running search terms against custodial ESI in accordance with the negotiated ESI protocol.” Id. Allergan states that “[m]any such documents have already been produced, and others will continue to be produced on a rolling basis.” Id., citing Docket No. 286-5, p. 7.

Regarding RFP Nos. 50, 51, and 54, Allergan asserts that its use of terms such as “business-planning documents, including long-range (LRP) presentations, business reviews, growth analyses, and target populations” did not reflect a unilateral narrowing of its search for responsive documents, but rather, was an attempt to “broadly describe[e] the types of documents it included in its production.” Id. at 23. Allergan contends that it “conducted reasonable and diligent searches and produced responsive documents it located.” Id., citing Docket No. 286-5, p. 2-3; Docket No. 286-1, p. 3-4; Docket No. 286-4, p. 1.

Responding to Revance’s claim that Allergan is “mak[ing] sure communications by Allergan’s personnel regarding Revance and its products [do not] come to light,” Allergan argues that “Allergan is running ESI searches that are targeted at these RFPs” and “producing such documents, including communications by Allergan’s personnel regarding Revance and its products as it locates them.” Id. at 23-24 (emphasis and alterations in original), quoting Docket No. 267, p. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted); citing Docket No. 286-5, p. 7. Noting that the Court “urged the parties to cooperate on ESI searches,” Allergan argues that it “cannot violate the Order by doing exactly what the Court suggested.” Id.

Finally, as to Revance’s contention that Allergan is only searching for documents back to January 1, 2018, rather than January 1, 2015, as ordered, Allergan maintains that “it was Revance that proposed a date range starting on January 1, 2018, for ESI searches designed to locate documents responsive to these requests . . . .” Id. (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, Allergan asserts that it “updated its ESI searches to include documents dating back to 2015, despite having to additionally review approximately 70,000 more documents.” Id., citing Docket No. 286-5, p. 7 (footnote omitted).

Characterizing Allergan’s position as “flip-flopping,” Revance contends that Allergan has not been consistent about whether search terms are required to find and produce responsive documents. Docket No. 291, p. 6-7. Revance also asserts that “Allergan initially refused to search for documents from 2015 to 2018,” and only began searching within this time period “a month after the deadline passed, [on] October 31 . . . .” Id. at 7, citing Docket No. 286-5 p. 7; Docket No. 267-6, p. 4.

The Court ordered that “to the extent that any nonprivileged documents that are responsive to these RFP are within Allergan’s possession, custody, or control, Allergan must produce them to Revance.” Docket No. 204, p. 21, 22. Allergan appears to have conducted a reasonable search for such documents pursuant to Rule 26 and maintains that it has produced the documents it found. Revance has not put forth any convincing evidence that Allergan has failed to do as the Court required. Allergan’s process, depending in large part upon the use of ESI search terms, appears reasonable to the Court due to the volume of documents in this litigation. As previously noted, the fact that Allergan has continued to produce documents since the September 30 deadline is not a violation of the Order as ongoing supplementation is required by Rule 26.

Much of Revance’s briefing focuses on small technical matters that do not persuade the Court that a violation has occurred. For example, Revance’s contention that that “Allergan initially refused to search for documents from 2015 to 2018,” and only began searching within this time period “a month after the deadline passed, [on] October 31 . . . .” appears to be based on a letter from Allergan’s counsel dated October 31, 2024, that states in part “in light of Revance’s request after the Court’s Order that Allergan should be running [ESI] searches on data going back to 2015, Allergan is expanding the date range of these searches accordingly.” Docket No. 267-6, p. 4. It is not clear from this letter when Allergan began running searches on data going back to 2015, only that it was ongoing as of the date of the letter, October 31, 2024, and appears not to have been occurring on September 25, 2024, when Allergan detailed the searches it was then running in a letter to Revance. See Docket No. 267-1, p. 3.

Allergan should have begun searching back to January 1, 2015, as soon as the Order issued, and certainly should not have waited for a “request” from Revance to do what the Order mandated, regardless of when it began expanding its search.[4] But Allergan complied within a reasonable time period, and (as discussed below), Revance has not established that it was prejudiced by what was, at most, a six-week delay.

3. Substantial Justification or Other Circumstances

“[An action] is ‘substantially justified’ if it raises an issue about which ‘there is a genuine dispute, or if reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.’” Doe v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 407 F.3d 755, 765, quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). In the Sixth Circuit, four factors are considered when determining whether the imposition of sanctions was an abuse of discretion:

The first factor is whether the party’s failure to cooperate in discovery is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault; the second factor is whether the adversary was prejudiced by the party’s failure to cooperate in discovery; the third factor is whether the party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to the sanction; and the fourth factor in regard to a dismissal is whether less drastic sanctions were first imposed or considered.

Id. at 765-66, quoting Freeland v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1997).

For the most part, the Court finds that Allergan has complied with the Court’s Order by conducting reasonable searches and producing the resulting documents. To the extent that Allergan has failed to comply (for example, by not beginning to search back to January 1, 2015 by September 25 and possibly later), the Court finds that the lack of compliance was not done in bad faith (in part because Allergan complied soon thereafter) and that Revance has not been prejudiced (because the discovery is ongoing and because both Parties have contributed to the delays in this matter).[5] 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Revance’s Motion (Docket No. 267) is GRANTED IN PART. No later than April 11, 2025, Allergan must file a notice stating that it has conducted reasonable searches for all the documents it was ordered to produce in the Court’s September 16 Order (Docket No. 204) and has produced all of the nonprivileged documents that were located as a result of those searches to Allergan. To the extent that it has not yet been done, by that same date, Allergan must verify its supplemental responses to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 12.

IT IS SO ORDERED.,