MARKETRX INC, a corporation, Plaintiff, v. Michael TURNER, Defendants Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Somerset, Hunterdon and Warren Counties Decided March 31, 2006 Counsel Douglas S. Zucker (Schenck, Price, Smith &amp; King, LLP) for Campbell. Stephen H. Roth for Defendant. Charles A. Reid, III (Drinker, Biddle &amp; Reath) for Plaintiff. Williams, Rosemary R., Judge Motion to Intervene; Motion for a Confidentiality Order; Motion to Compel Discovery; Motion to Quash Subpoena Background *1 Michael Turner (hereinafter “Defendant”) is an employee of Campbell Alliance Group, Inc. (hereinafter “Campbell”). Campbell is a management consulting firm specializing in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries. MarketRx (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) was Defendant's most recent employer prior to his employment with Campbell. Plaintiff is a competitor of Campbell in that it is also a management consultant to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Starting November 15, 2005, before Defendant began working for Campbell, Plaintiff wrote to Campbell and tried to limit Defendant's work for the company, based upon the terms of a non-compete agreement he signed with marketRx. Thereafter followed an exchange of correspondence between marketRx, Campbell, Mr. Turner, and their respective counsel. On or about January 19, 2006, marketRx filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint against Defendant, seeking a declaration that he is in violation of his agreement with Plaintiff and seeking damages. Plaintiff also sought an order which preliminarily and permanently enjoined and restrained him from working for Campbell in the areas of sales force planning and analysis and promotion planning and optimization or in any other capacity that would construe competitive activity under his non-compete agreement with marketRx. Plaintiff was also seeking an Order which preliminarily and permanently enjoined and restrained him from using, disclosing, conveying or disposing of in any manner marketRx's confidential, proprietary and trade secret information for his own benefit, to the benefit of Campbell or any others, and to the detriment of marketRx. The Court denied Plaintiff's request but did order Defendant to appear and answer the Order to Show Cause on March 10, 2006. Plaintiff also served Defendant simultaneously with the pleadings twenty-six (26) separate document demands and a notice for deposition on March 3, 2006. Plaintiff again filed a Motion with the Court on February 1, 2006 to order expedited discovery. Further, on February 15, 2006, marketRx's counsel served a subpoena on Campbell, through its counsel, with thirty-five (35) separate categories of documents that Plaintiff is seeking. Campbell is now seeking to intervene as a discovery defendant and to Quash Plaintiff's subpoena. MarketRx then filed a Motion to Compel Defendant to comply with its discovery requests. A. Motion to Intervene; Motion for a Confidentiality Order I. Campbell-Movant-Contends Campbell argues that the discovery sought by marketRx is an attempt for the company to gain protected information about Campbell. It contends these demands are directed at it, rather than at Mr. Turner or at protecting marketRx's proprietary information. An example of one of the requests is “any and all documents provided to [Mr. Turner] by Campbell Alliance from January 1, 2005 to the present.” Therefore, Campbell is seeking to intervene in this matter as a matter of right in order to protect its interests in its employee, in its documents, and in its confidential and proprietary information. *2 Intervention of right is set forth in R. 4:33-1 which states: Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action if the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. Campbell argues it can prove all four elements of this rule and therefore the Court must approve its application for intervention as of right. ACLU of New Jersey, Inc. v. County of Hudson, 352 N.J.Super. 44, 67 (App.Div.2002). Firstly, Campbell claims it has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action. The focus of the present action is that after leaving Plaintiff, Defendant began working for Campbell in violation of the non-compete agreement he had signed. Furthermore, Plaintiff is seeking to have Defendant enjoined from working for Campbell in a number of areas. Also, Campbell was directly subpoenaed for thirty-five of its business documents for this action. Thus, Campbell contends it is clear that it has an interest in this action. In addition, this action may impair Campbell's interest in Mr. Turner and its own confidential and proprietary information. Here, disclosure of Campbell's confidential and proprietary information to Plaintiff “will have a direct and immediate impact” on Campbell's business operations by eliminating its competitive advantage and, once disclosed, there would be no way that Campbell “might remedy the effect of disclosure once it has taken place.” ACLU, 352 N.J.Super. at 69-70. This would thus clearly satisfy the second prong of R. 4:33-1 test. Thirdly, Campbell's interest cannot adequately be represented by the present parties. Mr. Turner is a recently hired employee who is not in a position to represent Campbell's interest as those interests may not always be congruent. Moreover, Campbell's application is timely. On the issue of timeliness, courts have been quite flexible, allowing a motion for intervention to be granted as late as after entry of judgment. See Warner Co. v. Sutton, 270 N.J.Super. 658 (App.Div.1994). Plaintiff's verified complaint is dated January 17, 2006 and all parties have met together as recently as February 2, 2006. Furthermore, Mr. Turner was required to appear to answer the Order to Show Cause on March 10, 2006. Campbell argues that clearly the filing here is timely and therefore contends the Court must grant its request. If the Court does not grant its request, Campbell argues its Motion should be granted as a permissive intervention. Permissive intervention is found under R. 4:33-2 and is a more lax standard than that of intervention as a right. This rule provides: Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action if the claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any state or executive order administered by a state or federal governmental agency or officer, or upon any regulation, order, requirement or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the agency or officer upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. *3 The rule on “permissive intervention, R. 4:33-2, is to be liberally construed by trial courts ... with a view to whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties ... and whether intervention will eliminate the need for subsequent litigation.” Zirger v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327, 341 (1996). Since there are common questions of law and fact in the case at hand, Campbell argues that it is should be permitted to intervene under this rule. II. Plaintiff's-Cross-Movant's-Position Plaintiff partially opposes Campbell's Motion to Intervene as a Matter of Right; Plaintiff is not opposed to Campbell's intervention to the extent that it seeks to participate in discovery of its employee but it does oppose Campbell's motion to the extent that it seeks unrestricted intervention as of right. Plaintiff asks the Court to limit Campbell's intervention to attending and raising objections at Mr. Turner's deposition or in participating in and objecting to discovery requests served upon Mr. Turner or anyone else who may have knowledge of Campbell's trade secrets or confidential information. Thus, the Court should limit Campbell's intervention to participation in discovery matters which implicate its own trade secrets. Campbell should not be permitted to attend the depositions of marketRx's witnesses or obtain documents provided to Defendant or his counsel that may contain any of Plaintiff's trade secrets and confidential and proprietary interests. MarketRx argues Campbell does not have a right to intervene under R. 4:33-1. It contends that Mr. Turner is in violation of a non-compete agreement by engaging in competitive activity. Therefore the “property or transaction which is the subject of the action” is the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, to which Campbell is a stranger to and under which it has no rights. While Campbell may be financially impacted if Mr. Turner is no longer permitted to remain its employee in certain areas, Plaintiff argues Campbell has no “direct, substantial, legally protectable interest” in the “subject of this action” as it has no standing to contest the validity or reasonableness of the agreement at issue. See Washington Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Massachusetts Mun, Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir.1990) (“An interest that is remote from the subject matter of the proceeding, or that is contingent upon the occurrence of a sequence of events before it becomes colorable, will not satisfy the rule.”). Second, Plaintiff contends Campbell is not so situated that the disposition of this action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect whatever confidentiality interest it seeks to protect. This action does not impede Campbell from bringing a separate action against Defendant nor would it be estopped from any findings of the factual and legal issues in this case, nor would res judicata apply against it. Moreover, Campbell's interest in protecting its trade secrets can be adequately protected under the confidentiality order Plaintiff is seeking. Therefore, the Court should deny Campbell's application to intervene as a right to all discovery. *4 Plaintiff is also seeking a confidentiality order of this Court. R. 4:10-3 permits the Court to “make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including but not limited to ... [t]hat a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.” MarketRx recognizes Campbell's concern in protecting its trade secret and other confidential information from its competitors and the public at large as it too shares the same concern. Plaintiff believes both parties' fears can be assuaged by the entry of a confidentiality order which would, among other things, allow Campbell to exclude disclosure of certain documents to marketRx and its employees and limit such disclosure solely to Plaintiff's attorneys and experts. Courts have approved protective orders limiting a party's disclosure to the adverse party's attorney and experts under instructions not to communicate its contents to any other person including the client and its employees in the past. See Alk Associates, Inc. v. Multimodal Applied Systems, Inc., 276 N.J.Super. 310 (App.Div.1994). Plaintiff requests the Court enter a Confidentiality Order which would allow it to direct that certain documents be viewed only by Mr. Turner and Campbell's attorneys and experts and that would also allow Campbell to direct that certain documents only be viewed by marketRx's attorneys and experts. In response to marketRx's Cross-Motion for a Confidentiality Order, Campbell argues that such an order will not adequately protect it and its clients. It contends that even with a confidentiality order in place, it would still be required to disclose confidential, proprietary and trade secret information belonging not only to it, but also to its clients. Campbell therefore requests the Court deny Plaintiff's Cross-Motion and grant its Motion to Quash (discussed below). III. Discussion Motion to Intervene: Rule 4:33-1 states: Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action if the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. Moreover, applications to intervene should be treated liberally. See Civ. Liberties v. County of Hudson, 352 N.J.Super. 44, 67 (App.Div.), certif den. 174 N.J. 191 (2002). The Court believes that Campbell is entitled to intervene in this matter, as it has an undeniable interest in its employee. However, marketRx correctly points out that its proprietary and confidential interests may be jeopardized by Campbell's presence. Therefore, this Court will allow Campbell to intervene in the deposition of Mr. Turner only. Motion for a Confidentiality Order: *5 When a party has good cause to believe they should be protected from certain requests for a number of reasons the proper procedure is to apply to the court for a protective order pursuant to Rule 4:10-3 which states in relevant part: Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including, but not limited to, one or more of the following: (a) That the discovery not be had; (b) That the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; ... (d) That certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; ... (g) That a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; ... Here, Campbell is seeking to intervene, arguing that its confidential and proprietary interests are at issue in Plaintiff's action against Mr. Turner. Plaintiff argues that if Campbell is permitted to intervene without any restriction, its interests are jeopardized. In order to assuage the parties' concerns over the dissemination of their personal business information, Plaintiff seeks to have this Court impose a confidentiality order on all parties. The Court believes this request would help to protect both parties' interests in this matter and therefore grants Plaintiff's request. Thus, whenever material is confidential to either side (marketRx or Campbell), said material is to be viewed by opposing counsel and Mr. Turner (if appropriate) only. Both parties are ordered to abide by this confidentiality order in good faith. However, all parties should realize that this confidentiality order pertains to discovery only. Any documents which are made part of the Court's file must be made available to the public. IV. Decision Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, Campbell's Motion to Intervene is hereby Granted in Part and Denied in Part. Plaintiff's Motion for a Confidentiality Order is also hereby Granted. B. Motion to Quash Plaintiff's Subpoena I. Campbell's-Movant's-Position Campbell argues that this Court should quash marketRx's subpoena to protect its trade secrets and proprietary information. The company brings its Motion pursuant to R. 1:9-2 and seeks protection of the Court under R. 4:10-3. R. 1:9-2 states “[a] subpoena ... may require production of books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion may promptly quash or modify the subpoena on notice if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive ...” R. 4:10-3 states, in part: Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including, but not limited to, one or more of the following: *6 (a) That discovery not be had; ... (d) That certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; ... (g) That a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way Campbell argues that R. 4:10-3(g) is specifically appropriate here because it is seeking an Order from this Court to protect its “trade secret[s] and other confidential research, development, or commercial information not to be disclosed” to marketRx. It contends that it is well established that our courts can and will use this Rule to protect trade secrets and proprietary information from discovery. Hammock v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 142 N.J. 356 (1995) (Rule 4:10-3 can be paraphrased to be read that for “good cause shown, the court may make an order which justice requires to protect a party” from whom discovery is sought, by ordering that “a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.”). Initially, Campbell avers its consulting methodologies and compensation programs constitute trade secrets. It reminds the Court that there is a legitimate protectable interest of an employer regarding “trade secrets and other proprietary information ... and customer relations,” recognized by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta, 110 N.J. 609 (1988). The Restatement provides that a trade secret: [M]ay consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. Restatement of Torts § 757 Comment b (1939). Furthermore, the Court in Ciavatta listed six factors that the Restatement uses to determine whether a given idea for information constitutes a trade secret. Those factors are: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside the business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the owner to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to the business and to its competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended in developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others Id. at 637. Campbell contends its proprietary practices plainly satisfy the definition of a trade secret set forth in the Restatement and in Ciavatta. It states it goes to extraordinary lengths to protect the confidentiality of its consulting methodologies, including its documents, information, and proposals, and its performance management process. Campbell requires all of its applicants to sign a non-disclosure agreement and an employee confidentiality, proprietary rights and intellectual property agreement to protect its interests in its confidentiality. While it does publicize its employee compensation program, it imposes internal and external safeguards to limit the access to its confidential documents and information. Security is essential to the business to maintain its competitive position in its field. Thus it argues that its business methodologies, proposals, client projects, compensation system, and performance management process, all satisfy both the definition and the six part standard established in the Restatement and adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Ciavatta, 110 N.J. at 636, 637. *7 Campbell further argues that the Court's protective order should preclude marketRx from seeking or obtaining discovery of any of Campbell's trade secrets and proprietary information. Since it is clear that that its information constitutes a trade secret, Campbell contends that the Court should grant a protective order prohibiting marketRx from gaining access to many of the documents it seeks. Hammock v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 142 N.J. at 376. (“Documents containing trade secrets, confidential business information and privileged information may be protected from disclosure.”). It claims the following requests of the subpoena seek documents and information that constitute trade secrets and should be included in a protective order prohibiting marketRx from gaining any access to them: (a) requests seeking documents and information describing Campbell's compensation and performance management system (requests 1, 2, 12); (b) requests seeking documents and information describing any type of work that Turner performed for Campbell, including solicitations, proposals, and all documents and communications (including e-mails) he sent or received, and all computers and electronic equipment he touched (request numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 28, 30, 31); (c) requests seeking documents and information containing confidential client information, including RFPs and solicitations or proposals (request numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16), as well as all communications, including all e-mails, he sent or received, and every computer or electronic equipment and he touched, including all backups (request numbers 3, 10, 28, 30, and 31). Campbell also argues that marketRx's subpoena is overly broad and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is aimed at limiting competition, not protecting its legitimate interest. It claims the subpoena is extremely broad in its application and that it does not seek information that is subject to discovery as defined in our Rules of Court. R. 4:10-2(a), which defines the scope of permissible discovery, states: any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; nor is it ground for objection that the examining party has knowledge of the matters as to which discovery is sought. Campbell argues that marketRx is alleging in its action that Michael Turner is in breach of the proprietary information and inventions agreement he signed during his employment with marketRx. Its Complaint does not allege that Campbell did anything improper or that he or Campbell actually used any of marketRx's proprietary information since Turner began working for Campbell. MarketRx seeks all the information that Turner received, prepared, reviewed, created, read, or to which he was “privy” if it falls within the bounds of any type of work that marketRx performs. It also seeks extensive information about Campbell's practices and policies regarding document retention and computer back-up, when it has not established any basis on which such information either is relevant or reasonably may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Because marketRx did not cite any evidence to indicate that Turner used its proprietary information or conveyed it to Campbell, Campbell argues that marketRx has no basis for its assertion that Turner will violate his agreement with them, except that he learned the proprietary information while working there. Campbell argues that New Jersey law would not support marketRx's position because “a former employee is not required ‘to search his mind for all thoughts relating to the employer's business and thereafter be precluded from employing such thoughts when they are not trade secrets'.” Ciavatta, 110 N.J. at 631 (citing GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F.Supp. 762, 767 (S.D.Ohio 1969)). *8 Campbell contends that some of marketRx's requests make it patently clear that the intention behind the subpoena is to obtain confidential, proprietary and competitive information about Campbell. Some of its requests are intended to force Campbell to disclose its competitive position in the market place and where it may be directing its resources in the future. Therefore Campbell argues that marketRx is not trying to protect its own proprietary information, but rather, is trying to uncover as much of Campbell's confidential information as it can. It claims these efforts to thwart competition, rather than protect legitimate interests, will not receive judicial support and must be rejected. It points to Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc., 359 N.J.Super. 420, 434 (App.Div.2003), which states: When an employer's interests are strong, as seen in cases involving trade secrets or confidential information, a court will enforce a restrictive covenant; however, when the employer's interests “do not rise to the level of a proprietary interest deserving of judicial protection, a court will conclude that a restrictive agreement merely stifles competition and therefore is unenforceable.” ... A court will not enforce restrictive covenants “principally directed at lessening competition.” Id. at 434 (citing Ciavatti, 110 N.J. at 634-635; Raven v. A. Klein &amp; Co., Inc., 195 N.J.Super. 209, 213 (App.Div.1994)). Campbell argues this Court must not allow marketRx to use this litigation in an anti-competitive manner, as is its clear intention. Therefore, Campbell contends the Court should quash marketRx's subpoena. II. Plaintiff's-marketRx's-Position MarketRx contends its document requests are relevant to the claims against Mr. Turner as they are aimed at protecting its legitimate interests. In its brief, Campbell argues that marketRx is not entitled to “many of the documents sought in” its subpoena because marketRx has not demonstrated that Turner actually used its proprietary information or conveyed it to Campbell. However, Plaintiff claims regardless of whether the standard is “actual use” or the sufficient likelihood of use, it is entitled to discovery to determine whether he has used or is likely to use its trade secret information. Plaintiff contends Mr. Turner and Campbell have refused to produce any discovery related to his duties and responsibilities at Campbell and it should not be forced to rely on Mr. Turner's word that he is not violating the agreement he signed with them. Instead, it argues it has the right to conduct discovery on “all relevant, unprivileged information which may lead to the discovery of relevant evidence concerning the respective positions of both plaintiff and defendant.” Huie v. Newcomb Hosp., 112 N.J.Super. 429, 432 (App.Div.1970); cf. Pressler, Current Rules of Court N.J. Court Rules, comment 2 on R. 4:10-2 (2006) (“Relevancy for purposes of [R. 4:10-2] has been defined as congruent with relevancy under N.J.R.E. 401, namely, a ‘tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.” ’) (citing Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 148 N.J. 524 (1997) and K.S. v. ABC Professional Corp., 330 N.J.Super. 288, 291 (App.Div.2000)). *9 R. 4:10-2 provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and locations of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.” It further provides that “[i]t is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; nor is it ground for objection that the examining party has knowledge of the matters as to which discovery is sought.” R. 4:10-2. New Jersey's discovery rules are designed to “eliminate, as far as possible, concealment and surprise in the trial of lawsuits to the end that judgments rest upon real merits of the causes and not upon the skill and maneuvering of counsel.” Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v.. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 512 (1995) (quoting Oliviero v. Porter Hayden Co., 241 N.J.Super. 381, 387 (App.Div.1990)). MarketRx argues that Campbell's goal in filing the instant motion and its related Motion to Intervene is to limit the information that marketRx can present to the Court for purposes of the preliminary injunction against Mr. Turner. It claims that to argue that marketRx is not entitled to any discovery related to the nature of Turner's duties and responsibilities at Campbell is, at best, a transparent attempt to preclude marketRx from obtaining the information which would allow it to establish Turner's breach of his agreement and, in turn, its right to preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiff contends it has a strong interest in its confidential and proprietary matters and that Mr. Turner is in possession of its trade secrets. If such information was disseminated to its competition, it would greatly affect marketRx. “The employer's legitimate interests in protecting his trade secrets and the like have been long recognized even in cases without noncompetitive agreements though reasonably confined noncompetitive agreements may properly serve to avoid difficulties of definition and proof.” Whitmyer Bros., Inc. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25, 33 (1971) (internal citation omitted). It is well settled that “an employee's covenant [not to compete] will be given effect if it is reasonable under all the circumstances of his particular case [, and] it will generally be found to be reasonable if it ‘simply protects the legitimate interests of the employer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public.” ’ Whitmyer, 58 N.J. at 33. Here, marketRx claims it has it a legitimate interest in protecting its proprietary methodologies and software and other sensitive business information through the enforcement of a reasonable non-compete agreement, and its discovery requests are directly related to these issues and Mr. Turner's defense that he is not violating the agreement. Both Campbell and marketRx offer similar services and Plaintiff contends Mr. Turner may be assigned to an area in Campbell which he has first hand knowledge of its secrets which puts him in a position where he could produce great harm to marketRx. *10 MarketRx argues its discovery requests are narrowly tailored and are directly relevant to the claims and defenses in this case. Thus, it argues its requests easily fall within the New Jersey Court Rule's broad relevancy standard for discovery requests which should cause the Court to deny Campbell's request to quash the subpoena. Furthermore, Plaintiff claims many of the documents it seeks do not implicate Campbell's trade secrets. It contends that it requested numerous documents, such as “any and all documents referring to, relating to or reflecting your recruitment, solicitation or hiring by Campbell Alliance,” (to Mr. Turner) which clearly do not implicate any of Campbell's confidential information. It argues that Campbell's, and Turner's, refusal to produce any discovery materials, even when confidentiality is not implicated, evidences their motive to prevent marketRx from obtaining any discovery prior to the preliminary injunction hearing. Lastly, marketRx contends that even if some of the documents requested contain trade secrets, the parties' concerns about disclosure of trade secrets information can be protected by the entry of an appropriate confidentiality order. III. Defendant's-Turner's-Position Turner contends that is not in violation of the non-compete agreement he signed and that he will not violate said agreement. Furthermore, he argues that New Jersey has long refused to enforce any part of a restrictive covenant which is designed principally to suppress competition and to deny a former employee the opportunity to use his education and experience in his chosen career to support his family. Solari Industries, Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 576, 581 and 586 (1970); Whitmyer Bros. Inc. v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25, 31-33 (1971) (“The doubtful nature of the employer's claimed trade secrets or confidential information and the comprehensiveness of the verified denials by the former employees clearly point to the inappropriateness of any preliminary relief grounded on the suggested legitimate interests of the employer in trade secrets or confidential information.” Id. at 37). Thus he argues, in the context of the established case law, that it is irrelevant, as a matter of law, whether, as marketRx claims, it is in competition with Campbell or whether the different tools and approaches used by Campbell in its worldwide consulting business are qualitatively different form the formula-based approach of the upstart, would-be competitor, marketRx. He contends that unless and until Plaintiff makes any prima facie showing of his alleged breach of any enforceable restrictive covenant, marketRx's blizzard of paper will amount to nothing more than a “snow job.” Accordingly, he claims Plaintiff's demands are nothing more than an ice-fishing expedition. Berrie v. Berrie, 188 Super. 274, 286 (Ch. Div.1983) (“Justice Holmes recognized a right to confidentiality of business records in prohibiting ‘... a fishing expedition into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence ... The interruption of business, the possible revelation of trade secrets, and the expense of compliance ... are the least considerations. It is contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a search through all of the respondents' records, relevant, or irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn up.” FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306, (1921)). Therefore he requests that the Court grant Campbell's Motion. IV. Discussion *11 Here, Campbell and Turner argue the anti-compete agreement is too restrictive and therefore unenforceable. In order for an anti-competition agreement to be enforceable it must be reasonable under the circumstances. See Solari, 55 N.J. at 585. The court in Solari established a three part test to determine if an agreement is reasonable under the circumstances. The test set forth in Solari was recently reaffirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in The Community Hospital Group, Inc. v. More, M.D., 183 N .J. 36 (2005) and requires that: “(1) it must be necessary to protect the parties' legitimate interests; (2) it must cause no undue hardship on the former employee, and (3) it must not impair the public interest.” A.T. Hudson &amp; Co., Inc. v. Donovan, 216 N .J.Super. 426, 432 (App.Div.1987) (citing Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Applying the test established by the New Jersey Supreme Court to the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant the Court concludes that it is not clear the agreement will ultimately be found valid. The agreement prevents Defendant from performing a multitude of activities for another company without any geographic limitation. The protection of customer relationships and confidential information is a legitimate interest. See Ciavatta, 110 N.J. at 626; A.T.Hudson &amp; Co. v. Donovan, 216 N.J.Super. 426, 432-33 (App.Div.1987); Platinum Management, Inc. v. Dahms, 285 N.J.Super. 274, 294 (Law Div.1995). Here, the covenant restricts Turner from working with marketRx's clients who: (a) had an established relationship with marketRx during the year before his resignation; and (b) who have a relationship with Plaintiff within the year of his resignation. This requirement does not seem unreasonable. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that one should look to “the likelihood of the employee finding work in his field elsewhere” and the reason for the termination of employment between the parties. Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 N.J. 408, 423 (App.Div.1977). When an employer is the one who caused the parties to separate and the employee did not contribute to the separation enforcement of the covenant may be characterized as an undue hardship. The Community Hospital Group, Inc. v. More, M.D., supra, 183 N.J. at 58 citing Karlin v. Weinberg, supra, 77 N.J. at 423. Moreover, Karlin held that “a court should be hesitant to find undue hardship on the employee” when the employee voluntarily left the employment and in effect brought the hardship upon himself. Karlin v. Weinberg,supra, 77 N.J. at 424. Here, Mr. Turner is only affected by this agreement for one year. He has the ability to perform many services with Campbell so long as they do not implicate the confidentiality agreement he had signed with his former employer. Therefore, the Court finds the agreement will probably satisfy the first and second factors of the Solari test. *12 Moreover, the agreement appears to satisfy the third factor of the Solari test. Again the court in Karlin promulgated certain factors which a court can take into consideration when determining what effect the agreement would have on the public. These factors include: (1) “the demand for services rendered by the employee” and the likelihood that those services could be provided by others in the geographic area; (2) the extent to which clients will be unable to seek out the services of the departing employee. Here it is clear that several companies provide the same type of services provided by Campbell. For instance marketRx competes with Campbell. The agreement here is similar to the agreements in Karlin and Schuhalter. In those cases the public could still choose to go to the former employee for services. In Schuhalter the employee had to make payments to the former employer for any customer who chooses to seek the employee's services, while in Karlin the public simply had to travel a further distance to obtain the services of the former employee. See Karlin, 77 N .J. 408; Schuhalter v. Salerno, 279 N.J.Super. 504 (App.Div.1995). Here, the public can still seek out Defendant's services. Defendant is simply prevented from soliciting Plaintiff's clients. Therefore, the agreement at hand does not seem detrimental to the public and is likely to be enforceable. In order to quash a subpoena a party must satisfy R. 4:10-3 which states in relevant part: Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including, but not limited to, one or more of the following: (a) That the discovery not be had; (b) That the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (c) That the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (d) That certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; ... (g) That a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; ... If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of R. 4:23-1(c) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. Furthermore, R. 1:9-2 states in relevant part: A subpoena or, in a civil action, a notice in lieu of subpoena as authorized by R. 1:9-1 may require production of books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena or notice if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive and, in a civil action, may condition denial of the motion upon the advancement by the person in whose behalf the subpoena or notice is issued of the reasonable cost of producing the objects subpoenaed. *13 In State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 556-57 (1949) it was determined that a subpoena duces tecum could be quashed if it is unreasonable or oppressive. Under either R. 1:9-2 or R. 4:10-3 the determination of whether to quash and or modify a subpoena is based upon reasonableness and oppression. Here, Campbell and Turner argue that the information sought is confidential and the reasons why Plaintiff is seeking them is not substantiated by sufficient evidence. R. 4:10-2 governs what may be had by discovery and states in relevant part: Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: (a) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; nor is it ground for objection that the examining party has knowledge of the matters as to which discovery is sought. Here, Plaintiff argues the information sought is for purposes of showing Turner has in fact violated his non-compete agreement. In fact, the Court believes that Defendant's violation of said agreement may be implicated by the nature of his employment with Campbell. This therefore would appear to be relevant to the litigation. Since the information sought appears “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” this Court finds that Campbell should comply with the discovery requests. However, since this matter involves highly confidential information, the Court believes that the confidentiality order originally requested by marketRx should extend to this issue. In other words, Campbell and Turner are required to comply with Plaintiff's discovery requests. However, when the requested information/documentation is confidential, it should be so marked and may then only be viewed by Plaintiff's counsel. IV. Decision Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, Campbell's Motion to Quash marketRx's Subpoena is hereby Denied. C. Motion to Compel Written Responses and Production of Documents I. MarketRx's-Movant's-Position Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to an Order, pursuant to R. 4:18-1(b), requiring Mr. Turner to provide written responses to its document requests and to produce all responsive documents, or in the alternative, an Order, pursuant to R. 4:23-5(c), suppressing Mr. Turner's Answer. R. 4:18-1(b) provides, in pertinent part: *14 ... The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a written response within 35 days after the service of the request, except that a defendant may serve a response within 50 days after service of the summons and complaint upon that defendant. The written response, without documentation annexed but which shall be made available to all parties on request, shall be served by the party to whom the request was made upon all parties to the action. The response shall state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested, unless the request is objected to, in which event the reasons for objection shall be stated. Rule 4:18-1(b). The Rule further provides that “[t]he party submitting the request may move for an order of dismissal or suppression or an order to compel pursuant to R. 4:23-5 with respect to any objection to or other failure to respond to the request or any part thereof or any failure to permit inspection as requested.” Id.; see also R. 4:23-5(c) (“Prior to moving to dismiss ... a party may move for an order compelling discovery demanded pursuant to R. 4:18-1 ...”). The New Jersey Court Rules provide broad authority for a court to resolve discovery disputes in a fair and expeditious manner. R. 4:23-5(a)(1) allows a court to enter an order suppressing the pleading of a party who has failed to comply with a discovery demand pursuant to R. 4:18. The imposition of sanctions to enforce the rules of discovery is both explicit and “inherent in the judicial power.” Seacoast Builders Corp. v. Rutgers, 358 N.J.Super. 524, 542 (App.Div.2003). Furthermore, the imposition of sanctions is “peculiarly necessary in matters of discovery.” Lang v. Morgan's Home Equip. Corp., 6 N.J. 333, 338 (1951). Discovery rules are meant to eliminate “concealment and surprise in the trial of lawsuits to the end that judgments rest upon real merits of the causes and not upon the skill and maneuvering of counsel.” Abtrax Pharms., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 512 (1995) (quotingOliviero v. Porter Hayden Co., 241 N.J.Super. 381, 387 (App.Div.1990)). A party's failure to comply with discovery demands would afford it an unfair advantage, and “[p]revention of unfair advantage is a basic premise of our discovery rules.” Id. at 521-522. Here, marketRx served Mr. Turner with its First Request for the Production of Documents on January 20, 2006. His responses were therefore due on March 13, 2006. R. 4:10-2(a) authorizes discovery “regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ...” Plaintiff contends its requests are narrowly tailored and directly related to its claims against Mr. Turner. While Mr. Turner claims he cannot produce any documentation due to Campbell's Motion to Quash marketRx's subpoena, Plaintiff contends he should produce information that does not implicate Campbell's trade secret information since it did not seek confidential information only. *15 Plaintiff argues that at the very least Mr. Turner should provide written responses to its requests so that it can assess the nature of any objection. This, it claims, is a basic requirement under R. 4:18-1 that Defendant has failed to meet. Moreover, it argues there is no reason why it should have to wait to receive documents that are either unrelated to Defendant's relationship with Campbell or related to his relationship with marketRx or unrelated to Campbell's trade secrets. As such, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant its Motion to Compel Turner to provide written responses to its First Request for the Production of Documents and to produce all responsive documents by Monday, April 3, 2006 or, in the alternative, that it grant marketRx's Motion to Suppress Turner's Answer. II. Campbell's Position Campbell again argues that much of the information marketRx is seeking contains proprietary, confidential, and trade secret information belonging to it and its clients, to which marketRx has no right to gain access. Moreover, it claims marketRx has not presented any legal justification for its over-intrusive inquiry into such information. Firstly, Campbell argues that the Court should not allow or limit marketRx's discovery because it seeks to limit competition in violation of public policy. Specifically, it contends marketRx has admitted that its only basis for its suit is its belief that Mr. Turner is competing with it. Therefore, given its admitted focus on preventing him from competing, Campbell claims marketRx's claims cannot proceed as a matter of law unless it can prove more than the Turner may be competing. Campbell also claims marketRx cannot enforce its covenant solely to stifle its competition. MarketRx has failed to identify even one of its clients that Mr. Turner solicited using contacts or information he gained at marketRx. Likewise, it has not identified any trade secrets or confidential information of marketRx that he removed, used or will use in working for Campbell. Simply stated, marketRx cannot stop Defendant from competing. See Ciavatta, 110 N.J. 609; Raven v. A. Klein &amp; Co., 195 N.J.Super. 209, 213 (App.Div.1984); Hudson Foam Latex Prods., Inc. v. Aiken, 82 N.J.Super. 508 (App.Div.1964). It further contends marketRx cannot prohibit Turner from using prior knowledge to compete. Courts in New Jersey will enforce a non-compete provision in an employment agreement only if it finds that the covenant, “simply protects the legitimate interests of the employer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee and is not injurious to the public.” Whitmyer, 58 N.J. at 32-33; Solari, 55 N.J. at 585. Our Supreme Court in Ciavatta opined: Courts also recognize that knowledge, skill, expertise, and information acquired by an employee during his employment become part of the employee's person. “They belong to him as an individual for the transaction of any business in which he may engage, just the same as any part of the skill, knowledge and information received by him before entering the employment.” ... An employee can use those skills in any business or profession he may choose, including a competitive business with his former employer. Courts will not enforce a restrictive agreement merely to aid the employer in extinguishing competition, albeit competition from a former employee. Ultimately, the consuming public would suffer from judicial nurturing of such naked restraints on competition. *16 110 N.J. at 635 (internal citation omitted). In the case at hand, Turner worked for marketRx for about three and a half years (3 ½). MarketRx recruited him while he was working for ZS Associates, the leading pharmaceutical management consulting firm. Although Turner did gain some knowledge from his work at marketRx, he also brought a substantial amount of knowledge with him to the company. He then went to Campbell where he needed to acquaint himself with its confidential approaches. Campbell argues that it takes a very different approach than marketRx and that it uses different methodologies to provide consulting services to its respective clients and that Mr. Turner has no means of accessing marketRx's proprietary programs, even if that was his goal. Moreover, as a former employee, Campbell argues that Defendant is not required “to search his mind for all thoughts relating to the employer's business and thereafter be precluded from employing such thoughts when they are not trade secrets ... [because a]n employer is only entitled to restrain a former employee from disclosing and using confidential information which was developed as a result of the employer's initiative and investment and which the employee learned as a result of the employment relationship.” Ciavatta, 110 N.J. at 630 (citing GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F.Supp. 762, 767-768 (S.D.Ohio 1969). Mindful of these limitations, Campbell claims it has taken steps to prevent Defendant from using marketRx's proprietary information and trade secrets, and from disclosing such information to Campbell. Furthermore, Mr. Turner will not work in any of the activities that he performed for the first time while working for Plaintiff during the restrictive period in a commitment to his (and Campbell's) pledge to marketRx that he would not use or disclose any proprietary or confidential information or trade secrets of marketRx. Absent a substantiated allegation of misuse of its confidential information, Campbell claims marketRx has no standing to demand discovery of Campbell and its client proprietary, confidential and trade secret information. Campbell also argues that marketRx's attempt to stop Defendant from working at the only job he knows is contrary to public policy. Mr. Turner has always worked in sales consulting for pharmaceutical companies. The public policy of New Jersey does not support enforcement of covenants that prohibit former employees from working in their chosen field. See Ciavatta, 110 N.J. at 632. Thus, Campbell argues that marketRx cannot succeed in its attempt to stop Turner from working in the only industry and position he knows, merely because it fears the competition. Moreover, Campbell and Turner are willing to stipulate to limitations on Defendant's ability to solicit clients with whom he had contact at marketRx through a Court Order, provided marketRx ceases its continued pursuit of Campbell's and Turner's trade secrets and proprietary information, unless and until marketRx can provide an objective basis to demonstrate that Turner is in violation of his agreement with marketRx beyond mere competition. *17 Lastly Campbell claims marketRx is not entitled to discovery regarding Campbell's clients and client prospects. MarketRx must not be permitted to gain access to information from Campbell regarding its client prospects. It cannot seek to obtain disclosure of Campbell's prospective clients and business opportunities under the guise of enforcing its covenant. See Platinum Management v. Dahms, 285 N.J.Super. 274, 299-300 (Law Div.1995) (finding that to the extent a covenant prohibits contact with prospective customers, that portion is “overbroad and, thus, unenforceable” (citing Coskey's, 253 N.J.Super. at 638-639)). Therefore, Campbell argues the Court should deny Plaintiff's Motion. III. Discussion R. 4:18-1 governs New Jersey practice in the production of documents and things ... for inspection and other purposes during pre-litigation discovery. Its scope is set forth in relevant part: Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on behalf of that party, to inspect and copy any designated documents (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, and other data compilations from which information can be obtained and translated, if necessary, by the respondent through electronic devices into reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of R. 4:10-2 and which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served ... R. 4:18-1(a) Scope. Subsection (b) of the Rule states in relevant part that “the request may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon that party.” R. 4:18-1(b) Procedure. R. 1:9-2 provides that “a subpoena ... authorized by R. 1:9-1 may require production of books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein ...” But “except for pretrial production directed by the court pursuant to this rule, subpoenas for pretrial production shall comply with the requirements of R. 4:14-7(c).” R. 1:9-2. The standard for a subpoena is simply one of reasonableness: The early standard of “reasonableness” of the subpoena duces tecum was laid down in ... namely, that its subject must be specified with reasonable certainty ... [and that such a subpoena] should not be used as a substitute for such discovery, particularly where the relevancy and materiality of the material sought to be produced at trial can only be determined by collateral proofs at trial ... Here, Campbell raises issue with the materiality of the discovery sought by marketRx. Specifically it claims marketRx is seeking confidential and proprietary information. Moreover, it argues that marketRx has failed to provide any evidence to suggest Turner has violated the non-compete agreement. Rather it argues Plaintiff is seeking these documents to find enough evidence to prove Turner did in fact violate the agreement. However, marketRx contends that it is only seeking information pursuant to its claims against Turner (and subsequently to his defense of such claims). The subpoena therefore appears to be reasonable. *18 Moreover, the Court notes R. 4:10-2(a) which provides that: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; nor is it ground for objection that the examining party has knowledge of the matters as to which discovery is sought. R. 4:10-2(a). Scope of Discovery. In General. Our discovery rules must “be construed liberally in favor of broad pretrial discovery. Seacoast Builders Corp. v. Rutgers, 358 N.J.Super. 524, 541 (App.Div.2003), citing Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike, 148 N.J. 524, 550 (1997). Relevant documents are presumptively discoverable, but can be withheld by a demonstration of privilege. Here, the discovery sought by marketRx is presumed relevant, as it relates to its claims against Mr. Turner. As such, Campbell and Defendant must comply with Plaintiff's discovery requests. Once again, to protect each parties' interests, they are ordered to comply with the confidentiality order. Should any of the items requested specifically pertain to a trade secret, the information will be submitted to the Court for an in-camera review with an explanation as to why it constitutes a trade secret. All other requested discovery should be produced immediately. IV. Decision Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, marketRx's Motion to Compel is hereby Granted. Campbell and Mr. Turner must comply with its discovery requests by April 3, 2006.