*1 This matter comes before the Court on several outstanding motions.

Plaintiffs were salaried employees at the General Electric Appliances’ (“GE Appliances”) Bloomington Plant. (Docket No. 1 at ECF p. 2). In January 2016, General Electric announced it would be selling its subsidiary GE Appliances to Haier U.S. Appliance Solutions, Inc. (“Haier”). (Docket No. 1 at ECF p. 1). The acquisition involved an anti-trust review by the United States Department of Justice, and was made final on June 6, 2016. (Docket No. 1 at ECF p. 2). Plaintiffs allege that GE Appliances represented to its employees that all benefits would remain the same for one year after the acquisition by Haier was made final and that they also represented this to the Department of Justice during its review of the acquisition. Id. Plaintiffs allege that when they were subsequently laid off by GE Appliances, they did not receive the benefits to which they were entitled to under their purported employment contract. (Docket No. 1 at ECF p. 3). On September 2, 2017, Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit alleged violation of the Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification (WARN) Act (Count I); Breach of Contract (Count II); and Breach of Third-Party Beneficiary (Count III). (Docket No. 1).

On August 1, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the complaint seeking to “clean up the entity which is the properly named defendant” and “to add a legal cause of action of promissory estoppel, which is closely related to the current breach of contract claim.” (Docket No. 45; Docket No. 47). The motion is opposed and fully ripe. (Docket No. 50; Docket No. 52). For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that after a responsive pleading has been filed and twenty-one days have passed, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” The Rule, however “do[es] not mandate that leave be granted in every case. In particular, a district court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint if there is undue delay, bad faith[,] or dilatory motive ... [, or] undue prejudice ..., [or] futility of amendment.” Park v. City of Chicago, 297 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, to amend a pleading after the expiration of the trial court’s Case Management Plan deadline, as here, the moving party must demonstrate “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2). In making a Rule 16(b) good-cause determination, the primary consideration for district courts is the diligence of the party seeking amendment. See Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2011). “Whether to grant or deny leave to amend is within the district court’s discretion.” Campbell v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co., 893 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiffs assert that the amended complaint will not change the discovery in the case nor otherwise delay the case. Plaintiff points to Defendant’s amended answer, which was permitted after the amended pleadings deadline, and asserts that “in fairness,” Plaintiffs should be allowed this amendment as well. (Docket No. 45 at ECF p. 1). Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant will not suffer undue prejudice if the Court grants Plaintiffs’ request. The documents on which Plaintiffs base these claims have already been produced to Defendant and the core of the claim is essentially similar to the breach of contract claim. (Docket No. 47 at ECF p. 2). Defendant argues the motion should be denied as untimely. (Docket No. 50 at ECF p. 1). It argues its post-deadline amended answer met the good cause standard because of newly discovered evidence. (Docket No. 50 at ECF p. 2).

*2 Nearly one year after commencing this action, Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint to assert a promissory estoppel claim that, Plaintiffs themselves, admit is “closely related” to the initial breach of complaint claim. (Docket No. 52 at ECF p. 1). Plaintiffs make no attempt to satisfy the Rule 16(b) “good cause” standard in their initial brief.

A party seeking to amend a pleading after the deadline set forth in the CMP must first show “good cause” for the amendment under Rule 16(b); then, if good cause is shown, the party must demonstrate that the amendment is proper under Rule 15. The Court’s evaluation of good cause is separate from the inquiry into the propriety of the amendment under Rule 15. See Tschantz v. McCann, 160 F.R.D. 568, 571 (N.D. Ind. 1995). To demonstrate “good cause” Plaintiffs must show that despite their diligence the deadline could not have reasonably been met. See id. The Court finds the good cause standard has not been met given Plaintiffs have provided no substantive basis as why this request was filed over five months after the February 20, 2018, deadline. (Docket No. 14 at ECF p. 3).

Plaintiffs’ initial motion to amend does not acknowledge the “good cause” standard at all. Instead, for the first time in their reply brief, Plaintiffs allege that their motion is belated in part because Defendant has dragged its feet throughout the entire discovery process and repeatedly refused to produce relevant information. (Docket No. 52 at ECF p. 2). Plaintiffs assert that if Defendant had cooperated with discovery, Plaintiffs would have been able to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the facts at an earlier date. Id. Plaintiffs provide no substantiation for how Defendant’s purported discovery delinquencies prevented Plaintiffs from identifying promissory estoppel as a cause of action prior to the amended pleading deadline. In fact, the record suggests that Plaintiffs believed that some type of promissory estoppel claim existed when it filed its initial complaint. In Paragraph 8 of the original complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that “GE Appliances represented to its employees that all benefits would remain the same for a term of one year after the acquisition by Haier was made final.” (Docket No. 1 at ECF p. 1, ¶8). This allegation is substantially similar to the revised allegations Plaintiffs assert in their proposed amended complaint. (Docket No. 45-2 at ECF p. 2, ¶¶ 9, 14).

Moreover, Plaintiffs initial motion admits that the core of the claim, that official GE Appliances documents stated Plaintiffs would receive the layoff benefit, is essentially similar to the breach of contract claim. (Docket No. 47 at ECF p. 2). In fact, Plaintiffs concede that their original complaint “described statements made by Haier which promised that employee benefits would remain the same for one year once Haier purchased GE Appliances from GE.” Id. The fact that later discovery provided, unspecified, repeated statements to Plaintiffs meriting the inclusion of a promissory estoppel claim does not negate the fact that Plaintiffs knew of the facts underlying the proposed claim much earlier and failed to include the claim in their original complaint or amend in a timely manner.

Other courts in this circuit have denied motions for leave under similar factual scenarios and have been upheld by the Seventh Circuit. For example, in Trustmark Ins. Co. v. General & Cologne Life Re. of America, the district court found the plaintiff failed to act with due diligence and denied the motion to add a claim for equitable estoppel nine months after the deadline. 424 F.3d 542, 553 (7th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff argued it had good cause for the delay because it did not confirm its suspicions of the misrepresentation until it completed depositions. The district court disagreed, finding that the plaintiff knew, or should have known, the facts underlying the proposed claim much earlier and failed to amend in a timely manner. The Seventh Circuit found the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. See also Alioto, 651 F.3d at 720 (finding the district court did not err in denying leave to amend complaint eight months after the deadline expired due to a lack of diligence).

*3 With regard to “cleaning up” Defendant’s name, the proposed amendment would not change the case’s caption, which would continue to list the Defendant as Haier US Appliance Solutions, Inc. d/b/a GE Appliances. It would amend paragraph 2’s previous reference to Defendant General Electric Appliances to Haier US Appliance Solutions, Inc., which, pursuant to proposed amended complaint paragraph 3, purchased GE Appliances in 2016. (Docket No. 45-1). The Court notes that Defendant admits the allegations of the original complaint’s paragraph 2, which identifies the Defendant. (Docket No. 27 at ECF pp. 1-2). Not only do Plaintiffs not meet the good cause standard, but the amendment appears to be is unnecessary based on the facts before the Court.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Court must grant its belated motion to amend its complaint because the Court has already granted Defendant’s unopposed motion to amend its answer, which was also filed after the amended pleadings deadline. However, Defendant’s motion, which was filed a little over two months after the amended pleading deadline, cites the “good cause” standard and provides a basis for meeting it—namely newly discovered evidence.[1] On these facts, the Court found that “good cause” existed. (Docket No. 26 at ECF p. 2). While Plaintiff never objected to Defendant’s motion to amend, they now argue that the “so-called ‘evidence’ is a release agreement which Haier itself drafted and had in its own files.” (Docket No. 52 at ECF p. 2). These arguments are irrelevant to the Court’s analysis of this motion as Rule 16 requires the party seeking to make the belated request to establish “good cause” for its delay and Plaintiffs have failed to do so here.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint is DENIED. (Docket No. 45).

On July 9, 2018, Defendant’s filed a Motion for Protective Order and to Quash Trial Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions and Subpoenas Duces Tecum Issued to Haier US Appliance Solutions, Inc. and General Electric (Docket No. 37). Haier moves to quash three depositions and the corresponding subpoenas duces tecum on the basis that they are not relevant to the matter nor proportional to the needs of the case. The motion is opposed and fully briefed. (Docket No. 37; Docket No. 38; Docket No. 41). For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

As a preliminary procedural matter, a party moving to quash a nonparty subpoena generally lacks standing to challenge the subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d) (entitled “Protecting a Person Subpoena”)); see, e.g., Blake Plus LLC v. Kinetech LLC, No. 1:14-cv-01415-TWP-MJD, 2015 WL 630246, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 11, 2015). Defendant has also moved for a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), premised upon the same arguments as its Motion to Quash and both parties couch their arguments in terms of Rule 26(c). Given the near-identical standards set forth in Rules 26(c) and 45(d) for protection from discovery, the Court will treat the entirety of Defendant’s motion as a motion for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c).

*4 The scope of material obtainable by Rule 45 subpoena generally is measured by the same broad relevancy standard applicable to party discovery under Rule 26(b)(1). Arthrex, Inc. v. Parcus Med., LLC, No. 1:11-mc-00107-SEB-DML, 2011 WL 6415540, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 2011); Graham v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, 206 F.R.D. 251, 253 (S.D. Ind. 2002). Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party “may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The party seeking the discovery bears the burden to prove that the requested documents are both relevant and proportional to the needs of the case.

Here, Plaintiffs allege breach of contract, a third-party beneficiary breach of representations and warranties claim, and violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining and Notification (WARN) Act. (Docket No. 1). On June 8, 2018, Plaintiffs emailed three deposition notices to counsel for Haier. They seek: (1) a Rule 30(b)(6) corporate witness from GE to testify regarding communications between Haier and the federal government and (2) two Rule 30(b)(6) corporate witnesses, one from GE and one from Haier regarding other plant closings at each company from January 1, 2010 to the present. Each deposition notice was accompanied with a related subpoenas duces tecum. (Docket No. 37 at ECF pp. 4-6).

Plaintiffs assert that the requests focus on representations Haier made to the federal government related to retaining GE’s employee benefits and on plant closings and the employee plant closing benefits provided by GE in the past and by Haier after the sale of GE Appliances. (Docket No. 38 at ECF p. 1). Defendant argues that the requested discovery will not bear on whether the handbook is an enforceable contract or, if so, whether Haier breached it. (Docket No. 37 at ECF p. 6). Specifically, Defendant argues that it is irrelevant to the breach of contract claim because the alleged contract in question is a summary plan description of a benefit plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), the plan documents control and no additional testimony or documentation can trump the language of the plan. (Docket No. 37 at ECF p. 7). Defendant also argues that the discovery is irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claim for breach of representations made to the federal government because Plaintiffs testified in their depositions that they had no facts to support this allegation and because Haier has already produced copies of the information it submitted to the Department of Justice related to employee benefits in the context of Haier’s acquisition of GE Appliances. (Docket No. 37 at ECF p. 7). Defendant also asserts that even if the evidence sought by Plaintiffs were relevant, the notices and subpoenas are disproportionate to the needs of the case—again relying on the stance that ERISA controls.

Plaintiffs respond that Defendant’s ERISA argument fails because it leaps to the conclusion that the Haier lay-off and plant closing benefits in dispute qualify as ERISA plans. (Docket No. 38 at ECF p. 3).[2] Plaintiffs assert that Defendant’s lay-off benefits do not rise to the level of an ongoing administrative program, which they allege is required for ERISA to govern this litigation.

*5 This case’s slow progression has been partly due to the parties’ diametric viewpoints with regard to ERISA’s application to this matter. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 32) largely relies on its assertion that ERISA applies and, therefore, Plaintiffs’ contract and third party beneficiary claims fail as a matter of law. Plaintiffs assert that the lay-off benefits do not rise to the level of an ongoing administrative program, and as such ERISA does not govern the litigation. (Docket No. 38 at ECF p. 2). Given Plaintiffs’ claims are not brought pursuant to ERISA and this Court has not entered a ruling as to its applicability it is premature to limit discovery on the basis that ERISA controls.

With regard to the first deposition notice (Docket No. 37-3 at ECF pp. 10-17), Plaintiffs have alleged that they were third-party beneficiaries of the representations and warranties made by Haier to the federal government and that those representations and warranties were breached. (Docket No. 1 at ECF p. 5). Defendant assert that the 30(b)(6) deposition and corresponding subpoena duces tecum are irrelevant because Plaintiffs testified in their depositions that they did not have facts to support their third-party beneficiary claim. (Docket No. 37 at ECF p. 7). Defendant does not cite to any specific deposition testimony to support this assertion. Defendant also asserts that the notice and subpoena focus on things Haier did or did not communicate—yet the notice and subpoena are directed to a Rule 30(b)(6) corporate representative from GE. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) states “[t]he persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization.” Plaintiffs’ 30(b)(6) notices to GE are not focused on information known to GE. They would require non-party GE to conduct discovery of Defendant Haier to testify. The rule does not create such a burden. See PPM Finance, Inc. v. Norandal USA, Inc., 392 F.3d 889, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2004) (topics of Rule 30(b)(6) deposition permissible “as long as they were within the corporate rubric.”). Plaintiff provides no response to this argument and, the Court agrees that GE cannot be required to inquire into and testify as to the knowledge of Haier. See DSM Desotech, Inc. v. 3D Sys. Corp., No. 08-cv-1531, 2011 WL 117048, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011) (“[Rule 30(b)(6) does not require one entity which is not under the control of a second entity to inquire into and testify as to the knowledge of the second entity.”). Plaintiffs have not cited a single case to support the proposition that GE’s corporate representative should have to testify in a manner which binds GE regarding Haier’s pre-acquisition knowledge and actions. Defendant’s request to quash as to the GE 30(b)(6) deposition notice and subpoena duces tecum regarding “All communications [or approvals required] by Haier to the U.S. federal government [or to Haier employees]” from January 1, 2010 to the present is GRANTED.

With respect to the second two deposition notices and related subpoenas duces tecum (Docket No. 37-3 at ECF pp. 3-9; Docket No. 37-3 at ECF pp. 18-24), Plaintiffs have made no showing that the documents related to closings at other plants are relevant to their breach of contract, third-party beneficiary, or WARN Act claims. See Heckler & Koch, Inc. v. German Sports Guns GmbH, No. 1:11-cv-01108-SEB-TAB, 2014 WL 12756174, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 12, 2014) (“There is no articulated argument concerning the relevance of this document to this litigation, and the Court cannot determine how this request is reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.”). Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, breach of representations made to the federal government (via a third-party beneficiary theory), and violation of the WARN act are focused on the specific plant closing in Bloomington, Indiana. GE or Haier’s actions related to other plant closings has no bearing on the issues before the Court in this case nor have Plaintiffs made arguments otherwise. Thus, Defendant’s request as to the two 30(b)(6) deposition notices and subpoenas duces tecum regarding “all plant closings” from January 1, 2010 to the present is GRANTED.

*6 Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order and to Quash Trial Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions and Subpoenas Duces Tecum Issued to Haier US Appliance Solutions, Inc. and General Electric is GRANTED. (Docket No. 37).

On August 8, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for an Order to Compel Discovery (Docket No. 48; Docket No. 49). Plaintiffs move for further responses to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories: 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 and to produce documents responsive to Plaintiffs’ First Request for Production of Documents: 3, 7, 10, 11, 13, and 14. The motion is ripe with a response in opposition filed (Docket No. 51) and the period for reply passing without submission. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs’ request.

Parties are generally entitled to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Privileged matter may be withheld, but if a party believes that material has been improperly withheld or believes that an answer is insufficient, the party may move for the Court to compel production. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a); S.D. Ind. Local Rule 37-1. After the party seeking production meets its initial burden of establishing the requested discovery’s relevancy, then the party opposing a motion to compel has the burden to show the discovery requests are improper. Cunningham v. Smithklin Beecham, 255 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Ind. 2009).

On January 10, 2018, Plaintiffs served discovery requests on Defendant. (Docket No. 48 at ECF p. 1). Haier responded on February 23, 2018. Id. During a May 30, 2018, telephonic conference Plaintiffs’ counsel notified Defendant’s counsel that the written discovery responses were incomplete and sent an email that same day detailing the discovery materials that Plaintiffs still required. Id. On June 1, 2018, Defendant made a supplemental production and on June 9, 2018, Defendant indicated it would not make any further productions in response to the written discovery. (Docket No. 48 at ECF pp. 1-2).

Plaintiffs have individually discussed each interrogatory and request for production they believed are insufficiently answered.[3] Defendant responds to the motion generally arguing that the requested discovery is not relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. As to the breach of contract claim, Defendant asserts it has already produced the purported contract and related documents, as well as deposing the Bloomington Plant Manager and the Human Resource Manager, a Haier benefits expert, and the Bloomington Plant Manager’s boss. (Docket No. 51 at ECF p. 2). As to the third-party beneficiary claim, Defendant argues that the requested discovery is irrelevant and that Haier has produced documents containing any representations it made to the federal government regarding employee benefits. Id. Finally, as to the WARN act, Defendant asserts it has already produced the documents showing whether or not Plaintiff’s suffered an “employment loss” or were impacted by a “plant closing” or “mass layoff” within the meaning of WARN. (Docket No. 51 at ECF p. 2). Defendant again raises its ERISA argument to assert that the discovery plaintiffs seek is irrelevant and impermissible—however, the argument is akin to the argument the Court addressed in the above motion for protective order. The Court continues to find this argument unpersuasive in guiding the scope of discovery at this juncture. Defendant is correct that ERISA cases are governed by the arbitrary and capricious standard and, therefore, the scope of the court’s review is limited to the administrative record. See Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 2004). There has been no determination that this matter is governed by ERISA.

*7 The Court will address each disputed written discovery in turn.

(Docket No. 49-3 at ECF p. 8). In the context of the complaint, the Court finds this interrogatory sufficiently clear for Defendant to answer. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Haier made representations to the government about maintaining current levels of employee benefits prior to its purchase of GE Appliances. (Docket No. 1). This information is relevant to Plaintiffs’ third-party beneficiary claim; therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel as to Interrogatory No. 9 is GRANTED.

(Docket No. 49-3 at ECF pp. 8-9). Plaintiffs argue, without citing authority, that the interrogatory is relevant because the plant closing process for GE plants similar to the one in Bloomington would inform the question of whether Defendant complied with the WARN Act notice requirements. (Docket No. 49 at ECF p. 6).

WARN requires covered employers to provide 60 days’ advance notice to “affected employees” of a “plant closing” or a “mass layoff.” 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a). “Affected employees” are “employees who may reasonably be expected to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed plant closing or mass layoff by their employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5). A “plant closing” is the “permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or more facilities or operating units within a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50 or more employees excluding any part-time employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2). A “mass layoff” is a reduction in force that is not the result of a plant closing and results in an employment loss at a single site of employment during any 30-day period for (i) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time employees); and at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time employees); or (ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees). 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3).

*8 Nowhere in this analysis does an entity’s plant closing process at other locations make a purported WARN violation at the Bloomington, Indiana, plant more or less likely to occur and Plaintiffs provide no support otherwise. Plaintiffs’ request as to Interrogatory No. 10 is DENIED.

(Docket No. 49-3 at ECF pp. 10-11). Plaintiffs assert that the interrogatory is relevant because communications between Haier and salaried employees, which have been produced by Plaintiffs contradict the assertion that Plaintiffs were not eligible for the layoff benefits, which the hourly employees received. Therefore, they argue that this interrogatory is relevant and to conclude otherwise is to ignore a central factual dispute in the litigation. Defendant cites evidence that hourly employees had different benefits than the salaried plaintiffs, were represented by a union, and the union negotiated a plant closing agreement providing the hourly employees additional benefits not possessed by salaried employees, like Plaintiffs. (Docket No. 51 at ECF p. 3; Docket No. 34-7 at ECF p. 7; Docket No. 34-12 at ECF p. 3; Docket No. 34-8 at ECF p. 12). However, at the discovery phase Plaintiffs are not required to accept Defendant’s legal arguments and have established this information’s relevancy as to their claims. Plaintiff’s motion as to Interrogatory. 13 is GRANTED.

(Docket No. 49-3 at ECF p. 11). Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s assertion that it did file a WARN notice and “therefore there is no responsive information” only resolves the interrogatory’s first question and that the Defendant can still provide the names and job titles of the individuals who ensure compliance with the WARN Act and would be most knowledgeable on the topic. The Court disagrees. The “decision” referred to in (b) or (c) is a decision that Defendant asserts was not made. Therefore, Defendant’s response to the Interrogatory, given how the Interrogatory was framed, is complete. Plaintiffs’ request as to Interrogatory No. 14 is DENIED.

(Docket No. 49-3 at ECF pp. 11). Plaintiffs argue that Defendant did make such a determination when it decided to interpret the “plant closing date” as synonymous with the layoff date, inconsistent with the definitions within the Employee Pension Plan itself. (Docket No. 49 at ECF p. 8). Further, they assert that this was a conscious decision to limit the benefits of salaried employees, as indicated by the appeals from within GE Appliance’s own managers asking for more on behalf of their salaried employees. Thus, Plaintiffs argue that the interrogatory is specific and clear enough to justify a response. However, Plaintiffs’ argument does not directly translate to Interrogatory No. 15. Interrogatory No. 15 does not ask whether Defendant made a determination to interpret the “plant closing date” as synonymous with the layoff date—instead it asks why Defendant decided not to provide layoff benefits of 90% of each salaried employee’s pay for one year. The Court infers Plaintiffs have a legal argument as to how these two determinations correlate, but Defendant is not required to understand or accept that legal argument when answering the above interrogatory. As written, Interrogatory No. 15 has been adequately answered and Plaintiff’s request is DENIED.

(Docket No. 49-3 at ECF p. 12). Plaintiffs argue that as a Chinese company, Haier required federal permission prior to its purchase of GE Appliances. (Docket No. 49 at ECF p. 8). Further, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant made representations related to employee benefits to the federal government during the process of securing permission to purchase GE Appliances and, therefore, Plaintiffs’ seek to identify any representations made related to layoff benefits—which would be relevant to their third-party beneficiary claim. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Interrogatory is directed toward the discovery of relevant information and notes that Defendant’s only basis for its overbroad objection is that it seeks information related to non-similarly-situated employees (i.e., hourly employees)—an argument the Court addressed at Interrogatory No. 13. Plaintiff’s motion as to Interrogatory. 17 is GRANTED.

*10 (Docket No. 49-2 at ECF p. 4). Plaintiffs argue that the request is not unduly burdensome because it limits the request to those documents “which would be provided to employees,” thus limiting the request to those emails, handouts, notices, handbooks, fliers, and the like which were related to the layoff benefit and provided to employees. (Docket No. 49 at ECF p. 9). Plaintiffs also argue that the requested production is directly applicable to the central conflict of this litigation: whether Plaintiffs were entitled to the layoff benefit, which Plaintiffs assert Haier promised and then denied them. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that, without further substantiation from Defendant, as written the request is not overbroad given it is limited to documents “which would be provided to employees.” Like Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 17, Plaintiffs’ motion as to Request No. 3 is GRANTED.

(Docket No. 49-2 at ECF p. 6). Plaintiffs argue that an important aspect of this litigation are the benefit-related promises which Haier made both to Plaintiffs and to the federal government. (Docket No. 49 at ECF pp. 9-10). They assert that documents produced by Plaintiffs indicate that Haier promised that benefits at the Bloomington GE Appliance plant would for one year remain the same as they had been under GE ownership. (Docket No. 49 at ECF p. 10). Thus, Plaintiffs conclude GE’s documents related to the layoff benefit are central to the third-party beneficiary claim and to the breach of contract claim. Id. The Court agrees Plaintiffs have met their initial relevancy burden and without any substantiation from Defendant as to irrelevancy, finds the request should be answered. Plaintiffs’ request as to Request No. 10 is GRANTED, with the additional limitation that Defendant need only produce all responsive GE documents in Haier’s possession as it is inappropriate to require Defendant to inquire as to non-party GE’s universe of responsive records.

(Docket No. 49-2 at ECF p. 6). Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Defendant Haier did not comply with requirements of the WARN Act when it laid off Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that since Defendant seeks to shield via assertion of privilege and the work-product doctrine a substantial amount of Haier’s documentation related to the WARN Act compliance, Plaintiffs should be allowed to compare GE’s WARN Act compliance procedures with Haier’s shut down of the Bloomington plant. (Docket No. 49 at ECF p. 10). Plaintiffs’ argument is nonsensical. Plaintiffs allege that Haier did not comply with the requirements of the WARN Act, not GE. There have been other instances where GE’s records have been relevant based on the assertion that Haier would maintain GE’s benefit programs. However, one entity’s procedures to comply with an Act are not relevant to determine whether a separate entity indeed complied with the Act. Plaintiffs’ motion as to Request No. 11 is DENIED.

*11 (Docket No. 49-2 at ECF p. 7). Plaintiffs assert that Defendant’s objection that the layoff benefits were only available to hourly employees contradicts documents produced by Plaintiffs, which were disseminated by Haier and that, therefore, this request is relevant and to argue otherwise is to ignore a central factual dispute in the litigation. Plaintiffs are not required to accept Defendant’s legal arguments at the discovery stage and have established this information’s relevancy as to their claims. Plaintiff’s motion as to Request No. 14 is GRANTED.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Docket No. 48). Defendant is ORDERED to answer Interrogatory Nos. 9, 13, and 17 and Request Nos. 3, 10, and 14 by Thursday, October 4, 2018.

Finally, on July 19, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Extend Discovery (Docket No. 39) requesting that the Court extend the July 20, 2018, discovery deadline by sixty days due, in part, to complete the discovery that has been discussed by the Court in this entry. Defendant objects to the request. (Docket No. 42). The period for reply has passed without filing from Plaintiffs.

As of the time of Plaintiffs’ request, they assert that have not received documents produced by Plaintiffs but not by Defendant, responses to interrogatories, documents request, and the ability to conduct depositions. (Docket No. 39 at ECF p. 1). Defendant responds that it agreed to extend the deadline to complete four depositions, two of which were completed on July 25, one which Plaintiff’s withdrew their request, and one that was scheduled for and presumably took place on August 16, 2018. (Docket No. 42 at ECF p. 1). Defendant’s other objections were addressed by the Court in addressing the above discovery disputes.

In light of the Court’s above entries, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Extend Discovery is GRANTED and the Court hereby extends discovery in this case until Friday, November 2, 2018.

SO ORDERED.

Served electronically on all ECF-registered counsel of record.

Specifically, Defendant asserts that on March 20, 2018, Plaintiff Hotz answered Defendant’s first set of interrogatories suggesting he signed a release to obtain benefits associated with his separation from employment at Haier. This response prompted further investigation by Defendant—who then found the signed release and produced it to Plaintiffs’ counsel on March 22, 2018, with a request that Mr. Hotz be dismissed voluntarily from the lawsuit. (Docket No. 22 at ECF p. 2).

Plaintiffs dedicate a portion of their response to raise separate purported discovery abuses, which Plaintiffs assert Defendant has made in responding to Plaintiffs written discovery. This argument is unrelated to the instant motion and, to the extent the Plaintiffs request the Court provide relief for the purported deficiencies, violates Local Rule 7-1(a) and will not be addressed in correlation with the Court’s ruling on the instant motion.

Plaintiffs assert that Interrogatory 12 and 16, as well as Request for Production 7 and 13 were insufficiently answered, however, Plaintiffs never briefed these specific written discovery requests and, therefore, have failed to meet their initial burden to establish relevancy. Plaintiffs’ motion as to these written discovery requests is DENIED.