Dalena YORK, an individual, Plaintiff, v. HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign insurance corporation, Defendant No. 01–CV–590–B(J) United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma November 04, 2002 Joyner, Sam A., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER *1 Defendant filed a Motion to Quash Notice for Rule 30(b)(6) Designation and Motion for Protective Order on October 9, 2002, in response to Plaintiff's Notice of Oral Deposition of Corporate Witness for Party. [Docket No. 90–1, 90–2]. Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Quash and for Protective Order on October 24, 2002. [Docket No. 98–1]. Defendant subsequently filed its Reply to Plaintiff's Response on October 29, 2002. [Docket No. 99–1]. The Court heard argument on the Motions on October 31, 2002. The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order as set forth in this Order. [Docket No. 90–1, 90–2]. I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff, Dalena York, alleges that her insurer, Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to pay her policy limits under an uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage policy. Plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of head-on motor vehicle collision in February 2000. Defendant initially offered Plaintiff $20,000.00 to settle her uninsured motorist claim. Plaintiff rejected the offer and countered with a demand of $90,000.00. Defendant then offered Plaintiff $25,000.00 to settle the claim. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in evaluating her claim. Plaintiff places particular importance on Defendant's utilization of the “Colossus” computer software program, and asserts that the program valued her claim unreasonably low. Plaintiff contends that Defendant mandates the use of “Colossus” in all qualifying and third party claims, and that the program was twice used in her particular evaluation. Plaintiff argues that the use of “Colossus” is designed to defeat bad faith claims by establishing an artificially low base value and allowing Defendant to argue that a “legitimate dispute” exists as to the value of Plaintiff's claim. Defendant asserts that “Colossus” is merely a single piece of information consulted, and subsequently disregarded, in its evaluation of Plaintiff's claim. Defendant highlights the fact that its adjuster, Perry Sewell, offered Plaintiff $9,359.00 more than the “Colossus” program recommended. Therefore, Defendant argues that information regarding “Colossus” is not discoverable because it is irrelevant. Moreover, Defendant argues that information about “Colossus” is confidential and proprietary business information subject to copyright and non-disclosure agreements. II. DISCUSSION MOTION TO QUASH RULE 30(B)(6) NOTICE OF ORAL DEPOSITION OF CORPORATE WITNESS FOR PARTY AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER Defendant moves this Court to Quash Plaintiff's Notice for Rule 30(b)(6) Designation and grant a protective order mandating that discovery not be had, arguing that the requested notice and documents to be produced regarding “Colossus” are irrelevant, confidential, and proprietary business information subject to copyright and non-disclosure agreements. Defendant supports this argument with the contention that its adjuster consulted, but subsequently disregarded, the “Colossus” recommendation in Plaintiff's claim evaluation. A. Relevance *2 Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) Notice should be quashed and a protective order be granted because information on “Colossus” is irrelevant and exceeds the scope of discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Defendant contends that information on “Colossus” is irrelevant because its adjuster, Sewell, considered, but “likely disregarded,” the “Colossus” recommendation in evaluating Plaintiff's claim. Defendant cites as proof Sewell's Activity Log Comments and notes that Sewell actually offered Plaintiff $9,359.00 more than the “Colossus” recommendation. Plaintiff submits that “Colossus” is consulted in every case evaluation and was twice applied in her evaluation. The initial dollar value of Plaintiff's claim came from the “Colossus” recommendation. The adjuster subsequently added value for Plaintiff's alleged post-traumatic stress disorder and liability issues. Plaintiff asserts that no evidence exists to show Defendant's adjuster conducted an evaluation of Plaintiff's claim independent of “Colossus.” Defendant argues that Mr. Sewell's testimony rebuts this charge, but concedes it is an issue in this case. The Court finds that, although Defendant's adjuster exceeded the “Colossus” program, his decision appears to have been influenced by “Colossus” in that he used or relied on the “Colossus” recommendation in some fashion. Thus, the requested discovery is relevant to Plaintiff's claim. Moreover, such information is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). B. Proprietary Business Information Defendant further contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery regarding “Colossus” because it is confidential, proprietary business information subject to copyright and non-disclosure agreements. Plaintiff counters that information regarding “Colossus” is freely and publicly available in the public domain (i.e., over the Internet) and, therefore, not confidential proprietary business information. In fact, Plaintiff notes that approximately sixty percent (60%) of insurance companies in North America utilize the “Colossus” software. Having reviewed the parties' documents and hearing arguments, the Court finds Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the “Colossus” program is proprietary or confidential information because of its wide use in the industry. Information on “Colossus” available to the public is clearly not confidential. However, the nature and extent of Defendant's use of “Colossus” may be confidential and entitled to protection from third parties. Defendant may submit any appropriate protective order to the Court prohibiting disclosure of any confidential information revealed in the deposition or through the production of documents to third parties. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(7) (motion for protective order to protect party from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following ... that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way.”). III. CONCLUSION *3 The Court concludes that although Defendant's adjuster, Perry Sewell, exceeded the recommendation of the “Colossus” program, he apparently used or relied on the “Colossus” software in some fashion in his ultimate calculation of Plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff should be given the opportunity to discover what data was inputted into “Colossus” concerning her claim. Beyond that, a great deal of Plaintiff's Notice requests information and documentation for which the expense or burden outweighs the likely benefit of the proposed discovery. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(iii). The Court finds that Defendant's Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant's Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order is DENIED IN PART as follows: Defendant is directed to designate a person or persons to testify to the following matters: (1) Defendant's objective for using “Colossus” in evaluating claims; (2) All matters concerning Defendant's use of “Colossus” in evaluating claims; (3) All matters concerning the operation of “Colossus;” (4) Benefits to Defendant of using “Colossus” in evaluating claims; (5) Training of Defendant's personnel in the use of “Colossus;” (6) Defendant's contribution of settlement data to “Colossus;” and (7) Defendant's policies and procedures in using “Colossus.” Similarly, Defendant is obligated to produce to Plaintiff the following documents for use in the deposition: (1) All training manuals for use of “Colossus;” (2) All documentation showing the amount of training each of Defendant's adjusters receives in the use of “Colossus;” (3) All documents concerning Defendant's review and/or supervision of its adjusters' use of “Colossus;” and (4) All documentation of job duties, instructions, performance goals, requirements, policies and procedures for use of “Colossus” by adjusters and “Colossus” coordinators for the San Antonio office of the Defendant in the years 1999–2001. With respect to Plaintiff's section (q) request for all documentation and claims data supplied by Defendant to “Colossus,” The Continuum Company, Computer Sciences Corporation and/or any subsidiaries for use in creating the data base used by “Colossus” in the evaluation of claims, the Court finds that Defendant is not obligated to produce these documents, but must provide a Rule 30(b)(6) witness to testify to these documents. To require production of this documentation in this instance would be overly burdensome and is better pursued under notice rather than production. Defendant's Motion to Quash and Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED IN PART concerning all other notice and production topics. The Court concludes that the burdensomeness of the production request outweighs the probative value of the information sought. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(iii). Defendant is entitled to a protective order for testimony on the following matters: *4 (1) Defendant's decision making process for implementing “Colossus;” (2) Promotional items received by Defendant regarding “Colossus;” (3) All matters concerning Defendant's implementation of “Colossus;” (4) Effects of Defendant's use of “Colossus” on Defendant's cost containment; (5) Defendant's cost to use “Colossus” and from where the cost is derived; (6) Terms of original implementation and renewals of “Colossus” by Defendant; (7) Defendant's profit derived from the use of “Colossus;” and (8) All other matters concerning Defendant's use of “Colossus.” Defendant is entitled to a protective order for production of the following documents: (1) All promotional documents received by Defendant, its parent company, or any subsidiaries pertaining to “Colossus;” (2) All documents concerning the original license by Defendant, its parent company, or any subsidiaries of the license to use “Colossus;” (3) All documents concerning the renewal or extension by Defendant, its parent company, or any subsidiaries of the license to use “Colossus;” (4) All documents concerning the decision making process and reasoning of Defendant, its parent company, or any subsidiaries in implementing “Colossus;” (5) All documentation, drafts, and terms used in developing “Colossus” Policies and Procedures contained in section seven of Defendant's Claim Best Practices; (6) All documentation, drafts, and terms used in developing “Colossus” Tips for using Injury Codes contained in section seven of Defendant's Claim Best Practices; (7) All documents showing the profitability and/or money saved by Defendant by using “Colossus” in the evaluation of first party claims; (8) All documents identifying the terms and length of use of “Colossus” by Defendant; (9) All documents identifying the Defendant's cost for each use of “Colossus” and how this cost is distributed to policy holders and/or shareholders; (10) All documents and data regarding how the use of “Colossus” by Defendant on first party claims has affected the Defendant's cost containment in the years 1999–2001; (11) Any and all public statements, press releases, internal memos, instructional memos, and/or training memos regarding the use of “Colossus” and/or the effectiveness of “Colossus” in general and/or in first party bodily injury claims; and (12) All documents of Defendant's compensation to its adjusters that is related in any way to the adjuster's use of “Colossus.” To the extent that Defendant uses the “Colossus” program, such information might be confidential, proprietary business information, and Defendant may submit a protective order to safeguard divulgence of such information to third parties. IT IS SO ORDERED.