*1 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's renewed Motion to Compel Discovery. Dkt. #76. Plaintiff seeks certain sales information and electronically stored information dated between 2009 and 2011 from Defendants. Id. Defendants respond that the information sought is irrelevant, does not exist, or should not be compelled because it is beyond the agreed upon scope of electronic discovery. Dkt. #78. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's motion.

This matter arises from allegations of trademark infringement, false designation of origin and unfair competition. Dkt. #16 at ¶¶ 34-43. Plaintiff alleges that it has used the trademark “EAT RIGHT” since 2001 and the trademark “EATRIGHT” since 2003. Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff further alleges that from 2004 to 2013, Defendants sold products produced by Plaintiff and sold under the trademark “EATRIGHT.” Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have since sold and marketed products using a trademark confusingly similar to “EATRIGHT” without authorization by Plaintiff, in violation of federal trademark laws and Washington's Consumer Protection Act. Id. at ¶¶ 32-43.

“Litigants ‘may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.’ ” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). “Relevant information for purposes of discovery is information ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ ” Id. “District courts have broad discretion in determining relevancy for discovery purposes.” Id. (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). If requested discovery is not answered, the requesting party may move for an order compelling such discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). “The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” Cable & Computer Tech., Inc. v. Lockheed Sanders, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 646, 650 (C.D. Cal. 1997).

Plaintiff first seeks an Order compelling Defendants' financial information including revenues, costs and profits for the sale of prepared foods, as requested in Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 3. Dkt. #76 at 1-4. Plaintiff argues that this information is relevant because it has accused Defendants of trademark infringement through the placement of signs bearing the trademark EATRIGHT in numerous locations throughout its stores, including on individual bins for its prepared foods. Dkt. #79 at 1. Plaintiff's Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 3 and the responses thereto read as follows:

Dkt. #77, Ex. 1.

The Court finds that Defendants' responses are adequate based on the information provided to the Court at this time, particularly because Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with a copy of Interrogatory No. 1 and its response or objections thereto. See Dkt. #77, Ex. 1. Based on the parties' briefing, it appears that Defendants did not identify particular prepared food products in response to Interrogatory No. 1, and instead asserted objections. Plaintiff has not moved to compel any further response to Interrogatory No. 1. Accordingly, the Court will not compel any further response to Interrogatory No. 2. Further, Plaintiff fails to address the scope of the objections contained in response to Interrogatory No. 3. Therefore, the Court will not compel any further response to Interrogatory No. 3.

Plaintiff next seeks electronically stored information dated between January 1, 2009, and January 1, 2011. Dkt. #76 at 4-10. Specifically, they seek such information in response to Request for Production Nos. 9, 23 and 28. Id. These requests and the responses thereto read as follows:

Dkt. #77, Ex. 2.

The argument pertaining to these documents is centered on the parties' agreement pertaining to the discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”). Defendants argue that Plaintiff agreed to limit the discovery of ESI from January 1, 2011, to December 31, 2013, and that they have produced responsive documents in that date range. Plaintiffs respond that they did not appreciate that narrowing the initial search for documents to that date range would preclude discovery of any documents prior to those dates.

The Court has reviewed the parties' ESI Agreement. Dkt. #40. In that agreement, the parties agreed to limit discovery of ESI from January 1, 2009, to the present. Id. at 4. The parties also agreed that should additional search terms become necessary, or should results from electronic searches exceed a certain capacity, they would meet and confer regarding those issues. Id. at 4-5. The parties apparently met and conferred regarding the volume of results from initial searches, and agreed to limit the date range in an effort to reduce the voluminous results. Dkt. #77 at ¶ 12. However, despite several subsequent conferences, they cannot reach an agreement as to the production of records prior to January 1, 2011.

Having reviewed the parties' briefs and the declarations and exhibits referenced therein, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to demonstrate any undue burden with respect to the production of the records sought by Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion with respect to ESI dated from January 1, 2009, to January 1, 2011. However, Plaintiff has limited its motion to Request Nos. 9, 23 and 28, and therefore this Order is also limited to those requests. Further, this Order makes no decisions with respect to Defendants' other asserted objections, which have not been raised or briefed in the instant motion. Accordingly, to the extent that Defendants are now compelled to produce the requested ESI between January 1, 2009, and January 1, 2011, such production remains subject to the remaining objections advanced by Defendants.

The Court hereby finds and ORDERS that Plaintiff's Motion to Compel (Dkt. #76) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as detailed above.

DATED this 6 day of January, 2015.