*1 Plaintiff in this class action alleges that defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, by placing recorded calls to the cell phones of the class members without having received prior express consent to do so. On April 7, 2017, the District Judge signed an Order Granting Motion for Class Certification and Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement. (Docket No. 141). According to the Preliminary Approval Order, class counsel was to “subpoena wireless cell phone providers ... to obtain the email addresses and mailing addresses associated with ... phone numbers” on the settlement class list.[1] (Docket No. 141 at 6). In turn, the settlement administrator would use the contact information obtained from these subpoenas to provide written notice of the settlement to the settlement class. (Id.).

On April 21, 2017, plaintiff served respondents T-Mobile and MetroPCS (collectively “respondents”) with subpoenas pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, which directed respondents to identify the names, email addresses, and mailing addresses of the persons subscribing to the particular telephone numbers in the class list. (Joint Stipulation for Plaintiff David Martin’s Motion to Compel MetroPCS to Produce Documents in Response to Subpoena for Purposes of Class Notice, Docket No. 143-1, Exhibit 3; Joint Stipulation for Plaintiff David Martin’s Motion to Compel T-Mobile to Produce Documents in Response to Subpoena for Purposes of Class Notice, Docket No. 144-1, Exhibit 3) (collectively referred to as “Joint Stip.”).

Respondents object to the subpoenas on the grounds that the request is overly broad and burdensome as the class list of 1.8 million telephone numbers may contain hundreds of thousands of non-T-Mobile and non-MetroPCS subscribers. Respondents also object to producing information for subscribers residing in California, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, on the ground that statutes in those three states prohibit cellular phone providers from disclosing such information without first providing the subscribers the opportunity to consent to the disclosure.[2] Plaintiff now moves to have the Court compel respondents to produce documents in response to the subpoenas. On July 11, 2017, plaintiff and respondents filed a Joint Stipulation. (Docket Nos. 143, 144). On July 28, 2017, the Court ordered plaintiff and respondents to file supplemental briefing (Docket No. 156), which they did. (Docket Nos. 163, 164).

The Court has concluded that oral argument will not be of material assistance in determining plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.[3]

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

*2 Preliminarily, the Court will examine the issues in this Motion using the general standard set forth in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure(“Rule 26”) (as amended December 1, 2015). Rule 26 provides that a party may obtain discovery “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Factors to consider include “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. Discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Id. However, a court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by [the Federal] rules” if “(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Finally, the Court is mindful of the imperative that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be “construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1(as amended December 1, 2015) (emphasis added); see also Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936) (a court has the inherent power “to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants” and “[h]ow this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance”).

At issue here are plaintiff’s subpoenas served on respondents pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The scope of discovery allowed under a Rule 45 subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery allowed under Rule 26. Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., 2013 WL 6774072, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 Advisory Comm.’s Note (1970) (“[T]he scope of discovery through a subpoena is the same as that applicable to ... other discovery rules.”). Additionally, Rule 45provides that a subpoena must be modified or quashed if it “requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies,” or if the subpoena “subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii), (iv); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1) (party issuing a subpoena “must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena”).

B. Burden

The Court first considers plaintiff’s and respondents’ contentions regarding respondents’ objection based on undue burden.

Plaintiff rejects T-Mobile’s claim of burden, arguing that T-Mobile has in a past case created a “custom computer script that ran an automated query of T-Mobile’s subscriber database.” (Docket No. 149 at 1, citing Johnson v. Yahoo, 14-cv-2028 (N.D. Ill.) ). Thus, according to plaintiff, the burdensome objection is baseless as respondents currently have the technical capability to respond to the subpoenas.

Respondents assert, however, that they do not have an automated process for purposes of retrieving subscriber information on a bulk basis. In support, they explain that responses to subpoenas are handled by respondents’ Law Enforcement Relations Group (“LER Group”), which is made up of approximately eighty subpoena compliance professionals. (Joint Stip. at 7-8; Docket No. 164, Declaration of Debra Bernard (“Bernard Decl.”), Exhibit 2). The LER Group assists law enforcement, criminal defense attorneys and private attorneys, and responds on a daily basis to over 700 written requests for information and over 400 telephone inquiries. The average request received by the LER Group seeks subscriber information for a single telephone number. The LER Group is primarily designed to respond to demands from federal, state and local law enforcement, including life threatening exigencies and emergency calls for assistance. (Id.).

According to respondents, the LER Group would be “crippled” if compelled to search for information in response to plaintiff’s subpoenas. Respondents explain that “all searches are done manually -- [they] do not have the capability to input target telephone numbers via .csv file or other type of data file to locate subscriber information in an automated manner.” (Joint Stip. at 9). Additionally, MetroPCS has “prepaid” customers, and a “significant percentage” of T-Mobile customers are also pre-paid. Respondents do not require personal identification information upon activation of a prepaid account, and if personal information “happens to be provided” upon such activation, respondents do not “take any steps to verify the completeness or accuracy of such information.” (Joint Stip. at 10; Docket No. 164, Bernard Decl., Exhibit 2). Moreover, for MetroPCS, any personal information provided is only stored and maintained for six months after the account is terminated. (Docket No. 164, Bernard Decl., Exhibit 2). As such, respondents argue that requiring them to search through 1.8 million numbers -- “where it is unlikely that MetroPCS will even have the requested information” -- is a particularly daunting task. (Joint Stip. at 9).

*3 Respondents instead argue that they “should only be required to search data that has been culled for subscriber information from other carriers” (Joint Stip. at 8), and have requested that plaintiff provide them with a list of remaining targets once production from other carriers has concluded. (Docket No. 164 at 5). Respondents further assert that, even with a reduced number of targets, production of this scope and volume will require them to develop a customized process for plaintiff’s subpoenas, and that plaintiff “[a]t a minimum ... should be required to bear the expense of this process.” (Id.). Respondents point out that in the Johnson v. Yahoo case that plaintiff cites (see supra), the search involved only approximately 30,000 phone numbers with an ultimate production of subscriber information for approximately 22,000 phone numbers, and that requiring respondents to search through a list of 1.8 million phone numbers would require, as explained above, the development of a process unique for plaintiff’s subpoenas. (Docket No. 164, Bernard Decl., Exhibit 2, ¶ 7).

Respondents further contend that plaintiff has not made any attempt to use reliable and readily available commercial resources to determine “ownership” of the target telephone numbers, and states that “Neustar can readily provide this information. See, www.neustar.biz.” (Docket No. 164 at 5 n.1).

As set forth above, courts must quash or modify a subpoena if it “subjects a person to an undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv). Undue burden in the context of third-party discovery is the same standard as used regarding discovery served on parties to the litigation. Mount Hope Church v. Bash Back!, 705 F.3d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 2012). To meet its burden, the objecting party must provide specific facts that indicate the nature and extent of the burden. See, e.g., Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Flamingo Trails No. 7 Landscape Maintenance Assoc., 316 F.R.D. 327, 334 (D. Nev. 2016)(citing Jackson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 173 F.R.D. 524, 529 (D. Nev. 1997) ) (addressing undue burden objection in the context of Rule 26). “Conclusory or speculative statements of harm, inconvenience, or expense are plainly insufficient.” Nationstar Mortgage, 316 F.R.D. at 334 (citation omitted). “An evaluation of undue burden requires the court to weigh the burden to the subpoenaed party against the value of the information to the serving party.” Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 637 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citation and quotations omitted).

After a careful review of plaintiff’s and respondents’ contentions, and weighing the burden imposed against the value of the information sought, the Court agrees with respondents that the subpoenas involving 1.8 million phone numbers -- which include numbers from multiple carriers in addition to respondents -- subject T-Mobile and MetroPCS to undue burden as respondents do not have in place an automated process for retrieving subscriber information on a bulk basis. Under these circumstances, respondents’ request for plaintiff to first cull the list of target phone numbers after receiving responses from other carriers, and then provide this narrowed list to T-Mobile and MetroPCS, is reasonable.[4] Limiting the scope of the subpoenas in this manner would help respondents avoid the need to review possibly hundreds of thousands of non-T-Mobile and non-MetroPCS phone numbers, and thus greatly reduce the burden of responding to plaintiff’s subpoenas with respect to time and expense. Accordingly, the Motion to Compel is granted in part. Plaintiff is ordered to provide T-Mobile and MetroPCS an updated list of remaining target phone numbers after production from the other carriers has concluded and the phone numbers of the subscribers of those other carriers have been eliminated.[5]After receiving the reduced list, respondents T-Mobile and MetroPCS are ordered to produce the requested information, subject to the Court’s further ruling set forth below.

C. State Privacy Laws

*4 The Court next considers respondents’ objections based on statutory law in California, Pennsylvania, and Delaware that respondents argue prohibits the disclosure of subscriber information without the subscriber’s prior consent.

1. California

Section 2891(a)(4) of the California Public Utilities Code states in pertinent part:

Plaintiff asserts that Section 2894 of the California Public Utilities Codeprovides an exception for compliance with Section 2891 if this Court were to issue an order requiring disclosure of the customers’ information. (Joint Stip. at 5). Section 2894(a) states in its entirety:

Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 2894 (emphasis added).

Closely examining the above language, the Court disagrees with plaintiff’s interpretation of Section 2894 that a court order is sufficient for a carrier to avoid civil liability, and that the order need not be issued at the request of law enforcement. In particular, the Court determines that the phrase “state or federal court warrant or order” is modified by the term “at the request of a law enforcement official.” See, e.g., In re Farsheedi, 2009 WL 4572745 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2009) (bankruptcy court denied motion to compel third party wireless telecommunications provider to produce cellular phone records without subscriber’s consent, as none of Section 2891’s enumerated exceptions applied; district judge then denied leave to appeal bankruptcy court’s decision as applicable standard for appealing an interlocutory order not met).

Accordingly, California Public Utility Code § 2891 prevents providers from disclosing customer information pursuant to a subpoena for non-law enforcement purposes (as is the case here) without the prior written consent of the customer.[6]

2. Pennsylvania

*5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5742(c) provides the following in pertinent part:

(Emphasis added).

Additionally, subsection 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5742(c.1) provides:

Here, plaintiff argues that the above statute allows for disclosure of customer information if such disclosure is “authorized by Federal law,” citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5742(c)(4). Plaintiff asserts that, under this provision, Rule 45 and the District Judge’s preliminary settlement approval order are sufficient to authorize disclosure. (Joint Stip. at 5). The Court disagrees. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5742(c)(4) states in its entirety: “Subject to paragraph (2), a record or other information may be divulged as authorized by Federal law or as authorized by a Federal regulatory agency having oversight over the person or entity.” (Emphasis added). In turn, paragraph (2) allows for disclosure of customer information to a “party to a legal proceeding, upon receipt from the party of a court order entered under subsection (c.1).” Under subsection (c.1), the court order “may be issued only after the subscriber or customer received notice from the party seeking the record or other information and was given an opportunity to be heard.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5742(c.1)(2) (emphasis added).

*6 Thus, based on the above, the Court rejects plaintiff’s assertion that Section 5742 “does not preclude ... production of Pennsylvania subscriber information.” Rather, under Pennsylvania law, disclosure of such information to a party in a legal proceeding is only permitted pursuant to the customer’s consent and a court order.

3. Delaware

Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 2423(c) provides:

Plaintiff argues that the above provision “has no application to federal subpoenas” and only applies to the disclosure of information to “investigative or law-enforcement officers.” (Joint Stip. at 5). Again, the Court disagrees with plaintiff’s interpretation, as the language of the Delaware Code unequivocally prohibits disclosure “to any person other than an investigative or law-enforcement officer.”

4. Analysis

Having determined that the three state statutes at issue do in fact protect the disclosure of customer information for non-law-enforcement purposes, the Court now considers the parties’ arguments concerning privilege and preemption.

Plaintiff argues that in this “federal question” case, only federal privilege law controls, and therefore to the extent the state privacy statutes discussed above create a privilege, they are not applicable in this action. (Docket No. 163 at 1-3). Plaintiff further argues that, in any event, respondents should be required to comply with the subpoenas because Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preempts the state statutes pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.[7] (Joint Stip. at 6).

On the other hand, respondents argue that the state privacy statutes are substantive in nature, are not preempted by any federal law, and apply in this discovery proceeding to preclude disclosure of customer information without consent. Respondents also argue that, in the alternative, even if the state privacy laws only create a privilege, the relevant factors weigh against production.[8] (Joint Stip. at 15-16).

a. Privilege

*7 Plaintiff is correct that, to the extent the subject state statutes provide a privilege, they are not applicable in this discovery proceeding because only federal law on privilege applies in cases, such as this one, involving federal question jurisdiction. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989) (citing Fed. Rule Evid. 501[9]); see alsoHardie v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2013 WL 6121885, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2013) (“Because jurisdiction in this action is based upon a federal question, California’s privacy laws [based on the California constitution] are not binding on this court.”); Kalinoski v. Evans, 377 F.Supp.2d 136, 140-41 (D.D.C. 2005) (“The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (as well as Federal Rules of Evidence 501) prevent a State from directing a federal court with regard to the evidence it may order produced in the adjudication of a federal claim.”).

Respondents have not cited, and the Court is not aware of, any case holding that a federally-recognized privilege exists that prohibits a telephone company from disclosing customer information. See Spiegel v. Engagetel, 2015 WL 8986932, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2015) (“While federal law recognizes many forms of privilege, there is no privilege that prohibits telephone companies from producing demographic information regarding its subscribers.”). Indeed, under the federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), mobile telephone companies are permitted to provide customer information to any person other than a governmental entity. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6); See Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Assocs., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“[T]he SCA permits AT&T to ‘divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications) ... to any person other than a governmental entity.’ ”). Based on the foregoing, to the extent the state statutes create a privacy privilege, such a privilege is not recognized under federal law and is not applicable here. This determination does not end the Court’s inquiry, however, because if, as respondents assert, the subject state privacy laws are substantive in nature (as opposed to only providing an evidentiary privilege), the state laws would apply to prevent disclosure, so long as there is no preemption by a federal law. Robinson v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 2011 WL 2433369, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2011) (noting that if a state statute protecting the disclosure of information pursuant to a subpoena is a “substantive policy statute,” the court then considers whether any federal law preempts the state statute).

b. Substantive Policy and Preemption

The Court first considers respondents’ contention that Section 2891 of the California Public Utilities Code is a substantive policy statute. (Joint Stip. at 13-14). While the Court is not aware of any case holding that Section 2891is or is not a substantive law, the Court is informed by the decision in Robinson, 2011 WL 2433369, at *2, in which the court stated that “a good argument could be made” that Section 2891 is in fact a substantive policy statute because it “may govern the activities of state citizens, not only in litigation, but in everyday life.” In that case, after the defendant subpoenaed the plaintiff’s telephone records, the court considered the extent to which Section 1985.3 of the California Code of Civil Procedure[10] -- which requires written customer consent for subpoenas seeking personal records of a telephone corporation as set forth in Section 2891 -- “should be respected by federal courts.” Robinson, 2011 WL 2433369, at *2. The court observed that “a good argument could be made that specific state statutes precluding, or greatly limiting, the production of information are not simply privilege statutes, but rather substantive policy statutes,” and that “[o]ne can validly question the presumption that all such statutes are automatically preempted by federal law because the opposite presumption is generally in effect.” Id. (citing Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 (1991) (“When considering pre-emption, ‘we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ”) ). Nevertheless, because, inter alia, the party resisting the subpoena did not raise a preemption argument, the Robinson court only utilized a privilege analysis before concluding that disclosure of the plaintiff’s phone records was warranted. 2011 WL 2433369, at *4.

*8 Additionally, the Court notes the decision in Williams v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sheriff’s Office, 2010 WL 1576858, at *3 (M.D. La. Apr. 15, 2010), in which the court considered a motion to quash a subpoena for the defendant’s bank records because the plaintiff failed to provide an affidavit of counsel as required by a Louisiana state statute governing the disclosure of financial records, LSA-R.S. 6:333. The Williams court concluded that the state statute, LSA-R.S. 6:333, applied in a federal court case, reasoning that the statute was “part of the state’s substantive banking law, and not merely a regulation of discovery or evidence.... R.S. 6:333 [ ] does not merely serve to regulate discovery in civil cases or determine what banking records may be admissible in evidence. Rather, the statute both expresses state policy regarding the privacy of bank customer information and comprehensively regulates the manner in which banks and other financial institutions may produce customer financial information to third parties.” 2010 WL 1576858, at *3 (footnotes omitted).

The Court, in analyzing the nature of the state statutes at issue here, finds persuasive the above reasoning regarding the application of state law in a federal case. Section 2891 is found in California’s Public Utility Code, and is not merely a regulation of discovery or evidence. Rather, Section 2891applies to subscribers outside of the litigation context, and protects their personal information from any disclosure to third parties for non-law-enforcement purposes absent written consent. As such, the Court considers Section 2891 to be a substantive policy statute that applies in this discovery proceeding, despite the federal nature of this action.[11] In reaching this determination, the Court takes into account several rulings in other class action lawsuits in which courts applied Section 2891 and upheld objections to the disclosure of customer information. For example, in Ades v. Omni Hotels Management Corporation, et al., 2:13-cv-02468-CAS (MANx), the Court ruled that Section 2891 applied and ordered non-parties AT&T and Verizon to notify their subscribers whose records were subpoenaed to request that the subscribers consent to their information being provided to the parties in the litigation. See Case No. CV 13-2468-CAS (MANx) (Order issued on May 18, 2015, Docket No. 124) (“The Court also finds unpersuasive plaintiffs’ arguments that applying section 2891 in this instance would violate the United States Constitution. Applying the California statute to the wireless subscribers at issue -- who are not and in some cases never will be class members -- does not conflict with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) so as to violate the Supremacy Clause. Nor do plaintiffs point to any on-point authority suggesting that the section’s application would violate the Due Process Clause or First Amendment.”). Additionally, respondents have provided transcripts of two rulings from the Northern District of Illinois in which courts upheld objections to subpoenas with respect to subscribers from California, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. (See Docket No. 144-2, Bernard Decl., Exhibit 2 (March 20, 2015, transcript in Birchmeier v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., Case No. 12-cv-4069 (N.D. Ill.) ); Exhibit 3 (November 21, 2016, transcript in Ung v. Universal Acceptance Corp., Case No. 16-10054 (N.D. Ill.) ) ).

The Court now turns to the issue of whether the subject state laws are preempted by federal law. Plaintiff asserts that even if the state laws are substantive in nature and preclude the production of customer information, Rule 45 preempts their application.[12] In support, plaintiff cites Spiegel, 2015 WL 8986932, at **3-5, which held that, under the Enabling Act (28 U.S.C. § 2072),[13] Rule 45 conflicts with, and preempts, Section 2891.[14]

*9 After careful review of the parties’ arguments, and keeping in mind the presumption against preemption (See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 n.3, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009) ), the Court disagrees with the holding in Spiegel and finds no conflict between the subject state laws and Rule 45 for the following reasons. First, applying California’s and Pennsylvania’s privacy statutes would not render it impossible for plaintiff to comply with both state and federal laws in obtaining the requested customer information -- plaintiff is just required to take the proper steps to first obtain written consent. See, e.g., Williams, 2010 WL 1576858, at *3 (“Plaintiffs have not shown that Rule 45 can displace substantive state law generally or that the rule does so as to R.S. 6:333.C(2).... Furthermore, nothing in R.S. 6:333.C(2) prevents a person issuing a subpoena from also complying with Rule 45, particularly the provisions regarding notice and service, and avoiding imposing an undue burden and expense on the banks. Nor does anything in Rule 45 prevent a person issuing a subpoena from complying with R.S. 6:333.C(2).”).

Additionally, aside from the Rule 45 subpoena, plaintiff has other ways to provide notice to the targeted subscribers. As set forth in the April 7, 2017, Order regarding the preliminary settlement:

(Docket No. 141 at 6) (citations omitted). Accordingly, this is not a case where denying a motion to compel compliance with a subpoena due to a state privacy statute would result in the moving party being unable to obtain the requested information through other means.[15]

The Court also notes that Rule 45 allows a subpoena to be quashed or modified if it requires disclosure of “privileged or other protected matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii). Thus, to the extent the customer information protected by the subject state statutes amounts to “protected matter,” a plain reading of Rule 45 reflects that a court may properly prohibit disclosure by quashing a subpoena seeking such information. In other words, given the language of Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iii), it is apparent that Rule 45was not enacted to require disclosure of all material, and therefore a substantive state law protecting the confidentiality of certain matter poses no conflict with Rule 45.

The Court is mindful that requiring compliance with plaintiff’s subpoenas without obtaining consent would in effect require respondents to violate state laws as well as infringe the statutory privacy rights of cellular phone subscribers in those states to the extent their phone numbers are on plaintiff’s list of 1.8 million phone numbers. See, e.g., Tech v. United States, 284 F.R.D. 192, 202 (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2012) (“[W]e further conclude that state laws intended to guard against the unauthorized disclosure of their citizens’ private identifying information may properly be considered in evaluating whether to permit the requested discovery. We also find relevant the Carriers’ concern that being ultimately compelled to produce such information could cause the Carriers to be in violation of state privacy laws.”). Moreover, the subpoenas at issue here are not limited to the telephone records of one of the named parties (unlike, for example, in Kia v. Robinson, supra), but seek information regarding possibly hundreds of thousands of cellular phone subscribers who live in California, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. Thus, requiring respondents to comply with the subpoenas without first obtaining written consent would potentially result in hundreds of thousands of violations of state privacy statutes.

*10 Considering the legal protections that state law has put in place to shield against the unauthorized disclosure of personal identifying information for cellular phone subscribers, the Court determines that Section 2891 precludes the production of customer information of California subscribers without prior written consent. Likewise, for the same reasons set forth above, plaintiff must comply with the procedures set forth in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5742(4)(c) before obtaining the requested subscriber information for individuals in Pennsylvania. Because Delaware’s privacy statute does not appear to include any provision allowing production even with subscriber consent, the Court determines that Delaware Code Ann. tit. 11 § 2423(c) precludes production for subscribers in Delaware. However, as noted herein, plaintiff is not prevented from notifying the targeted subscribers through other means, such as a website dedicated to the settlement that includes an online submission form, a toll-free number, and through Facebook (see supra).

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the Court rules as follows:

1. After plaintiff receives responses to the subpoenas served on US Cellular, Cricket Wireless, New Cingular Wireless, Sprint, Boost Mobile, Virgin Mobile, and Verizon Wireless, plaintiff, if he continues to seek subscriber information from respondents, is ordered to eliminate any non-T-Mobile and non-MetroPCS phone numbers from the settlement list, and provide respondents T-Mobile and MetroPCS with the reduced list. After receiving the reduced list, T-Mobile and MetroPCS are ordered to produce the requested information, subject to the limitations set forth in Paragraph 2 below.

2. To the extent plaintiff has moved to compel respondents T-Mobile and MetroPCS to produce the names, addresses, and email addresses of cellular phone subscribers residing in California, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, the Motion to Compel is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

There are an estimated 1,800,000 members of the class. (Docket No. 141 at 3).

Due to the burdensome nature of the subpoenas (See infra), and because there is no indication that respondents have not acted in good faith, the Court determines that, to the extent respondents failed to make timely objections to the subpoenas, such objections have not been waived. See Moon v. SCP Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D. Cal. 2005).

The Court previously vacated the hearing in this matter scheduled for August 1, 2017. (Docket No. 156).

A review of the docket reflects that plaintiff has also subpoenaed subscriber information from, at a minimum, US Cellular (Docket No. 142); Cricket Wireless (Docket No. 153); New Cingular Wireless (Docket No. 154); Sprint, Boost Mobile, and Virgin Mobile (Docket No. 155); and Verizon Wireless (Docket No. 161).

As for respondents’ assertions that plaintiff should utilize “Neustar” to determine “ownership” of the target telephone numbers, respondents fail to explain with any specificity what Neustar is and how it can provide the information sought in the subpoenas. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that plaintiff should be required to obtain the subscriber information from Neustar. Additionally, although respondents contend that plaintiff should bear the costs of developing a customized process for responding to the subpoenas, respondents have not set forth any specific estimate of the time and expense involved with creating such a process. Thus, at this time, the Court will not make any determination regarding what costs, if any, plaintiff should bear.

In reaching this determination, the Court disagrees with the decision in McArdle v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 2010 WL 1532334, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2010), in which the court concluded that Section 2894 permits disclosure of customer information pursuant to “any court order.” The Court notes that the McArdlecourt reached this determination without any mention or analysis of the “law enforcement” language in Section 2894.

“Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law will override state law in three instances: (1) express preemption, i.e., when Congress expressly preempts state law; (2) field preemption, i.e., when congressional intent to preempt may be inferred from the existence of a pervasive federal regulatory scheme; or (3) conflict preemption, i.e., when state law conflicts with federal law or its purposes and preemption is implied.” Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F.Supp.2d 289, 296 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990) ).

In Pagano v. Oroville Hospital, 145 F.R.D. 683, 698-99 (E.D. Cal. 1993), the court employed a balancing test of the following factors to determine the scope of the right to privacy: (1) the probable encroachment of the individual’s privacy right if the contested action is allowed to proceed, and the magnitude of that encroachment; (2) whether the encroachment of the privacy right would impact an area that has traditionally been off limits for most regulation; (3) whether the desired information is available from other sources with less encroachment of the privacy right; (4) the extent to which the exercise of the individual’s privacy rights impinge on the rights of others; and (5) whether the interests of society at large encourage a need for the proposed encroachment. See Chatman v. Felker, 2009 WL 173515, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, 2009 WL 1110590 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2009) (noting that Pagano was overruled on other grounds).

Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:

Section 1985.3(f) of the California Code of Civil Procedurestates:

The Pennsylvania statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5742(4)(c), and the Delaware statute, Delaware Code Ann. tit. 11 § 2423(c), are similarly not found in a state code of civil procedure. Given the protections put in place to safeguard customer information from any disclosure for non-law-enforcement reasons, the Court likewise concludes that the Pennsylvania and Delaware statutes are substantive in nature.

Alternatively, plaintiff argues that the federal Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2702), which allows disclosure of customer information to any person other than a government entity, preempts the subject state laws pursuant to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Plaintiff’s argument, however, hinges on the assumption that the subject state laws provide a privacy privilege, and that federal law therefore controls in this case. (Docket No. 163 at 2-3). As explained supra, the Court has determined that the subject state laws are substantive in nature. Plaintiff has not shown that the federal SCA conflicts with, and preempts, the subject state laws in this proceeding.

The Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, provides in pertinent part:

A conflict preemption analysis is utilized when “(1) the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’ or (2) it is ‘impossible for a ... party to comply with both state and federal law.’ ” Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F.Supp.2d at 307 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 899, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) ).

For these same reasons, the Court also rejects plaintiff’s argument that the subject state privacy statutes conflict with Rule 23(c)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in pertinent part: “For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” (See Docket No. 163 at 5). With either subscriber consent, or through other means such as a website or Facebook, plaintiff will be able to provide “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances.” In other words, the subject state statutes do not serve as an obstacle to providing the best notice practicable, or otherwise make it impossible for plaintiff to comply with both state and federal law.