William USCHOLD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CARRIAGE SERVICES, INC., Defendant Case No. 17-cv-04424-JSW (EDL) United States District Court, N.D. California Signed January 17, 2019 Laporte, Elizabeth D., United States Magistrate Judge ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY DISPUTES Re: Dkt. No. 51 *1 Before the Court are several disputes raised by Defendant Carriage Services, Inc. Plaintiffs William Uschold, Jose Alamendarez, Tiana Naples, and Ton Saechao's (together, “Plaintiffs”) discovery responses and Plaintiffs' counsel's conduct during depositions. This is a putative class action alleging that Defendant failed to reimburse Plaintiffs for business expenses they incurred while working for Defendant and violated the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. The presiding judge referred this case to the undersigned for discovery purposes. Defendant filed the pending discovery letter on December 18, 2018, noting that Plaintiffs failed to provide their portion of the letter in a timely fashion. Plaintiffs responded that they would file their position on the discovery disputes by December 24, 2018 but did not do so. The Court ordered Plaintiffs to file their response by December 28, 2018, which they timely filed. After reviewing the letters, the Court ordered Defendant to file a reply letter. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs allege that they are former employees of Defendant in event planning and/or sales. Sec. Am. Compl., ¶¶ 6-9. In the course of performing their jobs, Plaintiffs allege that they used their personal vehicles for work-related travel, incurring costs for gas, vehicle registration, maintenance, and toll fare. Id., ¶ 13. Plaintiffs were also required to use their personal cell phones for work-related calls. Id., ¶ 15. Defendant had a policy of not reimbursing employees for use of their personal vehicles or cell phones, and even though Defendant provided eight company phones in their office there were not enough company phones for all employees to use. Id., ¶¶ 14, 16. Plaintiffs were also expected to attend work meetings or events outside of regular business hours, which required them to use their home office space, printing, and other personal resources without compensation. Id., ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court on July 3, 2017, asserting that Defendant: (1) violated Cal. Lab Sec. 2802 for failure to reimburse for necessary work expenditures and losses, and (2) violated California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A. Defendant removed the case to federal court on August 4, 2017. Id. Defendant filed two motions to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs agreed to amend their complaint after receiving Defendant's motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. Dkt. No. 15. The Court granted the second motion to dismiss and gave Plaintiffs leave to amend. Dkt. No. 33. Plaintiffs file a second amended complaint on April 4, 2018, which Defendant answered on April 11, 2018. Dkt. Nos. 37-38. II. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiffs' Discovery Responses Defendant served initial requests for production (“RFPs”) and interrogatories on each named Plaintiff in May, with Plaintiffs' responses due on June 25, 2018. The parties agreed to a two-week extension to respond, but Plaintiffs did not serve responses or objections by the extended deadline. The parties subsequently agreed to a further extension to July 18, 2018 to serve responses. Plaintiffs again failed to serve responses or objections. On July 24, 2018, a new attorney for Plaintiffs became involved with the case. Defense counsel requested that the parties meet and confer about the discovery responses, but Plaintiffs' counsel never responded to that request. Defense counsel raised the issue in their joint statement before the initial case management conference, and Plaintiffs explained that: “Plaintiffs inadvertently missed the deadline for serving discovery responses due to internal staffing changes, trial deadlines, and discovery obligations in other matters. Those issues have been resolved and Defendant is informed that responses will be served by August 10, 2018.” Dkt. No. 44 at 4. *2 Plaintiffs eventually served responses and objections to Defendant's RFPs and interrogatories on August 17, 2018, although Plaintiffs later withdrew each of their asserted objections. Defendant contends that the responses were incomplete and remain so even after meeting and conferring with Plaintiffs' counsel into December 2018 and seeks an order requiring Plaintiffs to serve complete responses, as well as an order that Plaintiffs waived objections. Plaintiffs argues that they have served amended discovery responses and produced all responsive documents they have in their possession, custody, and control. In their December 28, 2018 letter, Plaintiffs acknowledged that “they did not serve timely written discovery responses and waived objections.” Pls' Letter at 1. “A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection” if “a deponent fails to answer a question,” “a party fail to answer an interrogatory,” or “a party fails to produce documents.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). “It is well established that a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.” Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity. Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C) (“An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.”); Lam v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 2015 WL 4498747, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2015) (nothing that “some courts ‘read into Rule 34 the discretion granted under Rule 33(b)(4) (dealing with interrogatories) to excuse untimely objections to requests for production’ ”) (quoting Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. P. Before Trial § 11:1905 (The Rutter Guide 2015)). The Court orders the following relief: a. RFP No. 1: This request sought “[a]ll documents relating to your employment with [Defendant] and/or the allegations of your Second Amended Complaint ...” Plaintiffs responded to RFP No. 1 as follows: “After a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, Plaintiff has not located any responsive documents in [their] possession, custody, or control.” “A client is ... bound by his attorney's failure to raise timely objections during the trial process.” Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 460 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 1978) (citing Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir. 1968)). “It is well established that a failure to object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.” Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1473; see alsoMiller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 302 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 1992) (finding waiver of attorney-client privilege objections when the party claiming the privilege never produced a privilege log). However, waiver for failure to raise a strictly timely objection is not automatic where there are “potentially harsh consequences associated with waiver.” Liguori v. Hansen, 2012 WL 760747, at *11 (D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2012). In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railyard Co. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005), the court ruled that a court should use Rule 34's 30-day time period as a “default guideline” for waiver of privilege under Rule 26 using a “case-by-case determination,” based on: “(1) The degree to which the objection or assertion or privilege enables the litigant seeking discovery and the court to evaluate whether each of the withheld documents is privileged; (2) The timeliness of the objection and accompanying information about the withheld documents (where service within 30 days, as a default guideline is sufficient); (3) The magnitude of the document production; and (4) Other particular circumstances of the litigation that make responding to discovery unusually easy or unusually hard.” Id. at 1149. *3 Defendant points to recent deposition testimony as evidence that there are almost certainly documents that are responsive to this request, or responsive documents existed, possibly after Plaintiffs' duty to preserve was triggered. It notes that during one of the depositions taken in this case Plaintiffs' counsel objected to questions regarding communications “about this lawsuit” such as “group e-mails, where I send an e-mail to all the clients or vice versa.” Defendant also raises the possibility that Plaintiffs' counsel has any documents in his files about his investigation of the allegations before filing the complaint. Defendant seeks what would otherwise be privileged documents because Plaintiffs confirmed in their own letter that they “do not dispute that they did not serve timely written discovery responses and waived objections.” Pls' Letter at 1. There is no evidence that Plaintiffs have produced a privilege log. Plaintiffs conceded that they waived their objections by serving belated objections and responses and then later withdrawing the objections they had raised. In addition, each of these factors weighs in favor of waiver. Plaintiffs withdrew their objections (assuming they objected to the production of privileged documents) and have not produced a privilege log. They have hindered discovery in this case by delaying their responses to Defendant's requests for many months and it seems unlikely that there is significant discovery that is being withheld on privilege grounds. Plaintiffs stated in their letter that they have not withheld any documents on privilege grounds, but counsel's statement regarding group emails to Plaintiffs suggests that may not be the case. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have waived all objections, including objections regarding privilege. In addition to as-yet produced privileged material, Defendant also points to Plaintiff Naples' testimony that she communicated with other Plaintiffs by email and text message, but, according to Defendant, she has represented that those documents have not been produced because she replaced the phone used to make those communications. Even if she did replace the phone, that does not explain why those communications have not been produced from other Plaintiffs. Defendant has established that there is a strong possibility that Plaintiffs have additional responsive documents that they have not yet produced. Plaintiffs are ordered to produce any responsive documents in their possession, custody, or control, including privileged documents or any other documents they are withholding under any objection. If Plaintiffs contend that they have produced all documents, then they must provide a written confirmation to Defendant under oath that they have completed their production. Finally, Plaintiffs must explain in writing and under oath whether they had responsive documents after their duty to preserve arose that are no longer in existence. • RFP No. 8: This document request seeks Plaintiffs' tax returns from 2012 to the present. Each Plaintiff responded that ‘[a]fter a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, Plaintiff has not located any responsive documents in [their] possession, custody, or control.” Defendant states that Plaintiffs acknowledged in a meet and confer session that they have the right and ability to obtain their tax returns from the IRS. Defendant states that Plaintiff Alamendarez has not produced any tax returns for 2012 and Plaintiff Saechao has not produced any tax returns for 2012 and 2013. Plaintiffs Uschold and Naples testified that they did not file tax returns for the years for which they have not produced tax returns. “Control is defined as the legal right to obtain documents upon demand.” Id. (quoting United States v. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989)). If, as it appears, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) permits taxpayers to request copies of tax returns, then Plaintiffs must request the missing, responsive tax returns immediately and produce them to Defendant. *4 • RFP No. 17: The next disputed document request seeks Plaintiffs' cellphone statements and call logs. Defendant represents that no Plaintiff has produced these records. Plaintiff Alamendarez's response stated that he had not located any responsive documents and the rest of the Plaintiffs identified Bates ranges in their responses that did not contain the requested cellphone statements or call logs. Despite not producing the documents in response to the request, Plaintiffs identified these records in their initial disclosures, which require a party to provide “a copy – or a description by category and location – of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). However, during counsel's meet and confer on this dispute, Plaintiffs' counsel stated that each Plaintiff tried but could not obtain the records from their cellphone carriers. Defendant notes that Plaintiff Alamendarez's deposition testimony contradicts this representation, as he testified that his carrier told him that his records could be obtained by submitting an online request and that he had requested them as instructed. Plaintiff Alamendarez could not, however, provide an explanation about why the records had not been obtained or produced. Plaintiffs have not established that they are unable to obtain the requested records from their cellphone carriers. The evidence is to the contrary. Plaintiffs must request the responsive documents immediately from their carriers. See Quintana v. Claire's Boutique, Inc., 2014 WL 3371847, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2014). If their carriers refuse to provide the records, Plaintiffs must provide Defendant with sworn statements about why they could not obtain the records. See Ortiz v. Amazon.com LLC, 2018 WL 2383210, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2018). • Interrogatory No. 5: This interrogatory sought information about the vehicles that Plaintiff Alamendarez claims he drove for work purposes while at CSI, including the timeframe and number of work-related occurrences. His original and amended responses identified two vehicles but did not identify timeframes or the number of claimed work-related occurrences. Plaintiff Alamendarez has not offered an explanation for why he did not or cannot provide the information sought. Plaintiff Alamendarez is ordered to further amend his interrogatory response to provide responses about timing and the number of work-related occurrences immediately. • Interrogatory No. 6(h), (i): This interrogatory sought information about Plaintiff Uschold's vehicle use while working at CSI. Defendant explains that Plaintiffs' counsel emailed amended responses dated October 19, 2018, but did not serve or verify those responses. Rule 33 requires “[t]he responding party [to] serve its answers and any objections” and also provides that “[t]he person who makes the answers must sign them, and the attorney who objects must sign any objections.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2), (b)(5) (emphasis added). Plaintiff Uschold must immediately serve his amended responses on Defendant and verify them. • Interrogatory No. 11: This interrogatory asked Plaintiffs to “identify all correspondence or communication through which [they] requested that [CSI] provided reimbursement to [them] for the expenses [they] claim[ ] to have incurred for work-related purposes.” Plaintiffs Uschold, Naples, and Saechao responded that they were not aware of any “correspondence” or “documents” about the information sought, but Defendant objects that they did not respond to the request about “communications.” Plaintiffs Uschold, Naples, and Saechao are ordered to further amend their interrogatory responses to address any “communications” beyond correspondence or documents in which they made requests for correspondence. *5 Aside from the tax returns, which Plaintiffs may be delayed in obtaining from the IRS because of the current government shutdown, and the cellphone records, Plaintiffs are otherwise required to produce responsive documents that are in their custody, possession, or control; provide sworn affidavits; and serve amended responses within five (5) days of this Order. Plaintiffs must request their tax returns and cellphone records within two (2) days of this Order and produce them to Defendant without delay once they have received the documents from the IRS and cellphone carriers. B. Depositions 1. Plaintiffs' Counsel's Conduct at Earlier Depositions Defendant has also moved for an order prohibiting Plaintiffs' counsel from instructing his clients not to answer on any grounds other than those expressly permitted under Rule 30(c)(2) and an order prohibiting Plaintiffs' counsel from making speaking objections or coaching the deponents or impeding the depositions. The gravamen of Defendant's motion is that Plaintiff's counsel made numerous improper objections to deposition questions based on privacy objections, which resulted in a significant waste of time and Defendant's inability to obtain testimony. Before analyzing the substance of Plaintiffs' privacy objections, the Court will address Plaintiff's counsel's conduct at the depositions and in its December 28, 2018 submission to this Court. The Northern District of California's Guidelines for Professional Conduct require that “[w]ritten materials submitted to the court should always be factual and concise, accurately state current law, and fairly represent the parties' positions without unfairly attacking the opposing party or opposing counsel.” Northern District of California's Guidelines for Professional Conduct, ¶ 7. They also require counsel to be civil in their communications with other parties. Id., ¶ 8. Accusing opposing counsel of intentionally misleading the Court, as Plaintiffs' counsel did in his December 28, 2018 letter, is a serious charge and unnecessarily inflammatory. The parties have a dispute and casting aspersions on the other side, particularly where accusations are unsubstantiated, is not helpful to resolve the issues before the Court. This unprofessional conduct will not be tolerated. Similarly, Plaintiffs' counsel's conduct during the depositions left much to be desired. Counsel engaged in lengthy, argumentative speaking objections and, at least once, gave a speech impugning the conduct of other attorneys. These actions violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Northern District of California's Guidelines for Professional Conduct, and the presiding judge's standing order on depositions which expressly prohibits “[s]peaking objections or those calculated to coach the deponent.” Judge White, Standing Order for Civil Practice, Deposition Guidelines, ¶ 4; Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (c)(2) (“An objection must be stated concisely in a nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner.”); Northern District of California, Guidelines for Professional Responsibility, ¶ 9(g) (“Once a question is asked, a lawyer should not coach the deponent or suggest answers, whether through objections or other means.”), (k) (“A lawyer should refrain from self-serving speeches during depositions.”). Plaintiffs' counsel's conduct also falls below expectations for producing documents before depositions. Defendant conducted depositions of Plaintiffs Uschold and Alamendarez in early December and Plaintiffs produced their incomplete tax returns the night before their depositions. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they produced Plaintiffs' Uschold and Alamendarez's tax returns on the eve of their depositions but contend that the timing of the production was due to their need to review and properly redact the documents after a search for the documents that included contacting third parties and searching storage units. This is not an excuse for the late production. The deposing party must be given sufficient time to review relevant documents and prepare for the deposition, an opportunity that Plaintiffs' counsel denied Defendant with respect to the tax returns. See Northern District of California, Guidelines for Professional Conduct, ¶ 9(f) (“A lawyer should not delay producing documents to prevent opposing counsel from inspecting documents prior to scheduled depositions or for any other tactical reason.”). If Plaintiffs needed significant time to contact third parties and search storage units, it was their duty to undertake that search well in advance of the deposition to permit enough time for a timely production of the tax returns before the depositions. *6 Turning to the substance of Plaintiffs' privacy objections, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to establish that the deposition testimony Defendant seeks is privileged. The California Constitution “expressly grants Californians a right of privacy.” Williams v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 3 Cal. 5th 531, 552 (2017) (citing Cal. Const., art. I, § 1). The right to privacy is not, however, a complete bar to discovery. Instead, as Plaintiffs recognize, it is necessary to balance the right to privacy against the needs of litigation. See Saca v. J.P. Molyneux Studio Ltd., 2008 WL 62181, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008) (citing cases). A party waives this protection when she puts that topic at issue in the litigation. Doe v. City of San Diego, 2013 WL 6577065 at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2013). To aid in the Court's determination of whether the need for the information outweighed whatever privacy interest Plaintiffs had in the information, Defendant provided a summary of the deposition topics to which Plaintiffs objected and Defendant's position on why the information sought is relevant to the litigation. The Court rules as follows: a. Other employment and businesses: Multiple Plaintiffs refused to testify about their employment after CSI. Defendant argues that this is relevant background information and Plaintiffs have no privacy interest in this information. See Lee v. Pep Boys, 2015 WL 9268118, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015) (“The privacy right protects personnel information, including an employee's confidential human resources file and records relating to discipline or demotions, but not the facts of employment itself.”). Defendant also contends that this is relevant to credibility and bias, for example, to the extent that Plaintiffs were communicating to their subsequent employers while still employed at CSI and shared their expense-related complaints or conveyed other biases. Defendant also notes that Plaintiff Uschold testified about business-expense deductions on tax returns for a separately owned business, possibly for the same property that he allegedly used for work-related purposes while employed at CSI, although he made no similar deductions for unreimbursed expenses at CSI. Defendant argues this could be evidence about damages and credibility. The background information about Plaintiffs' employment history is not privileged and may be discovered. See Lee, 2015 WL 9268118, at *4. Moreover, even if it were conditionally privileged, the need to obtain the information would be relevant for those Plaintiffs like Uschold who had some overlap between discussions with subsequent employers and their employment with CSI. The testimony is also relevant to Plaintiff Uschold's damages and credibility, considering his apparently different treatment of work-related expenses incurred while working at CSI and his subsequent employer. Thus, the Court overrules Plaintiffs' privacy objection to questions about Plaintiffs' work histories. b. Tax preparers: Plaintiff Uschold refused to identify who helps him prepare his taxes. Defendant contends that this information is relevant to the issue of why he claimed business expenses for one employer but not for CSI. Defendant argues that this tax preparation information is also relevant because Plaintiff Naples pleaded guilty to conspiracy to file false tax returns while employed at CSI. SeeUnited States v. Cooper et al. – Tiana Naples, Case No. 2:14-cr-00022-JAM-2 (E.D. Cal., plea entered April 12, 2016), Dkt. No. 106. As a result, it argues that information about tax preparation could be relevant to credibility and adequacy for class representatives. *7 This information might have some relevance for the reasons Defendant sets forth. The privacy objections about the identity of their tax preparers are overruled. c. Identity of family members: Plaintiffs have refused to name their family members on privacy grounds. Defendant contends that this information is relevant because Plaintiffs seek expenses that they allegedly incurred while living with or using the property of their families. Based on the transcript excerpts that Defendant provided to the Court, it is apparent that at least some of the Plaintiffs lived with relatives at the time they allege that they were working out of their homes. Identifying the relatives' identifies will assist Defendant in corroborating or disproving Plaintiffs' allegations about the extent that they worked from home and the expenses incurred. Plaintiffs have also not established a strong privacy interest in keeping the names of relatives private. Accordingly, the Court overrules Plaintiffs' privacy objection to questions asking them to identify relatives. d. Damages evidence: Many of Plaintiffs' privacy objections were made in response to questions about Plaintiffs' home mortgages and other financial arrangements. Defendant argues that these questions go to Plaintiffs' damages and that it is entitled to confirm whether and what amount of expenses were incurred when Plaintiffs allegedly worked from their homes, which requires inquiry into who owns the property Plaintiffs used, the property's value, and who paid for the expenses. This line of questions is relevant because it focuses on the central issue of Plaintiffs' claim that they should have been reimbursed for their expenses when they worked at home, including for the use of home office space. With respect to questions seeking the name of Plaintiffs' mortgage lenders, Defendant argues that it is entitled to conduct third-party discovery to confirm Plaintiffs' testimony about their expenses, particularly because of the lack of documents produced by Plaintiffs. If Plaintiffs are not personally providing sufficient information about the expenses they are claiming, then Defendant is entitled to issue subpoenas to obtain the discovery it needs to defend Plaintiffs' damages claims. Thus, the Court overrules Plaintiffs' privacy objections regarding questions about the expenses they are claiming in this case and the information Defendant needs to determine the bases for those expenses, including information about Plaintiffs' mortgages. e. Witnesses with knowledge of claims: The last category concerns testimony about the identity of witnesses with knowledge of claims and, specifically, a man named Tyrone Dangerfield. Plaintiff Uschold identified Mr. Dangerfield in his interrogatory responses as a person he may rely upon to prove or support his claim. Defendant represents that Plaintiff Uschold has described Mr. Dangerfield as his “brother,” “good friend,” and a coworker at CSI. Since Plaintiff Uschold inserted Mr. Dangerfield into this case and anticipates relying on Mr. Dangerfield to prove his case, Plaintiff Uschold has waived his privacy objection regarding his relationship with Mr. Dangerfield. Accordingly, the Court overrules the privacy objection as to Mr. Dangerfield and any other individuals Plaintiffs have identified as having knowledge about their claims or upon whom they intend to rely for evidence supporting their case or to challenge Defendant's defenses. *8 The parties have entered into a protective order for this case. The Court has overruled Plaintiffs' objections to answering questions about the topics discussed above, but their deposition testimony may receive protection from future public disclosure if it is entitled to confidential treatment under the terms of the protective order and the applicable legal standards. Finally, the Court can only rule on the topics that were presented to it, but there may be additional issues that are explored in the future (see the next section for a discussion of further depositions) to which Plaintiffs object on privacy grounds. Counsel should consult the Court's rulings and proceed in good faith when posing deposition questions or objecting to them to avoid unnecessary disruptions and motion practice. 2. Further Depositions In light of Plaintiffs' privacy objections and their belated and incomplete discovery responses, Defendant seeks an order authorizing further depositions of Plaintiffs who have already been deposed. The Court grants Defendant's request. Plaintiffs must submit to further depositions. The Court does not, however, have an adequate basis to determine how much additional time is necessary for each Plaintiff. The parties are ordered to meet and confer to agree on the amount of time that Defendant needs to depose each Plaintiff based on the supplemental responses and document productions they provide and the deposition topics that they must revisit, as required by this order. C. Sanctions Defendant requests monetary sanctions against Plaintiffs for the cost of further depositions and for Defendant's costs in bringing its motion. Rule 37 provides that if a motion to compel a discovery response, including deposition testimony, document production, or answers to an interrogatory, is granted, then “the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5). Sanctions are not allowed if “(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). Rule 30 also provides that the Court “may impose an appropriate sanction – including the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred by any party – on a person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2). Since the Court has granted Defendant's motion in nearly all regards, an award of monetary sanctions may be warranted for at least Defendant's costs in bringing the motion. At this time, however, the Court will not rule on Defendant's request. Local Rule 7-8 and this Court's standing discovery order require a sanctions motion to be filed separately and noticed for a hearing date. L.R. 7-8(a); Dkt. No. 54, Standing Discovery Order, ¶ 3. The motion and the sanction requested must be supported by declarations. L.R. 7-2(d), 7-5. Accordingly, Defendant's request for sanctions is denied without prejudice to a later request that complies with the Local Rules. *9 IT IS SO ORDERED.