I. INTRODUCTION

*1 Plaintiffs Mohamadreza Yazdi, D.D.S. and Richard Gutierrez, D.D.S. filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Further Responses to Plaintiffs' Requests for Production of Documents, Set One on July 22, 2019. (“Motion” or “MTC,” Dkt. No. 33). The Parties submitted a Joint Stipulation in connection with the Motion pursuant to Local Rule 37-2, (“Jt. Stip.”), including the declaration of Howard Loring Rose (“Rose Decl.”) in support of the Motion, and the declarations of Shannon L. Ernster (“Ernster Decl.”) and Lisa Adinolfi (“Adinolfi Decl.”) in opposition to the Motion. On July 30, 2019, the Parties respectively filed supplemental memoranda, (“P Supp. Memo.,” Dkt. No. 35; “D Supp. Memo.,” Dkt. No. 34), and Plaintiffs filed Written Objections to Defendant's Evidence. (“P Obj.,” Dkt. No. 35-1). The Court held a telephonic hearing on the Motion on August 22, 2019. For the reasons stated below and on the record at the hearing, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs' Objections to Evidence are OVERRULED.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

Drs. Yazdi and Gutierrez started providing dental services to Saudi Arabian students studying in the United States beginning in 2012 and 2013, respectively. (Jt. Stip. at 1). The students were covered by a health insurance policy issued by Defendant Aetna Life & Casualty (Bermuda) Ltd. to the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission (“SACM”). Defendant paid Plaintiffs' bills under the SACM policy promptly until approximately mid-2015, when abruptly payments were delayed or denied. (Id.). According to Defendant, Plaintiffs were put under investigation by its Special Investigations Unit (“SIU”) for suspicious and potentially fraudulent billing practices, and had to submit documentation to support their claims as part of the audit. (D Supp. Memo. at 3).

Plaintiffs filed suit in state court on August 6, 2018 to recoup payment on unpaid claims. (Rose Decl., Exh. A). On August 31, 2018, Defendant served Plaintiffs a Demand for a Bill of Particulars in which it sought a listing of each claim at issue, including “the amount owed, the date on which such amount became owing, and the amount of interest, if any, accrued for each amount for all claims at issue in this action.” (Ernster Decl., Exh. A at 1-2). Plaintiffs did not respond to the Demand. (Id. ¶ 3).

Defendant removed the case to federal court on September 27, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on November 9, 2018. (“SAC,” Dkt. No. 14). At an early meeting of counsel on January 9, 2019, Defendant once again sought a list of the claims at issue, which Plaintiffs did not provide. (Ernster Decl. ¶ 4). On January 16, 2019, Defendant filed an Answer to the SAC, as amended by the District Judge's earlier dismissal of the California Unfair Competition Law claims (see Dkt. No. 20). (“Ans.,” Dkt. No. 21). The Court issued a Scheduling Order on February 8, 2019, setting November 27, 2019 as the discovery cut-off, and a March 3, 2020 trial date. (Dkt. No. 24).

*2 Plaintiffs served their first set of requests for production of documents (“RFP”) on the same day that the Scheduling Order issued, February 8, 2019. (Rose Decl. ¶ 7). Defendant served its written responses on March 20, 2019. (Id., Exh. B). On April 30, 2019, eight months after Defendant first served its Demand for a Bill of Particulars and nearly three months after Plaintiffs served their production requests, Plaintiffs provided Defendant with a chart of the 1,979 specific claims (submitted on behalf of 288 separate patients) that they contend are at issue. (Ernster Decl. ¶ 9; (P Supp. Memo. at 2 n.1). Concurrently with service of the claims chart, Plaintiffs demanded that Defendant produce all documents responsive to the requests within thirty days. (Ernster Decl., Exh. C at 2). Defendant responded on May 7, 2019, stating that it would take up to five months to produce documents responsive to each claim, and suggesting that the Parties discuss “an alternative approach to discovery.” (Rose Decl., Exh. F at 4).

Following further unsuccessful attempts to resolve the Parties' discovery dispute, Plaintiffs requested an informal discovery conference (“IDC”), which took place on June 21, 2019. (See Transcript (“Tr.”), Ernster Decl., Exh. G). On June 25, 2019, Plaintiffs sent Defendant a letter requesting a conference of counsel, which took place on July 3, 2019. (Rose Decl. ¶ 14). The Parties were unable to resolve their differences, and this Motion followed on July 22, 2019.

Defendant offers the declarations of Lisa Adinolfi and Shannon L. Ernster in support of its contention that producing nearly 2,000 separate claim files and related documents would be unduly burdensome. Ms. Adinolfi is a paralegal and a member of Defendant's Litigation Team in the Law and Regulatory Affairs Department. (Adinolfi Decl. ¶ 1). Ms. Adinolfi states that she “routinely” searches Defendant's record-keeping systems and databases for documents and data concerning claims that are the subject of litigation, and that she is familiar with the Defendant's processes for doing so. (Id. ¶ 4). According to Ms. Adinolfi, the process for retrieving claim files requires separate, individual searches on several data systems for each claim and may take between thirty minutes to an hour or more per claim to complete. (Id. ¶ 8). Ms. Adinolfi further reports that the Project Manager in charge of this case estimates that it may take between three and four months to retrieve all of the materials requested by Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 9).

Ms. Ernster, Defendant's outside counsel, estimates that legal review of each file would then take, on average, between ten to thirty minutes per file. (Ernster Decl. ¶ 11). As such, Ms. Ernster predicts that it would take “a minimum of 330 hours to complete this process for all 1,979 claims,” thereby adding to the alleged burden of the production.[1] (Id. ¶ 12).

III. STANDARDS

A. Scope Of Permissible Discovery

*3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), as amended on December 1, 2015, provides:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “Even after the 2015 amendments, courts continue to recognize that discovery relevance remains ‘broad’ in scope.” Sci. Games Corp. v. AGS LLC, 2017 WL 3013251, at *2 (D. Nev. July 13, 2017); see also Wagafe v. Trump, 2018 WL 348470, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 10, 2018) (“[T]the scope of discovery is broad.”). “Proportionality focuses on the marginal utility of the discovery sought.” In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prod. Liab. Litig., 180 F. Supp. 3d 273, 280 n.43 (S.D. N.Y. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Because discovery must be both relevant and proportional to the needs of the case, the right to discovery, even plainly relevant discovery, is not limitless. The December 1, 2015 amendments to Rule 26 “were designed to protect against over-discovery and to emphasize judicial management of the discovery process, especially for those cases in which the parties do not themselves effectively manage discovery.” Noble Roman's, Inc. v. Hattenhauer Distrib. Co., 314 F.R.D. 304, 308 (S.D. Ind. 2016); see also Davita HealthCare Partners, Inc. v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 394, 398 (2016) (2015 amendments to the Federal Rules “contribute to the overall goal of regulating the time and expense of litigation”). At the same time, the larger and more complex the case, the more even relatively voluminous discovery may be considered proportional. The party resisting discovery bears the burden of showing why discovery should not be allowed. Doutherd v. Montesdeoca, 2018 WL 3008867, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 15, 2018) (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)).

B. Requests For Production Of Documents

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a), a party may request documents “in the responding party's possession, custody, or control.” Rule 34(b) requires the requesting party to describe the items to be produced with “reasonable particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1). “ ‘All-encompassing demands’ that do not allow a reasonable person to ascertain which documents are required do not meet the particularity standard of Rule 34(b)(1)(A).” In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 256 F.R.D. 151, 157 (E.D. Pa. 2009).

*4 Following a reasonable investigation to locate responsive materials, a responding party must serve a written response to each request either (1) stating that the materials requested will be produced, in whole or in part; (2) affirming that no responsive documents exist in the party's possession, custody or control, or (3) posing an objection to the request, including the reasons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2). Pursuant to the revisions to the Federal Rules effective December 1, 2015, if objections are posed, the “objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.” Fed. Rule Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). The 2015 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 34 explain:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, Advisory Committee Notes (2015 Amendment).

A proper written response should also provide sufficient information for the requesting party, and the court, to be satisfied that the responding party conducted an adequate investigation for responsive materials. As one court has explained:

Atcherley v. Clark, 2014 WL 4660842, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2014) (internal citations omitted); see also A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper -- especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections.... Similarly, boilerplate relevancy objections, without setting forth any explanation or argument why the requested documents are not relevant, are improper.”); Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 375, 379 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[U]nexplained and unsupported boilerplate objections are improper.”); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 408 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (boilerplate privilege assertions are ineffective).

However, a court cannot order a party to produce documents that do not exist. A plaintiff's mere suspicion that additional documents must exist is an insufficient basis to grant a motion to compel. See Bethea v. Comcast, 218 F.R.D. 328, 329 (D. D.C. 2003). Rather, the moving party must have a colorable basis for its belief that relevant, responsive documents exist and are being improperly withheld. See Carter v. Dawson, 2010 WL 4483814, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2010) (defendants' representation that they are unable to locate responsive documents precludes the grant of a motion to compel “unless Plaintiff can identify a specific document that Defendants have withheld”); Ayala v. Tapia, 1991 WL 241873, at *2 (D. D.C. Nov. 1, 1991) (denying motion to compel where moving party could not identify withheld documents).

IV. DISCUSSION

*5 As a general matter, Plaintiffs complain that Defendant's written responses to the RFPs are uniformly defective because they assert boilerplate objections, but do not reflect whether documents have been withheld pursuant to the objections. (See, e.g., Jt. Stip. at 22). The Court agrees that the responses are incomplete in that regard. See Fed. Rule Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C). Accordingly, where production of documents or supplementation of a written response is ordered here, Defendant shall clearly reflect in an amended response whether any documents have been withheld pursuant to an objection. Defendant is not required to serve amended responses to RFPs for which no further production is ordered.

A. Claims Data (RFP Nos. 4, 6, 7 (Dr. Yazdi) & 8, 10, 11 (Dr. Gutierrez)[2]

Plaintiffs seek production of claim files, requested in the following three sets of parallel RFPs:

(Jt. Stip. at 8).

(Id. at 9).

(Id.).

The Parties do not seriously dispute Plaintiffs' entitlement to the information requested by these RFPs, and Defendant's written responses to the Requests, served before Plaintiffs delivered a chart of the claims at issue, state that Defendant will produce responsive materials once the specific claims at issue are identified. For example, after asserting boilerplate objections, Defendant's written responses to RFP Nos. 4 and 8, which seek evidence reflecting the “handling or administration” of the claims at issue, state in relevant part:

(Id. at 8). Similarly, Defendant's responses to RFP Nos. 6 and 10, which seek assignment of benefits communications, state in relevant part that Defendant's production of claim files “will include any communications between Defendant and [Plaintiffs] pertaining to the claims at issue.”[3] (Id. at 9). Finally, Defendant's responses to RFP Nos. 7 and 11, which seek documents reflecting whether any insured instructed SACM not to pay for a service provided by Plaintiffs, state that the production of claim files “will include any communications between Defendant and any of the members pertaining to the claims at issue.” (Id. at 10).

*6 Instead, the Parties' dispute focuses on whether Defendant is required to produce claim files for each of the 1,979 claims that Plaintiffs identified on April 30, 2019, and what the timetable should be for the production. Plaintiffs maintain that Defendant's burden contentions ring hollow because Defendant should have been able to identify the claims at issue from the moment this action was filed in state court. According to Plaintiffs, based on the Complaint alone, Defendant knew that the case involved claims submitted by Plaintiffs for dental services provided under the SACM policy that were delayed or denied beginning around June 2015, and that many if not all of the claims were placed in “audit” or “investigation” status by Defendant. (Id. at 10-11). As such, Plaintiffs argue that the claim files should have been produced as part of Defendant's initial disclosures pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), but instead, Defendant refused to even begin to search for responsive materials until Plaintiffs produced a chart of the claims at issue. Plaintiffs further contend that because Defendant effectively “brought this case to a standstill,” the discovery cut-off is imminent, and Plaintiffs need claim files for all the challenged claims, Defendant should be ordered to produce all responsive materials within sixty days. (Id. at 12).

Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiffs bear significant responsibility for the delay in production because Plaintiffs waited eight months after Defendant served a Demand for a Bill of Particulars before they identified the claims at issue, despite Defendant's repeated requests for that information. (Id. at 13-14). Defendant contends that in light of the amount of information it must enter to search for any particular claim in any given database, the numerous databases it must search for each claim, and the steps it must take to review any documents retrieved, it could take until October 2019 for it to identify, review and produce a full set of files. (Id. at 16-19; see also id. at 21 (“[T]he process for gathering and producing claims documents is a multi-step, time-consuming process, and to complete this process for 1,979 [claims] will require a minimum of 1,320 hours of work by Defendant and its counsel.”). Accordingly, Defendant asks the Court to deny Plaintiffs' request that it produce claim documents for 1,979 claims in sixty days, and instead order the Parties “to employ a sampling, or bucketing, approach and agree on 100 representative claims,” which Defendant will produce in 45 days. (Id.).

At the hearing, Plaintiffs persuasively argued that a sampling approach to the production of claims files would impair their ability to prove damages at trial because this action (in contrast to a class action) places at issue a set of particular claims, not “representative” claims. Counsel for Defendant implicitly agreed that Plaintiffs are entitled to the files for each of the disputed claims by acknowledging that Defendant would be able to produce the files for all 1,979 claims at issue in this litigation by November 2019.

Defendant's counsel further represented that her office had just that day received the files for 54 claims and would be able to produce them to Plaintiffs within fourteen days. Following the production of those 54 claims files, 1,925 will remain to be produced. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Defendant to produce the claims files for each of the disputed claims in this action by the following deadlines:

Defendant's counsel did not explain at the hearing how the fifty-four claims files received on August 22, 2019 were selected for the initial wave of review and production. However, to ensure that the remaining claims files are produced in an orderly fashion without regard to content, the three tranches of the outstanding files shall be produced, to the extent possible, by date of service, starting with the oldest claims first. The Motion to Compel production of claims files is therefore GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

B. Telephone Call Recordings And Transcripts (RFP Nos. 5 (Dr. Yazdi) & 9 (Dr. Gutierrez)

*7 RFP Nos. 5 and 9 seek:

(Jt. Stip. at 21). Defendant's written response objected to these RFPs in their entirety, stating: “Defendant objects to this request on the following grounds: (1) it is vastly overbroad, including as to time and scope, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and harassing; (2) it is vague and ambiguous; (3) it seeks information that is not relevant to the parties' claims or defenses, and is disproportionate to the needs of the case; (4) it seeks information in violation of HIPAA, and confidential and protected health information of third party patients not at issue in this litigation; and (5) it seeks information not within the possession, custody, or control of Defendant.”[4] (Id.).

Plaintiffs argue that the recordings and transcripts requested -- for all calls between each of the Plaintiffs and Defendant regarding any SACM claims, not just the claims at issue -- are relevant because the SAC alleges a course of dealing between the parties, which Defendant allegedly denies, in which Plaintiffs (or their office) would contact Defendant by phone to verify coverage before rendering services. (Id. at 21). Plaintiffs also claim to have spoken with Defendant's auditors and investigators, and recordings of these conversations promise to be “highly relevant” evidence. (Id. at 22). Plaintiffs deny that there are any HIPPA concerns in the disclosure of these calls, but even if there were, they claim that the Protective Order is adequate to handle patient privacy concerns. (Id.). Finally, Plaintiffs reject Defendant's burden contentions because Defendant does not appear to have even attempted to search for the relevant calls, and the range of the estimated amount of time it would take to conduct such a search -- between “330 and 4,000” hours for even just the 1,979 claims at issue -- is so broad as to lose any credibility. (P Supp. Memo. at 4) (citing Adinolfi Decl. ¶ 11).

*8 Defendant argues that these RFPs are unduly burdensome and disproportionate to the needs of the case. (Jt. Stip. at 23). According to Defendant, Plaintiffs' primary interest was in obtaining recordings and transcripts of calls to the SIU. Upon learning that calls to the SIU are not recorded, Plaintiffs returned to their original demand for materials pertaining to all calls for all claims, even though the calls unrelated to the SIU were of admittedly marginal interest. (Id.). Defendant explains that it is not able to conduct searches for telephone calls simply by provider name; in addition to the provider name, a search requires the member name and the approximate date of the call, and can only be conducted one claim at a time. (Id.). Furthermore, due to Defendant's retention policies, the only recordings to which Defendant still has access would be calls recorded after October 1, 2015, and the “vast majority of the claims at issue are for dates of service pre-dating October 1, 2015.” (Id. at 24). Accordingly, a search would likely identify only a small number of calls, while requiring up to 4,000 hours to conduct, and as such, the burdensomeness of the request is “clearly outweighed” by its likely benefit. (Id.; see also D Supp. Memo. at 5-6).

The Court finds that Defendants have satisfied their burden to demonstrate that retrieval and transcription of the requested information would be overly burdensome. Moreover, because the content of such calls is entirely speculative, Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of establishing that relevant information will be discovered if the calls are transcribed, or that the need for this information outweighs the burden. Because the Court denies the Motion on these grounds, it is unnecessary to address the parties' remaining arguments involving these requests. Accordingly, the Motion to Compel further responses to RFP Nos. 5 and 9 is DENIED.

C. SACM Provider Audits (RFP No. 13)

RFP No. 13 seeks:

(Jt. Stip. at 24). Defendant asserted various objections to this RFP, including that production of information unrelated to the claims at issue would violate HIPPA, and stated: “ Without waiving any objections, Defendant responds as follows: Defendant will produce documents pertaining to any investigation by SIU of Plaintiffs, their claims submissions and/or billing practices.” (Id. at 25).

Plaintiffs argue that any patient privacy concerns, which they deny exist here, are addressed by the Protective Order in this case, which “contains specific provisions to manage Protected Health Information to comply with HIPPA.” (Id.). Apparently acquiescing to Defendant's limitation of the scope of the response to SIU investigations of Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs further note that privacy concerns are not implicated by the RFPs because “these individuals are Plaintiffs' patients,” and Plaintiffs already have knowledge of the treatments they provided and the dates of service. (P Supp. Memo. at 4-5) (emphasis omitted). Defendant maintains that despite the Protective Order, it is “unable to produce documents pertaining to claims not at issue in this matter,” even if a claim involves a patient at issue in this action, but for a different date of service. (Jt. Stip. at 26). However, Defendant does not object to producing SIU materials relating to the claims at issue in this case.

The Court notes as a preliminary matter that Defendant's repeated contentions at the hearing regarding HIPPA's limitations on the disclosure of protected health information are generally unavailing. HIPPA broadly prohibits the disclosure of protected health information, but that general prohibition is subject to several exceptions, including when disclosure is authorized by a court order. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (“A covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by this subpart or by subpart C of part 160 of this subchapter.”); see also id. § 164.512(e)(1)(i) (authorizing the disclosure of protected health information pursuant to a court order). Indeed, even in the absence of a court order, a covered entity may disclose protected health information simply in response to a discovery request if the covered entity receives “satisfactory assurance” that the individual who is the subject of the protected health information “has been given notice of the request” and an opportunity to object, or if there is an adequate protective order in place. Id. § 164.512(e)(1); see also Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 309485, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2007) (“HIPPA permits disclosure of protected health information pursuant to a court order or discovery request when the ‘healthcare provider receives satisfactory assurance from the party seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to secure a qualified protective order.’ ”) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(1)(e)(ii)(b)). Furthermore, the normal concerns about disclosure are diminished here because as the health care providers who submitted claims for reimbursement, Plaintiffs have already seen their patients' protected health information. Finally, the asserted privacy interests may be addressed by the Court's protective order.

*9 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated the relevance of the requested information, as modified by Defendant's restriction of the request to “documents pertaining to any investigation by SIU of Plaintiffs, their claims submissions and/or billing practices.” Accordingly, the Motion to Compel further responses to RFP No. 13, as modified, is GRANTED.

D. Financial Performance Of SACM Policies (RFP No. 14)

RFP No. 14 seeks:

(Jt. Stip. at 26). Defendant's written response objects to this RFP in its entirety, stating: “Defendant objects to this request on the following grounds: (1) it seeks information that is confidential or proprietary in nature; (2) it seeks information that is not relevant to the parties' claims or defenses, and is disproportionate to the needs of the case; (3) it is vague and ambiguous, including as to the terms “financial performance,” “loss ratios,” “levels of claims” and “other events influencing your level of profit or loss”; (4) and it is overly broad, including as to time and scope, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and harassing.” (Id.).

Plaintiffs contend that information about the financial performance of the SACM plan is relevant to their allegation that Defendant delayed and denied payments when and as it did, not because of suspected wrongdoing by Plaintiffs, but because SACM terminated the policy and Defendant was losing money on it. (Id. at 26-27). As such, it seeks evidence to prove that the audits and investigations were pretextual. (Id. at 27). Furthermore, Plaintiffs repeat that any confidential or proprietary information is protected by the Protective Order in this case. (Id.). While denying that the RFP is overbroad, Plaintiffs state that they are willing to “restrict [the] Request to the years 2013, 2014 and 2015.” (Id.). Finally, concerns about disclosure of “proprietary” information are unwarranted because Plaintiffs are not competitors with Defendant. (P Supp. Memo. at 5).

Defendant contends that even limited to the years 2013-2015, the RFP seeks information to which Plaintiffs are not entitled. Defendant notes that the SAC is “devoid” of any allegations that Defendant denied claims because it was losing money on the SACM policy. Instead, the SAC alleges that Defendant denied claims because the SACM policy was being cancelled, without reference to its financial performance. (Jt. Stip. at 28). Moreover, Plaintiffs' request is not limited to dental claims. Because of the annual and lifetime caps on dental services under the policy, and the lack of a lifetime maximum for medical claims, Defendant contends that “any financial information regarding premiums and loss ratios would largely pertain to medical claims, with dental claims only representing a fraction of the overall payout of the SACM Plan.” (Id.). Because the information sought is of “questionable relevance,” it does not outweigh Defendant's interest in “protecting financial information from disclosure.” (D Supp. Memo. at 6).

*10 Whether or not the operative pleading in this case specifically alleged that Defendant delayed and denied payments to Plaintiffs because the SACM policy was no longer profitable is not controlling as to the discoverability of the requested information. Plaintiffs more broadly allege that their claims were suddenly being investigated and denied for improper reasons, and Plaintiffs are permitted to explore what those reasons might be. Defendant's contention that the discovery is “not relevant” because the profitability of the policy was determined more by medical than dental reimbursements is similarly unpersuasive, as that argument goes to the weight that the evidence should be given, not its discoverability. Furthermore, Plaintiffs are not Defendant's competitors, and the confidentiality of the information requested is adequately protected by the Protective Order. Accordingly, the Motion to Compel further responses to RFP No. 14 is GRANTED.

E. Architecture Of Claims Data Processing Systems (RFP No. 16)

RFP No. 16 seeks:

(Jt. Stip. at 28). Defendant's written response objects to this RFP in its entirety, stating: “Defendant objects to this request on the following grounds: (1) it seeks information that is confidential or proprietary in nature; (2) Plaintiffs have not identified the claims at issue; (3) it seeks information that is not relevant to the parties' claims or defenses, and is disproportionate to the needs of the case; (4) it is vague and ambiguous as to the terms ‘claims,’ ‘sufficient,’ ‘architecture,’ ‘claims-data-processing computer systems,’ ‘client and server,’ and ‘hardware’; and (5) it is overly broad, including as to time and scope, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and harassing.” (Id. at 29).

Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to information about Defendant's data systems to test Defendant's representations that it will take months to produce the requested claims documents. (Id.). Plaintiffs further note that “confidential and proprietary” information is protected by the Protective Order, and far from being vague, the terms in the RFP are commonly understood by IT professionals. (Id.; see also P Supp. Memo. at 5).

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs should not be allowed to pursue this information because they did not address this RFP in the informal discovery conference. (Jt. Stip. at 30). Substantively, Defendant contends that it is unclear what kind of information Plaintiffs are seeking, or how a description of data systems would enable Plaintiffs to “test” Defendant's production. (Id.). According to Defendant, this RFP does not have any relevance to Plaintiffs' claims, while Defendant has a “strong interest” in maintaining the privacy of its proprietary data systems. (Id.). Additionally, the purported “benefit” of this information does not outweigh the burden of searching for and producing it. (D Supp. Memo. at 6).

At the hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel conceded that the information sought by RFP No. 16 is not “directly relevant” to the claims and defenses in this action, and further admitted that it was not clear that the information would be needed at all to the extent that Defendant would be producing claims data. Accordingly, the Motion to Compel further responses to RFP No. 16 is DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and on the record at the hearing, Plaintiffs' Objections to Evidence are OVERRULED. The Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. With the exception of claims files, for which a specific production schedule has been provided, where further responses are required by this Order, Defendant shall serve amended written responses and produce potentially responsive documents in its possession, custody, or control within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Production of claims files shall adhere to the schedule set forth on pages 17 and 18 of this Order.

*11 IT IS SO ORDERED.