*1 Plaintiffs Jennifer Bagosy and Alex Bagosy (“Plaintiffs”) filed this action in Orange County Superior Court on June 27, 2018, alleging ten claims against defendant PHH Mortgage Services (“Defendant”) relating to the handling of a residential mortgage and attempted loan modification. Dkt. 1-1 (“Complaint”). Defendant removed the action to this Court on September 26, 2019. Dkt. 1. The Scheduling Order in this case was entered January 14, 2019, setting a discovery cutoff date of August 12, 2019 and a trial date of November 12, 2019. Dkt. 15. Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging nine claims on March 20, 2019. Defendant answered the Complaint on April 17, 2019.

On May 30, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Further Responses by Defendant to Requests for Production (“RFP”), with a Supporting Joint Stipulation (Dkt. 25, “Motion”), as well as a declaration of counsel and exhibits (Dkt. 25-1), set for hearing on June 20, 2019. In the Motion, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant has not timely complied with its obligation to produce materials in response to certain RFPs, Defendant contends it “did not hold a single document from its production” (emphasis in original) but “will produce additional emails, policies and procedures for the loan modification process, and audio recordings to the extent that they exist,” both sides accuse the other of delay, and Plaintiffs seek an award of costs associated with the Motion. See generally Motion. On June 6, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Local Rule 37-2.3 Supplemental Memorandum. Dkt. 26.

The Motion is now fully briefed. The Court finds this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument (see Local Rule 7-15) and vacates the hearing set for June 20, 2019. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. “Relevance ‘has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.’ ” Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Wyo Tech Inv. Group LLC, ––– F. Supp. 3d –––, 2019 WL 1531886, at *7 (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)).

Under Rule 34(a)(1), a party may serve on any other party requests, within the scope of Rule 26(b), to produce or permit inspection of, among other things, “(A) any designated documents or electronically stored information.” Such requests “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected ... [and] must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for the inspection ....” Rule 34(b)(1)(A), (B). The party responding to a request for production must, “[f]or each item or category, ... either state that inspection ... will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Rule 34(b)(2)(B). “An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.” Rule 34(b)(2)(C). The 2015 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 34 explain:

Rule 34, Advisory Committee Notes (2015 Amendment).

A propounding party may move for an order compelling an answer or production to a request for production if the responding party fails to produce documents or fails to respond as requested under Rule 34. Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). An evasive or incomplete answer or response is treated as a failure to answer or respond. Rule 37(a)(4). “[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper—especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections.” A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996)). “When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming that the information is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material, the party must: (i) expressly make the claim; and (ii) describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.” Rule 26(b)(5)(A)(ii); cf. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. V. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating, in the context of Rule 34, that “Rule 26 clarifies that a proper assertion of privilege must be more specific than a generalized boilerplate objection”). A party asserting the attorney-client privilege must identify specific communications and the basis for each claim of privilege. See United States v. Salyer, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1018 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1000 (9th Cir. 2002)). Further, “[a]lthough the court may, of course, take into account legitimate privacy interests that might be implicated in the disclosure of documents and information, privacy concerns are not absolute; they must be weighed against other competing interests.” Ramirez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 231 F.R.D. 407, 411 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604-05 (C.D. Cal. 1995).

“[B]oilerplate objections or blanket refusals inserted into a response to a Rule 34 request for production of documents are insufficient to assert a privilege.” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 408 F.3d at 1149. However, the failure to produce a privilege log within the 30-day period for responding to document requests under Rule 34 does not automatically waive privilege. Id. When a party withholds information on the basis of privilege, the party must “describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.” Rule 26(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 408 F.3d at 1147 (stating that “Rule 26 clarifies that a proper assertion of privilege must be more specific than a generalized, boilerplate objection.”).

*3 Plaintiffs moves for an order compelling production of documents responsive to RFP Nos. 1-10, 13-17. The Court has reviewed each of the RFPs and Responses at issue and finds that the RFPs at issue seek information within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). In fact, except for RFP Nos. 14-17, Defendant has agreed to produce nonprivileged responsive documents. With respect to RFP Nos. 14-17, seeking employee handbooks and training materials or instructions for case managers, the Court finds: (1) the materials sought are relevant and proportional to the needs of the case; and (2) Defendant has not met its burden, as set forth above, as to its various objections. In so finding, the Court relies upon the fact that Defendant does not appear to argue in support of any of its objection in its portion of the Joint Stipulation in support of the Motion and in fact represents that “it is in the process of searching for any documents regarding policies, procedures, training, and instructions” and “plans to produce such policies by June 10, 2019.” Motion at 14.

As a result, and subject to the Confidentiality Protective Order in place in this action (Dkt. 21), Defendant's objections, except the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, are all overruled, and Defendant is ordered to produce all non-privileged documents, including electronically stored information and audio files, responsive to RFP Nos. 1-10 and 13-17. If Defendant withholds any documents based upon the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, it shall serve a complaint privilege log.

The Court next turns to timing. As noted, although Defendant asserts it “did not hold a single document from its production” (emphasis in original), it nevertheless states that it is still “actively searching” for responsive documents and “plans” to produce further documents by June 10, 2019. It appears Defendant is arguing that its counsel did not withhold any documents, but Defendant's search remains ongoing. Defendant's position runs counter to the requirements of Rule 34.

Rule 34(b)(2)(B) requires a production in response to a request for production must “be completed no later than the time for inspection specified in the request or another reasonable time specified in the response.” Here, the RFPs, served on January 28, 2019, requested production within 30 days from service of the RFPs. See Dkt. 25-1 at 10. Interpreting that date to have been continued when Plaintiffs' counsel agreed to extend Defendant's time to respond to the RFPs, the date demanded for production was March 18, 2019. Dkt. 25-1 at 3. Defendant's responses to the RFPs did not specify “another reasonable time.” As a result, under Rule 34(b)(2)(B), the production was required to take place on March 18, 2019.

On March 18, Defendant served written responses to the RFPs but did not produce documents; rather, for the first time, Defendant asserted that it required a protective order before producing any responsive documents. It is unclear to the Court why the entirety of Defendant's production would require a protective order, or why Defendant waited seven weeks from the service of the RFPs to begin the process of seeking such a protective order, particularly where the issue was referenced in the parties' January 7, 2019 Rule 26 Report (Dkt. 14 at 5). Regardless, such an order was entered on April 2, 2019.

Even giving Defendant the benefit of the doubt, there is no reason why Defendant should not have completed its production of all documents it agreed to produce, including audio files, by April 2, 2019. As for RFP Nos. 14-17, which Defendant did not initially agree to provide, certainly by the time it subsequently agreed to produce such records there was no reason for further delay. As far back as January 7, 2019, Plaintiffs stated they would be seeking those very documents and Defendant represented it had a “litigation hold” in place. See Dkt. 14 at 4. The Court is cognizant of the reality of litigation and corporate document retention and storage. However, for a case pending almost a year, with the nature of the documents sought known for six months, and a discovery cutoff only two months away, further delay is unwarranted.

*4 Defendant argues that it produced 2,618 pages of documents already. Motion at 11. However, the fact that some documents were produced does not excuse the fact that other documents apparently were not produced, and a Motion was required to compel the production of those unproduced documents. Defendant alternatively argues that “any delay in discovery in this action is of Plaintiffs' own making” and asserts that the Motion is “premature.” Motion at 11, 13. The Court disagrees on both counts. Plaintiffs reasonably and timely propounded the RFPs, reasonably and timely conferred regarding Defendant's insufficient production, and timely moved upon the issues remaining after the meet and confer process. The reasonably tailored RFPs were propounded more than four months ago and seek documents directly related to Plaintiffs' claims. The discovery cutoff looms approximately two months away. Plaintiffs neither unnecessarily delayed nor acted prematurely in bringing the Motion.

As a result, Defendant is ordered to deliver all non-privileged documents, including electronically stored information and audio files, responsive to RFP Nos. 1-10 and 13-17 by no later than ten (10) days from the date of this Order. If Defendant withholds any document based upon the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, it shall serve a complaint privilege log by ten (10) days from the date of this Order.

In the Motion, Plaintiffs seek to recover their expenses incurred in bringing the Motion, $2,000, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5), and include a declaration from counsel attesting to counsel's hourly rate, experience, and a summary of hours incurred in connection with the Motion. Defendant argues that it should not be required to pay such costs because it “worked diligently to comply with Plaintiffs' excessive discovery requests, has not held a single document from its product, and continues to meet and confer with Plaintiffs with regards to Plaintiffs['] additional requests.” Motion at 14.

Plaintiffs, having succeeded on the Motion, are entitled to recover reasonable expenses incurred in making the Motion, including attorneys' fees. Rule 37(a)(5)(A). Defendant's arguments to the contrary do not show that Defendant's actions were substantially justified or that circumstances exist rendering such an award unjust. Id.

Reasonable attorneys' fees are generally calculated based on the traditional “lodestar” method. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). Under the lodestar method, the Court determines a reasonable fee by multiplying “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation” by “a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The reasonableness of hours expended depends on the specific circumstances of each case. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978. The Court “has a great deal of discretion in determining the reasonableness of the fee and, as a general rule, [an appellate court] will defer to its determination ... regarding the reasonableness of the hours claimed.” Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). In making fee determinations generally, the goal is to do “rough justice,” not to achieve “auditing perfection,” with trial courts using their overall sense of the litigation in making the determination. Fox v. Vice 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011) (citing Hensley).

Defendant did not contest the amount of fees sought in the Motion or file a Supplemental Memorandum. In her declaration, counsel for Plaintiffs attests her billing rate is $375 per hour, she spent six hours preparing the Motion, declaration, exhibits, and in meet and confer efforts, and anticipates incurring an additional five hours in finalizing the Motion and appearing at the hearing. The Court finds Plaintiffs' counsel's rates to be reasonable, and, with one exception, finds the hours to have been actually and reasonably incurred. The one exception is the time anticipated for appearing at the hearing which is not warranted because the Court herein have vacated the hearing. However, even excluding the entire block of time in which the hearing time is included and just considering the six hours spent preparing the Motion, Plaintiffs' have shown reasonable attorneys' fees incurred of $2,250 (6 hours at $375/hour), more than 10% higher than the fees sought.

*5 As a result, the Court, considering both a lodestar method and a holistic review, finds an award of the $2,000 sought by Plaintiffs is reasonable and appropriate.

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion (Dkt. 25) is GRANTED.

Within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, Defendant shall deliver to counsel for Plaintiffs all non-privileged documents, including electronically stored information and audio files, responsive to RFP Nos. 1-10 and 13-17 and, if Defendant withholds any document based upon the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, shall serve a complaint privilege log.

Within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order, Defendant shall deliver to counsel for Plaintiffs $2,000 for expenses reasonably incurred in bringing the Motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.