Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to compel further responses to interrogatories. Docket No. 133. Defendant filed a response in opposition. Docket No. 139. Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 144. The motion is properly resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion to compel is hereby GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves claims that Defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct with respect to high-end colocation data centers within the Las Vegas area. See Compl. (Docket No. 1) at ¶ 3. Although some state law claims are also brought, at its heart this case involves claims that Defendant's alleged conduct violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and engaging in unlawful restraints of trade. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 147-171. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unlawfully stifled competition in an effort to maintain its monopoly in high-end colocation data centers in the Las Vegas metropolitan area through a variety of means, including reliance on exclusive-dealings agreements, threats of refusals to deal, predatory pricing, and a campaign of disparagement of Defendant's competitors (including Plaintiff). See id. at ¶¶ 44, 73; see also id. at ¶¶ 95-120 (providing product and geographic market definition).

One aspect of the allegedly anti-competitive conduct involves Defendant's requirement that customers, carriers, vendors, and other third parties agree to “Acceptable Use Policies” (AUPs) through which they were forbidden from dealing with competing data centers within 50 miles. See id. at ¶ 48. The 2013 AUP specifically prohibited business dealings with Plaintiff. See id. at ¶ 50. Defendant attempts to justify this exclusionary provision on the basis that it was necessary to “protect [its] intellectual property” given a settlement agreement in a case in which Plaintiff's CEO was alleged to have had unauthorized possession of Defendant's “intellectual property and confidential information.” Id. at ¶¶ 86-87.

The parties are now before the Court on a discovery dispute with respect to two interrogatories propounded by Plaintiff aimed at testing the basis for Defendant's justification. Plaintiff seeks identification of the specific trade secrets (Interrogatory 16) and the specific intellectual property (Interrogatory 17) that Defendant contends had been misappropriated by Plaintiff's CEO. See Docket No. 133-2 at 6.

II. STANDARDS

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]“[B]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); see also *301 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998). The scope of discovery is limited to nonprivileged matter that is relevant to a party's claim or defense and is proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The party seeking to avoid discovery bears the burden of showing why that discovery should not be permitted. Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Carr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 312 F.R.D. 459, 469 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (concluding that the 2015 amendments to discovery rules did not alter the allocation of burdens). The party resisting discovery must specifically detail the reasons why each request is irrelevant or otherwise objectionable, and may not rely on boilerplate, generalized, conclusory, or speculative arguments. F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc., 291 F.R.D. 544, 553 (D. Nev. 2013). Arguments against discovery must be supported by “specific examples and articulated reasoning.” E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Ent., 237 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D. Nev. 2006).[1]

[6] [7] [8]Discovery is limited to relevant matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). District courts enjoy wide discretion in deciding relevancy for discovery purposes. E.g., Shaw v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 306 F.R.D. 293, 296 (S.D. Cal. 2015). To be permissible, discovery must be “relevant to any party's claim or defense.” In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 563-64 (D. Ariz. 2016) (discussing impact of 2015 amendments to definition of relevance for discovery purposes). Relevance for the purposes of discovery is defined broadly. See Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, Case No. 2:14-cv-02046-JAD-PAL, 2016 WL 778368, at *2 n.16 (D. Nev. Feb. 25, 2016) (finding the scope of relevance remains broad even after 2015 amendments).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant opposes the instant motion on various procedural and substantive grounds, which the Court will address in turn below.

A. Sufficiency of Pre-Filing Conference

[9]Defendant opposes the instant motion in large part by challenging the sufficiency of the pre-filing conference required before filing a motion to compel. Resp. at 3-8. Plaintiff responds that a sufficient conference was held for the motion to be considered on its merits. See, e.g., Reply at 4-5. Plaintiff has the better argument.

[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16]“Discovery is supposed to proceed with minimal involvement of the Court.” F.D.I.C. v. Butcher, 116 F.R.D. 196, 203 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). Counsel should strive to be cooperative, practical and sensible, and should seek judicial intervention “only in extraordinary situations that implicate truly significant interests.” In re Convergent Techs. Securities Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the party bringing a motion to compel must “include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). The Local Rules further expound on this requirement, providing that discovery motions will not be considered “unless the movant (1) has made a good-faith effort to meet and confer ... before filing the motion, and (2) includes a declaration setting forth the details and results of the meet-and-confer conference about each disputed discovery request.” Local Rule 26-7(c). This prefiling conference requirement is not simply a formal prerequisite to seeking judicial intervention, but requires a fulsome discussion of the issues in dispute. Nevada Power v. Monsanto, 151 F.R.D. 118, 120 (D.Nev.1993).[2] Courts may *302 look beyond the movant's certification to determine whether a sufficient meet-and-confer actually took place. See, e.g., Cardoza v. Bloomin' Brands, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1145 (D. Nev. 2015).

[17] [18] [19]These meet-and-confer requirements are very important and the Court takes them very seriously. At the same time, litigants should not expect courts to look favorably on attempts to use the prefiling conference requirements as procedural weapons through which to avoid complying with their discovery obligations. See, e.g., Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., Case No. 2:12-cv-00053-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 4714273, at *2 (Aug. 30, 2013). Gamesmanship by an opposing party that thwarts the meet-and-confer process is not grounds to deny a discovery motion. See, e.g., Nevada Power, 151 F.R.D. at 120 (judicial consideration of a dispute is proper when “one party has acted in bad faith, either by refusing to engage in negotiations altogether or by refusing to provide specific support for its claims ...”). The text of Rule 37 reinforces this proposition, requiring only that the movant “attempted” to engage in a rule-complaint conference. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); see also Local Rule 26-7(c) (requiring a “good-faith effort”). In addition, the Court retains the discretion to waive the meet-and-confer requirements with respect to any particular motion based on the circumstances of that case. See Rogers v. Giurbino, 288 F.R.D. 469, 477-78 (S.D. Cal. 2012); see also Mielke v. Standard Metals Processing, Inc., Case No. 2:14-cv-01763-JCM-NJK, 2015 WL 2152664, at *1 (D. Nev. May 7, 2015) (collecting cases).[3]

In a first for this Court, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the telephonic conference that was admittedly held on the discovery now in dispute at the conclusion of which Defendant's own counsel invited Plaintiff to file the instant motion to compel. Hence, there is no dispute Plaintiff's counsel did in fact confer telephonically with Defendant's counsel as to the discovery now before the Court. See, e.g., Resp. at 7. Defendant does not dispute that it was Defendant's own counsel who ended the discussion on this dispute. See Docket No. 133-1 at ¶ 7. There is also no dispute that Defendant's counsel then instructed Plaintiff's counsel to proceed with filing the motion to compel. See, e.g., Resp. at 8. Nonetheless, Defendant asks the Court to deny the motion to compel on the basis that a more complete conference could have been held at which there was more thorough discussion at a time when counsel was not tired. See id. at 7-8.[4] To that end, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not provide it an opportunity to evaluate arguments presented in writing to enable a further response. See id.[5]

There are several fundamental flaws to Defendant's position. First, it takes significant *303 chutzpah for Defendant to complain about the “rushed, three-minute-long conversation,” Resp. at 7, when it was Defendant's own attorney who cut off the discussion and instructed Plaintiff to file a motion to compel. See Docket No. 133-1 at ¶ 7. That defense counsel stymied Plaintiff's meet-and-confer efforts does not negate that Plaintiff at least “attempted” to confer as required by the rules. Second, the Court finds disingenuous Defendant's representation in the briefing that counsel somehow believed further conferral efforts would be forthcoming after the telephonic conference. See Resp. at 8. It makes no sense to tell opposing counsel to file a motion to compel if there is a legitimate desire for further discussion.[6] Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel sent an email after the telephonic conference making clear that the parties had reached an impasse and Plaintiff would be filing its motion to compel on this issue as defense counsel had invited, Docket No. 133-2, but defense counsel did not respond to that email by indicating that a sufficient meet-and-confer was not held or that further discussions may be fruitful in eliminating or narrowing the parties' dispute. Lastly, and relatedly, Defendant has now obviously seen Plaintiff's arguments fully developed in writing through the motion and it has responded by disputing Plaintiff's position. See, e.g., Resp. at 2 (“Regardless of the lack of a true meet and confer, Switch's interrogatory answers satisfy FRCP 33”). There is no point in the Court requiring further conferral efforts when Defendant knows Plaintiff's positions (as displayed in writing) yet continues to dispute the motion.

In short, the Court rejects Defendant's funhouse-mirrored view of the meet-and-confer process. At the very least, Plaintiff attempted to engage in a proper meet-and-confer on the issues now in dispute and there appears to be no point in requiring further conferral efforts given Defendant's positions on the merits of the dispute. The Court will not deny the motion for lack of a sufficient meet-and-confer.

B. Substance of Dispute

There are two interrogatory responses currently in dispute. Interrogatory 16 seeks the identification of the trade secrets that Defendant contends Plaintiff and/or Michael Ballard (Plaintiff's CEO) stole from Defendant. Interrogatory 17 seeks the identification of the intellectual property that Defendant contends Plaintiff and/or Mr. Ballard stole from Defendant. Defendant's supplemental responses that are now in dispute lodge several objections, including overbreadth and undue burden. See Docket No. 133-2 at 74-76. The responses then provide, purportedly subject to those objections,[7] that:

Id. (emphasis omitted).[8] The parties dispute the sufficiency of these responses.

1. Relevance

[20] [21]Defendant makes a threshold argument that the interrogatories seek irrelevant information with respect to the specific identification of intellectual property and trade secrets because neither party brings an intellectual property or trade secret claim in this case. Resp. at 9-13.[9] Plaintiff counters that the discovery is relevant because it relates to Defendant's defense that its exclusionary provision in the AUPs was merely an attempt to protect its trade secrets and intellectual property from Plaintiff and Mr. Ballard. See Reply at 6. Plaintiff has the better argument.

[22]Defendant's starting point is entirely true. It is well-established that, for example, a party bringing a claim for trade secret misappropriation must identify with particularity the trade secret(s) allegedly misappropriated. See, e.g., Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., 152 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1998).

[23]Defendant stumbles in attempting to extrapolate from this basic premise a broader proposition that a specific identification of trade secrets or intellectual property can only be required in a case that includes such a misappropriation claim. See Resp. at 13. Not so. The scope of discovery in any particular case is determined by the information relevant to the claims or defenses in that case, a concept that is broad in scope. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). It is not novel or unusual for intellectual property rights and antitrust law to intersect. See, e.g., XII Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 2040(a) at 256 & n.1 (4th ed. 2019). In this case, Defendant has advanced a defense that its AUPs were not anticompetitive measures because Defendant was instead using them in a legitimate effort to protect its trade secrets and intellectual property rights against potential misappropriation by Plaintiff in light of alleged past misappropriation. Resp. at 13. Hence, as Defendant makes clear, this contention is premised on its assertion that Plaintiff and Mr. Ballard engaged in trade secret and intellectual property theft that was the subject of earlier litigation. See id. That Defendant has raised this contention in the context of an antitrust matter does not insulate it from discovery aimed at testing that defense. Plaintiff intends to counter this defense by arguing that Defendant's conduct with respect to the AUPs was not a legitimate effort to protect its intellectual property or trade secrets and, instead, any such justification is a pretextual effort to whitewash its anticompetitive conduct. See Reply at 6. A threshold inquiry for Plaintiff to challenge the defense is determining what trade secrets or intellectual property Defendant contends were stolen (i.e., the basis for its alleged concern in requiring AUPs). Contention interrogatories aimed at obtaining that information fall well within the scope of relevant discovery.

In short, Defendant is raising a defense in this case that its practice of requiring AUPs was not anticompetitive because it was a legitimate effort to protect its trade secrets and intellectual property from misappropriation by Plaintiff. Defendant having put those trade secrets and intellectual property rights at issue, Plaintiff is entitled to discovery to challenge this defense. A contention interrogatory seeking identification of the trade secrets and intellectual property on which the defense is premised is within the scope of permissible discovery.

*305 2. Sufficiency of Responses

[24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29]The parties next dispute the sufficiency of the supplemental responses already provided. A discovering party may seek relief from the Court with respect to interrogatory responses that are “evasive or incomplete.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3) (interrogatories must be answered “fully”). An interrogatory response must be complete in itself, explicit, and responsive. See, e.g., Scaife v. Boenne, 191 F.R.D. 590, 594 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (collecting cases); accord Lawman v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1140-41 (N.D. Cal. 2016); United States ex rel. O'Connell v. Chapman Univ., 245 F.R.D. 646, 650 (C.D. Cal. 2007). An interrogatory response is improper if it merely references information contained in declarations, pleadings, or other discovery responses. See, e.g., Mulero-Abreu v. Puerto Rico Police Dep't, 675 F.3d 88, 93 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Larkin, 229 F.R.D. 240, 243 (D.N.M. 2005) and Int'l Mining Co. v. Allen & Co., 567 F. Supp. 777, 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).[10] Similarly, an interrogatory response may not simply refer to the litigation record in an underlying action. See, e.g., Pham v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 193 F.R.D. 659, 663 (D. Colo. 2000). The sufficiency of an interrogatory response must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular question being asked. 8B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2177, at 81 (3d ed. Supp. 2019).

Adherence to these principles is especially critical with respect to contention interrogatories, which can be targeted at obtaining notice of an opponent's litigation position and the basis for that position. See, e.g., Nat'l Acad. of Recording Arts & Sciences, Inc. v. On Point Events, LP, 256 F.R.D. 678, 682 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (addressing various types of contention interrogatories). Failure to provide a rule-compliant response to a contention interrogatory hinders the discovering party's ability to conduct follow-up discovery and to formulate a trial strategy. See Lawman, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 1140-41 (excluding theory from summary judgment motion practice because it was not properly identified in response to contention interrogatory, which hindered the discovering party's ability to obtain follow-up discovery).

Defendant's supplemental interrogatory responses are deficient. First, the responses refer broadly to categories of trade secrets and intellectual property that Defendant “has” without identifying any particular trade secret or intellectual property that Defendant contends was stolen. Docket No. 133-2 at 75. What Defendant owns and what Defendant contends was stolen are two very different things; this aspect of the interrogatory responses is evasive of what is actually being sought by the interrogatory.[11] Moreover, the supplemental responses refer to the pleadings and papers in the previous case as “speaking for themselves” with respect to the allegedly stolen trade secrets and intellectual property. Docket No. 133-2 at 75. It is well-settled that reference to papers or pleadings in an underlying case is insufficient.

Accordingly, Defendant's supplemental responses to Interrogatories 16 and 17 are deficient and new answers must be provided.[12], [13]

*306 IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff's motion to compel is hereby GRANTED. Additional supplemental responses to Interrogatories 16 and 17 must be served by January 10, 2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED.