V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd.
V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd.
2019 WL 13157472 (D. Nev. 2019)
December 20, 2019
Koppe, Nancy J., United States Magistrate Judge
Summary
The court denied the motion to compel production of withheld documents, but ordered the Defendant to supplement the deficient privilege log entries and produce documents by January 10, 2020. The court also required the Defendant to use reasonable diligence to ensure that the information conveyed in the privilege log is accurate.
Additional Decisions
V5 TECHNOLOGIES, Plaintiff(s),
v.
SWITCH, LTD., Defendant(s)
v.
SWITCH, LTD., Defendant(s)
Case No. 2:17-cv-02349-KJD-NJK
United States District Court, D. Nevada
Filed December 20, 2019
Counsel
Bryan A. Merryman, Pro Hac Vice, Catherine S. Simonsen, White & Case LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Claire A. DeLelle, Claire L. Leonard, Pro Hac Vice, Jerry Frank Hogue, Pro Hac Vice, Celia Anne McLaughlin, Pro Hac Vice, Dana Foster, Pro Hac Vice, White and Case LLP, Washington, DC, I. Scott Bogatz, Kerry Elizabeth Kleiman, Rory Jason Reid, Reid Rubinstein and Bogatz, Las Vegas, NV, Sequoia R. Kaul, Pro Hac Vice, White & Case LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff(s).Ariel C. Johnson, Ariel C. Johnson Law, LLC, Chad Harrison, Selman Breitman LLP, Lynnel Marie Reyes, Samuel D. Castor, Switch, Ltd., Mark A. Hutchison, Cynthia Milanowski, Daniel H. Stewart, Jacob A. Reynolds, Piers R. Tueller, Shelby A. Dahl, Hutchison & Steffen, PLLC, Las Vegas, NV, Christopher LaVigne, Pro Hac Vice, Deke Shearon, Pro Hac Vice, Shearman & Sterling LLP, New York, NY, David Higbee, Pro Hac Vice, Djordje Petkoski, Pro Hac Vice, Ryan Shores, Pro Hac Vice, Todd Stenerson, Pro Hac Vice, Shearman & Sterling LLP, Washington, DC, Michael A. Wheable, Special Litigation Counsel, Ely, NV, for Defendant(s).
Koppe, Nancy J., United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER [Docket No. 132]
*1 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to compel production of withheld documents. Docket No. 132. Defendant filed a response in opposition. Docket No. 138. Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 142. The motion is properly resolved without a hearing. See Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion to compel is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
This case involves claims that Defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct with respect to high-end colocation data centers within the Las Vegas area. See Compl. (Docket No. 1) at ¶ 3. Although some state law claims are also brought, at its heart this case involves claims that Defendant's alleged conduct violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and engaging in unlawful restraints of trade. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 147-171. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unlawfully stifled competition in an effort to maintain its monopoly in high-end colocation data centers in the Las Vegas metropolitan area through a variety of means, including reliance on exclusive-dealings agreements, threats of refusals to deal, predatory pricing, and a campaign of disparagement of Defendant's competitors (including Plaintiff). See id. at ¶¶ 44, 73; see also id. at ¶¶ 95-120 (providing product and geographic market definition).
The parties are now before the Court on a dispute regarding Defendant's privilege objections and its production of a privilege log. As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the instant dispute spans approximately 31,700 documents but the briefing largely omits individualized discussion and does not provide a feasible means by which the Court could resolve all aspects of the instant dispute in a practical manner.[1] Given these circumstances and the procedural posture of the case, the Court will make a few overarching rulings that will hopefully provide guidance to eliminate or narrow the other aspects of the dispute.[2]
*2 First, the Court will deny at this juncture Plaintiff's request for an order that Defendant has waived privilege. Waiver is a harsh remedy. Moe v. Sys. Transp., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 613, 623 (D. Mont. 2010). The Ninth Circuit has rejected a per se waiver rule. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). Instead, the Ninth Circuit has instructed courts to conduct a “holistic reasonableness analysis,” including by analyzing the following factors:
(1) degree to which the privilege log enables an evaluation of the privilege (“where providing particulars typically contained in a privilege log is presumptively sufficient and boilerplate objections are presumptively insufficient”);
(2) the timeliness of the privilege log (“where service within 30 days, as a default guideline, is sufficient”);
(3) “the magnitude of the document production;” and
(4) “other particular circumstances of the litigation that make responding to discovery unusually easy ... or unusually hard.”
Carl Zeiss Vision Int'l GmbH v. Signet Armorlite Inc., Case No. 07-cv-0894-DMS (POR), 2009 WL 4642388, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2009) (discussing Burlington Northern, 408 F.3d at 1149). Par for the course in this case, the briefing is filled with accusations and counter-accusations of bad faith litigation tactics. Such bombast is not persuasive from either side. Given the voluminous nature of the document production, Defendant's efforts in conducting the document review, the production of the initial privilege log on February 13, 2019, and the production of several supplemental privilege logs thereafter, the Court finds that waiver is not warranted notwithstanding the privilege log's deficiency. Cf. USF Ins. Co. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctr., Inc., Case No. 2:10-cv-01413-RLH-LRL, 2011 WL 2457655, at *3 (D. Nev. June 16, 2011). The better approach is to require the production of a further supplemental privilege log.[3]
Second, the Court finds deficient the 24,910 privilege log entries providing a description of documents as “attorney work product, attorney client privilege, common interest/joint defense privilege for regulatory matters and compliance” or “attorney work product, attorney client privilege.” A privilege log must “describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself that is privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii). More particularly, there must be a “detailed” privilege log that sets forth for each document “(1) its type (i.e., letter, memo, notes, etc.), (2) its author, (3) its intended recipients, (4) the names of any other individuals with access to the document, (5) the date of the document, (6) the nature of the claimed privilege (i.e., attorney-client, work-product, etc.), and (7) a brief summary of the subject matter of the document.” Nevada Power Co. v. Monsanto, 151 F.R.D. 118, 121 & n.5 (D. Nev. 1993). As Plaintiff correctly notes, the entries in dispute here provide “a label, not a description” that allows for meaningful evaluation of the privilege assertion. Mot. at 21. As such, these entries are insufficient.
*3 The Court also rejects Defendant's position that it need not comply with the basics for a proper privilege log. Defendant relies on case law addressing the potential for undue burden in providing a proper privilege log when there is voluminous discovery. See Resp. at 12-13. As an initial matter, even where less detail has been allowed, the withholding party must still provide information sufficient to enable evaluation of the privilege assertion. See Burlington Northern, 408 F.3d at 1148 (“The notes also provide that, while details may be appropriate under some circumstances, there are circumstances in which they would be unduly burdensome. Still, the party must provide sufficient information to enable other parties to evaluate the applicability of the claimed privilege or protection” (emphasis added; internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted)); see also Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Case No. Civ S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2008 WL 2468492, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 17, 2008).[4] The privilege log entries at issue here do not provide sufficient information to evaluate the privilege claim. Moreover, a successful undue burden argument requires a specific factual showing of the nature and extent of the burden. See, e.g., Nationstar Mrtg., LLC v. Flamingo Trails No. 7 Landscape Maintenance Assoc., 316 F.R.D. 327, 334 (D. Nev. 2016) (citing Jackson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 173 F.R.D. 524, 529 (D. Nev. 1997) and U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Entm't, 237 F.R.D. 428, 432 (D. Nev. 2006)); see also Friedman v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., Case No. CV 06-06282 AHM (CTx), 2009 WL 10672797, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2009) (rejecting undue burden argument with respect to supplemental privilege log based on lack of factual showing). Defendant makes no such showing here.[5] Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant's assertion that it need not actually describe the withheld documents.
Third, the Court finds at least partially deficient the 6,635 privilege log entries for documents involving in-house counsel that provide a description of “[d]raft [document][6] containing attorney edits.” A privilege log may be deemed sufficient when the subject line or document title makes it plain that an attorney associated with that document was communicating in his or her legal capacity. See, e.g., Saud v. Cal., Case No. 2:14-cv-2536 GEB AC, 2016 WL 2927591, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2016). When the privilege log does not itself make that clear, the withholding party may attempt to fend off a challenge by providing a declaration from in-house counsel showing that legal advice was being provided. See Garcia, 2018 WL 6566563, at *2; see also Churchill v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., Case No. 08-99-M-DWM, 2009 WL 10656999, at *3 (D. Mont. Nov. 17, 2019). Regardless, there must be disclosure of the attorney's identity to assess the privilege claim. See, e.g., Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass'n v. Cal. Dept. of Ed., Case No. 2:11-cv-3471 KJM AC, 2017 WL 445722, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017). These disputed entries do not identify any attorney and, as such, they are defective.
Lastly, Defendant indicates its non-opposition to producing some of the documents addressed in the motion. See Resp. at 3. With respect to these documents, the motion to compel will be granted.
*4 Given the above rulings, the motion to compel is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part consistent with the above.[7] Defendant must serve a supplemental privilege log by January 10, 2020. The Court expects the supplemental privilege log to be thorough and complete so that this case can move beyond discovery issues to the merits phase. To the extent supplemental review reveals additional documents that are not privileged, those documents must be produced by January 10, 2020. The documents at issue in the unopposed portion of the motion to compel must be produced by January 10, 2020.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
The Court declines the parties’ invitations for an in camera review of the tens of thousands of documents at issue. Mot. at 29; Resp. at 2-3. An in camera review is disfavored and is not a substitute for the adversarial process. See, e.g., Garcia v. Serv. Empls. Int'l Union, Case No. 2:17-cv-01340-APG-NJK, 2018 WL 6566563, at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 6, 2018) (citing Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Rebel Oil Co., 157 F.R.D. 691, 700 (D. Nev. 1994) and Nikita, Ltd. v. Fuji Photo Film Co., 181 F.R.D. 465, 467 (D. Nev. 1998)). Moreover, an in camera review of 31,700 documents is not feasible given the competing demands on judicial resources. See Mazzeo v. Gibbons, Case No. 2:08-cv-01387-RLH-PAL, 2010 WL 3020021, *1 (D. Nev. July 27, 2010).
“[B]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). The scope of proper discovery is limited to nonprivileged matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Because this case involves a federal question, the Court applies federal law regarding attorney-client privilege. See Fed. R. Evid. 501; see also Agster v. Maricopa Cty., 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 2005) (same for pendent state law claims). The withholding party bears the burden of establishing the applicability of the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2002). One way to satisfy that burden is to produce a proper privilege log. See, e.g., Bartech Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Mobile Simple Sols, Inc., Case No. 2:15-cv-02422-MMD-NJK, 2018 WL 834589, at *6 (D. Nev. Feb. 12, 2018).
The briefing alludes to the potential for extending (or reopening) discovery deadlines to prevent any potential prejudice to Plaintiff. See, e.g., Resp. at 7. The Court expressed reluctance at further extensions given the lengthy extension allowed previously, see Docket No. 81, but nothing prevents a request for such relief from being filed. The Court would review such a request based on the information contained therein and expresses no opinion on whether it would grant such relief.
Courts are more inclined to allow a less detailed privilege log based on undue burden concerns “if the items can be described by category.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), Advisory Committee Notes (1993).
The assertion of an undue burden is somewhat puzzling since Defendant has been aware of the need to provide a description for these documents at the times it has been re-reviewing the withheld documents. See, e.g., Docket No. 132-12 at 2, 4. Indeed, Defendant represents that its attorneys are in the process of again reviewing each of the documents at issue in this dispute. See Resp. at 9. Any incremental burden seems minimal for these same attorneys to write a description of the documents that they are reviewing.
The descriptions do not say “draft document” and instead provide a more specific description. For example, the privilege log contains descriptions of “Draft Non-Disclosure Agreement with attorney edits,” “Draft Master Services Agreement with attorney edits,” “Draft Referral Agreement with attorney edits,” “Draft License Agreement with attorney edits,” and “Draft Non-Disclosure Agreement with attorney edits.” See, e.g., Docket No. 132-19 at 830.
Plaintiff argues that certain entries in the privilege log are inaccurate. See, e.g., Mot. at 21. The Court will not opine herein on the accuracy of any particular entries based on the scant presentation made. Nonetheless, the Court notes that Defendant must use reasonable diligence to ensure that the information conveyed in the privilege log is accurate.